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ABSTRACT 
 
           This dissertation, Mobile Ethnicity, examines the formation of a transnational ethnic 
working class and the dynamics of remittance development in the context of Korean Chinese 
labor migration between China and Korea. I conducted multi-sited field research for over two 
years, mainly in Seoul, South Korea, and the Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture of 
Yanbian, China, the ethnic zone bordering North Korea. My ethnography is built on a local 
saying: “Everybody is gone with the Korean Wind.” The Korean Wind is the popular name for 
the massive Korean Chinese transnational labor migration to South Korea that occurred mostly 
during the 1990s and 2000s, at the intersection of post-Cold War and post-socialist cultures. I 
especially highlight the Korean Wind as a unique product of China’s economic reform and open 
economy (gaigekaifang), which has affected not only Korean Chinese but also Han Chinese in 
Yanbian and elsewhere in the region. 
            Through the lenses of kinship, development, money, love, bodies, and time, I analyze the 
new affect and materiality, new forms of belonging and dwelling, and new hopes and frustrations 
of mobile ethnicity. On the one hand, I trace the reconstituted subjectivity of Korean Chinese as a 
particular ethnic working class in a transnational setting. On the other hand, I map the re-
characterized ethnic space of Yanbian as a borderland traversed by a myriad of different agents. 
Caught between the “Korean dream” and the “Chinese dream,” Korean Chinese have chosen 
transnational mobility as a way of dealing with the contingencies of neoliberalism and 
globalization. But their way of working for a better future has created unexpected vulnerabilities, 
sealing them into a circuit of migration as a transnational ethnic working class.  
           This ethnography illuminates the ripple effects of the Korean Wind with a focus on 
remittances, as Korean Chinese have discovered, promoted, and deployed their ethnic currency 
 v 
in the transnational labor market. On a macro level, remittances play a critical role in relocating 
populations (both pulling them into spaces and pulling them out), and create an intersection of 
internal migration and transnational migration, thereby reshaping the ethnic relationships and 
spatial characteristics of the region. I emphasize the vulnerable characteristics of a remittance-
dependent economy, which fluctuates in response to exchange rates and global economic forces. 
On a personal level, remittances are not only gifts or realizations of familial duty, but also an 
unstable form of currency requiring careful management and submission to a peculiar temporality 
of long waits and unknown futures. The life built upon the contingent flow of remittances has 
created and been impacted by the transnational temporality, constantly moving back and forth 
between the sharply split worlds; working and resting, making money and spending money, 
Korea and Yanbian. Rigid visa regulations by the Korean government especially force migrant 
workers into a “split life,” as they must weave two different worlds into a common everyday life, 
and discipline their bodies to switch easily between two different modes of time.  
   This study examines “Yanbian Socialism” that has responded to and intersected with 
the Korean Wind, a particular socialism that stresses overt expressions of the Korean Chinese 
political faith in China while acknowledging the prefecture’s cultural and economic links to 
Korea. My dissertation aims to weave together an account of the particular structure of feeling 
experienced by Korean Chinese as they are caught between confusion and hesitation, contention 
and contradiction, economic desperation and political caution. I view their constant adjustments 
and revisions as a major influence on the formation of mobile ethnicity. My work thus provides a 
new understanding of the politics of class and gender among Chinese ethnic minorities, 
articulated through transnational mobility at the intersection of post-Cold War, post-socialist, and 
neoliberal currents across and beyond East Asia. 
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PROLOGUE 
Church like a Camp : Being Vulnerable in Seoul 
 
          In July 2004, I first visited Uijuro Church in Hongjedong, a neighborhood in northern 
Seoul, in order to meet a minister named Lim Gwangbin, a leader in the pro-democracy 
movement of the 1980s. Since the military government officially came to an end and 
democratization started in 1993, however, Minister Lim’s focus shifted toward issues of social 
equality. I had not met Minister Lim in person until that day, but had heard about him from 
NGO activists and media reports as one of the leaders of the social justice movement. He had 
recently led a year-long series of demonstrations to demand the legalization of undocumented 
Korean Chinese workers and reform of the Overseas Korean Act. I expected to learn from him 
more about the stories, progress, and future of the social movement on behalf of Korean 
Chinese. My formal experience as a volunteer activist working for KIN (Korean International 
Network, a non-governmental organization that advocates for the human rights of overseas 
Koreans) gave me access to Minister Lim and members of his church and helped me quickly 
develop close ties to them.  
           During the summer, I went to the church every weekday, and attended Sunday services. 
Most of the time, I helped Minster Lim to counsel Korean Chinese workers regarding legal issues 
such as unpaid wages, industrial accidents and related insurance compensation, marriage to and 
divorce from Koreans (mostly Korean men). But the myriad problems mostly derived from their 
long undocumented status. Minister Lim wanted me to document the consultations to build an 
archive as a reference for the church, the public, and my research. The interviews I handled 
helped me grasp the circumstance in which the undocumented Korean Chinese workers had 
been situated. Many of the testimonies were impossible to listen to without shedding tears. But 
 xviii 
the stories were enlightening, teaching me about the conflict and suffering that these workers 
went through on a daily basis in what was supposed to be their putative ethnic “home” country.  
          Uijuro church was in some respects an ordinary church offering services on Sundays and 
Wednesdays for Koreans as well as Korean Chinese.1 But it was also used as a living space for 
dozens of Korean Chinese during the week. I felt, when I first entered the church, as if it were a 
camp where the fifty or sixty undocumented Korean Chinese staying there shared the space 
together but could not freely go out to work, living the “bare life” (Agamben 1998),2 exposed to 
the threat of deportation back to China. They were stuck in the church, avoiding possible arrest 
while vaguely waiting for good things to happen to them, particularly a change of policy by the 
Korean government to initiate more favorable treatment of Korean Chinese as ethnic Koreans. 
My research started with and has been built upon the heightened anxiety and tension among 
these Korean Chinese that I first witnessed at the church. Since the summer of 2004, I have 
developed, expanded, and situated my research in a transnational setting, tracing the migration 
trajectory of Korean Chinese back and forth between China and Korea as they have taken shape 
as a mobile ethnicity in conjunction with the fluctuating economic and political circumstances of the 
last two decades.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The role of Korean churches in raising a voice on behalf of undocumented Korean Chinese workers should not 
be overlooked. Ministers from the 1980s democracy movement, such as Minster Lim, turned their attention to 
human rights, and have emerged as central figures dealing with the concerns of Korean Chinese and other 
immigrant workers pouring into Korea (formerly a labor-exporting country). The ministers established centers and 
organizations for immigrant workers that offered legal services, emotional community, and shelter, while 
encouraging the workers to attend Sunday services. Christianity goes hand in hand with human rights in Korea, as 
churches press the government to change policies that work against the human rights of immigrants. Most Korean 
Chinese are not Christian, yet they assume that churches are the places for them to get help settling in an 
unfamiliar country. I became familiar with several Korean Chinese churches in and around Seoul. Whether they 
were believers or not, hundreds of Korean Chinese regularly attended church on Sunday. In this context, Minister 
Lim is only one of many ministers doing such work. But he was distinctive in the sense that he had led the year-
long demonstrations in close collaboration with the Korean Chinese Association, a community that was formed 
and maintained by Korean Chinese workers themselves with his support.  
 
2 Giorio Agamben writes, “bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something 
that is included solely through an exclusion”(Agamben 1998:11). Bare life is included in politics through exclusion, 
and yet excluded if there is no exception under the liminal condition of exclusive inclusion and inclusive exclusion.   
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*                    *                     * 
          Minister Lim and a hundred members of the Korean Chinese Association had fought together 
to press the Korean government to revise the Overseas Korean Act, sticking together through a 
live-in-demonstration for three months—from November 2003 to February 2004—in a place 
called the One Hundred Years Memorial Building of Korean Christian, located in the central part 
of Seoul. In the end the Korean government admitted that the Act was flawed and accepted the 
need for revision—although at that point it was unclear when change would actually take place. 
But, overall, it was accepted as a great victory that Minister Lim and the members of the 
Association achieved together. Whenever I visited the church in July 2004, I often heard 
recollections of their demonstration experiences from the members. “It’s hard to express in 
words how much we suffered for those three month of cold winter,” one former demonstrator 
told me. “We slept on the cold concrete floor, shared the room with dozens of other Korean 
Chinese, and ate only small amounts of distributed food, and rarely got to take a shower.” During 
the demonstration, some members got sick. Some left for work. Some returned to China, or got 
deported there. One person died in an accident. Most of them expressed how tired they were 
during the demonstration, and how frustrated they were afterwards. Since their legal status 
remained undocumented even after the demonstration, they still faced the risk of arrest and 
deportation. The Korean Chinese members of the Association moved to the church together in 
order to find a community and safety net just in case they were caught by police. The members 
treated the church as if it were a camp, a space of exception—“a hybrid of law and fact in which 
the two terms have become indistinguishable” as Agamben notes in Homo Sacer (Agamben 1998). 
During this liminal and uncertain period, the undocumented members were included but 
excluded in Korea. Inside the church, they felt safe without worrying about deportation, whereas 
 xx 
they were still vulnerable to arrest once they were outside. In effect, the church was treated as a 
zone in which the law was suspended. Until the reforms took effect and the Korean government 
clearly announced how to handle the problem of a half million undocumented Korean Chinese, 
the church continued to function as a space of exception.  
            The church was also a voluntary community for these sixty people, with a division of 
labor, and special roles for each person: cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping, boiling water, and 
so on. The members were given nicknames according to their task: “Ms. Cook” and “Mr. Boiling 
Water,” for example. Interestingly, since most of them entered Korea under pseudonyms they 
had adopted on falsified visas and passports, some Korean Chinese used two names—real and 
assumed—whereas others just used their fake names, which had come to sound more familiar to 
them than their real names. The church as a space of exception had to be reorganized to 
accommodate them. The main hall of the church was remodeled as a large dormitory. With 
separate spaces for female and male, dozens of Korean Chinese shared the hall as a sleeping place, 
unfolding their own blankets on the floor at night. During daytime, the hall served as a 
communal space where the members of the Association shared their anxious stories and sighed 
about the uncertain future. They were strangers to each other, but at the same time, they were 
friends in the same boat, undocumented and suffering from the fear of arrest. Only when money 
began to run out did some people secretively go out to work. But the irregular working schedules 
they had to adopt did not assuage their anxiety, since the income was irregular, too. The 
psychological pressure made some of the residents physically sick. But they could not afford to 
visit doctors, either. The anxiety took its toll on the little community. The members thought of 
themselves as friends and comrades, and even addressed each other in kinship terms. But 
sometimes they argued and quibbled, often about not very serious issues. The community 
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gradually dwindled as more and more had to leave to find jobs, regardless of the risk of 
deportation, but it endured until amnesty was instituted in 2005, when the remaining members 
finally scattered. Since then, I have kept in contact with some of them, and continued to follow 
their routes from Seoul to Yanbian and back. Their travelling stories are imprinted in this 
dissertation 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I am a windflower floating without direction. I have been moving back and forth, not staying 
between where the wind is coming from and where the wind is going. I have flown here and 
there, continuously remembering and forgetting, blaming and missing the other world. I 
belong to both worlds, while, at the same time, I escape from both worlds. Who am I, the one 
who has flown all around? I am the wind….  
 
Huh Ryunsoon, The Windflower 
 
One day in April 2009, I chanced to eavesdrop on a conversation between two women sitting 
next to me in a small, crowded bus from Yanji to Longjing, two cities in Yanbian, the Korean 
Chinese Autonomous Prefecture in Northeast China on the border with North Korea. The 
two women had seemingly gone a long time without seeing each other and were busy catching 
up, comparing notes on what they had done and where they had gone over the past couple of 
years. One part of their lively conversation especially caught my attention, as it reflected the 
complex trajectory of contemporary Korean Chinese culture in the context of economic 
reform in Yanbian and China at large. 
A: Where have you been? I haven’t seen you for years! I heard that you went to Russia after stopping 
your work in North Korea (Bukchosun). When did you come back? 
 
B: I came back from Russia a long time ago. After that, I went to Korea [South Korea, Hankuk]1 again. 
I’ve spent eight years working in Korea.  
 
A: Ah, really? Then you must have made a lot of money if you went both to Russia and to Korea. 
Before that you went to North Korea, too, right? 
 
B: What money (indicating she has not made much money)? I just got old and full of diseases. I wasn’t 
sure if I could keep on doing drudgery work in Korea any longer. I was thinking of staying in China 
permanently. But there’s nothing to do here! So now I’m waiting to go back to Korea again. As long as 
I work, I can make money there. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 One legacy of the Cold War in the Korean peninsula is the confusing usage of terms for “Korea.” The official 
name of North Korea in English is Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). But in Korean, the name is 
Chosun People’s Democratic Republic. Given that Chosun was not only the name of the last dynasty prior to the 
founding of modern Korea, but also a common ethnic name for Koreans, Chosun is a word widely used in China 
to indicate things related to North and South Korea. Korean Chinese commonly call North Korea North Chosun 
(Bukchosun in Korean), while referring to South Korea simply as Korea (Hankuk in Korean). North Koreans use 
the term Chosun for the Korean peninsula, and call the two countries North Chosun and South Chosun. The 
terms North Korea and South Korea are from the point of view of South Korea. 
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A: You’re a lucky one. I’ve never been to Russia, let alone Korea, even though everybody has gone there. 
Do you know what happened to Chunhua? 
 
B: She’s in Korea, too.  
 
A: She is? Everybody’s gone with the Korean Wind [Hankuk Baram]. But I don’t know if the day will 
ever come that I go to Korea. 
 
This dissertation tells the story behind a common Korean Chinese saying: “Everybody who can 
walk [any able body] is gone with the Korean Wind.” There is talk about the Korean Wind 
“whenever even two people get together,” as Yanbian people put it. The saying encapsulates 
belonging and dwelling, affect and materiality, uncertainty and futurity, all in the context of 
the collective and obsessive outflow of Korean Chinese to South Korea in the wake of the 
“opening” of China in the last two decades. Korean Chinese are descended from Koreans 
who moved to China during the colonial period or even before. They lived during the Cold 
War era as a Chinese ethnic minority forbidden from having connections to South Korea. 
My dissertation asks: what established the great Korean Chinese transnational ethnic labor 
migration of the 1990s and 2000s, or, as Korean Chinese term it, the Korean Wind? What 
can this transnational migration tell us about how ethnicity relates to mobility, and how 
ethnicity articulates with class and gender in a transnational setting? What constitutes, drives, 
and perpetuates the Korean Wind, and why did the Wind emerge when it did? Finally, in 
what way has the Korean Wind re-characterized the ethnic space of Yanbian and the 
subjectivities of the region’s people? My dissertation is a multi-sited and long-term 
transnational ethnography of the cultural logic and politico-economic principles of the 
Korean Wind. I followed the trajectory of Korean Chinese migrants back and forth between 
Yanbian and Seoul, Korea, from 2004 to 2011, including eighteen months of field work 
from June 2008 to December 2009. In the resulting study, I argue that Korean Chinese have 
fashioned a mobile ethnicity as a way of dealing with the contingencies of contemporary 
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economic restructuring. But the methods they have developed of carving out a better future 
in the current climate have themselves created unexpected vulnerabilities, sealing many 
Korean Chinese into a circuit of migration as a transnational ethnic working class. I have 
developed an ethnographic analysis of the Korean Wind as shaped by the post-Cold War 
and post-socialist in South Korea and China; in the following chapters I look at Korean 
Chinese labor migration through the lenses of kinship, development, money, love, and time.  
1. “Gone with the Korean Wind”  
            There are around two million Korean Chinese living in China nationwide, mostly 
concentrated in the northeastern provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. About 
700,000 of them, 35 percent of the total, now live in the borderland of Yanbian, an 
autonomous prefecture in southeastern Jilin province. The Korean Chinese are an ethnic 
minority group with Chinese nationality, their ancestors having crossed the Tumen River from 
the Korean peninsula in search of better farming lands beginning in the late nineteenth 
century. Later, Koreans moved to Manchuria to escape from poverty exacerbated by Japanese 
imperialism or, in in the 1930s and 1940s, to support the independence movement from 
relative safety outside of Korea. Korean Chinese in Yanbian are mostly the descendants of 
immigrants from the northern part of Korea—Hamkyungbukdo, the northeast region of the 
contemporary North Korea—who crossed over in the late nineteenth century. Most Korean 
Chinese in Yanbian still speak a dialect similar to that of Hamkyingbukdo, which is right across 
the river, and maintain the regional food culture and housing style. As the new China was 
established in 1949, and Yanbian was designated as the Korean Chinese Autonomous 
Prefecture in 1952, these descendants of Korean immigrants became Chinese nationals, 
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“proud” to be one of 55 ethnic minorities officially recognized by the Chinese government.2 
Under the stringent policies of the Cold War era, however, Korean Chinese were forbidden to 
contact or claim kinship ties to either of the two Koreas, especially South Korea, condemned 
as a colony of “devil capitalism” and “a baby of imperial America.” Things dramatically 
changed, however, as China and South Korea normalized diplomatic relations in 1992 and the 
Cold War came to an end. Korean Chinese have since developed a close relationship with 
South Korea, mostly through kinship visits and labor migration. First came recognition of 
cultural and familial ties, a sense of belonging that had been forbidden and forgotten under 
Cold War politics. Later, a persistent, even obsessive labor migration began, driven by the vast 
income gap between China and South Korea. This came to be called the Korean Wind, and it 
dominated the affect, materiality, and futurity of Korean Chinese for the next two decades.  
                As we saw in the conversation on the bus, the act of “going with the Korean Wind” 
has been widely accepted as an inevitable life phase for Korean Chinese, thereby remarking a 
rapid cultural, economic, and political transition in Yanbian. Being “gone” does not simply 
mean to disappear or leave for Korea or some other foreign countries; rather, it signifies a 
condition of living, of moving back and forth, a condition to which many Korean Chinese 
have become accustomed as a deep and essential part of their livelihood. Many wait for the 
return of family members as well as the money remitted from Korea; some wait while they 
prepare to leave for Korea or other foreign countries; some are deeply indebted due to 
multiple attempts to enter Korea through illegal and often dishonest brokers. Some consider 
the omnipresent phenomenon of “being gone” to possess a pathological force that poses an 
“ethnic crisis,” and view it as a symptom of a spreading sociological “disease.” This pathology, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Chinese ethnic minority policy is based on the notion of “plural singularity” (Mullaney 2011), which 
recognizes diversity while emphasizing the central control of the government. 
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it is said, has manifested itself in high divorce rates, deficiencies in childcare, juvenile 
delinquency, and extravagant spending of the money from Korea. Critics of the “Korean 
dream” believe that these “disease” factors threaten the stable, sustained ethnic community of 
Yanbian by “contaminating” the ethnic consciousness of Korean Chinese with capitalism, 
creating within them a relentless desire to pursue “money-money” (don-don in Korean, a common 
Yanbian term). The Korean Wind has imprinted its influence on every corner of Korean 
Chinese society for the last twenty years.  
           In this turbulent context, the concept of wind (baram in Korean) began to be circulated 
with multi-layered connotations in conjunction with the shifting politico-economic 
circumstances of the early 1990s—the beginning of the post-Cold War and post-socialist era. 
First, the Korean Wind emerged as a new fashion among Korean Chinese as part of the new 
political environment. The circumstances of the Cold War, in particular, the Cultural 
Revolution, had been the primary condition that formulated Korean Chinese as part of the 
socialist Chinese nationality by nearly eradicating their ethnic culture and identity. Korean 
Chinese were redefined as part of the Chinese ethnic group of chauxianzu, and were no longer 
considered ethnic Koreans with legitimate emotional and political attachments to North and 
South Korea (see chapter 5). The political normalization between China and Korea in 1992, 
however, enabled Korean Chinese to forge new connections to South Korea. Kinship ties to 
North Korea, which are much more common among Yanbian Korean Chinese, were 
gradually obscured as bogus kinship ties to South Korea were created through fake marriages 
and illegal visa brokers (chapter 1). As a result, the reconnection with South Korea raised 
critical questions of belonging; how should Korean Chinese situate their ethnicity and identity 
across several borders, between China, North Korea, and South Korea?  
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               Second, in a more rhetorical sense, the “wind” could be, as in the passage from the 
Korean Chinese writer Huh Ryunsoon quoted at the beginning, a metaphor that represents 
the floating subjectivity of Korean Chinese as aimless, rootless, nomadic subjects, without 
clear belonging to any world. The Korean word for wind, baram, indicates not only the flow of 
air, but also the fashions and collective obsessions shared by a society during a certain period 
of time. In the latter sense, baram could cause people to “flow” in a certain direction, and 
sometimes people can get lost within the flow. Thus, baram structures a vague feeling of the 
specific moment in a given place, as well as creating a shared temporality that influences the 
attitudes and actions of contemporaries. Korean Chinese have used the term Korean Wind 
(Hankuk Baram) as a vivid expression of the collective obsession with and pervasive desire for 
the Korean dream, the dream that Korean Chinese have pursued in the transnational labor 
migration to South Korea by taking advantage of the vast income gap between China and 
Korea as well as their ethnic affinity with Koreans. For the last two decades, the Korean Wind 
has been at once a condition of hope for the future and a destructive power that threatens to 
dissolve old ties. The Korean Wind has been the decisive element in the creation of a new 
subjectivity for Korean Chinese, as a mobile ethnicity in the newly rising China. And yet, the 
wind did not blow in Yanbian until the diplomatic normalization between China and South 
Korea in 1992 signaling the wane of Cold War politics and the waxing of Chinese post-
socialism. 
*                    *                   * 
             I hope to accomplish four goals with this dissertation. First, Mobile Ethnicity tells the 
story of the emergence, pervasion, and perpetuation of Korean Chinese transnational 
migration—the Korean Wind—ethnographically. By illustrating the detailed process of 
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reconnection between Korean Chinese and South Korea, a long-forbidden homeland, I 
analyze how Korean Chinese ethnicity, repressed in China during the Cold War, has been 
revived, promoted, and transformed into a form of currency that enabled Korean Chinese to 
enter the transnational labor market. I do not simply suggest that the authentic characteristics 
of Korean Chinese ethnicity or ethnic similarity to Koreans enabled Korean Chinese to wield 
competitive power or use their ethnic currency in the Korean labor market. Rather, I want to 
argue that the particular relationality of Korean Chinese to Korea—their status as almost Korean, 
but not quite—is precisely what has created Korean Chinese niche in the Korean economy. I 
will show how Korean Chinese have performed their peculiar ethnic relationality by focusing 
on the process of entry into and adjustment to South Korea—the newly rising homeland as a 
market place. Here, I aim to extend the theory of ethnicity by drawing on theories of 
“articulation” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985) and “performativity” (Butler 1993). I focus on the ways 
in which the Korean Chinese performance of ethnicity articulates with gender and class, as in 
fake marriages to Koreans, or how Korean Chinese workers, through their ethnic currency, 
have made themselves suitable as cheap workers in particular service sectors in Korea. As 
Korean Chinese migrants have performed their constantly unsettled ethnicity, I argue, they 
have shaped their labor migration into a site of value production and identity articulation, and 
have remade themselves into a transnational ethnic working class.  
            Second, I explore the flip side of the ethnicity that serves as currency in the 
transnational labor market by looking into the exacerbated vulnerability of Korean Chinese 
migrants once they have entered the circuit of transnational migration. I examine this 
vulnerability on two levels. First, Korean Chinese migrant workers have been subject to 
frequent and unpredictable legal changes imposed by the Korean government. Most Korean 
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Chinese who remained undocumented were granted amnesty in 2007, under a new regulation 
actually aimed at preventing Korean Chinese from permanently settling in Korea (chapter 4). 
Under the new law, Korean Chinese migrants can only stay in Korea for a limited number of 
consecutive years; they are required to return to China every couple of years. As a result, a 
spatial split has opened up, as Korean Chinese view Korea as a place of work and China as a 
place of resting, and waiting. During the “resting” period in China, migrant laborers generally 
make no money.  They can only spend, as anxiety about unstable financial status rises. In 
addition, Korean Chinese migrants have in recent years come to feel that they have missed out 
on the Chinese boom and are lagging behind those who never left to work in Korea (chapter 
6). The mobility of Korean Chinese, constrained by visa regulations, has aggravated their 
vulnerability, although migration was originally supposed to help them attain economic 
betterment and stability. My observations have been made mostly on the micro level, by 
looking into the lives of those who are waiting for remittances, for the return of family 
members, for the opportunity to go to Korea. They are supposed to maintain the household 
and care for the money sent back by their partners, and yet, the long wait is not always 
rewarded—partners can be unfaithful or unreliable, remittances may stop (chapter 3). Those 
who are waiting to leave for Korea tend to stop working in Yanbian, as they often have to be 
ready to pick up and go on a moment’s notice. Exploring the liminal temporality of waiting that 
has dominated Korean Chinese everyday life and the region of Yanbian, I argue that the body, 
time, money, and future of Korean Chinese migrants are subordinated to a constantly 
fluctuating transnational time—I call it split time—along with the emergence of new visa 
regulations and global economic circumstances.  
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         Third, I aim to analyze the adaptation and appropriation of remittance development, 
driven by the incessant flow of money from Korea and conditioned by transnational 
temporality. Remittance development has induced rapid urbanization, bringing rural Korean 
Chinese to cities. It has also reshaped the ethnic composition of the region as Han Chinese 
migrants have flocked into the city of Yanji in order to serve the thriving leisure industry—
karaoke, sauna, and massage—and into the Yanbian countryside, which is being vacated by 
the outflow of Korean Chinese to the cities and to Korea. The flow of remittances has 
fundamentally restructured the landscape and ethnic relationships of Yanbian in two respects. 
First, any remittance-dependent economy is vulnerable to factors such as currency rates and 
international economic conditions, regardless of the work ethic of individuals, or their 
strength of purpose, as evinced by what happened when the global financial crisis hit the 
Korean Chinese labor market in 2008 and 2009 (chapter 6). I aim to illuminate how 
remittance-dependent development is neither stable nor predictable, given the fluctuations of 
the global economy. Second, remittance development has shaped a new ethnic 
interdependency between Han Chinese and Korean Chinese, despite the long ethnic 
separations of the region. Han Chinese do not remain unaffected by the dramatic social 
changes generated by the Korean Wind, being a critical part of remittance development as 
investors as well as service workers. The growing ethnic interdependency can help us situate 
the Korean Wind as a transnational economic drive to reconfigure the ethnic and urban 
landscape across and beyond Yanbian—the Korean Wind is about more than just Korean 
Chinese migration. 
               Fourth, I examine the intersection of Chinese socialism (specifically “Yanbian 
socialism”) and the Korean Wind. In response to the current economic development and 
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social shift conditioned by the Korean Wind, how do Korean Chinese socialist subjects 
understand at once an economic achievement that is strongly linked to South Korea, the 
previously forbidden “enemy” homeland, and the rapid development of the modern Chinese 
economy, led by the Communist Party? How do they situate and make sense of these two 
different and somewhat conflicting, but intertwined, sources for Yanbian’s economic 
development? Attempting to answer these questions, I unravel two distinct Korean Chinese 
responses to the Korean Wind (chapter 5). On the one hand, many Korean Chinese have 
viewed and pursued the Korean Wind in solely economic terms, foregrounding their Korean 
ethnicity as a transnational currency. On the other hand, other Korean Chinese, especially 
dedicated socialists, view their ethnic position in mostly political terms, expressing their deep 
loyalty to the state of China and the Communist Party instead of interpreting Korean Chinese 
identity as a transnational construction. I pay attention to this seemingly unambiguous split 
response to the Korean Wind, and the ways in which Korean Chinese situate their ethnicity 
between economic and political terms. I argue that vigilance and self-censorship on the issue 
of ethnicity characterize Korean Chinese as an ethnic minority that deals with multiple modes 
of belonging—to Korea and to China—in distinct ways. 
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2. The Overseas Korean Act: Governing the Korean Diaspora 
The problem is discrimination against Korean Chinese by the Korean government. Korean 
Americans and Korean Japanese are free to enter Korea. Why should the Korean government 
limit Korean Chinese? It’s because they are well off whereas we are poor—isn’t it? Unlike 
Koreans who left Korea during the 1970s and 1980s, we Korean Chinese are descendants of 
those who left the Korean peninsula to live a better life or to protect ourselves when we lost 
our country or to pursue the anti-Japanese movement in the fight for independence. How can 
Korea discriminate against Korean Chinese simply because we are poor?  
 
Huh Ryunsoon, The Windflower (148) 
 
2.1 The Conditions of the Act 
 
               The Overseas Korean Act was passed in 1999. It defined who belonged to the 
category of the “Overseas Korean” and what benefits they would get in the “home” country, 
benefits that included free entry and the ability to stay up to two years without a visa, medical 
insurance, property ownership, and favorable conditions for capital investment. The Act 
granted a sort of quasi-citizenship to overseas Koreans by providing almost the same rights as 
Korean citizens could enjoy (Park and Chang 2005). The category of the Overseas Korean, 
however, was limited to Korean citizens who had lived in foreign countries, along with former 
Korean citizens and their descendants. Since “Korea” was established as a modern nation 
state in 1948, “Korean” citizenship only came into being at that time, and consequently certain 
groups of overseas Koreans—Korean Chinese, Korean Russians and Koreans in Japan who 
left the Korean peninsula during the colonial period (1909-1945) before Korea was established 
in 1948—were excluded from the definition of “Overseas Korean.” 
                 In order to provide a better understanding of the background from which the 
Overseas Korean Act emerged, let me briefly outline the history of Korean migration here. 
Starting in the late nineteenth century, Koreans began to migrate to China or Russia as 
seasonal farmers and traders. During the colonial period under imperial Japanese rule (1919-
45), many Koreans chose, or were forced, to work in Japan or in Japanese-occupied northeast 
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China (Lim 2002; Park 2006; Seol and Skrentny 2004). Their descendants in China, Russia, 
and Japan constitute the majority of the Overseas Korean population, numbering about three 
and half a million out of a total, worldwide Korean diaspora of six million. When colonial 
Chosun achieved independence from Japan in 1945, many of these dispersed Koreans 
returned to Korea, but some did not, either due to the Korean War or because they were 
already well-settled in their host countries (Kim 2009).  
                Beginning in the 1950s, the South Korean government was focused on rebuilding a 
new country from the ruin of the Korean War. Modernization projects enabled rapid 
economic development during the 1960s and 1970s. During this compressed period of 
development, labor exports played a critical role in the dramatic rise of the South Korean 
economy (Athukorala and Manning 1999). Perhaps most importantly, the Korean government 
promoted the transfer of Korean nurses and miners to Germany and Korean construction 
workers to the Middle East from the 1960s to the 1980s. Remittances from these Korean 
emigrants contributed significantly to Korean economic development and the prosperity of 
individual households. 
                By the 1980s, however, the situation had changed dramatically, as South Korea had 
joined Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan as one of the dragons—Asian countries that 
achieved rapid economic development led by strong and in most cases authoritarian states. 
Korea became a net importer rather than a net exporter of labor. In the early 1990s, the 
Korean labor market even started suffering from labor shortages, especially in manufacturing. 
As the wages of Korean workers skyrocketed, the search for cheap labor became more 
important in the struggle for competitive market power (Han 2003). In addition to declining 
fertility rates, the expansion of the service sector, and the improving education level of the 
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overall population, younger Koreans come to prefer to work in white-collar jobs rather than in 
manufacturing (Athukorala and Manning 1999). 
               In order to resolve this critical labor shortage, the Korean government devised ways 
to import migrant workers with programs such as the Industrial Technical Training Program 
(ITTP), which supplied the manufacturing sector with trainees from South and South East 
Asia as cheap labor. Entering Korea as trainees, migrant workers sometimes have to depend 
on brokers who are involved in the illegal migration market. The trainees in the ITTP are 
regarded not as “workers” because they only stay in Korea temporarily to get trained in 
manufacturing, although their workload is as heavy as or even heavier than that of regular 
workers. Korean law does not allow these trainees to have “regular” jobs and prevents them 
from permanently staying in Korea. Because of harsh labor conditions and extremely low 
wages in the manufacturing sector, trainees often escaped from their workplace, and became 
undocumented migrant workers. 
                A large number of migrants other than trainees have also come to Korea to work. 
But the quotas on these workers are much smaller than the number of people who want to 
enter Korea, and as a result, most migrant workers entered Korea through illegal means. Of 
these immigrants, Korean Chinese have emerged as the most competitive group in the labor 
market, dominating construction and the service sector. Their advantage comes from their 
geographical proximity and cultural Korean-ness, and the fact that they speak Korean. The 
sharp surge of undocumented Korean Chinese immigrants into Korea alarmed the Korean 
government, thus Korean Chinese were banned from having the right to permanent or long-
term residence, even as they continued to flood the labor market.  
 
 14 
2.2 Neoliberal Korea 
               Rising labor migration to Korea should be understood alongside a major shift in the 
Korean economy as a result of a newly flexible regime of accumulation (Harvey 1991)3 and 
economic restructuring among East Asian countries. The “four dragons”—Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea—undertook a high-speed, compressed course of 
development through manufacturing and export-oriented economies in the 1980s (Chow 2002; 
Athukorala and Manning 1999). But as these countries made a gradual shift to the information 
technology and service industries in the 1990s, the Korean economy began to transplant its 
manufacturing to China and other Asian countries in search of cheaper labor, while 
promulgating the gospels of globalization (segewha) and the information society (Samuel Kim 
2000). In the midst of this rapid shift, the Korean government intensively highlighted labor 
flexibility and creativity, and mobilized informationalization and venture capital (Song 2009), a 
combination that came to characterize Korean neoliberalism—that is, an ideology of 
aggressive self-improvement exposed to unlimited competition (Seo 2009).  
         The financial crisis in 1997 was a turning point that accelerated the spread of neoliberalism 
in South Korea. During this period, the country underwent rigorous structural adjustments 
mandated by the IMF. Such structural adjustments were based on neoliberal economic models 
that emphasized labor flexibility, resulting in soaring numbers of irregular workers. Additionally, 
as part of the agreement with the IMF, Korea was required to increase economic transparency in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In The Condition of Postmodernity, Harvey argues that Fordism is not simply a system of mass production but a total 
way of life (125) based on the principles of scientific management. It aims to maximize labor productivity by 
breaking down each process into component motions and organizing fragmented work tasks according to 
standardized time and space. Mass production has become a disciplinary regime that coerces people into an 
unprecedented, high-speed rhythm of life and production. However, Fordism faltered in the face of market rigidity 
and government control, leading to the restructuring of labor markets in the interest of greater flexibility and a 
faster pace. The transition of the regime of accumulation from rigidity to flexibility has resulted in increasing 
geographical mobility, deindustrialization, and devaluation of labor power. In addition, increasing flexibility and 
mobility have exacerbated the precariousness of life due to a failure to guarantee stable, long-term employment 
(Hardt & Negri 2004). 
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order to facilitate the opening of its markets to foreign companies (Lim and Hwang 2002). The 
IMF sought market-centered policies by minimizing the government’s control over the economy 
(Stiglitz 2003). Less successful companies were merged into bigger corporations, and many 
people were fired without any safety net. Social services shrank and poverty levels and the 
number of homeless surged in the late 1990s (Song 2009). 
             The Korean government’s response to the social problems caused by IMF policies was 
to pursue a number of structural reforms to attract foreign capital. The Overseas Korean Act 
emerged as one of these reforms. The Korean government announced the rationale for the Act 
as following: “We,” as “global Korea,” should secure the free entry, residence, and business 
activity of diasporic Koreans by recognizing overseas Koreans, not by ethnicity or blood, but by 
nationality—that is, citizenship (Park and Chang 2005; Seol 2002; Seol and Skrenty 2009). 
Therefore, the Overseas Korean Act ended up embracing whoever had or used to have “Korean” 
citizenship, a status that only came into existence in 1948, which resulted in the exclusion of large 
numbers of overseas Koreans in China, Japan, and Russia.  
            From the beginning, an Act that denied “blood” ethnic ties could not avoid critiques of 
its arbitrary inclusions and selective exclusions, which had resulted in a sense of “hierarchical 
nationality” (Seol & Skrenty 2009). “Rich cousins” from the United States and Japan were 
included, but not “poor cousins” from China and the former Soviet Union (Park & Chang 2005). 
The disparate treatment of overseas Koreans depending on their host countries threatened 
Korean ethnic nationalism and its sense of the “one-ness” and homogeneity of Korean ethnicity 
(Shin 2006). The Act was especially impactful on the legal status of Korean Chinese. Korean 
Chinese had moved to China (Manchuria back then) during the colonial period (1909-1945) or 
even before, and they were granted citizenship after the People’s Republic of China was 
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established in 1949. By the 1990s the two million Korean Chinese constituted a plurality of the 
six million overseas Korean worldwide, and began to enter the low-end, manual labor market as 
the largest single immigrant group. But they were not recognized under the Overseas Korean Act, 
so most of these Korean Chinese immigrants ended up overstaying as undocumented workers. 
The Korean government found it impossible to control the increasing number of undocumented 
Korean Chinese workers, and it gradually became a critical social issue.  
           A discourse of Korean ethnic solidarity became the dominant counter-argument against 
the Act, the one on which Korean Chinese themselves, NGO activists, and the churches 
increasingly focused. These groups insisted on colonial history and the Cold War context as 
critical factors in understanding the history of the Korean diaspora. They began to tell the 
personal and family histories of individual Korean Chinese to demonstrate their close kinship ties 
to Korea that were disrupted due to the Korean War and the Cold War.4 The stories varied: the 
ancestors of some Korean Chinese had been forced to go to Manchuria to escape severe poverty, 
which worsened under Japanese imperialism; others actively fought the Japanese in the cause of 
an independent Korea; some had wished to return to Korea but were prevented by the Korean 
War, and yearned for their homeland until they died. In the discourse of Korean ethnic solidarity, 
Korean Chinese retained their rich history of colonialism and the Cold War, while at the same 
time they began to appear as socialist subjects who were counter-posed in various ways to 
Koreans living under capitalism and democracy. South Koreans had heard little about Korean 
Chinese people or culture until the diplomatic normalization between China and Korea in 1992, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In fact, the Korean government did begin to recognize the descendants of ancestors who had participated in the 
independent movement against Japanese imperialism. Once they had proved their status as descendants, they were 
eligible for monetary compensation from the Korean government, and were given the right to Korean citizenship. 
In order to prove their eligibility for this recognition, applicants had to testify about their personal and family 
history, and were sometimes required to provide DNA evidence.  
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as communist China (Zhonggong) was something of a taboo subject under the anti-communist 
cultural and political environment of the so-called “red complex.”  
             The Korean government had its own reasons for excluding Korean Chinese from the 
Overseas Korean Act.5 The first stemmed from the fact that the Chinese government insisted 
that Korean Chinese be recognized as Chinese. Since neither China nor Korea granted dual 
citizenship to their people, the Chinese government was concerned that the Act could work as 
the medium through which Korean Chinese could convert their citizenship into Korean. The 
political concern is additionally related to the rumor for the ethnic dependence. China was also 
worried that the geographical proximity and close ethnic ties between Yanbian and the Korean 
peninsula could lead Korean Chinese to demand some form of independence. Second, the 
Korean government was concerned that covering the floating population of Korean Chinese 
under the Overseas Korean Act would flood the Korean labor market with too much cheap labor, 
even though undocumented Korean Chinese workers already comprised a majority of the 
migrant workers in South Korea. And third, Korean Chinese suffered from aftereffects of the 
Cold War. Along with Korean Chinese, Korean Russians and Korean Japanese who were 
especially associated with North Korea were also excluded from the Act. It was feared that 
overseas Koreans with socialist affiliations could be a threat if they were granted unlimited free 
entry. Even as Cold War politics seemed to be coming to an end, its legacy remained in this 
policy of differently treating the people of the Korean diaspora depending on their host states.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In a setting of migration, citizenship is understood beyond the legal rights and obligations. The 
inclusion/exclusion of immigrants as a member of a certain society is based on a set of “imagined qualities desired 
of citizen” (Ngai 2004) and “imaginary symbolic citizenship” that the nation state identify the ideal citizen 
(Friedman 2006). The contention surrounded by the imaginary desired citizen is also revealed in a reunion of the 
same ethnic people such as in the case of reunion between mainlander Chinese and Hong Kong 
people(Newendrop 2008), and Japanese and returning Japanese(mainly from Brazil)(Tsuda 2003). The identity of 
Korean Chinese is understood on the basis of “lack” of the ideal Korean-ness as I illustrate in Introduction.  
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            Although the Korean government has never been explicit about its reasons for the 
selective exclusion of some overseas Koreans, the stakes were high, and the impact was far-
reaching. The Act stimulated heated political debate and demonstrations by human rights 
activists and churches that advocated the embrace of Korean Chinese as fellow Koreans. These 
groups raised their voices in support of revising the Overseas Korean Act, insisting the Korean 
government should not exclude and discriminate against Korean Chinese. Their position is 
expressed in the novel Windflower: “The problem is the discrimination against Korean Chinese by 
the Korean government. Korean Americans and Korean Japanese are free to enter Korea. Why 
should the Korean government limit Korean Chinese? It’s because they are well off whereas we 
are poor--isn’t it?” 
2.3 After Amnesty (H-2 Visa): Back and Forth 
             In 2004, the Korean Constitutional Court eventually found the Overseas Korean Act to 
be unconstitutional because it unjustly discriminated against some overseas Koreans on the basis 
of their host states and economic potential. The Overseas Korean Act was rewritten to include 
those who had previously excluded, granting the same rights to all overseas Koreans (through the 
F-4 visa)—except those who engage in simple physical labor, the kind of work that most Korean 
Chinese did. As a result, Korean Chinese who worked in the service and construction sectors 
could not take advantage of the F-4 visa, which allowed free entry and long stays in Korea. 
Instead, beginning in 2005 the Korean government addressed these Korean Chinese workers 
separately, through the regulation of the H-2 visa, the Overseas Korean Visit-Work Visa. 
Although this visa was designed for any overseas Koreans in low-skill jobs, in practice, it has 
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been used mostly by Korean Chinese and Koreans from the former Soviet Union.6 The visa is 
effective for only five years and renewal is not automatic. 
           Here, I would like to highlight the impact of the revised Overseas Korean Act and the 
initiation of the H-2 visa—the “visit-work visa”—in two respects (see chapter 4 for a more 
detailed consideration). First, the H-2 visa was devised for Korean Chinese as a form of amnesty, 
a way to rescue the half-million undocumented Korean Chinese in South Korea. In order to 
qualify for this amnesty, however, Korean Chinese workers have to leave Korea and stay in China 
for a year before they can return to Korea, this time being allowed to work for three years. After 
those three years, they must leave Korea again until the visa expires and they have to apply again. 
The visa allows Korean Chinese to work in Korea legally, but only for three years at a time. 
Regardless of this limitation, however, Korean Chinese migrant workers are no longer invisible, 
undocumented workers beyond the Korean government’s reach—they are officially recognized 
as an ethnic population governed under special visa regulations. This new inclusion has enabled 
the government to track and predict the levels and patterns of Korean Chinese migration in and 
out of South Korea. Korean Chinese migration becomes a matter of population regulation, which 
treats immigrants as coded and numbered beings in a form of bio-politics of population 
(Foucault 2007) or “governmentality, that is, the disposition of men and things” (Foucault 1991).7 
The governance of the Korean Chinese labor population no longer consists of relentlessly 
tracking down and deporting the undocumented, but rather subtly controlling and ordering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to the statistics announced by the Korean government, the total number of foreign nationals is 
1,409,577(as of August 2012) and 40%(570,158) of the population is Korean Chinese. Of this, those who have 
acquired the Korean citizenship are 68,012. The foreign nationals who purpose to work in Korea are 588,944. 
Korean Chinese (having H-2 visa) are 295, 604, which is more than half of the foreigners working in Korea.	  	  
 
7  In “Security, Territory, Population,” Foucault points out that the abstract governing of population is based on 
an eradicated individual subjectivity, arguing that “[p]opulation is not a collection of juridical subjects in an 
individual or collective relationship with a sovereign will. It is a set of elements in which we can note constants 
and regularities	  even in accidents, in which we can identify the universal of desire regularly producing the benefit 
of all, and with regard to which we can identify a number of modifiable variable on which it depends” (79). 
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individuals into specific visa categories (H-2 or F-4), which determine how long they are allowed 
to work in what fields. Most importantly, the foreign identification provided to these 
documented Korean Chinese when they are granted H-2 visas constitutes symbolic proof that 
they are a special group of overseas Koreans. That is, Korean Chinese are now governed as 
legitimate foreigners working in their ethnic homeland.  
          This special condition leads to the second point. The new visa regulations for overseas 
Koreans have resulted in a sharp division and different treatment of overseas Korean according 
to the kind of visas they hold—F-4 for those who work in professional and business fields, and 
H-2 for unskilled laborers. The holders of H-2 visas became, in effect, officially recognized as a 
special migrant class who are allowed to work only in fields designated as simple, physical labor.8 
This articulation of ethnicity with migrant status and working-class subjectivity culminates in the 
enactment and implementation of the H-2 visa, which integrates Korean Chinese into the Korean 
labor market as a transnational ethnic working class, or, as I also call it, the “Korean Chinese 
migrant class.” I argue that the formation of a Korean Chinese migrant working class was 
solidified by the visa regulations of the Korean government. The official distinction of Korean 
Chinese as migrant working class has in turn reinforced discrimination toward Korean Chinese—
not only in the labor market but also in Korean society in general. The national mark of “China,” 
carved in the very term Korean Chinese, stamps a strong migrant working-class subjectivity on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Louis Althusser articulates the way that capitalism has been inevitably 
reproduced through the reproduction of state apparatuses and a certain subject formation. Here, the role of 
ideology is crucial in constituting individual into subjects; “all ideology hails and interpellates concrete individuals 
as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject…. I shall suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or 
‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals, or ‘transforms’ the individuals into 
subjects by that very precise operation that I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the 
lines of the most commonplace every police hailing: ‘ Hey, you there!”(1971(2001): 117-118). The distinctive 
categorization of Korean Chinese as a working class subject (by the Korean government) enables the Korean labor 
market to rely on a cheaper pool of labor force of Korean Chinese. It leads to reinforce the national/ethnic 
hierarchy and keep the labor cost low.  
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Korean Chinese that in some ways supersedes the Korean ethnic identity of Korean Chinese. 
Drawing on the exclusive inclusion and inclusive exclusion that Korean Chinese have confronted 
in the transnational labor market, my dissertation archives the repetitive travels back and forth 
between Korea and China, China and Korea, imposed by visa regulations. Since 2005,9 the bodies, 
money, time, labor, and futures of Korean Chinese migrant workers have been tightly governed 
by the temporality set by the H-2 visa, or, as I call it, the rhythm of circulation that has split 
Korean Chinese lives between two worlds (Chapter 4).  Korean Chinese have become free to 
move, yet also trapped within the circuit of transnational migration (chapter 6).  
2.4 Becoming a Transnational Ethnic Working Class 
            The content, intention, and timing of the Overseas Korean Act (which codified the F-4 
visa) and the Overseas Korean Work-Visit Visa (or H-2 visa) reflect a particular historical 
entanglement with Korean neoliberalism. These laws demonstrate how “global Korea” has 
interpreted and situated the concept of “ethnicity” and built colonial history and Cold War 
politics into the logic of neoliberalism. These laws are the epitome of neoliberal governmentality, 
distinguishing deserving overseas Koreans from non-deserving ones on the basis of the market 
potential that each national group is able to generate (Ong 1999; 2006). As Comaroff and 
Comaroff argue, “ethnicity has its origins in the asymmetric incorporation of structurally 
dissimilar groupings into a single political economy” (1992); each group of overseas Koreans has 
encountered the homeland of Korea with a different political orientation and economic potential, 
and each has thereby been dissimilarly treated by the homeland. The Korean government also 
disparately treats each group based on the different kinds of ethnic currency they generate, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In Migrants for Export (2010), Robyn Magalit Rodriguez demonstrates how the Philippine state has systematically 
brokered its own people to the world as migrant workers. While the government plays a leading role in controlling 
and exporting the migration in the case of Philippine case, the state of China and Korea have not actively engaged 
the process of migration, the migration that has been expanded by illegal brokers, by manipulating kinship, 
marriages, and work visa.  
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range from providing investment capital to teaching English to providing cheap labor. In this 
special topography of the Korean diaspora, Korean Chinese become exclusively viewed as a 
migrant working class on the basis of their particular in-between-ness, their status as almost Korean, 
but not quite, the gap between their Korean-ness and their Korean Chinese-ness.  
              This asymmetrical affiliation to the homeland hinges on the Cold War ideologies and 
politics that still dominate the politics and consciousness of Korean society. The Overseas 
Korean Act initially excluded Korean diasporic groups with socialist associations, regardless of 
their colonial and Cold War histories; these included ethnic Koreans in China, Russia, and Japan 
(those who supported and were supported by North Korea). The Korean government construed 
these socialist legacies not only as a threat to a Korean society that had long been intimidated by 
the “red complex,” but also as a troublesome association with the media image of dreary, 
poverty-stricken, and totalitarian socialist countries. In the midst of the ongoing Cold War 
politics of the Korean peninsula, Korean Chinese were still seen as “socialist subjects,” a 
subjectivity that reinforced their ethnic currency as cheap and disposable migrant ethnic workers 
coming from “poor,” “socialist” China.              
             Korean visa regulations show the way that ethnicity works in both economic and 
political terms. Despite the long history of Korean diaspora, the Korean government did not 
enact the Overseas Korean Act until 1999 when the Korean economy was suffering from 
economic restructuring. In the Act, Korean ethnicity is expressed as a bridge of emotional 
belonging to and political association with the homeland, as an “imagined community” conceived 
as a, horizontal comradeship “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail” 
(Anderson 2006:7). Ethnic membership facilitates group formation as part of global Korea 
through ethnic imagination—a “political artificiality” and “ethnic fiction” in Weber’s term 
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(Sollors 1996:55; Weber 1922)—with something like quasi-citizenship granted to overseas 
Koreans in the form of the F-4 visa. Yet, as seen in the differentiated and discriminatory granting 
of this quasi-citizenship on the basis of host states, overseas Koreans come to have dissimilar 
affiliations with and different imaginations of the homeland. For example, a young Korean 
American might imagine Korea as a place to make money by teaching English, whereas middle-
aged Korean Chinese might relate to Korea as a place of harsh discrimination and low-end 
physical labor. The Act emerges as an expression of the neoliberal governmentality that the 
Korean government claims to advocate, emphasizing the market value and economic potential of 
each overseas Korean. In other words, the Act does not simply channel each overseas Koreans to 
Korea as a homeland, but serves as a force that governs lives and futures, especially for Korean 
Chinese who stayed undocumented partly due to the exclusion from it.  
            Both the Act that excluded Korean Chinese and the H-2 visa that aims to include Korean 
Chinese as migrant workers have reinforced their vulnerability, economically as well as politically, 
forming them into a transnational ethnic working class subject to the fluctuations of visa laws. 
Yet Korean Chinese are vulnerable not only in Korea, but also in a rapidly privatizing and 
increasingly neoliberal China, as I discuss at length in later chapters. With respect to Korean 
Chinese vulnerability, two fundamental themes need more discussion. First, the particular 
currency attached to Korean Chinese ethnicity has been rejuvenated, deployed, and promoted by 
the transnational labor market as well as by themselves. Second, the short-term temporality 
imposed by visa regulations has shaped the bodies, economic fortunes, and futurities of Korean 
Chinese transnational workers and their families.  
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3. The Formation of Mobile Ethnicity 
3.1 The Currency of Ethnicity  
             During the field research, I often observed Korean Chinese branding themselves as a 
mobile ethnicity by using multiple metaphors on the basis of their long migration history, 
referring to themselves as the wind (baram in Korean)the nomads (ddeodori in Korean), the 
rootless (bucho in Korean) and the border-crossers (guojing minzhu in Chinese). Chinese economic 
reforms encouraged Korean Chinese to become more mobile, many of them moving to larger 
Chinese cities and foreign countries (mainly Russia and North Korea) in search of better 
prospects (chapter 1). The Korean Wind was the most influential wind that unsettled Korean 
Chinese in conjunction with the transnational labor market. In this process, Korean Chinese have 
ended up performing their ethnicity in a certain way by meeting the expectation of the 
transnational market (Chapter 4). Most of all, the new institutions and new responsibilities 
generated by neoliberal governmentality both in China and Korea have rapidly challenged the 
limited identity of Korean Chinese as inhabitants of an ethnic zone on the margin of China 
(chapters 1, 2, and 5). Going beyond this parochial ethnic status, Korean Chinese migration 
stories tell us about the peculiar role and multiple forms of ethnicity they have adopted to 
generate a special currency and value in the post-Cold War and post-socialist era.  
             Even though I aim to overcome the view of ethnicity as a biological and cultural marker 
that demarcates the inclusion and exclusion of social groups, I do not mean to dismiss the 
complexity and elusiveness of the concept as a quintessential part of identity. Ethnic boundaries 
are maintained and reinforced through exclusion of and interaction with other groups (Barth 
1969); ethnicity is confined to “named human populations with shared ancestry myth, histories, 
and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity”(Smith 2001); 
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ethnicity can function both as a term of exclusion, a clear boundary marker keeping out certain 
groups, and as a term of inclusion, aimed at removing boundaries and discrimination against 
othered groups (Chow 2002:25). 
             Drawing on these studies of ethnicity as a medium of identity formulation through 
boundary making, I push my interest toward how the differences and boundaries constituted by 
ethnicity have intertwined with the emergence of a neoliberal global economy and related politics. 
In other words, I aim to relate mobile ethnicity to conversations about ethnicity as a site of 
“value production” (Comaroff & Comaroff 2009:4) and “cultural currency” (Catelino 2008). 
Recent studies have started conceptualizing the “identity industry,” “Ethnicity Inc,” (Comaroff & 
Comaroff 2009), “ethno-enterprisez” (Catelino 2004,2008), “natural economic groups” (Dirlik 
2000:129), and “ethnic entrepreneurs” (DeHart 2010), offering various perspectives on how 
ethnic difference is integrated and interpolated into the domain of the market. Culture emerges as 
a site to generate expediency through copyright, bureaucratization, and commodification (Yudice 
2004). Moreover, ethnic difference is used to bolster economic and political claims of cultural 
authenticity, tradition, and history, as if the ethnic group owns its ethnic attributes (Comaroff & 
Comarroff 2002). The economic currency that ethnic culture creates can also help to secure the 
political sovereignty of ethnic groups, as seen in the case of Native Americans in the United 
States (Catelino 2008). Economic and political sovereignty can in turn rearticulate and reinforce 
ethnic identity (chapter 5). 
           Analyzing ethnicity as a site of “value production” and as a source of the commodification 
of cultural difference, I am also informed by the idea of “contingent articulation” (Laclau 
&Mouffe 2001: xii) in exploring the way that Korean Chinese articulate their ethnicity with class, 
gender, and nationality, especially in a transnational setting. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
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Laclau and Mouffe conceptualized “articulation” as any practice “establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (105). The 
point is that it is impossible to have an completely fixed identity— rather, there is only a “partial 
fixation,” proceeding from the openness of the social, which results in the constant overflowing 
of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity (112-113). The concept of 
contingent articulation provides insights for the case of Korean Chinese culture in the sense that 
ethnicity does not stand alone in deciding who Korean Chinese are and what they should be like. 
But ethnicity—always situated in relation to other ethnicities—is a nodal point merges with class, 
gender, and nationality when it enters the circuit of transnational migration as a mobile ethnicity 
that generates a specific economic currency. 
              The following chapters will evince the contingent articulation of ethnicity 
ethnographically. For instance, Korean Chinese are commonly perceived, not only in Korea, but 
also in China, as “workers,” “brides”, “nannies,” and “cheap construction workers” from 
“socialist” China. In addition, Korean Chinese migrants are commonly known to fake kinship 
ties to Koreans through illegal migration brokers, and to use fake identities while working as 
migrant laborers in Korea (chapters 1 and 4). All these bracketed perceptions of Korean Chinese 
have opened up new identities for Korean Chinese on the transnational labor market, while, at 
the same time, they enable Korean Chinese to perform the expected “ethnic” roles. 
            A sort of oscillating ethnic identity has been manifested in the image of transnational 
Korean Chinese migrants, complete with stereotypes that I learned from my multi-sited field 
research in China and Korea. There are many examples. Korean Chinese read and write the 
Korean language, but they speak in a strong Yanbian accent; they share a colonial history with 
Koreans, but they grow up as socialist subjects in China, a very different situation from Koreans 
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who grow up in capitalist society; they eat similar foods as Koreans, but have different dress and 
makeup codes and social manners. Along with these ethnic stereotypes of Korean Chinese duality, 
I have learned that Korean Chinese-ness has been built and defined according to what it lacks of 
the stereotypes of Korean-ness that have been constructed by the idea that “authentic” Koreans 
live only in the territory of Korea. That is, the peculiar ethnic relationality of Korean Chinese as 
“almost Korean, but not quite” has created and reinforced the gap between Korean-ness and 
Korean Chinese-ness. My ethnographic work has observed, among other things, the efforts of 
Korean Chinese to fill this gap by performing their ethnicity, particularly in the Korean labor 
market.  
          Here I borrow the concept of “performativity” that Judith Butler developed in Gender 
Trouble (1990) and Bodies that Matter (1993) in order to overcome dichotomous, fixed 
understandings of gender identity constructed between nature and culture, biology and sociology, 
determinism and voluntarism. She mainly argues that sex becomes a naturalized norm and that 
gender is the effect of the constraints of normativity, produced through the forcible heterosexual 
normativity (Butler 1990). Developing this argument in Bodies that Matter, Butler argues that 
“performativity is not a singular act, for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms, and 
the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the 
conventions of which it is a repetition”(Butler 1993: xxi). Her point is that gender identity is the 
effect of a compulsory reiteration of gender norms rather than a pre-existing essence or an 
intractable construction (Weeks 1998: 125-134). Thus, there emerges room to alter gender norms 
through reiterations, and the political possibility to subvert gender norms. Despite the reiterative 
practice of regulatory norms, the consequences of repetition of norms would not be the same, 
and thus, we could have new types of cultural emergence and disobedience. In this subversion of 
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regulatory normativity, Butler discovers the possibility to reorganize sexual normativity. Although 
we comply with the norms, we can alter our performance and fail to reproduce the identity, in 
what has been called the “politics of disidentity” (Yudice 2003:57), thereby enabling the 
subversion of gender norms. Yet according to Butler, performativity is achieved not by an 
intention or subversive agency, but by the reiterative regulatory norm; it is neither voluntary nor 
detrimental.  
            The concept of performativity has been mainly developed in relation to gender identity. 
But the performativity theory can be helpful in analyzing Korean Chinese culture, in that Korean 
Chinese migrant workers continue to articulate ethnicity with class, gender, and nationality as 
they move back and forth between China and Korea. Since Korean Chinese are “almost Korean, 
but not quite,” they attempt to reconcile their Korean-ness with their Korean Chinese-ness. For 
example, some Korean Chinese migrant workers try not to be noticed as Korean Chinese in 
Korea, notably through the self-regulation of their Yanbian accent. And yet, as soon as they 
return to Yanbian, they will try not to speak in the Seoul accent for fear of mockery by their peers 
(Chapter 4 and 6). In addition, Korean Chinese migrant workers tend to act like “humble workers” 
in Korea, saving every penny, whereas once they are back in China they tend to show off what 
they have achieved in Korea by spending money entertaining friends and relatives (qingke). 
Korean Chinese perform different ethnic norms depending on time and place, switching modes 
of ethnic performance in what I call the “split life” (chapter 4).  
           Their performance of being almost Korean, but not quite, should be discussed in light of 
Homi Bhabha, whose work is especially conditioned by the context of colonial India. In Of 
Mimicry and Man, Bhabha describes “mimicry,” borrowed from Lacan, as one of the illusive and 
effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge, and asserts that it is “the desire for a 
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recognizable Other as a subject of a difference that is almost the same but not quite” (1994:122). In 
other words, mimicry is an attempt to disavow the difference of oneself from the Other and to 
reform and appropriate the Other, fixing the colonial subject as a partial presence (126). However, 
colonial mimicry is not a simple narcissistic identification with the Other, or a desire for the 
impossibility of the Other. Rather, while not having an obvious desiring object, colonial mimicry 
has “strategic objectives,” producing an anomalous representation of the colonized. Even though 
I am aware that Korean Chinese transnational migration differs greatly from colonial India, and 
Korean Chinese are not actually “mimicking” or trying to become exactly like “Koreans,” the 
concept of mimicry—“almost the same, but not quite”—is essential for me to develop my 
discussion of the particular way in which Korean Chinese have created and promoted their ethnic 
niche and relationality and become integrated into the transnational labor market. Korean 
Chinese do not make an effort to mimic Koreans, but do play with ethnic affinity and national 
difference.  
          Shedding light on a series of articulatory practices and performativities of ethnicity, my 
dissertation does not mean to examine the specific ethnic characteristics “owned” by Korean 
Chinese, or their savvy mobilization of an “authentic” ethnic economy in order to generate new 
capital. Instead, I look into the way that Korean Chinese and the responding labor market have 
mutually discovered, promoted, and mobilized specific “niches” as a means of value production 
in the ethnic labor economy, and how these niches have put Korean Chinese into a special 
domain of the Korean labor market, as live-in nannies, restaurant cooks and waitresses, hotel 
cleaning ladies, and construction workers. On this point I argue that the flexible and fleeting 
ethnic location of Korean Chinese—“almost Korean, but not quite”—is the very condition that 
has generated the persistent Korean Chinese transnational labor market. In other words, the 
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peculiarities of Korean Chinese ethnicity, as Korean with a “poor,” “socialist,” “Chinese” 
difference, has become articulated with and performed by a working-class subjectivity. The 
ethnicity is also articulated with and interpolated to gender, appearing in problematic real/fake 
marriages, mostly between Korean men and Korean Chinese women (Chapter 1 and 3), and with 
national disparities between China and Korea, disparities that are used as grounds for ethnic 
discrimination toward Korean Chinese working in Korea. The Korean Chinese stories I have 
compiled tell us that  “identity economy” (Comaroff  & Comaroff 2008) is not simply generated 
by commodification of authentic identities and ethnic attributes, but by articulating and 
performing ethnic relationality—such as Korean Chinese identity with / difference from Koreans.  
3.2 Transnational Temporality 
           As I introduced in Prologue, I started my field research on Korean Chinese transnational 
migration in 2004 when most Korean Chinese were undocumented and under a high risk of 
deportation. But this dissertation mainly focuses on the post-amnesty, looking closely into the 
emerging temporality shaped by the H-2 visa, which requires a “1-3-2” rhythm of circulation: a 
one-year return to China after amnesty, then three years of work in Korea, followed by two years 
back in China, after which a new visa must be obtained to return to Korea. Since these new visa 
regulations allowed many more Korean Chinese to legally enter and work in Korea than in the 
pre-amnesty era, transnational migration became even more preponderant in Yanbian. The 
dominance of transnational labor has dramatically transformed affect and materiality, and 
understandings of money, time, and the future, as I explore in the following chapters. I pay a 
particular attention to emerging post-amnesty temporalities and the ways in which laboring 
bodies have been constituted through the imposition of the “1-3-2” rhythm on Korean Chinese 
migrant workers. Lefebvre suggests that the rhythm of everyday life is produced by the 
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combination of cyclical time with linear time. He also highlights that for there to be rhythm, there 
must be repetition in movement, and that the rhythm results in a new becoming with difference 
(Lefebvre 2004: 78-79). Pushing further the concept of Lefebvre’s rhythm, repetition with 
difference, I additionally take into account rhythm as a governmental force of life, a rhythm that 
constitutes a new kind of Korean Chinese subjectivity.  
           Rhythm and time functioning as a governmental force has been long discussed in 
conjunction with work conditions, in particular the setting of the modern factory. In the chapter 
on “The Working Day” in Capital, Marx points out the two constituent parts of the working 
day—“necessary labor time and surplus labor time” (341). Labor time requires the reproduction 
of the labor power of workers, and the duration of labor time depends on the duration of surplus 
labor time—that time the worker spends resting, sleeping, feeding, washing, and clothing. The 
worker, who has no means of production other than his own body, “must be able to work 
tomorrow with the same normal amount of strength, health, and freshness as today” (343). This 
regularity of the working day—“tomorrow as today”—could be enabled by the use of surplus 
labor hours to reproduce the same strength of labor power every day. However, under the 
extreme extraction of labor power to maximize surplus value, labor hours encroach more and 
more on the surplus labor hours, given the 24-hour limit of the working day. Therefore, the 
laboring body eventually deteriorates under the rhythm and demands of the working day—which 
results in the extreme alienation of workers from their own bodies.  
            What Marx illustrates is that the working day is based on a manipulation of basic everyday 
life; it represents a reification of the natural rhythm and meter of everyday practice, in the 
interests of maximizing the productive capacity inscribed in the temporality of the act. In “Time, 
Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,” E. P. Thompson similarly investigates the 
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temporality of working days, with more focus on the formation of modern time. Thompson 
discusses how the spread of clock-time in the labor process led to the emergence of durational 
time. Time, in industrial society, becomes abstract, homogenous, linear, and task-fragmented, as 
opposed to the pre-industrial experience of time as concrete, cyclical, and task-oriented 
(Thompson 1967)10. According to Thompson, time eventually arises as a site of contention 
between workers and employers: “Workers had accepted the categories of their employers and 
learned to fight back within them. They had learned their lesson, that time is money, only too 
well (91).” At the same time, the disciplining of work-time has become a mechanism of social 
integration and part of unwilled collective realities, wherein the agency of individuals is 
transposed to the horizon of institutional norms (Thompsom 1967; Binkely 2009).11 
            Whereas Thompson sees time as a means of institutionalizing labor exploitation and 
controlling working bodies, Foucault focuses instead on the way in which time becomes a 
socialized means to produce docile bodies through modern institutions such as prisons, schools, 
and the military. Here, temporality plays a critical role in the ongoing and open-ended practice of 
government, and in the self-forming work of subjectification itself (Binkely 75). In Discipline and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10Akhil Gupta is critical of the distinctive transition possibly applied in creating the binary temporality of Self and 
cultural Other. By looking at the concept of the “rebirth” of human life and commodity, he demonstrates that these 
temporal distinctions–such as pre-industrial vs. industrial time, or Self vs. Other—are blurred and indistinct. Gupta 
argues that the lived experience of time in the modern Western world is poorly explained by postulating linearity and 
cyclicality as opposing and essential principles (Gupta, 1992). I take Gupta’s critique as a useful point in understanding 
the mixture of flexibility and regularity. Two contrasting and conflicting temporalities are competing in the everyday 
life of Korean Chinese due to their dependence on insecure daily wage labor; they are seeking flexible labor while at 
the same time they want regular labor—which is how they visualize a stable life.  
 
	  	  11 Arlie Russel Hochschild effectively discussed contemporary time-discipline in The Time Bind. While looking into the 
lives of workers’s for a U. S. company called Amerco, she elaborates on the way that work has dominated domestic life, 
by showing how time is divided and re-deployed into divisions such as work time and family time. She traces this time 
management back to Taylorist “scientific management,” which imposes rigorous standards of efficiency on the work 
place and individual workers. Under Taylorism, time was precisely equated with production and money, and so time 
required measurement and saving. She also argues that “the social world that draws a person’s allegiance also imparts a 
pattern to time. The more attached we are to the world of work, the more its deadlines, its cycles, its pauses, and 
interruptions shape our lives and the more family time is forced to accommodate to the pressures of work” (2000: 45-
52). Here, family time is subject to industrial time.	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Punish, Foucault elaborates on the control of activity, investigating the relationship between the body 
and time through various examples of disciplinary mechanisms. Foucault displays the timetable as 
an exemplary means to establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, and regulate the cycles 
of repetitions. In addition, he discusses how physical discipline managed by time leads to the 
“temporal elaboration of the act” through the example of marching troops on the basis of a 
collective and obligatory rhythm imposed from the outside; “the act is broken down into its 
elements; the potions of the body, limbs, articulation is defined; each movement are assigned a 
direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession is prescribed. Time penetrates the 
body and with it all the meticulous controls of power”(152). Modern institutions such as 
classrooms and armies have inscribed temporal elaboration on bodies, and the deployment of 
duration in the act has become autotomized without obviously revealing the governing subjects. 
Foucault analyzes discipline not as an art of distributing bodies and of extracting time from them, 
but as a process of composing forces in order to assemble an efficient machine. The 
“serialization” of body movement and exercise becomes a way of ordering earthly time and 
serving to economize time (162-164). Yet, in all these temporalization processes, the disciplining 
subjects are ambiguous, and thus the ultimate motivation appears unwilled and unseen, concealed 
in the remote planning schemes of institutions (Binkely 2009:73)12 
            The discussion of time as a governmental force—both as a means for labor exploitation 
and as a socialized disciplinary mechanism—is apt for the analysis of Korean Chinese working 
bodies and their subjectivity in the sense that Korean Chinese migrants have been subject to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Although time penetrates the individual body from outside, Foucault does not see temporal discipline as an 
omnipotent power: “Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals 
both as objects and as instruments of exercise. It is not a triumphant power, which because of its own excess can 
pride itself on its omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, but permanent 
economy. These are humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or 
the great apparatuses of the state” (170). 
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multiple temporalities that have controlled the pattern and rhythm of their migrations. Here, my 
interest is not only in the temporality shaped by strict visa regulations and the rhythm of “1-3-2” 
that the Korean government imposes on the migrants. I am also attentive to the particular 
temporality to which their working bodies must get accustomed in order to endure the 
transnational, split time of their particular migratory rhythm back and forth between China and 
Korea (chapter 4). I have frequently heard Korean Chinese migrant workers testify that their 
healthy bodies are their basic means of production, and that caring for the body is essential to 
maintain physically intensive labor. Care for the self emerges as a lingering theme in the 
narratives of Korean Chinese migrants who have lived and worked in transnational time.  
           I take Foucault’s discussion of the government of the self as an analytical point of 
departure to examine Korean Chinese care for their bodies, money, and time, as Foucault offers 
insights on the relationship of the self with itself when situated in unstable and vulnerable 
transnational circumstances. Foucault’s interview on the hermeneutics of the self (1980) 
introduces the concept of a “contact point” that accounts for the government of the self—
techniques of domination as well as techniques of the self. 
The contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct 
themselves, is what we can call, I think, government. Governing people, in the broad meaning 
of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what they governor wants; it is 
always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which 
assumes coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself”(Foucault 
1993: 203-4; emphasis added). 
 
Foucault points out the production of autonomous and self-regulating subjectivity is key to 
government of the self—that is, an action of the “self on self” (Dean 1999). Modern political 
power does not take the form of the domination of subjectivity, but come to depend upon a web 
of technologies for fabricating and maintaining self-government (Miller & Rose 1990: 26-28). Yet, 
Foucault still sees the government of the self as having an ethical dimension, since it can be seen 
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as the practice of forging the self in relation to existing rules of conduct or styles of existence. 
Drawn from the Greeks’ self-discipline, Foucault views the government of the self as a form of 
“caring for the self”: “one cannot care for the self without knowledge. The care for self is of 
course knowledge of self… but it is also the knowledge of a certain number of rules of conduct 
or of principles, which are at the same time truths and regulations. To care for self is to fit one’s 
self out with these truths. That is where ethics is linked to the game of the truth” (Foucault 
1987:16). From this statement, we see that caring for the self—government of the self—requires 
a relationship with the self, with others, and with regulations, and assumes self-autonomy and 
self-sufficiency. It is also accompanied by continuous self-modification and self-invention, 
endlessly negotiations between external coercion and self-adaptation. However, I find that in 
caring for the self, the self is undifferentiated and the caring is un-contextualized. And the 
particular purpose and consequence of caring for the self remain abstract or unknown.  
            Drawing on the discussion of time as a government force and self-modification as caring 
for the self, I push further to situate the self as a gendered, classed, and ethnicized subject 
constituted through transnational time based on the multiple temporalities that emerge from 
moving between different legal regulations, between different paces and densities of time. 
Throughout the dissertation, I argue that transnational migration initiated to care for the self and 
its future does not necessarily lead to economic rewards. Rather, the care sometimes ends up 
serving labor exploitation and even causing bodily deterioration as the migrant workers strive to 
make their bodies more marketable. In the following chapters, I highlight how the transnational 
temporality that Korean Chinese migrants and their families have lived with for the last two 
decades is a major principle that constitutes the Korean Chinese as a transnational ethnic working 
class and that reshapes the ethnic space of Yanbian, integrating it into the transnational economy.  
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3.3 Chapters 
            My dissertation is composed of six chapters. In chapter 1, Gone With the Korean Wind: The 
Formation of Mobile Ethnicity, I show how Korean Chinese living on the ethnic borderland have 
been gradually integrated into larger national and transnational economies. I especially historicize 
the Korean Wind as an epochal occurrence happening at the intersection of post-Cold War and 
post-socialist transformations, a circumstance that has enabled Korean Chinese to claim their 
long-forgotten kinship to the forbidden homeland of South Korea. My ethnography archives the 
starkly contrasting economies of Korean Chinese kinship with the two Koreas. Whereas Korean 
Chinese cultivate sympathetic kinship ties to North Korea, frequently transferring goods and 
money to those who have suffered from that country’s dire economy, they consider kinship with 
South Korea mostly as a means of gaining invitation rights through faking and making marriages 
and documents (or, as I term it, paper kinship). I argue that Korean Chinese challenge the very 
biological basis of kinship by crafting and manipulating kinship as a commodity that confers the 
ability to visit (and work in) South Korea.  
           In chapter 2, Live or Leave: The Liminal Life and Remittance Development, I explore the rapid 
urbanization and economic development of Yanbian, a remarkable change driven by the flow of 
remittances, mainly from Korea. This chapter primarily examines the way that internal migration 
intersects with and is influenced by transnational migration, with a focus on a particular hesitation 
that Korean Chinese have displayed: living in Yanbian, or leaving. My ethnographic emphasis is 
on differentiated mobility by ethnicity and the region’s growing dependency on Korean money, 
as I examine stories of Korean Chinese migrants, South Korean businessmen, and new, incoming 
Han Chinese. I argue that mobility has been differentiated by ethnicity, leading ethnic groups to 
have different ranges, routes, and life choices. But I also argue that differentiated mobility has 
 37 
deepened interconnections between Han Chinese and Korean Chinese (as between service 
providers and customers), both of whom have become interdependent parts of the remittance 
economy. 
          In chapter 3, Labor of Love: The Economy of Waiting and Affective Currency, I situate remittances 
as a particular form of money with a future-oriented temporality, functioning not only as money 
but also as gift. My ethnographic accounts—stories of the families of migrant workers waiting for 
them to return—show the contradictory work of remittances as both a means of economic 
prosperity and a source of moral crisis, disrupting traditional family values and stable marital 
relationships as a side-effect of “capitalist contamination.” I argue that the remittances have not 
only reshaped intimate relationships but also maintained the flow of Korean Chinese mobility, 
despite aggravating moral and sexual tensions. 
            In chapter 4, Split Life: Bodies and Time Between the Two Worlds, I examine how the lived 
experience of transnational migration is structured by the peculiar rhythm and temporality that is 
imposed by the visa regulations of the South Korean government. My argument is twofold. First, 
I highlight the spatial division created by this repetitive migration: South Korea is a place for 
making money, whereas Yanbian is a place for spending money. Second, laboring bodies have 
become adjusted to frequent movements: Korea is a place for working (productive labor), 
Yanbian is a place for resting (reproductive labor). Under this split in spatial practices, I argue, 
migrants have internalized a rhythm—a back and forth—that serves as a governing force on the 
laboring body, thereby making care for the body more difficult, and prolonging its exploitation in 
intensive labor.  
          In chapter 5, Vigilant Ethnicity: Encounters with the Forbidden Homeland, I examine how the 
ethnic politics of Korean Chinese Communist Party members has developed in response to the 
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Korean Wind, South Korea having long been considered a forbidden capitalist enemy. The 
elderly party members I interviewed exemplify a sharp split in the politics of ethnicity that 
distinguishes economic intention from political position; they are highly economized through 
transnational migration to Korea while at the same time intensely politicized because of their 
tight identification with China as socialist subjects. I argue that the combination of a vigilant 
ethnic politics with a sense of multiple belonging is what constitutes and generates Korean 
Chinese as a mobile ethnicity in the post-Cold War and post-socialist circumstance. 
          In chapter 6, Between Two Dreams: From Dagong (Worker) to Laoban (Entrepreneur), I examine 
new reflections and re-evaluations of the Korean Wind within and beyond Yanbian in the wake 
of the global rise of the Chinese economy. Since the financial crisis of 2008 dramatically altered 
the terms of the Korean dream by greatly increasing Chinese economic clout, many Korean 
Chinese have turned their attention to a new “Chinese dream.” My ethnographic focus is on the 
social imperative that has risen in Yanbian that encourages Korean Chinese migrants to 
transform themselves into entrepreneurs who manage their own money, businesses, and futures. 
Yet the Korean Chinese, many of whom have grown accustomed to working as physical laborers 
in South Korea, sometimes for a decade or more, find it quite difficult to compete in the new 
Chinese socio-economic context. This chapter elaborates on the struggles of Korean Chinese 
migrants caught between two dreams and the futurity that they must constantly reimagine in the 
midst of a fluctuating and unpredictable global economy.  
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Chapter 1. “Gone with the Korean Wind”: The Formation of Mobile  Ethnic i ty  
 
Yanbian 4: Yanbian is Going 
 
There are people who think Yanbian1 is in Yanji,  
Or in Gurogongdan and Suwon,2  
But that is what people say who do not know things. 
Yanbian came with a small basket carried by cow (from Chosun) 
It once collapsed during the Cultural Revolution— 
Later, it was revived like vegetables in the Yanji West Market, 
And became famous along with Kimchi in front of Changchun train station. 
Later, to Beijing, to Shanghai, 
It was stretched like noodles.  
Yanbian is everywhere in the big cities of China. 
Nowadays it goes to Korea via ship and plane 
We can hear news from there, from restaurants and construction fields, 
But it is a little. 
To the east, Tokyo, to the North, Habarosque,  
To Saipan, San Francisco, Paris, and London, 
There is no place without Yanbian in the world. 
Everybody’s prepared to leave with fake passports or fake marriages. 
Someday, perhaps, we will find Yanbian on the moon (after everybody is gone). 
 
            Sukhwa, the Series of Poem of <Yanbian> 
              On a sunny day in June 2009, I had a chance to go hiking with a group of Korean 
Chinese. Since the healthy body and quality of life have become widespread concerns in the 
wake of the current economic development of China, hiking is an increasingly popular 
leisure activity amongst Korean Chinese in Yanbian, where there are ranges of beautiful 
mountains. Hiking with many different groups became one of my major opportunities for 
participant observation that allowed access to Korean Chinese everyday life: I could hear 
about personal life histories while exploring the geography of Yanbian. This time we were  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Here, “Yanbian” signifies not only an actual place—the Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture—but also the 
symbolic home of Korean Chinese culture in general. What is on the move in this poem is not only the people of 
Yanbian, but also the symbolic Yanbian, which has been transferred along with migrant workers to other places, 
such as Seoul, Beijing, Shanghai, and so forth.   
 
2 These are districts in and near Seoul, where Korean Chinese both live and work in large numbers.  
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Photo 1. The Tumn River from Reguansan. The Left Side of the River is North Korea and 
the right side is Yanbian. By June Hee Kwon(2009) 
 
headed to a mountain called Reguang. Standing on the peak, I could see the long flow of the 
Tumen River, which serves as a natural and territorial border between China and North 
Korea. Yanbian’s character as a border zone was more vividly impressed on me. A small 
town on the North Korean side, looking impoverished, dilapidated, and sparsely populated, 
in stark contrast to the Chinese side, formed the main backdrop for our conversation on the 
mountaintop. The hiking club members, mostly well-off Korean Chinese, shared personal 
stories; how (much long ago) their families moved to Yanbian and how they have dealt with 
their families living in both North and South Korea. But they ended up highlighting how 
proud they were of being a national member of globally rising China—the triumphant 
Chinese socialism in a rapid economic development. In this conversation, I found it ironical 
that these members made a slight distinction between the Chinese economic success and 
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that of Yanbian, the Korean Chinese autonomous prefecture which has been run by the 
different principle due to the ethnic zone on the border. Here, Yanbian is an absolute part of 
Chinese territory while, at the same time, Yanbian seems to be a distinctive zone from the 
rest of China (the zone of Han Chinese), as if it were not quite China. In addition, in an 
ordinary language habit, Korean Chinese indicate “Chinese” as Han Chinese, distancing 
Korean Chinese themselves from these “real” Chinese whereas Korean Chinese call 
themselves chosunjok that conveys a sharp ethnic distinction from Han Chinese despite their 
shared Chinese citizenship. The constant evocation of Korean Chinese—Yanbian as a 
“border zone” and Korean Chinese as “settler ethnic minority” jumping the attachment 
amongst China, North and South Korea—is the point of departure for this chapter. It is an 
ambiguous territorial and ethnic identification that I witnessed throughout the fieldwork, 
characterizing who Korean Chinese are and what Yanbian is like. 
           This chapter is to stage Yanbian as an ethnic margin—culturally and geographically—
and Korean Chinese as mobile ethnicity on the constant move in the following three sections, 
exploring how “Yanbian is going” as the poem describes. First, I introduce the 
historiography of Korean Chinese border crossing and the geography of border landscape of 
Yanbian. In this section, I portray the trajectory of Korean Chinese migration and settlement 
in conjunction with the modern history—from the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, to the 
establishment of China, to the Cultural Revolution, and to the open economy and politics of 
China. Second, my focus is shifted to the Korean Chinese mobility after the declaration of 
the economic reform and open economy (1980-2000), tracing the fashions that have 
dominated Yanbian; North Korean Wind, Soviet Wind, and (South) Korean Wind3, each wind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In the following, the Korean wind indicates the South Korean wind (hankuk baram).  
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which is local periodization of contemporary social changes in Yanbian’s terms. In this part, 
I analyze the way that Korean Chinese have gradually connected this ethnic margin to other 
Chinese larger cities and other countries (mostly North Korea, Russia, and South Korea), by 
moving across and beyond Yanbian, and thereby developing new imagination and sense of 
space. Third, of the winds, I highlight the recent strong influence of the Korean wind, in 
particular, on reorganizing the structure and meaning of Korean Chinese kinship. I trace the 
way that Korean Chinese have rejuvenated the value attached to long-separated and broken 
kinship with South Koreans due to the political reason under the Cold War context while 
gradually dismissing the tie with North Koreans, the tie that could not bring about the actual 
currency. I articulate this contrasting kinship practice as “the economy of kinship” on the 
basis of ethnographic observation that demonstrates the contingent and unstable meaning 
and practice of kinship. In so doing, I argue that the new kinship practice—rejuvenating, 
manipulating, and manufacturing kinship via faking documents or real/fake marriages as I 
term it paper kinship—has generated the preponderant transnational migration in Yanbian. 
Exploring the formation of mobile ethnicity—moving through winds, my aim is to introduce the 
way that Yanbian has been diverted from the tie to North Korea due to the geographical and 
ideological proximity, and swiftly integrated into the circuit of transnational labor migration 
to South Korea, a homeland and market place that shows the high demand for Korean 
Chinese as a cheap source of labor.  
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1.1.Border Landscape 
1.1.1 Border Historiography: Story of Beyond  
          The theme of border crossing is deeply ingrained in the oral histories that I have heard, 
and the Korean Chinese history books that I have collected.4 The stories commonly start off, by 
saying that Korean Chinese bravely and secretively crossed the Tumen River and endured the 
biting cold to reclaim barren land in China—which was part of the Qing dynasty’s “holy land.”5 
Although it was forbidden for Koreans to cross the river and cultivate the Qing land in the late 
19th Century, poor Korean farmers sneaked into the holy land untouched for hundreds of years, 
inspired by the saying, “If you go to Manchuria, you will grow potatoes as big as a baby’s head” 
as an eighty five year old Korean Chinese lady put it to me in Yanbian.6 In the mountainous 
northern part of the Korean peninsula bordering China, there was a lack of farming land. In 
addition, the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula had worsened poverty, leading 
Koreans to join the intense flow of migration to China. 
            Despite the variation of border crossing history, <The Common Sense of Korean Chinese 
History>, a small text-book-like history book written by Yanbian Korean Chinese historians, 
sums up Korean Chinese migration history through six phases. First, it was the late Ming and 
the early Qing era from 1620 to 1766. Koreans were subject to the Qing dynasty as war slaves. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 <Common Sense of Korean Chinese History>, <The Traces of Korean Chinese>, <One Hundred Years of Korean Chinese 
History>, <Jilin Korean Chinese>, and multiple collections of local histories written by local historians (Yanji, 
Longjing, Tumen, Hualong, Wangqing, Hunchun). All were written in Korean, and published in Yanbian. 
5 The Qing government did not allow Chinese to live in what is now Northeast China because it was the birthplace 
of their dynasty, their “holy land.” During the late 19th century, Koreans began sneaking across the Tumen River to 
farm, while Russians were aggressively moving south into Manchuria. Around 1880 the Qing government lifted the 
prohibition and started allowing Chinese farmers into Northeast China, distributing farming land at low prices and 
offering tax benefits.  
6 A novel, <Bugando> written by An Sukil, a Korean writer, deals with Korean Chinese farmers’ border-crossing 
and settlement stories. In this novel, China is described as more prosperous than Chosun. Yet Koreans had to face 
issues of cultural assimilation and ethnic discrimination (see also Park 2005). 
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Second, it was the late Qing period from 1677 to 1881, which was right before the prohibition 
of the entry of the holy land was lifted. Koreans sneaked cross the Tumen River and cultivated 
land in China. Third, it was from 1882 and 1910, the phase that the Qing government 
encouraged Han Chinese and Koreans to move to northeast China to protect their land from 
Russia moving to the South. Fourth, it was from 1911 to 1920, which was free migration era. 
Koreans were moving to China escaping the Japanese occupation and aggravated poverty under 
Japan. Fifth, It was from 1921 to 1931, right before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. China 
forced Korean Chinese to change their citizenship to Chinese because China was in 
competition with Japanese that considered Korean as their citizens. Sixth, it was from 1931 to 
1945, which was the era when Japan forced Koreans to move to China as a means of territorial 
occupation. Most Korean Chinese and Korean historians consider the Korean Chinese 
migration began from the third phase (from 1882), after the Qing lifted the prohibition of entry 
of the holy land.  
           In fact, the distinction of migration phase and the moment of settlement is a politically 
sensitive issue because the settlement history could imply the affiliation of Korean Chinese to 
China in terms of ethnicity, nationality, and territoriality; how deeply and how long this migrant 
ethnic minority group has claimed the association with the land of China. Although Yanbian—
which used to be called “gando”(an island between China and Chosun)—is clearly Chinese 
territory now, it has historically been the subject of disputes between China and Korea78(Park 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
8 Until the late 19th Century, the Qing and Chosun governments had disputed the territory of Kando, the 
former name of Yanbian. As a result of the Qing’s defeat 
in the Qing- Japan War, Japan took the right to build railroads in the southern part of Manchuria while yielding 
the territory of Kando to the Qing government. Kando's status as part of Chinese territory was formalized in 
the “Kando treaty” of 1909. (Lim 2002; Park 2005) 
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2005). Even after the territorial settlement in 1909, the status of Yanbian’s Korean migrants, 
who were mostly farmers from the Korean peninsula, remained unclear—at various times they 
were considered citizens of China, Korea, and even Japan, occupier of Northeast China 
(Manchuria) from 1937 to 1945.9 This border crossing continued until Korea (the colonial 
Chosun) won independence from Japan in 1945. As the new China was established in 1949, 
Korean Chinese actively supported the Chinese communist party, and subsequently Korean 
Chinese became citizens of China as members of an officially recognized ethnic minority group 
(Lee 1998; Lim 2002). Some Koreans moved back to Korea following national independence 
while some remained in China, becoming settled farmers and Chinese nationals. Some Koreans 
were prevented from returning to Korea by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Today 
two million Korean Chinese—an officially recognized Korean ethnic group with Chinese 
nationality—are descendants of these settlers who crossed the Tumen River with “empty hands,” 
and reclaimed the wasteland of what is now Yanbian. I heard Korean Chinese in their seventies 
and eighties speak of the border crossings in their family histories, but most of them do not 
maintain active relationships with distant relatives in North Korea, where most Yanbian Korean 
Chinese moved from, and which is one of the most impoverished states in the world today.   
            The settler history of Yanbian also portrays an ethnic distinction between Han and 
Korean Chinese. On a short trip to the countryside, I often heard the ethnic comparison from 
my Korean Chinese companies, “Korean Chinese built their houses with shabby bush clover 
fences while Han Chinese built and rebuilt brick fences every year, expanding their territory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 When Japan occupied Chosun in 1909, Chosun was deprived of its sovereignty and diplomatic rights, and 
Koreans under Japanese control became Japanese citizens. However, in truth Japan did not acknowledge the full 
status of Koreans, adding the distinction of “Chosun” to their citizenship. During the colonial period, Koreans’ 
citizenship status was ambiguous, especially in Manchuria until 1945, when Chosun became independent from 
Japan. 
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little by little.” This orally transmitted “ethnic tale” tells how Korean Chinese as migrant 
settlers seemed always to be ready to leave without developing an attachment to where they 
lived whereas Han Chinese planned not to move, staying put for longer periods. Many Korean 
Chinese, in particular, those over 80 years old, recounted how they moved continuously from 
one place to another in pursuit of better and more land, relying on kinship networks and 
friendship ties across Northeast China. Until Japan retreated from Manchuria in 1945, 
Yanbian was a construct where ethnic tensions between Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese were 
suppressed under the Manchukuo regime (Park 2005). 
             After the Japanese left Yanbian as a result of their defeat in World War II and China 
established itself anew in 1949, the Korean settlers became “Chinese” in terms of nationality 
and social identity. The “Chinese-ness” of Korean Chinese is especially important to Korean 
Chinese Communist Party members, who emphasize their contribution to the war of 
liberation against Japan and the Guomindang, and their deep engagement in the socialist 
revolution. In fact, Korean Chinese devotion to the party enabled Yanbian to complete the 
class revolution and the redistribution of land by 1948, which was earlier than other areas of 
China. The Chinese government gave credit to the Korean Chinese as a major revolutionary 
group by designating Yanbian as an ethnic autonomous zone in 1952. Since then, Korean 
Chinese have become official civic members of Communist China rather than floating and 
temporary migrant farmers from the Korean peninsula.  
            However, even after Korean Chinese became recognized as an ethnic minority group 
with Chinese nationality, their ethnic identity seemed to supersede their (official) national 
identity. I heard from Communist Party members in their eighties about their emotional and 
national attachment to Korea in the 1950s. For example, when filling out official documents 
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and forms related to the registration of their houses, ethnic Koreans entered North Korea as 
their “original” address or “birth” place. They read, wrote, and sang in Korean. Surrounded by 
other Korean Chinese, they had no need to be able to speak Chinese in their everyday life.  
            Even though Han Chinese lived and worked in Yanbian, the main language was 
Korean in official meetings, while “small translation”(xiaofanyi in Chinese) from Korean to 
Chinese was provided for Han Chinese in a low voice. An old Communist Party member 
recalls Yanbian in that era as an “all Korean Chinese world (chosunjok sesang in Korean)” Yet 
things changed dramatically beginning in the late 1950s. The “national identity education 
program” (Zuguoguan Jiaoyu) launched in 1958, emphasizing the idea that Korean Chinese were 
citizens of China and requiring Korean Chinese to break off their national ties to the two 
Koreas—both North and South. Under this intensive education, Korean Chinese were taught 
that China was their only home country, and reassured that they were definitely and without 
exception welcome members of the Chinese nation. 
            The Cultural Revolution was a particularly harsh period for Korean Chinese, as they 
became subject to random and continuous purges and persecutions. Their ethnicity, or more 
precisely, their ethnic affinity to North and South Korea came into play in the political tumult. 
Since Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea at the time, criticized the brutal aspects of the 
Cultural Revolution, criticism which ignited the fury of Mao,10 the reciprocal relationship 
between the neighboring socialist states was seriously fraying. During this time, culture and 
discourse that could be considered “ethnic” was strictly prohibited as a betrayal of the state of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, had been an active member of the Chosun Communist Party. 
Yanbian was the main domain for his socialist revolutionary activities under Japanese imperialism. When Yanbian 
was designated as the autonomous prefecture in 1952, North Korea became an important supporter of Korean 
Chinese by exchanging teachers and offering textbooks from North Korea. This socialist reciprocity continued 
until Kim Il Sung criticized Mao’s socialism as “revisionism.” His critique caused considerable trouble for Korean 
Chinese during the Cultural Revolution (Lim 2005).  
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China. Any possible tie to the two Koreas—familial, economic, and political—could provide a 
cause for political persecution. Kinship ties to North Korea were treated with suspicion, given 
the proximity of Korean Chinese to the North Korean border. Ties to South Korea—the 
capitalist enemy—were used as critical evidence for accusations that an individual was a “baby 
of capitalism (jabonjuuisaggi in Korean).” Many Korean Chinese were put to death as political 
scapegoats, caught up in unfair accusations and false reports. The overall turmoil left a deep 
scar across the whole ethnic community of Korean Chinese until the 1980s, as many of the 
older generation of Korean Chinese testified to me with their long unspeakable traumatic 
wound (chapter 5). 
             In order to avoid the emotional, political, and physical trauma, Korean Chinese had to 
prove their faith to China as a home country, and their full identity as Chinese by de-
emphasizing their ethnicity. Korean Chinese who underwent the Cultural Revolution said that 
they had to eradicate their “ethnic color,” by prohibiting ethnic songs and dances, and were 
not allowed to speak freely about anything related to their Korean ethnicity in public space. 
Politically speaking, Korean Chinese had to avoid any association with North or South Korea. 
People tried to defend themselves from arbitrary political persecution by making overt 
declarations that they were “anti-capitalist” or “anti-South Korea,” or by pledging allegiance to 
China. The period from the late 1950s to the late 1970s was culturally sterile and politically 
brutal for Korean Chinese. After the chaotic age of the Cultural Revolution eventually ended 
in the late 1970s, Yanbian ushered in a new phase of economic reform and an open economy, 
like other regions of China. In this new era, multiple fashions, new desires, new flows, and 
new forms of border crossing have continuously swept Yanbian in a form of “wind” such 
North Korean wind and Soviet Wind, the fashion that I will elaborate in the following section. 
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And by the early 1990s, the South Korean wind finally reached Yanbian as the diplomatic 
normalization was established between China and South Korea.  
1.1.2 Border Geography: On the Ethnic Margin 
          As I lay out in the beginning of the chapter, the idea of Yanbian as an “ethnic minority” 
and “border” zone is lingered in everyday life. Yanbian zhou, the Korean Chinese 
Autonomous Prefecture, is a district composed of six cities: Yanji (the capital), Antu, Helong, 
Longjing, Tumen, and Wangqing. The total population of the Yanbian Zhou is around two 
million; ethnic Koreans comprise 35% of the population, and Han Chinese 65% 
approximately. Besides ethnic Koreans and Han Chinese, a small number of other ethnic 
minority groups also live in Yanbian including Manzu and Menguzu. Out of these six cities, the 
city of Yanji as a capital of the prefecture has demonstrated a growth of population for the last 
twenty years along with the rapid urbanization and economic development, now reaching 
more than half a million people. Despite being the Korean Chinese ethnic autonomous 
prefecture, Yanbian seems to have a majority Han Chinese population; and Chinese language 
is essential to get by in everyday life. And yet, a lot of Korean Chinese testified that the 
increasing Han Chinese population and emerging necessity of Chinese language are recent 
phenomena after Korean Chinese started moving to Korea to make money and Han Chinese 
came to replace the gap—as a result of the Korean Wind (chapter 2). 
             Despite the growing dominance of “Chinese-ness,” Yanbian has still presented a 
strong ethnic characteristic through a series of Korean ethnic organizations; the Zhou 
government, Yanbian University, Yanbian Newspaper, Yanbian People Publishing Company 
and Yanbian broadcasting—TV and Radio. Since Yanbian was designated as the prefecture of 
ethnic autonomous zone in 1952, these organizations have been designed to speak and write 
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in Korean language as the first language.11 In the streets, signs must be written bilingually—
Korean coming first and Chinese next. Sometimes, we can find some Han Chinese who can 
speak fluent Korean although it is a rare case. The “great” ethnic minority policy is believed to 
enable Korean Chinese to maintain ethnic identity and ethnic harmony along with Han 
Chinese and other ethnic minorities in China without being assimilated into Han centered 
Chinese culture. Thanks to the policy, in addition, Korean Chinese think that they have lived 
in China, not as “ethnic other” under “internal orientalism”(Schein 2000) or “civilizing 
project”(Harrel 1995), but as a proud member of communist China, the ethnic group who is 
the most highly educated and civilized (mofan minzhu in Chinese, mobum minjok in Korean), 
even compared to Han Chinese after they migrated from the Korean peninsula. In Yanbian, it 
is common to hear about the celebration of the ethnic policy in an academic conference as 
well as in an ordinary conversation with Korean Chinese (see chapter 5).  
           Of identity markers that demonstrate ethnic identity, the Korean language is construed 
as the most critical element in proving who they are—as Korean Chinese. The majority of 
Korean Chinese children choose to go to Korean ethnic schools and get educated there in 
Korean as their native language.12 The Korean language that Korean Chinese speak has a 
regional accent of Yanbian, the accent similar to the northern part of contemporary North 
Korea—Hamkyunbukdo—where most ancestors of Yanbian Korean Chinese moved from a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Yanbian Korean Chinese Prefecture used to consider the dialect of Pyungyang as a standard of Korean 
language until South Korean media has become common to watch through satellite in the 2000 in Yanbian. The 
Korean language we hear from Yanbian TV or Radio station is not exactly Pyungyang nor Seoul. But in everyday 
life, a lot of Yanbian Korean Chinese speak the Hamkyungbookdo accent although there are minor variation and 
difference in speaking.  
 
12 The ethnic education has been considered as a default choice amongst Korean Chinese in order to maintain 
ethnic identity. And yet, there is a new fashion for Korean Chinese parents to send their children to Han Chinese 
school in order for their children to speak fluent Chinese—unlike themselves.  Han Chinese schools have a limited 
portion for Korean Chinese. The competition to get into Han Chinese school is high. The “extra” money is 
required if the child do not go through the official entrance competition.	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century ago. When speaking Chinese language, most Yanbian Korean Chinese speak in a 
distinct accent. Therefore, in Yanbian, there is a natural way of recognizing Korean Chinese 
from Han Chinese. 
           Within China, Yanji is the largest and the most densely populated city by Korean 
Chinese. Since Koreans first moved from the Korean peninsula to Yanbian from the late 19th 
century, Yanbian has been built as the ethnic comfort zone for Korean Chinese. Many Korean 
Chinese, in particular, farmers or older generations, said that they neither needed to speak 
Chinese nor to deal with Han Chinese since the ethnic line divided the living space and social 
network. For the occasion of having to interact with Han Chinese and speak Chinese language, 
I sometimes saw Korean Chinese farmers or workers express their annoyances and 
discomforts. The lack of fluency in Chinese has become a definite hindrance to live in a city 
like Yanji—where the influx of Han Chinese population has rapidly increased (chapter 2). But 
Korean Chinese could avoid the overlapped space with Han Chinese and try to find a way out 
if they want to, because Yanbian, as the autonomous prefecture is still favorable to Korean 
Chinese and Korean ethnicity and language is dominant in daily life. Thus, the lack of Chinese 
is not necessarily a shame or an impossible condition to live in Yanbian.  
           Along with the ethnic characteristic, the border location is another critical factor in 
shaping the landscape of Yanbian. In Yanbian, the trip to the border is an essential route for 
tourists. When I first visited Yanbian in 2006, a Korean Chinese friend of mine, Sun—who I 
met through the church in Seoul—took me to the border patrol zone where the Chinese 
military stood against North Korea. She believed that this scene was the most unique 
characteristic of Yanbian. She also said it was Yanbian’s most popular tourist spot. Border 
patrols range along the Tumen River, looking to repel North Korean runaways. Some parts of 
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the river are deep and wide while some parts are shallower and easier to cross. Thus, border 
control is stricter in some places than others. A simple line on the bridge connecting China 
and North Korea indicated the border. But the simple line implies both structure and symbol 
of a state’s security and sovereignty (Donna & Wilson 1999) in that it signifies not only the 
domain of the Chinese state, but also the prohibition on crossing into or from North Korea.  
Although the border control that I observed on the spot looked fairly tight, many tourists 
were enjoying themselves, taking pictures of the borderline and the border patrol. It was not a 
scene solely of anxiety or nervousness. Rather, the border looked like a nice “theme park,” 
with North Korea as backdrop. The long Tumen River, meandering as a natural and territorial 
border between the two countries, also provided a nice walking trail for tourists. The trail 
allowed tourists to see the contrasting mountain views; Chinese mountains were full of trees 
whereas North Korean mountains were naked because the trees had been cut down to make 
room for cultivation in the face of long food shortages. While looking at the stark contrasting 
mountains, Sun also said, “ North Korean is that much in poverty whereas we are this much 
better off” as many other Korean Chinese have mentioned to me. In this manner, the border 
zone, as a touristic spot, enables tourists to imagine the possible misery and poverty of North 
Korea across the Tumen River. The sharp borderline separating the two countries does not 
seem to be a blurred borderland that overlaps multiple cultures and hybrid identity (Gupta & 
Ferguson 1997) or “culture +culture” as fusion of registers (Hannertz 1997). Rather it appears 
as a frozen zone where cultural production and meaning-making processes have paused for a 
long time.                 
          While exploring in Yanbian—through hiking and conducting field research, I took 
several trips to different border zones. They left quite different impressions depending on 
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where we looked out over the Tumen River and which North Korean border town we were 
facing across the river. Of the hiking members that I introduced at the beginning of this 
chapter, I had a chance to be guided by Cadre Yang to a border city, Yuejing, which used to 
have a prosperous pulp factory and highly productive rice farming. Cadre Yang was from this 
town, and he explained the history of the town in addition to his own personal story. 
Yuejing’s adjacency to North Korea permitted much traffic through the city between the two 
countries until the Chinese government acted to strongly bar the flow of North Korean 
runaways in the early 2000s. The development of the city can be traced back to the colonial 
period of Japanese imperialism. Yuejing was built as a bridging point between the Korean 
peninsula and China (Manchuria at the time), having a train station that connected to other 
Northeast Chinese cities. The location as a major traffic point attracted Japan to build 
infrastructure—electricity, roads, water, and so forth—in order to run factories and channel 
goods and people from southern Manchuria to northeast China and Russia. In addition, 
proximity to the northern part of Korea (contemporary North Korea), where people suffered 
from the lack of farming land and aggravated impoverishment under Japanese occupation, 
attracted poor Korean farmers across the river in search of land. The majority of the Yuejing 
population is now composed of ethnic Koreans. While exploring the downtown of the city 
along with several surrounding farming towns, I met several Han Chinese farmers who spoke 
fluent Korean in a Yanbian accent. Cadre Yang, who accompanied me, jokingly said, “They 
(Han Chinese) have been assimilated to Koreans for ethnic harmony.” We laughed in an 
agreement of the bizarre dynamic occurring in the ethnic autonomous zone. “As we have 
lived in the same town for years, Han Chinese become like Korean Chinese, doing the rice 
farming13 as good as Korean Chinese and eating kimchi as often as Korean Chinese.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Rice farming characterizes Korean Chinese culture in Northeast China. Due to Chinese farmers being barred 
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              In Yuejing, the Tumen River is a key component of the border landscape, a constant 
reminder that we are right at the border with North Korea. Given the extreme isolation of 
North Korea from the external world, its eerie politics and harsh treatment of its people, 
Yuejing has become a popular spot for curious tourists, from South Korea as well as other 
Chinese regions, to peer through telescopes at neighboring North Korean towns, hoping to 
witness the barrenness and poverty of North Korea from afar. Cadre Yang also took me to a 
telescope spot on a nearby mountain. In fact, the telescoping of North Korea is sort of a 
common ritual on visits to all the border towns of Yanbian. On each occasion, my Korean 
Chinese companions told me that they had distantly related families back in North Korea but 
had lost contact with them. Despite the proximity, the kinship relationships between Korean 
Chinese and North Korea seemed to have quickly worn thin, especially since the Cultural 
Revolution. The Korean Chinese tended to emphasize the great disparity between North 
Koreans and Korean Chinese in terms of personality and national culture, largely constituted 
by economic differences between the two countries. Cadre Yang also tried to convince me 
that there was a sharp contrast between the Chinese and North Korean landscapes and 
cityscapes. He was right. On the North Korean side, dilapidated factories looked dreary and 
few people were seen in the street. Cadre Yang also told me that Korean Chinese in border 
towns have suffered from robberies and home invasions by desperate North Korean 
runaways. Sympathy toward poor North Koreans has notably lessened in recent years. The 
border patrol has become stricter. The Tumen River that Korean Chinese ancestors crossed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from Northeast China in order to protect the Qing’s holy land, most of the land there remained barren and 
uncultivated. Korean farmers started reclaiming this abandoned land and transforming it into rice fields. Rice 
farming requires special skills and weather condition, and Korean farmers tended not to transfer their expertise to 
Chinese rivals. Despite the illegal residence of the Koreans, most Chinese landowners did not evict them, instead 
taking advantage of their high-profit rice farming and their relatively cheap labor (Park 2005:Lim 2002). 
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over in pursuit of farming lands has become another barrier that North Koreans have to 
surmount to escape starvation. The border’s meaning shifts in different contexts and under 
different stresses, but its geography remains. 
1.2 New Winds  
           Yanbian’s urbanization began alongside the end of the political turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution since Deng Xiaoping announced the economic reform and open economy in 
December 1978. This epochal proclamation included three stages of development; 1) solving 
the eating problem (温饱 wenbao) from 1980 to 1990, 2) distribution of the decent affluence (小康 
xiaokang) from 1990 to 2000, and finally, 3) the achievement of socialist market economy until 
the mid-twenty first century. Pragmatism was vital to this economic reform, expressing “it 
does not matter whether it is black or white cat as long as it catches a mouse.” (黑苗白描论). It 
also encouraged some groups of people to become richer prior to some other group (选富论), 
admitting the market competition and consequential social inequality as an inevitable rite of 
passage. Deng announced this declaration in 1978 and promoted Chinese people to practice 
market activity. Yet, it took a while for the reform policy to reach and be put into practice in 
everyday life of Yanbian. In the early 1980s people in Yanbian were still confused about what 
it meant to be the “market economy” and “property-making.” It was because “privatization” 
or “selling” was still forbidden while, at the same time, these activities were secretively but 
gradually more widespread.14 Due to the geographical marginality as an ethnic enclave, as I 
illustrate above, Yanbian’s development has been overlooked or deferred by the central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In the early 1990s, the former Soviet countries had the same reaction to the “market.” The long forbidden 
market activities made people shameful of doing “immoral” activities (selling and making profits), while at the 
same time, they became “proud” of individual autonomy and rapid economic betterment through the market 
activities. The contradictory response to the “market” has been ethnographically documented in Markets & 
Moralities: Ethnographies of Postsocialism (Mandel and Humphrey 2002).  
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government. Yet, as Yanbian Korean Chinese experienced the rise of market over time, they 
testified the role of market in helping them “open” the eyes through contacting with external 
“world” and long-distance business trips to larger Chinese cities. The interaction with the 
“world” by going out soon became a fashion that created a certain flow of mobility and 
circulation—things, people and habits.  
              While I stayed in Yanbian, I witnessed the ambiguous periodization that characterizes 
the “transition”15 along with the economic reform, following the cycle of emergence and 
demise of a collective fashion and yearning for something new; as people called it, “wind.” As I 
earlier introduced in the Introduction, wind has multiple connotations in this context: it 
continues to move and change the direction without notice; it changes the airflow; it is 
temporary but influential if it is strong. The metaphorical use of wind, which sometimes results 
in turbulence, is to describe the passion and fashion that has shaped and reshaped the 
direction of mobility and the method to care for the future amongst Yanbian Korean Chinese. 
In what follows, I trace the trajectory of urbanization intersected with Korean Chinese 
mobility—Market wind, North Korea Wind, Soviet Wind, and Korean Wind. Even with the Winds 
the ethnic enclave remained fairly intact until the Korean wind blew to Yanbian from the early 
1990s.  
1.2.1 Wind  I: The Rise of Market 
           From the early 1980s, the farming land was redistributed on the basis of the family 
number and the farming products came to belong to individual families, no more to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  As Karl Polany suggested in The Great Tranformation(1944(2001)), the economy has never been purrely economic; 
it is always a political and cutlural economy. Buraway and Verdery also point out the transitional economy has 
brought about the cultural and political transformation. Transition is a process, not a unilinear one of moving from 
one stage to the next but a combined and uneving ones having multiple trajectories (1999:14). Yanbian’s economic 
transition, in particular, during the early stage of the economic reform, has reshaped the mind, behavior, and 
perspectives of the people in the region; Korean Chinese, in particular, reconstituted themselves as transnational 
subjects along with their homelands—North Korea and South Korea.  
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collective unit. This new system of production and distribution encouraged farmers to 
increase their productivity and start selling the surplus product to the market if there was 
surplus left. The idea of profit making rapidly permeated to urbanites and the practice of 
selling had the ethnic margin gradually connected to the external “world.” While researching 
on the history of market in Yanbian, I happened to meet Mr. Hong in a summer picnic 
organized by the association of the old (laoren xiehui). The Association has collective activities on a 
regular basis, such as dancing, singing, and hiking, for the Korean Chinese retirees who are 
mostly older than sixty years old. At this picnic, I met several former business people who did 
xiahai (plunging into the ocean) in the late 1980s and early 1990, as precursors to lead their 
own business for the economic profit. Of these, Mr. Hong was considered a successful 
businessman in the wake of economic reform and open economy. I continued to carry a 
conversation with him, mainly asking about how he started and managed his business. He told 
me about his swift reaction to the economic reform, resulting in economic betterment over 
others in a short period of the time. 
             Mr. Hong in his late sixties used to work for the post office, living in Yanji. From the 
early 1980s, he began to see some of his neighbors and other farmers selling simple things—
tofu, sunflower seeds, tobacco, and so forth—on the street and making some profit, which 
turned out to bring more income than their regular salaries. This surreptitious activity made 
Mr. Hong interested in selling something, but he was not sure what item he would have to sell. 
One day, a good idea occurred to him. Hong’s wife was a factory worker, but she was 
especially good at making mahua (麻花 snack in a twisted shape). Her friends always liked what 
she made and envied her talent. His wife and himself mutually agreed with each other and 
soon started selling mahua as their secondary job. They set up a stand located on the corner of 
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street, where many people passed by. Since Mahua was considered a kind of morning food, the 
Hong couple had to get up at 3am to prepare for a daily business. They started selling at 6am. 
But the prepared mahua was all sold out by 7am. Mr. Hong went to the post office for his 
regular job after this busy morning business. As the business quickly picked up beyond their 
expectation, they had to prepare more ingredients for more sales, by getting up at 2am. Mr. 
Hong said, “we were physically tired, but this extra cash income made us forget about the 
exhaustion. It was incomparable to our combined incomes—more than four times.” However, 
he heard, one day, the local government would prohibit street vendors from doing businesses 
for the purpose of city landscape.  
         The Hong couple was not worried much because they were not the only vendor. 
People—both Han and Korean Chinese—still sold things regardless of the ban of the local 
government. As the regulation could not stop these rapidly increasing vendors day by day, the 
local government eventually had to decide to establish an “official market.” The government 
was acting like a landlord by selling or renting booths to individual sellers. To begin with, 
Hong’s couple got a rented booth within the new market. Soon later, their successful business 
allowed them to buy a booth for the restaurant. They became the owners of a restaurant—the 
laoban. The opening of official market was a historical event, which dramatically transformed 
the perspective of money, profit, market, and “the world.” In 1985, as “the Yanji West 
market”(西市场 xishichang), opened as the first and largest market in Yanbian, smaller cities— 
Longjing, Tumen, and Helong—also came to have their public markets that allowed sellers to 
have their own business as laoban within the markets. Hong’s story is one of numerous 
examples that could help us sense the initial landscape of market and mood of privatization 
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Photo 2. The Yanji West Market. By June Hee Kwon (2009) 
	  
in Yanbian. He found a good niche market by capitalizing on the talent of his wife. He also 
realized the harder he worked, the more money he could make in contrast to the collective 
farm and rigid socialist production system. The excitement about the emerging market and the 
derived benefit and profit was rapidly spread out and widely shared. Whenever I interviewed 
with current business people and government officers in their fifties or older, including the 
former business people I met at the picnic, they recollected the 1980s as the time full of new 
energy, new experience, and new thought in the wake of market. This was an eye-opening 
moment for Korean Chinese who used to live in an insular ethnic zone. 
          The eye opening experiences were more prominent in business that required long 
distance trips. While Mr. Hong’s restaurant business was localized without need of travel, 
those who engaged in trading business had to take multiple trips to buy products in larger 
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cities. Before starting the business, these traders had never left this ethnic enclave in their life. 
At the kernel of this memory, when I talked to peddlers, lie the fear and excitement about the 
first long distance trip to other Chinese cities to buy stuff to sell for their business. Given the 
marginalized location of Yanbian, peddlers (采购员 caigouyuan) had to go to larger cities in order 
to buy new products, carry them back to Yanbian and sell them in their stores. They had to 
repeat this cycle because Yanbian did not have a big market to meet the high demand on 
product consumption. The peddlers took trains to closer cities in Northeast China, such as to 
Shenyang or Harbin. It was a day or two day trip. But, when they took longer trips to more 
commercialized southern cities like Shanghai or Guangzhou, it took three days only to reach 
there. The peddlers remember these business trips were long, exhausting, and risky. Since this 
peddling was transacted only with cash, the peddlers were known to carry a large amount of 
cash with them. The cash was always the target of robbers. Danger lurked in the train all the 
time. In order to protect themselves from the risk of being attacked by these random robbers 
and brighten up the dull and long trip, the peddlers took business trip in a group with three or 
four other peddlers. Responding to continuous and multiple business trips, one of Korean 
Chinese ladies, a current seller at the West Market of Yanji, who I met at the picnic, said to me, 
“Whenever I took a trip, I felt my eyes were open to the bigger world and newer things” and 
“I came to learn how to do the business in “real” China with “real” Chinese.”  
          The rise of market enabled to circulate not only things but also transform people in a 
new fashion.16 The business trip brought a dual impact. It helped Korean Chinese living in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In fact, the peddlers I happened to meet were predominantly females. And, when we go to the Yanji West 
Market (Xishichang), most laobans are female. In Yanbian, there is a common saying, “ there is no place where 
Korean Chinese do not go,” and in more gender specific, “the first group to start taking a business trip was those 
who went to sell Kimchi to Han Cave (Han Chinese populated areas meaning most of Chinese cities).” A lot of cases, 
majority of these female peddlers did not speak Chinese at all when having business with Han Chinese. All 
business was a series of learning process—not only Chinese language, but also a Chinese way of doing business. 
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parochial ethnic enclave to “open” their eyes to the new world while, at the same time, the trip 
made them realize their ethnic minority-ness—who speak no Chinese and have no knowledge 
about “real” China and Chinese culture (Chapter2). Feeling the ethic discomfort, the “pure” 
ethnic subjects came to face with the external world, waidi, in the wake of market, extending 
the geographical imagination and the scope of actual mobility, not only to Chinese large cities, 
but also to North Korea and Soviet Union for transnational businesses. In the wake of the 
initiation of market, North Korea came to the fore as the first transnational business partner 
due to the geographical proximity, linguistic similarity, and kinship connectivity. 
1.2.2 Wind  2: North Korean Wind  
           From the mid-1980s, the peddling was expanded to North Korea and later, to the 
Soviet Union. I often heard about small and large business experience to North Korea from 
Korean Chinese migrant workers who I met both in Korea and in Yanbian. The frequent and 
repetitive story telling might evidence the wide practice of the business amongst Korean 
Chinese in the mid-1980s. Despite the geographical adjacency between Yanbian and North 
Korea, the business relationship had been limited by political circumstances for decades. Even 
though China and North Korea had been on the reciprocal terms as neighboring socialist 
states, the diplomatic relationship was seriously hostile during the Cultural Revolution because 
Kim Ilsung, the leader of North Korea back then, was critical of the harsh political gesture of 
Mao. Kim’s critique made Mao furious and resulted in political antagonism between two 
countries. In particular, Korean Chinese were treated as possible runaways to North Korea 
(ancestors’ homeland) and as political betrayers who would abandon China (their official 
home country). Any possible tie related to North Korea—familial, economic, and political—
was a condition for political persecution. In order to avoid the emotional, political, and 
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physical traumatic events fraught with politics, Korean Chinese had to prove how faithful they 
were to China, a home country, and how fully they became Chinese by de-coloring their 
ethnic identity as “full” Chinese (highlighted in Chapter 5). Yet, as the political tension was 
gradually eased and the diplomatic relationship was recovered from the mid-1980s, Korean 
Chinese were allowed to visit their families back in North Korea with less political burden. On 
the way, some Korean Chinese began to carry Chinese industrial products to exchange with 
the North Korean seafood, which was known to have a high quality. Or, some Korean 
Chinese began to work like peddlers for the big margin of the business, staying in North 
Korea for several days or weeks.17            
           One of Korean Chinese migrant workers who I met in Seoul told me about her trading 
experience in North Korea. She used to work in a furniture factory in Yanbian. But as the 
factory showed a gradual decline, she started her own business such as selling fruits in the 
market. In addition, she considered going to North Korea a source for the extra income in the 
late 1980s. She said, “  
I carried as much stuff as I could all the way to North Korea—as heavy as my back 
and arms were broken. Once I got there, I had to rely on a North Korean mediator 
who guided me to a large market that opened on a regular basis—such as once a 
week. I put my products on the market. There were a lot of thieves in the market. I 
got stolen once too. It was very stressful to be alert all the time. Sometimes, I just 
passed the products to the mediator and exchanged seafood on the right spot. The 
money that I could earn from the selling (exchanging) was not bad, which was better 
than several months of salary given by my factory. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Various Korean Chinese informants testified about “the advanced” culture of North Korea influenced by 
Korean Japanese who returned from Japan to North Korea. From the late 1950s to the early 1960, North Korea 
promoted the “returning home” program to attract Koreans in Japan who underwent harsh ethnic discrimination 
in Japan. This repatriate program was aimed to tighten the relationship between North Korea and Koreans in 
Japan, those Koreans who might work as a channel to induce “advanced” culture and modernized things from 
Japan to North Korea. The Japanese products were sold and exported to China through Korean Chinese peddlers. 
As a result, Yanbian was one of the first places in China to enjoy the color TVs, audio recorder, and video player 
that were imported from Japan according to informants in Yanbian.  Morris-Suzuki developed the narrative related 
to the repatriate Koreans from Japan to North Korea in Exodus to North Korea (2007). 
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However, the stories I was told showed that the peddling to North Korea did not last long. 
Even though it became a popular extra source of income among farmers and factory workers, 
it had several limits in itself. First, the profit margin could not increase because the amount of 
products that these peddlers could carry to North Korea was limited in each trip. Given the 
public transportation was not reliable to get to North Korea crossing the border, the (Korean) 
Chinese peddlers had to rely on personal vehicles on the way to North Korea by paying a 
certain amount of money for drivers. The peddlers knew that the more they carried, the more 
they could sell and earn, because there was always high demand on Chinese products in North 
Korea. Peddlers, who were individuals and not organized sellers, could not change the small 
scaled-business style and thus, could not amass capital. They realized they were unable to turn 
the trading into a big business. Most of all, since Korean Chinese were unfamiliar with the 
market situation of North Korea, they had to rely on North Korean mediators. Some distantly 
related North Korean relatives or newly made North Korean business partners often turned 
out to be traitors and cheaters. Sometimes, North Koreans thieves robbed Korean Chinese 
peddlers. In addition, since the market restriction was too tight and fluctuating—where and 
when to sell what to whom—in North Korea, it was not free for Korean Chinese to do the 
business in North Korea as if they were lost and frustrated in an old homeland. Under the 
special market condition with high risk and low trust, Korean Chinese sometimes went 
bankrupt although their business had showed quite of success for some period of the time. 
The poor and unpredictable market condition had quickly exhausted Korean Chinese peddlers 
and the North Korea wind was flagging as the Soviet wind was blown to Yanbian in the late 1980s. 
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1.2.3 Wind 3 : The Soviet Wind                
             As the Soviet Union ended in 1991, many Chinese left for the former Soviet areas in 
order to seize the new market opportunity by introducing Chinese industrial products. In stark 
contrast to the small scale and short period barter type trading with North Korea, the business 
with Russian18 market was more organized, merchandised and high-profit making oriented. 
Since the Soviet industry was developed with a focus on heavy industry under the socialist 
regime, the industrial product—so called, the light industry—was always short in Russia. By 
targeting this niche market, some Korean Chinese also engaged in the business, taking long 
trips to Moscow or Ukraine, but the majority of Korean Chinese dealers left for the east part 
of Russia because it closely faced with Northeast China—in particular, eastern Part of Jilin and 
Heilongjiang. The items for sale were diverse, but these merchants mostly concentrated on 
selling clothes and shoes, which were on high demand in Russia.19 These merchants came to 
deal with much larger portion of products in the Russia market, staying for years, which was a 
much longer period of the time compared to the business in North Korea. 
             In fact, majority of those who did have experience as peddlers to North Korea went 
to Russia for business, too. When I heard about the long distance business trips to Russia 
from former Korean Chinese merchants, I found that one of intriguing points of the business 
in Russia is the way that the business was organized for self-protection and profit-
maximization. Despite the high margin, Russia was known to be an extremely dangerous place 
to do business as expressed in a saying, “when people went to Russia for business, they almost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In Yanbian, people frequently alternate Russia with the Soviet Union in their use. Here, I use Russia because the 
area where Korean Chinese had business is mostly the current Russia territory. Yet, when people refer the “wind,” 
only the “Soviet” Wind (soryun baram) is used.  
 
19  Even now, it is easy to see Russian merchants or tourists shopping in Yanbian, in particular, in a city called, 
Hunchun, a city that borders with Far East part of Russia.  
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put their life out there.” In fact, Russian gangsters targeted Chinese merchants because 
Chinese were good at business and believed to carry a lot of cash with them. Regardless of 
high risk, however, the high margin seemed to overshadow the fear and anxiety for the trip to 
Russia, which kept the Soviet wind blowing throughout Yanbian from the late 1980s to the early 
1990s.  
            The Soviet wind seemed to dovetail with the economic reform and open economy in 
China. Sometimes, the government work unit encouraged workers to go to Russia to make 
money by providing official vacation for the trip. It was implicit but institutionalized support 
from the work units. Mr. Kim Hakman in his early seventies, who used to be a vice mayor of 
one of cities in Yanbian, recalled the Soviet Wind as following: 
When the Soviet collapsed in 1991, they needed a lot of products. At that time, we, 
Korean Chinese, thought that it was a great opportunity to make money. Thus, in our 
work unit, we encouraged our workers to have temporary vacation and do whatever they 
could make money. They were allowed to return to the work unit in a couple of years 
after making decent money. Since I was fairly high ranked in a city government, I could 
not stay away and do business. But, I have been to the Soviet [Union] a couple of times 
in 1991. I was very impressed with their higher level of “civilization” and development 
compared to China at that time. But, doing business in the Soviet was extremely 
dangerous. My brother in law, my wife’s brother, went to the Soviet and made a lot of 
money there. But, Russian gangsters stabbed him with knife. He was almost killed. 
Even with the risk, people went to the Soviet until the early 1990s because the return 
was big. 
 
In response to the high risk, the merchants had to develop new methods to protect 
themselves. Not only Mr. Kim, but also other former merchants to Russia detailed the special 
way: the merchants made a team for the business while they stayed in Russia. The business 
team was organized between friends before they left for Russia. But, sometimes, they formed 
a team with strangers after they got to Russia—that was for a mutual win-win outcome. More 
importantly, these merchants did fake marriages in order to look as if they were a family that 
shows the merchant is not alone, having a trustworthy companion. Many former merchants 
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said that before they left for Russia or they began the business in Russia, the couple had a 
wedding ceremony. But the “couples” were not supposed to ask about the personal 
information including real names. The merchants lived as a new person throughout the 
promised period of the business in Russia. From stories told by the former merchants, I 
noticed there was a type of division of labor by gender. Once the real business started, women 
tend to take care of the store while men were in charge of purchasing products from China 
and carrying them to Russia. In order to take care of the security issue, sometimes, two 
couples were jointed as business partners. The “married” merchants—“bride and groom”—
lived together as if they were a real couple in quest for the common goal and safety. 
Sometimes, they developed the feelings for each other and had actual love affairs. But, the 
“official” contract was that they kept the fake couple relationship between themselves, and 
would not meet again after they returned to China. Despite the “contract,” the Soviet wind 
posed a challenge about the normative couple and family relationship to Korean Chinese 
merchants with the embedded practice of “fake coupling” as a rite of passage. It was 
performed for the purpose of self-protection and business interest but it has also evolved as a 
natural way of life, which led to actual affair and increase of divorce in Yanbian (see chapter 3).              
             When I was collecting the memories related to the Soviet Wind from various former 
Korean Chinese merchants, I could sense the anxiety and excitement of informants in 
recalling the time of Russia. The stakes were high. The risk was high. The returning benefit 
was high. If succeeded, it would be the chance to come once in a lifetime. But, the business 
seemed to be so unpredictable that most merchants could not continue the business after one 
or two attempts unless there was a solid organized supporting group—financial, security, and 
social network support. The former merchants said that it would be hard to maintain the 
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business without support from gangster groups that backed their security. Even though 
Korean Chinese merchants remember good things about Russia as a developed and civilized 
western country, Russia seemed to be too foreign for them to live a life for a longer period of 
the time, not to mention that the language was hard to master. The Soviet wind was peaked in 
the early 1990s, formulating the flow of mobility to Russia and new economy, depending on 
the large sum of money from Russia. But, it rapidly faded out and was replaced with the Korean 
Wind as China normalized the diplomatic relationship with South Korea in 1992. 
1.2.4 Wind  4: Korean Wind  
            The diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea in 1992 was an epochal 
event for the Korean Chinese community in China in the sense that it rejuvenated kinship ties 
forgotten under Cold War politics and created a new flow of population. In addition, Koreans 
have come to China to find new business partners and cheaper labor, while Korean Chinese 
moved to Korea to serve as the cheaper labor. I often heard Korean Chinese recall their first 
encounter with South Korea, expressing their overwhelming anxiety and nervousness about 
the visit to the long forbidden “home” country and reunion with separated family (see 
chapter5). The kinship reunions that the South Korean government began the late 1980s as a 
humanitarian gesture became a channel for Korean Chinese to visit Korea. South Korea 
issued “kinship visit visas” to Korean Chinese, which triggered the intense flow of Korean 
Chinese migration later in the 1990s. Many Korean Chinese brought Chinese medicine in bulk 
to South Korea (chapter6), partially as gifts for relatives, and partially to sell for profit. At the 
heart of stories about traveling to South Korea was always the amount of money the teller 
could make in several months by selling Chinese medicine. Through these repeated trips, 
Korea emerged as a profitable marketplace for Korean Chinese from Yanbian. 
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          The financial benefit was substantial. Back in the late 1980s, “Ten Thousand Yuan” 
(Wanyuan currently $1,600) was an amount considered conferring symbolic affluence and 
success in China—households that had succeeded in saving this amount were lauded as 
wanyuanhu (ten thousand Yuan household). But some Korean Chinese made ten thousand 
yuan from a single visit to Korea. This sudden material achievement incited Korean Chinese 
to have a fantasy of South Korea as a dreamland. “If you go to Korea,” it was said, “your back 
will ache from gathering dollars all over in the street.” South Korea, which Communist China 
had long portrayed as an impoverished capitalist enemy and “baby” subject to the US 
imperialism, started becoming viewed as a destination that enabled an escape from socialist 
poverty in China, in particular, for farmers. The Korean Chinese outflow to Korea started 
slowly in the late 1980s as the South Korean economy expanded after hosting the Seoul 
Olympics in 1988. But emigration gathered dramatic momentum after 1992 with the 
normalization between the two countries.  
         The kinship visits rapidly evolved into labor migration in a couple of years. From the 
early 1990s, Korean Chinese who entered with the family visit visas began overstaying and 
working as cheap, illegal labor. However, despite the increasing numbers of undocumented 
Korean Chinese, the visa situation was not favorable to Korean Chinese from Yanbian. As I 
illustrated above, their ancestors, of course, had mostly moved from the contemporary North 
Korea to China beginning in the late nineteenth century, and thus, they had a harder time 
obtaining family visit visas because the majority of them did not have actual kinship ties to 
South Koreans and registration records left in South Korea.20 As the suddenly well-off Korean  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The majority of Korean Chinese living outside of Yanbian (in Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning) had moved from 
the southern part of Korea—current South Korea—during the Japanese occupation. Consequently they could 
easily demonstrate family ties to South Korea, and were as a group able to enter the South Korean labor market 
prior to Yanbian Korean Chinese.  
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Photo 3. Korean Chinese Town in Gribongdong, Seoul, Korea.  Most restaurants are run by 
Korean Chinese migrants who came through the Korean Wind. By June Hee Kwon (2011)	  
 
Chinese who returned from South Korea spurred a new “Korean dream,” illegal brokers 
developed methods to forge visa and passports by “making and faking kinship” via marriage 
(Freeman 2011), and putting into circulation faked documents as pricy commodities. Of  
course, again, the stakes were high, as everything was illegal, and it cost tremendous sums, 
often putting visa-seekers into debt. The financial burden was heavy. But as there was a widely 
shared presumption that migrants could pay off the debt in a year or two after getting into 
Korea, the debt was believed to be not an obstacle. The illegal migration market has expanded 
year by year, expedited by the brokers and by the high demand on visas to Korea. The reliance 
on illegal brokers became the most common and normal route to get into Korea—it became the 
way to go to Korea. Under the far-flung black market that was advertised only by word of 
mouth, those who wanted to enter Korea continuously searched for the best would-be broker 
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with the highest “success” rate. The search and its impact continue till now even after the visa 
regulations have been relatively loosened as I lay out in the Introduction (also see chapter 4). 
1.3  The Economy of Kinship 
              The Korean Wind was first felt in Northeast China outside of Yanbian, in other parts 
of Jilin province and in Heilongjiang, areas where Korean Chinese with ethnic origins in the 
southern part of Korea (Chosun at the time of migration) have been more likely to settle. The 
ancestors of the Korean Chinese now living in these areas were the so-called “latecomers” to 
China, who arrived during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in the 1930s, whereas 
Korean Chinese who settled in Yanbian—the border area—generally arrived much earlier, 
moving into China starting in the late nineteenth century.21 Since the early comers, from the 
northern part of Korea, took the land of Yanbian (in the southern part of Manchuria), the 
latecomers had to go further north, into northern Manchuria, to find unoccupied lands 
untaken. Due to the particular topography shaped by Korean Chinese migration history, 
Korean Chinese living outside of Yanbian tend to maintain stronger emotional attachments to 
South Korea as their original homeland, and their kinship ties are usually to relatives in South 
Korea.22 Here I want to introduce the unique intersection of ethnicity with kinship embedded 
in Korean Chinese transnational migration.  
            In the wake of the Korean Wind, kinship ties to South Korea have come to possess a 
certain currency: they have become a core means of enabling Korean Chinese migration to 
South Korea in the name of visiting relatives and reuniting families. Moreover, marriage to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Korean Chinese make distinctions among themselves depending on their ancestors’ origins in the Korean 
peninsula. Those whose ancestors came from southern Korea (and settled in northern Manchuria) are called 
Namdoqi (the southerners), while those whose ancestors came from northern Korea (and who mostly settled in 
Yanbian) are called Buldoqi (northerners). 
 
22 A majority of them speak in the accent of Kyungsangdo, a district in the southern part of South Korea. These 
Korean Chinese do in fact sound like “actual” Koreans.  
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Koreans has turned out to be the easiest way to get Korean citizenship, which then channels 
the opportunity to visit Korea to the families of Korean Chinese who have married Koreans. 
As a result, kinship—both rejuvenated and manufactured—has become the very site of 
production of economic value. In other words, family connections that once posed a fearful 
political threat to Korean Chinese during the Cultural Revolution now enable transnational 
migration (chapter 5). 
           Exploring how the economy of Korean Chinese kinship works as actual currency, I am 
informed by and indebted to kinship studies23 that view kinship as a major factor in maintaining 
social continuity, as a means of transferring goods, ideas, and behaviors based on consangual 
and affilial relationships (Peletz 1995), and as a “mutuality of being” and “intersubjective 
belonging” (Sahlins 2012).24 The core of debate in this field lies in the contentions embedded in 
kinship: kinship as a connection between two domains (natural/given and cultural/creative) 
(Satrathern 1992b), as an aftereffect of the biological realities of sexual reproduction intersected 
with cultural codes and social meanings (Schneider 1984; Yanagisako and Delaney 1995), and 
also as “a symbolic construction” of the natural facts on which society imagines itself to be 
based (Strathern 1992)25  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In particular, Schneider’s statement that “blood is thicker than water,” made in relation to the culture of 
American kinship, still shows a strong distinction between codes of social conduct and blood as biogenetic 
substance. He sees “relatives,” as defined by blood relationships in biogenetic terms, as symbols for biogenetic 
substance (Schneider 1980; Carsten 2004). 
 
24 Sahlins argues that people can choose kinship but they cannot choose how to react to their kin because the code 
of conduct is categorical and already existing (Sahalins 2012:10). 
 
25 Franklin and McKinnon, in their introduction to the edited volume Relative Values: Reconfiguring Kinship Studies, 
point out that kinship can signify specific kinds of connection and inclusion, and simultaneously, disconnection 
and exclusion, that confound boundaries and classification (2001: 15). Besides the role of kinship as social 
demarcation, I also pay attention to the double bound meaning of kinship from an economic point of view. 
Korean Chinese kinship connections and disconnections are based on a demarcation between deserving and 
undeserving kinship, in accordance with the values attached to kinship (as illustrated by the contrasting kinship 
relations of Korean Chinese to North Koreans on the one hand, and South Koreans on the other).  
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            As new technologies and new types of human relationships have redirected sociality and 
community across and beyond biological and familiar relations, “new kinship studies” have 
coined novel kinship terms and political relationships such as “families we choose” (Weston 
1997),26 “queer diaspora” (Eng 2010), “adoptee kinship” (Kim 2010), and “transnational kinship” 
(Freeman 2011). These new kinship studies do not mean to celebrate the “implosion” of nature 
and culture; rather, they pay critical attention to “the how and why of explaining forms of 
cultural change and social organization emergent in the context of an altered grid of relationally” 
(Franklin 2001:319). Within the new kinship studies, I find especially useful the concept of 
“enterprise-up” of kinship (Harraway 1997; McKinnon200; Strathern 1992) in that it focuses on 
the special role of kinship in maintaining property and economic status, for example in new 
genetic and reproductive biotechnologies. McKinnon especially discusses the economies of 
kinship, looking into the relationship between paternity and private property, analyzing kinship 
as a method of perpetuating patriarchal genealogy by “enterprising up” paternity (2001:284).  
             Kinship as a means for “enterprising up” is relevant to the analysis of Korean Chinese 
kinship practices, which are invariably reinvented and employed for economic reasons in the 
context of transnational migration. At the same time, Korean Chinese kinship critically 
challenges kinship studies that still emphasize familial and social continuity, in that Korean 
Chines experience shows how kinship can be manufactured and performed, through (for 
example) faking documents, without any of the assumed continuity and sociality of kinship. I 
push my examination further in two ways. First, I analyze Korean Chinese kinship as a site of 
value production, not only through genealogy but also through enabling certain kinds of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Kath Weston’s discussion of gay kinship is convergent to and divergent from Schneider’s argument. Weston 
states, “Informed by contrasting notions of free will and fixed-ness often attributed to biology in this culture, the 
opposition between straight and gay families echoes old dichotomies such as nature versus culture and real versus 
ideal.”(1997:38). Here, the agency of “we” (in families we choose) highlights each person’s part in constructing gay 
communities, in contrast to biological families based on ideas of blood that are out of individual control.  
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transactions. The following stories tell us the actual process through which kinship produces 
and transfers the potential value that enables transnational migration. Kinship is not here a 
means of passing on values or property to the next generation so as to maintain genealogical 
and social continuity. Rather, there is a measurable, tradable value attached to the kinship tie 
that enables transnational migration. Kinship becomes a commodity that circulates and 
generates actual currency in the migration industry.  
        Second, I try to rethink communal affect and sociality built upon continuity and long-term 
temporality (Carsten 2004; Weston 1997). Korean Chinese migrants and migration markets 
have rejuvenated and transformed decades of broken kinship ties. Many Korean Chinese 
experiences, however, demonstrate that reforging kinship ties does not lead to the 
establishment of sociality. The reconstituted relationship rapidly devolves into an economic 
transaction between Korean Chinese and Koreans. The assumed “shared sociality” and “shared 
memories”27 are largely omitted in Korean Chinese kinship practice. What follows—an 
exploration of Korean Chinese kinship relationships with both North Koreans and South 
Koreans—leads us to a new understanding of kinship as a commodity established on the basis 
of a fragmented and discontinuous temporality.  
1.3.1 The Burden of Kin: North Korea     
          Let me return to the story of the trip to a border town with Cadre Yang. While guiding 
me to the border landscape facing North Korea, Cadre Yang added criticism of the odd 
dictatorship of Kim Jong Il who had not taken care of the basic livelihood of his people. “We, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Sahlins also points out the temporality embedded in kinship saying, “unlike kinship by procreation alone, an 
extended temporality is a condition of the relatedness at issue, since it requires a cumulative process of parental 
care—a condition more or less true of many forms of performative kinship”(2012:8). Here, “shared life,” “shared 
memories,” “shared bodies” require long-term temporality to make and maintain kinship. 
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Chinese, are full of food. We resolved the famine problem long ago.” When we reached the top 
of a mountain that allowed us to see the North Korea side, he pointed out the various North 
Korean towns with his finger, naming each of them for me.28 He started talking about his North 
Korean relatives and the severe poverty afflicting the country, but his sympathy seemed limited 
for some reason.  
          His father’s family was originally from a small North Korean town. They crossed the 
Tumen River when Yang’s father was five years old, in the early 1920s. After settling in Yuejing, 
they focused on farming and reclaiming wasteland. All of his family members were farmers, and 
he grew up doing rice farming, too. Although most of his family now lived in Yanbian, Cadre 
Yang had an aunt who “ran away” from China to North Korea during the Great Leap, in the 
late 1950s and the early 1960s, when China suffered from starvation and poverty. During this 
time the Communist Party requested sacrifices from farmers in order to concentrate on 
industrial development, in order to pay off the debt from the Soviet Union. An old Communist 
Party member I met in a farming town recalled the era: “Nothing was left after we handed in 
the crops we harvested to the government.” This impoverished condition, exacerbated by 
natural disaster, motivated some Korean Chinese to steal away to North Korea, which was 
better off than China at that time. In the early 1960s, North Korea, recovering from the ruins of 
the Korean War, started boosting its heavy industry, and welcomed Korean Chinese to serve as 
factory workers. Since factory work, which represented urbanity and modernity, was considered 
much more prestigious than farming, this became a popular option for Korean Chinese farmers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The Tumen River flows for 548 kilometers (340 miles) between China and North Korea, forming the border 
between them. There are many small towns on both sides of the river. Where the river is particularly narrow, towns 
on opposing sides (China and North Korea) are almost like neighborhoods of the same town.  
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dreaming of a better life in their “home country.” As one of the old cadres told me, “A lot of 
Korean Chinese secretively crossed the Tumen River from our village for the first couple of 
years in the 1960s. We were too poor to eat properly here in China. We found several people 
disappearing every day. They ran away to North Korea during the night. The fashion of 
‘running away’ to North Korea swept through Yanbian at that time.”         
            However, life in North Korea turned out to be more regulated and rigid than they 
expected. In addition, their living conditions were not better than in China and the North 
Korean government did not give them much help. Thus, these runaways tended to return to 
China after a couple of years. The Chinese government accepted them back without inflicting 
any official punishment.29 In the midst of comings and goings, some runaways settled in 
North Korea and lived through up until now like Cadre Yang’s aunt. But these Korean 
Chinese runaways to North Korea could not imagine the critical poverty they would endure in 
the ensuing decades. 
             Cadre Yang continued to talk about his aunt and her family from North Korea. A few 
years ago, Cadre Yang’s aunt came to visit Yang’s family with her two sons. Her husband had 
died from a serious illness that could not be treated amid the starvation and poverty. Since 
they had not seen one another for several decades, Yang’s family eagerly anticipated their visit. 
They collected and packed old clothes, blankets, and food for the aunt to take back with her, 
not to mention enough money to survive for a year in North Korea. They fed them well, 
offering many different kinds of meat dishes. As Cadre Yang remembered, “They could not 
stop eating since they had been starving for years in North Korea. We watched them eat with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 In fact, these runaways were subjected to political persecution during the Cultural Revolution as “North Korean 
spies.”  
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deep pity. When my aunt’s family went back to North Korea, their complexion looked much 
better and healthier.” The aunt and cousins completely filled their truck with what Yang’s 
parents had gathered for them. If they sold what they brought back from China,30 it would 
have been of great financial help, said Cadre Yang. His family felt good about the help they 
were able to provide. Within less than a year, however, the aunt’s son came to visit Yang’s 
family again to plead for more money. Cadre Yang sensed that his cousin did not seem to be 
thankful or apologetic at all. As his North Korean relatives asked for assistance more and 
more frequently, Yang’s sympathy turned into apathy. “I have a lot to deal with on my plate,” 
he said. 
             It’s not only in the border towns on the Tumen River like Yuejing, but also 
throughout Yanbian, that family histories related to North Korea are preserved among 
Korean Chinese. In these narratives, the meaning of North Korea is multifaceted. On the one 
hand, North Korea is the ancestral homeland; on the other it is a comparison group to prove 
the success of Chinese socialism. North Korea, under tight control and surveillance, also 
substantiates the significance of freedom, which Chinese believe they ordinarily enjoy in 
contrast to North Koreans. Looking at the suffering of his North Korean relatives there, 
Cadre Yang came to realize that his life in China was relatively affluent and happy. But he also 
became aware that he was not affluent enough to provide endless economic support to them. 
Relatives in impoverished North Korea have turned out to be a financial as well as emotional 
burden for Cadre Yang, who sometimes hopes to go to South Korea to make money if there 
is a proper visa available for him.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Interestingly, North Koreans refused to accept the blue jeans because they could not sell them in North Korea, 
where they were regarded as symbolic of U.S. imperialism. 
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            In addition, despite the geographical proximity and biological kinship tie, reunions 
after several decades often do not eventuate in any longer term relationships, ending up as 
one-time life events.31 The sharp economic disparity between North Korea and China has led 
many Korean Chinese to block out North Korean relatives who threaten to be financial 
burdens. Most of all, since North Korean refugees have become a critical political concern in 
the border area, Korean Chinese try to avoid causing political trouble for themselves in the 
name of kinship ties. In contemporary China where “money is more important than anything,” 
as many Korean Chinese put it, they have turned their interest to South Korea where they can 
work and make better money than in China. If they have no kin in South Korea, as is the case 
of most Korean Chinese in Yanbian, they have crafted new or fake kinship ties through 
marriage or illegal migration brokers. On the one hand, kinship ties to North Korea have been 
forgotten, obscured, or denied over time. On the other hand, new kinship ties to South Korea 
have come into being, generated by a new flow of migration and migration market.  
1.3.2 The Currency of Kin: South Korea 
          As the kinship visits dramatically evolved into labor migration in a couple of years, both 
Korean Chinese and Korean relatives soon discovered the mutual lucrative aspect of kinship 
visa, which led its wide commodification in migration market. I heard the similar pattern of 
narrative regarding the “visa deal” that Korean Chinese went through with their Korean 
relatives. A lady I met in Korea told me about the visa deal story as following.  
We (my husband and I) were so happy to find that there lived a cousin of my husband 
in Korea. We felt as if we got a lottery ticket since we could be invited to go to Korea. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Tumen River, a movie directed by Zhang Liu, was shot in a Yanbian town on the border, and dramatizes the 
ambivalent relationship between Korean Chinese and North Koreans as co-ethnic groups.  On the one hand 
North Koreans are seen as impoverished neighbors in desperate need: the movie portrays the friendship that 
develops between a Korean Chinese boy and a North Korean boy who crosses the River in search of food.  On 
the other hand, North Korean defectors are often seen as criminal outsiders; the movie also contains a scene in 
which a North Korean man rapes a Korean Chinese girl who had given him food. 
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Yet, once they decided to invite us (husband and herself), they started asking us to pay 
money for the visa application. It was five thousand dollars. It was fairly big money 
back in the early 1990s. We had to pay that mount for the cousin because we still 
thought that it was much better deal than going through illegal brokers. After we 
entered Korea, there was no business left between the cousin and us. In Korea, we 
could not get close to the cousin’s family because the family was separated too long—
the connection was broken even before the Korean War. 
 
The encounter between Korean Chinese and Korean relative did not seem to look like 
a happy family reunion, the family long split by the Korean War, bur rather a business-
like that required actual money transactions. While having the visa deal in  “business-
like” ways, these two parties ended up turning backs to each other or breaking up the 
relationship in worse cases. However, given the truth that there are less Korean 
Chinese in Yanbian, who have relied on the kinship visit visa to enter Korea than 
other area of Northeast China (for the reason that most ancestors of Yanbian Korean 
Chinese had moved from the contemporary North Korea to China), having the 
kinship ties to South Koreans was highly considered the potential currency. A few 
precursors who had ties, took advantage of them, and thus visited South Korea 
proved their rapid economic achievement. This suddenly well-off Korean Chinese 
came to spur the “Korean dream” in Yanbian.  
             Here, government policy toward Korean Chinese immigration needs special attention. 
The kin-focused visa issued to Korean Chinese by the Korean government (Freeman 2011; 
Kim 2011) has formulated the pattern of Korean Chinese migration, the policy that has 
Korean Chinese aiming to extend and manipulate kinship relations. Since Yanbian Korean 
Chinese have fewer “biological” kinship ties to South Koreans on the basis of family 
genealogy as mentioned above, marriage has become a major means to create affilial kinship 
between Korean Chinese women and South Korean men—“in-law” family. The reasons for 
and consequences of the marriages vary greatly, of course, and cannot always be classed 
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simply or easily as “fake” or “real.” My aim here is not to explore the marriage patterns or the 
dynamics between two parties—Korean and Korean Chinese. Rather I focus on the way in 
which marriage plays a role in extending and transferring the “right” for the related kinship to 
enter South Korea; not only for direct family, parents and siblings, but also extended family 
members such as uncles and aunts.  
           The history of the visa regulation runs as follows. At the start of the Korean Chinese 
migration in the 1990s, Korean Chinese women who married a Korean man were able to 
invite her parents, and her parents were allowed to stay for a year. However, after the 
invitation visa became widely used to overstay and work in Korea, the Korean government 
has modified the visa conditions, allowing Korean Chinese women to invite more family 
members, and letting these invited members stay for longer periods of time. The intention of 
the government was to gradually increase the entry number of Korean Chinese and minimize 
the number of undocumented subjects. Yet the Korean government has resisted expanding 
the number of entry visas issued to Korean Chinese, in the name of protecting the domestic 
labor market. Yet, there is always an excess of Korean Chinese waiting to go to Korea. In 
these competitive circumstances, the Korean Chinese who do not get visas rely on illegal 
brokers to expedite the trip to South Korea, and the brokers always find a new loophole in the 
system.  
            The visa regulations of the Korean government are complicated and change frequently 
depending on the government’s position on immigrant labor and overseas Koreans. I am 
often surprised to see how knowledgeable Korean Chinese are about Korean visa trends, and 
how swiftly they are able to adjust their plans in tandem with policy changes. I heard much 
about the extended family invitation visa time and again. The story from the youngest member 
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of the hiking group, Jielan in her late twenties, provides us with an insight regarding the 
economy of kinship. She was a daughter of farmers from a rural part of Yanbian. Her parents 
were fairly well off compared to other farmers in her town, but they had a hard time paying 
for her college education solely with income from farming. In order to relieve the financial 
burden, her father tried to go to Korea many times via brokers, as many people he knew had 
done. But his visa applications kept being denied, until he finally succeeded just two years 
before. Jielan had a female cousin who got married to a South Korean man. The cousin could 
invite up to four related family members into South Korea according to the invitation 
regulation. After the cousin’s parents (Jielan’s father’s brother and his sister-in-law) were 
invited as the first group, there were two “seats” left. There was a slight competition to get 
these remaining “seats” amongst Jielan’s father’s siblings over the years. Two years ago, the 
cousin’s brother came back to China, and his “seat” became available to Jielan’s father.32 Again 
the kin-focused visa regulation has created a flow of migration along the kinship chain.    
              This story is not uncommon in Yanbian. Once somebody has married a Korean man, 
the right to invitation can be transferred to other family members—both consangual and 
affilial kin. In addition, when the invitation visa cannot be used directed by family members, 
the visa can go on the “market” and be sold to “customers” who want to go to Korea. Here 
we obviously observe the birth of “paper kinship”: kinship is not only the product of 
“relatedness” but also of the means to transfer rights as goods in the marketplace. In addition, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 There are many different kinds of entry visa available to Korean Chinese at different moments because the 
Korean government has frequently changed the visa regulation. Since 2007, one of the most common types 
nowadays is the F-2 visa, which guarantees free entry for five years in order to work in designated fields (mostly 
physical labor and the service sector). In order to acquire the F-2, applicants have to take a qualification exam that 
tests their fluency in Korean and knowledge of Korean law and society. If the participants in the test gain over 60% 
of score, they qualify for a lottery, and if they are chosen in the lottery they are allowed to go to Korea. Jielan’s 
mother and Jielan herself both passed the exam and won the lottery. Jielan’s father went to Korea via the kinship 
visitation visa.  
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kinship is not a ground on which to create communal feeling or affect. Rather, it works as the 
potential currency that enables transnational migration and pursuit of a better economic future. 
The tie that used to pose a threat during the Cold War era turns out to have a valuable 
currency in the wake of the “Korean Wind”—the fashion that Korean Chinese have intensively 
pursued through migration for the last two decades—whereas the old socialist kinship with 
North Korean has been forgotten or obscured. The currency of kinship has formulated the 
direction and flow of Korean Chinese migration, providing migrants with potential market 
value.  
             My suggestion here is that the discovered and circulated currency attached to kinship 
leads Korean Chinese migrants not to create a sense of belonging to the homelands, but to 
facilitate the freer border crossing for the economic means, thereby making Korean Chinese 
migrants fall into others or strangers in “homeland” of South Korea. In other words, the 
currency of kinship has played a role in reinforcing the Korean Chinese border affect and 
minority subjectivity. Here, the role of “kinship” is peculiar: it does not only imply the 
biological tie that brings about empathy and sociality. It also challenges the very biological basis 
of kinship by crafting and manipulating kinship as a commodity that confers the ability to visit 
(and work in) South Korea: the emergence of “paper kinship,” creating relatedness to strangers 
who might sometimes use somebody else’s visa and ID cards. On the other hand, the actually 
biological kinship tie to North Korean relatives has worn thin and been downplayed due to the 
emotional, financial and political burden it entails, despite sympathy for the impoverished state 
of North Korea. The links and ruptures facilitated by the economy of kinship have 
continuously rewired the connectivity of this borderland to the global economy, affecting new 
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flows of migration from China to Korea, and from Korea to China. The economy of kinship is 
driven less by familial intimacy than by desire for actual currency, “enterprising-up” kinship.  
1.4  Conclusion 
          This chapter aims to stage Yanbian as an ethnic border zone and Korean Chinese as an 
ethnic minority of China, the condition that has shaped Korean Chinese as a mobile ethnicity 
who have had to sensitively respond to the social changes via constant mobility across and 
beyond China. I situate the historical and geographical context of Korean Chinese migration 
history in correspondence with the vernacular periodization of the Winds widely circulated 
amongst Korean Chinese. Most of all, I highlight the Korean Wind as a main driving force that 
has shaped the contemporary landscape of Yanbian—“everybody is gone”—as a symptom 
occurring at the intersection of post Cold War with post socialism. Here, I pay a special 
attention to the mechanism that has expedited and perpetuated the Korean Wind by looking 
into the role of kinship currency deployed and mobilized in the migration market.  
           The particular economy of Korean Chinese kinship challenges the previous kinship 
studies in two different ways. First, kinship supposes that the related members are expected to 
invest a certain time and effort in order to create and maintain the community and 
relationship (Carsten 2004; Sahlins 2012; Weston 1997)—it is based on the longer temporality. 
And yet, half a century of the Cold War circumstance and political turmoil across East Asia 
resulted in breaking and forbidding Korean Chinese kinship ties to two Koreas. Under the 
interrupted temporality, Korean Chinese discovered and rejuvenated the kinship ties and 
quickly transformed them into a form of currency that made it possible to facilitate the flow 
of transnational migration along with the rapid economic restructuring in China. In this 
respect, Korean Chinese kinship in a form of commodity and currency does not share much 
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time and effort to create community and sociality. Second, relating to the first suggestion, I 
have argued that the Korean Chinese kinship is not much a medium for the “culture of 
relatedness”(Casten 2000), as most kinship studies assume, but a pipeline for transferring 
derivative values as seen in a form of “paper kinship”—a commodity—through faking or 
making marriage and counterfeiting documents. In this process—either faking or making, 
Korean Chinese migrants have been constantly asked to prove or perform the biological and 
legal related-ness, which does not lead to the cultural relatedness and development of the 
kinship affect or sociality. The strangers tied through “paper kinship” come to co-exist via the 
anonymous and random migration market. My introduction to historical formation of Korean 
Chinese as mobile ethnicity and particular migration context shaped by the Korean Wind will lead 
to dramatic social differentiation and transformation in the following chapters; the remittance 
development, new family relationship, gender contention and dynamics, and ethnic politics in 
reaction to multi-layered migration in and out of Yanbian.  
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Chapter 2. Live or Leave : 
The Liminal Life on the Remittance Development 
 
           Yanji is a compact and vibrant city; we can often hear the sound of fireworks that 
celebrate the opening of new business as well as the noise from demolishing old buildings soon 
to be replaced with a new high rise building, diantilou (a building with elevators). The lively 
streets of downtown are full of the high-toned voices of sellers, haggling customers, and 
Korean songs (that are widely enjoyed by Korean Chinese). On weekends, restaurants, massage 
parlors, saunas, and karaoke bars are full. We often have to wait in long lines to find an empty 
room at the fancier karaoke bars or massage parlors. Taxis are lined up waiting to take home 
night customers. This small city is well set-up for customers to spend money on eating, drinking, 
singing, dancing, and massages 24 hours a day. Within this landscape, what especially caught my 
attention is the constant flow of Han Chinese and Korean Chinese flocking into Yanji, not only 
from the countryside of Yanbian, but also from other Chinese cities, to serve the new 
developing industry of consumption and to enjoy the rapid urbanization of the region. There is 
a strong local belief; this animated consumption and driven migration have not been made 
possible without the “Korean money,” remittances that Korean Chinese migrants have sent 
from Korea for the last two decades. I call this emerging phenomenon remittance development,1 the 
development deeply and heavily dependent upon the flow and temporality of remittances. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The body of literature on development views development as a purportedly self-evident modern standard 
(Ferguson 1990; 1999), and as a set of relations among institutions, practices, and systematization for a whole 
(Escobar 1995). These studies assume that development moves from developed regions to underdeveloped ones 
by conveying and implanting modernity through education, capital investment, and economic-political 
restructuring. My focus is rather to investigate the double-bound aspect of remittance development that brings 
about the contention between autonomy and dependence. Development in Yanbian is autonomous, in that it has 
been enabled not by external foreign forces of capital that intend to “modernize” Yanbian, but rather is a 
consequence of the intensive transnational labor of the Yanbian people. At the same time, it is contingent and 
dependent upon the flow of remittances that unpredictably fluctuate with economic conditions, both local and 
global.  
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           The close relationship between remittance and development has been pointed out an 
UNDP report that highlights the positive agency of migrants in development (UNDP 2009; 
Glick Shiller and Faist 2010). Remittance is conceived as a “livelihood strategy” by which 
migrants spread risk and create insurance, thereby improving well-being, reducing poverty, and 
stimulating economic growth (de Hass 2007). By means of remittances, transnational migration 
can become a resource for the production of capital and a dynamic force that promotes 
entrepreneurial activity and economic expansion (Messy and Parado 1998). Most of all, migrants 
facilitate not only the transfer of money, but also “social remittances,” such as new perceptions 
of human rights, gender equity, and democracy (Faist 2010; Levitt 2001; Levitt & Lamba-Neives 
2011). Although the negative effects—brain drain, reduced economic activity, productive 
disarticulation, and increasing local disparities in sending countries—have been highlighted 
(Glick Shiller 2010; Wise and Covarrubias 2010), the migration-development nexus is affirmed 
by the force of remittances, the money transfers vital to social transformation and economic 
development in both sending and receiving countries.  
          Even though the migration-development nexus is also obvious in Yanbian, the 
development based on remittances cannot be stable or predictable. Until 2008, a billion dollars 
a year in remittances had been flowing from Korea to Yanbian according to unofficial Yanbian 
customs statistics. But the global financial crisis in 2008 caused the influx to drop to about 
seven hundred million dollars because of a sharp depreciation of the Korean currency. But the 
Korean currency has since recovered, and as the value of the Korean won increased from 
10,000 won: 40 yuan in 2008 to 10,000 won: 58.90 yuan in 2011, Korean Chinese have rushed 
to exchange the won into yuan, driving consumption up again (Yeonhap News, May 1, 2011). 
That is to say, the flow of remittance is very volatile in tandem with the contemporary inter-
 86 
connected global economy. The whole economy is sensitively shifting along with this unstable 
money flow.  
            An insightful conversation that I had with a Han Chinese taxi driver nicely reveals the 
fluctuating characteristic of remittance and the development. The Han Chinese taxi driver, a 
migrant from countryside of Heilongjiang, emphasized the high levels of consumption in 
Yanbian, particularly that of Korean Chinese. He continued to tell me.  
Most of my customers are Korean Chinese. Korean Chinese spend money 
like water. When the Korean economy is good, my business is good because 
Korean Chinese make more and spend more. They think that when it runs 
out, they can go back to Korea to make more. I came to Yanbian to become 
a taxi driver because I heard that Korean Chinese are good at spending 
money like that. It’s hard for us Han Chinese to go to Korea. We have to 
make ends meet in China. We cannot spend money like them.  
 
This taxi driver statement can be seen as providing testimony to bolster the ethnic stereotype 
widely acknowledged and circulated in Yanbian. At the same time, he exemplifies the inter-
dependency and differentiated mobility between Korean Chinese and Han Chinese, accelerated 
by the Korean wind and Korean money. The common route of nightlife—dinner followed by 
karaoke, massage, and lamb skewers over drinks—seems to be generated and maintained by 
different kinds and scales of migration. Remittance development occurs on multiple scales—
transnational and internal, countryside and city, small city and large city—collapsed together 
and co-present in migration stories, the complex migration that constitutes the ethnic-finance-
city-scape of Yanji.  
           This chapter aims to understand the cultural logic and actual practice of multi-layered 
and multi-scaled movements of population in the ethnic zone in the wake of the remittance 
development. I examine how transnational migration has been intertwined and intersected with 
internal migration—from countryside to big city, from big city to bigger city, from city to 
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countryside, and vice versa—restructuring the ethnic-finance-urban scape of Yanji, in flux and 
in transition. My particular attention is to the constant hesitation, between living and leaving, the 
structure of feeling2 that various migrants have confessed. To do that, I analyze the stories of 
migrants to the city: a farmer moving back and forth between the country and the city, a laid-off 
factory worker, a xiagang (laid off) worker moving from a small city to Yanji, a South Korean 
entrepreneur moving to Yanji in pursuit of new business opportunities, and a Han Chinese 
dagong (physical worker) moving from the countryside to Yanji. On the basis of these personal 
stories, I piece together the puzzle of an ethnic margin that has been reshaped by the Korean 
Wind in order to provide a better understanding of the dynamics of remittance development, which 
is a central condition of life across the region. I have three aims in this chapter. First, I explore 
the way that Korean Chinese attempt to re-define and re-characterize the city of Yanji in 
response to the Korean wind. Yanji, which has been considered an ethnic hub as well as ethnic 
enclave3, engenders mixed feelings in Korean Chinese as they interact more and more with the 
“external” world. Focusing on multi-scaled migration, I analyze the new ways in which Korean 
Chinese have related to Yanbian, an ethnic hub that is continuously remade, largely by the 
Korean Wind. Second, I examine how transnational migration has been intertwined with Han 
Chinese and Korean Chinese internal migration. In particular, my interest is centered on the 
ambivalence between living and leaving as a dominant structure of feeling amongst Korean 
Chinese. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 By “structure of feeling,” Raymond Williams means the affective elements of consciousness and relationships that 
are “not feeling against thought but thought as felt and feeling as thought.” That is a practical consciousness of a 
present kind in a living and inter-relating continuity as a living process (Williams 1977:132-133). 
 
3 There is a double bounded connotation of Yanji; that is an ethnic hub as an ethnic center while at the same time 
it is an ethnic enclave as a parochial ethnic zone. 
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Photo 4. The Yanji International Airport. There are direct flights bewteen Yanji and Seoul 
several times a day. By June Hee Kwon(2009) 
	  
Third, I investigate the ripple effect caused by the Korean Wind. Here, I am attentive to 
“differentiated mobility” (Massey 1993)4 by ethnicity (between Han and Korean Chinese) in 
transnational migration, a mobility driven by the uneven and unequal positioning of different 
groups and persons in relation to various flow and movements (Chu 2009: 10). How differently 
have Han Chinese and Korean Chinese appropriated and reacted to the Korean Wind? In what 
ways have these two distinctive ethnic groups been convergent to and divergent from each 
other in the context of remittance development? Throughout the chapter, I argue that the 
Korean Wind has stirred an ethnically specific mobility. But I also argue that the Korean Wind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Doreen Massey critiques the concept “time-space compression,” coined by David Harvey, as too broad and 
undifferentiated. Instead, she introduces the notion of the “power-geometry of time-space compression,” 
showing how mobility can be differentiated: “different social groups and different individuals are placed in very 
distinctive ways in relation to these flows and interconnections…. Different social groups have distinct 
relationships to this anyway differentiated mobility; some are more in charge of it than others; some initiate 
flows and movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively 
imprisoned by it.”(Massey 1993:61) 
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has created a deep inter-dependency between Han and Korean Chinese, both of whom have 
become distinctively connected to and influenced by the flow of Korean money and the 
remittance development of the region in conjunction with global economic changes.  
2.1. Urban Scape: Ethnic Hub in Flux 
2.1.1 Ethno Scape5  
          Over the last twenty years, the Han Chinese population in Yanbian has increased sharply, 
now reaching 65 percent of the total. This is one of the critical results of the rise in labor 
migration to Korea described by the saying, “gone with the Korean Wind.” Simply speaking, 
Korean Chinese leave Yanbian to live a better life, whereas Han Chinese move into Yanbian—
also to find a better life. The various migratory traffic flows—coming-in and going-out, living 
and leaving—have gradually reorganized the ethnic landscape. The daily conversations that I 
had with Korean Chinese illustrated their complex feelings toward these rapid population 
changes.  
            For example, I frequently heard Korean Chinese observe that before the Korean wind 
hit Yanbian, most taxi drivers were Korean Chinese. But now the Korean Chinese have left, 
and the taxi drivers are all Han Chinese migrants. And that is not the only occupation that has 
been affected. Most service industries are now overwhelmingly staffed by young Han Chinese 
workers (fuwuyuan) who have moved from the countryside of Jilin and Heilongjiang in northeast 
China in order to work as waiters and waitresses at restaurants, karaoke bars, and saunas. 
Cashiers at supermarkets and shopping centers, bank tellers, and postal clerks are mostly Han 
Chinese. Sellers in markets and business owners are Han Chinese. In Yanbian, it is impossible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In an article, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy (1990), Appadurai coined several new terms—
ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, financescape, ideoscape—to map out the disjunctive and non-isomorphic 
landscape of the global economy. Here, I borrow Appadurai’s scape that indicates the fluidity and irregularity of the 
flow in order to capture the fluctuations of an ethnic zone going through rapid economic and urban development.  
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not to interact with Han Chinese and not to speak the Chinese language on a daily basis—
unlike a decade ago. A Korean Chinese reporter told me that Han Chinese dominance is a fairly 
new phenomenon: “Yanbian has become a Han Chinese World [hanjokgul in Korean]. It is not like 
before. Old Korean Chinese farmers who are not fluent in Chinese find it harder and harder to 
get by in Yanbian. We are concerned about the increasing Han Chinese population. Yanbian 
could be taken over by Han Chinese, and we could lose the status of autonomous zone due to 
the small portion of Korean Chinese population in the region.” The encroaching Han Chinese 
“occupation” of Yanbian has increased ethnic tensions and threatened the status of the Korean 
Chinese who had been the majority for most of the last six decades, since the Autonomous 
Prefecture was officially established in 1952.  
           The tensions between Han Chinese and Korean Chinese are juxtaposed with a feeling of 
“ethnic comfort.” Ethnic comfort has been structured partly on the basis of a spatial division by 
ethnicity. First of all, schools are divided; Korean Chinese and Han Chinese go to different 
schools and are taught in different languages—Korean and Chinese respectively. Consequently, 
social networks tend to be ethnically differentiated. Except for those few who go to Han 
Chinese schools, Korean Chinese testify they do not have many close Han Chinese friends. And 
the reverse is true as well, as I found it from multiple interviews with Han Chinese and Korean 
Chinese. Most of all, marriage has played a crucial role in consolidating boundaries between the 
two ethnic groups. Even though Korean Chinese have lived in China for more than a century, 
most Korean Chines I met in Yanbian and South Korea strongly discourage the inter-ethnic 
marriage of their children, due to the language barrier and presumed cultural differences.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 These stereotypes are commonly circulated in Yanbian: Korean Chinese men are supposed to be patriarchal, 
refusing to help with house work and lacking respect for women, while Korean Chinese women are considered to 
be very domestic, devoted to housework and serving their husbands. Han Chinese are generally thought to be 
more frugal and diligent than Korean Chinese. Han Chinese men are family-centered and respect women, while 
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Although there are growing ethnic and cultural interactions and inter-ethnic marriages between 
Han and Korean Chinese, the “ethnic comfort” built upon social separation causes Yanbian 
Korean Chinese to feel mostly detached from China’s dominant Han culture and social network.  
          In Yanbian, the ethnic hub as well as ethnic enclave of Korean Chinese, I found that 
Korean Chinese reveal the double bound perspectives of ethnic dis/comfort when Yanbian is 
compared with other Chinese cities. The feeling emerges more obviously when Korean Chinese 
travel outside of Yanbian, in what is called 外地 (waidi, meaning external world). Jielan, a 
college graduate in her late twenties, insightfully explained the duality of “ethnic comfort.”  
Whenever I take a train and stop seeing Korean signs—which means I’m 
leaving Yanbian—I feel as if I am in “real” China. Even when I go to 
Changchun, which is not the best or largest city in China, I feel ashamed that 
I am from a small ethnic town, and I feel myself not urban enough compared 
to these city people. In addition, I speak Chinese in an accent that sounds 
like a foreigner. Sometimes Chinese ask me if I am from Korea, thinking that 
I am Korean. Whenever I leave Yanbian, I just feel disheartened because I 
am not Chinese enough. 
 
Nevertheless, she continued to affirm that despite its backwardness and marginal location, Yanji 
is still “the best city for me,” because “it has everything I need.” In addition to Jielan, many 
other Korean Chinese friends of mine, in their twenties to forties, expressed similar 
contradictory feelings regarding the “ethnic comfort” of Yanbian. Interestingly, the best-ness of 
Yanbian comes from ethnic comfort, while this same ethnic comfort forces Korean Chinese to 
realize they are living within a parochial and insular ethnic enclave. In other words, the 
perception that “Yanbian is the best place to live” is frequently accompanied by a disdain for 
Yanbian based on its small size, backwardness, and marginal border location. In fact, I often 
heard from non-Yanbian Korean Chinese that Yanbian Korean Chinese are often stigmatized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Han Chinese women are believed to be strong and dominating, unlike Korean Chinese women. These beliefs have 
helped to structure networking patterns, social relationships, and marriages.  
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as “a frog in a small pond,” the assumption being that they have narrower minds and worldviews.7 
Yanbian’s cultural and political autonomy has helped to maintain or improve the quality of 
ethnic education, newspapers, and TV and radio stations. But Yanbian has also become a place 
where Korean Chinese end up interacting less with Han Chinese and Chinese society at large. 
          The dual aspect of Yanbian—a comfortable home as well as a parochial ethnic zone—
might have helped to generate a particular receptivity to the Korean Wind. As I explained in the 
previous chapter, as recently as the 1990s few Chinese traveled even within China, not to 
mention internationally. Most Korean Chinese had never been to any Chinese cities outside of 
Yanbian before they visited Seoul. For the majority of Korean Chinese migrants to South 
Korea, Seoul was by far the largest city they had ever visited. In contrast to Chinese cities, 
toward which Korean Chinese often feel an ambiguous discomfort and fear, the city of Seoul 
gave emotional comfort and familiarity to Korean Chinese visitors on their arrival. Linguistic 
affinities play a critical role in creating the feeling of comfort; everything is written in Korean, 
and everybody is speaking Korean, the native language of Korean Chinese. In addition, Korean 
Chinese commonly testified that things were more “civil” (wenming) in Korea, at least at first 
sight; everything is cleaner and better organized than in China. Along with the high demand for 
Korean Chinese as a cheap source of labor, this widely-felt ethnic affinity has allowed Korean 
Chinese many opportunities in fields that require especially close and interactive verbal 
communication, such as restaurant service, motel cleaning, caring for the old and the sick, and 
construction. It is not only the vast income gap, but also the ethnic affinity that Korean Chinese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is true that Korean Chinese living outside the prefecture of Yanbian have to frequently interact with Chinese-
speaking Han people, whereas Yanbian Korean Chinese do not necessarily need to speak Chinese or develop	  
networks with Han Chinese. This is because non-fluency in Chinese is still acceptable in Yanbian, and Korean 
culture and language enjoy official status. 
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feel for Korea, that has generated the massive, persistent, and sometimes reckless Korean 
Chinese labor migration to South Korea.  
           In response to the Korean Wind, in Yanbian, the new ethnic scape has emerged as 
newcomers arrive and go, live and leave as following. First, Korean Chinese rural migrants and 
laid-off workers have fled from the smaller cities and countryside of Yanbian to the city of 
Yanji in pursuit of better economic opportunities, better ethnic education, and urban living 
conditions. Of these migrants, the majority chooses to go to work in Korea, and the 
remittances enable them to become city residents and maintain an urban lifestyle for family 
members left behind in Yanbian. Another group is Han Chinese farmers who have moved 
mostly from other small towns in Northeast China or the Shandong area via kinship and social 
networks, drawn to the vast farming lands left behind by Korean Chinese who have left for 
Yanji or Korea. Due to these incoming Han Chinese farmers, what were once “pure” Korean 
Chinese ethnic towns—“empty out towns”—have been rapidly reconstituted by the influx of 
Han Chinese. Korean Chinese ethnic schools in countryside have had to close due to the lack 
of students, while new Han Chinese schools are opened. Korean Chinese farmers, who once 
did not need to speak Chinese at all, are confronted with more and more Han Chinese 
neighbors. In addition, Han Chinese—stereotypically thought to be clumsy rice farmers—have 
come to dominate the cultivation of rice, a crop that Korean Chinese farmers used to consider a 
particular specialty. Thirdly, in an urban setting, Han Chinese “dagong”8 (physical laborers) are an 
emerging group in construction and road-building. Most waiters, waitresses, and masseuses in 
service sectors are Han Chinese migrants. Since most Korean Chinese tend to be unwilling to 
perform physical and service labor in Yanbian, knowing that they can be paid so much more for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Dagong means “working for the boss, or selling labor, connoting commodification and a capitalist exchange of 
labor for wages (Ngai 1999; Yan 2009:6). 
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the same work in Korea, Han Chinese workers have come to meet the high demand for service 
labor in Yanbian, thereby becoming new floating residents in the region. In this booming 
economy, Han Chinese business people also compose an essential part of the new incoming 
population, especially in Yanji, where urban development and housing construction afford them 
many opportunities. In the next section, I explore the ways in which these Han Chinese waidiren 
(those who come from the outside) view the ethnic dynamic between Han Chinese and Korean 
Chinese and the specificities of remittance development in the region.  
2.1.2 Differentiated Mobility 
           In Yanbian, my interactions with Han Chinese—the majority of the population—were 
narrower and less in-depth than those with Korean Chinese since my research mainly focuses 
on the Korean Chinese transnational migration. And yet I was exposed to a range of Han 
Chinese on a daily basis: taxi drivers, masseuses, fuwuyuan, cashiers, farmers, and students. Some 
Han Chinese were born and grew up in Yanbian. But the majority comes from other areas, such 
as Shandong, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. I appreciated these daily encounters, which gave me a 
chance to understand Han Chinese perspectives on the unique style of economic development 
of Yanbian. At the same time, I was curious to know what it means for Han Chinese to live in 
an ethnic prefecture—as a “relative minority.” One encounter with a Han Chinese businessman, 
Mr. Wang, whom I got to know through a Korean Chinese businessman, was particularly 
informative. Mr. Wang was in his mid-forties. He had moved from northern Heilongjiang to 
Yanji fifteen years ago in search of better economic opportunities. Despite the small size, its 
marginal location, and strong ethnic culture dominated by Korean Chinese, Mr. Wang made up 
his mind to move down to the city of Yanji, drawn by the strong business potential of Yanbian 
due to the influx of remittances from South Korea. He and several friends moved around the  
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Photo 5. Yanji's night scape. By June Hee Kwon (2011) 
 
same time, following the rumor of Yanbian’s economic rise and related possibilities in the wake 
of the Korean Wind. After multiple trials and errors in the new city, Mr. Wang ended up 
working in the interior decorating business, which has grown sharply in Yanji along with the 
increasing construction of modern apartments, mostly purchased by Korean Chinese migrants 
with money from their Korean jobs. Mr. Wang considered himself a success, and had settled  
well in Yanji. He was clearly proud of his knowledge of Korean Chinese ethnic culture as well 
as his ability to analyze Yanji’s market conditions.  
         One day over lunch with other Han Chinese businessmen, Mr. Wang gave me a quiz with 
a smile: “Do you know what three main industries are in Yanbian?” He was obviously joking, 
but the joke reflected the peculiar characteristics of Yanbian’s industrial and urban landscape. 
The three industries, he explained, are the following: 1) Yanbian’s heavy industry (重工业) is its 
bulgogi restaurants, because smoke comes out of the chimney; 2) the region’s light industry (轻
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工业) is karaoke, because it is a service and leisure industry; and 3) Yanbian’s handcraft industry 
(手工业) is massage, because it involves work with the hands. All of us at the lunch laughed, 
implicitly agreeing with him. Of course, the joke conveyed an understanding of the pleasure-
centered consumption industries that have occupied a central position in the everyday life of 
Yanji. In practice, these leading industries—bulgogi restaurants, karaoke bars, massage parlors—
are what keep the neon signs of the city lit up day and night, as if they are the main engine 
driving the city’s economy.  
            At the same time, I understood this joke as a satire, implying that the city of Yanji is a 
marginal place lacking in “real” jobs that belong to stable and regular work unit (danwei) in a 
conventional sense. In other words, the joke portrays Yanbian, especially the capital city of 
Yanji, as a place where people do not work to produce things for profit-making, but only 
consume and spend for immediate gratification. Most of all, the satire presumably targets 
Korean Chinese who have developed a deep dependency on “Korean money,” a phrase that 
connotes money that is easy to make and quick to be spent. In this context, “Korean money” 
seems to have a double connotation. On the one hand, it is a corrupting influence that makes 
Korean Chinese lazy and extravagant and unwilling to work hard in China, as they instead 
dream of leaving for Korea. On the other hand, Korean money is truly the “heart” of the 
regional economy, and feeds many people in Yanbian—not only migrant families but also 
incoming business people and service workers across Yanbian, regardless of ethnicity.  
          Each ethnic group has reacted differently to Korean money, resulting in ethnic 
stereotypes built upon consumption patterns and methods to prepare for the future. Ethnic 
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stereotypes have been described as each “brushing against that of the other” (Chow 2002)9, as 
stereotypes are grounded on fixed ideas that prevent actual understanding of complex ethnic 
dynamics and subjectivities. For example, Mr. Wang and his friends at the lunch exchanged the 
following ethnic joke: “Korean Chinese are all customers who spend money for instant pleasure, 
whereas Han Chinese are business owners who make the money that Korean Chinese spend,” 
or “Korean Chinese spend money without thinking of tomorrow, whereas Han Chinese save 
money without spending for today’s pleasure.” I heard versions of ethnic stereotypes regarding 
spending habits time and again, not only from Han Chinese but also from Korean Chinese, 
clearly a form of “ethnic contrast” (Sollars 1995) that solidifies the boundary between “Korean 
Chinese” and “Han Chinese.” Yet I would argue that these stereotypes are not an attempt to 
make “ethnic others” by essentializing each group in order to maintain an ethnic hierarchy, in 
contrast to the colonial context that Bhabha illuminates (Bhabha 1994:112). Instead, I take 
these ethnic jokes as a consequential reflection of “differentiated mobility” (Messey 1993), the 
mobility that shows how each ethnic group becomes differently related to the economy of 
trans/national migration and thus creates different routes and pathways to the future.  
            Throughout my fieldwork, I have noticed strong patterns and tendencies of mobility in 
Yanbian: Korean Chinese migration is transnational between Yanbian and South Korea whereas 
Han Chinese migration is internal, into and across Yanbian. This means that Han Chinese are 
not immobile, but differently mobile from Korean Chinese. In this respect, ethnic stereotypes, 
such as those voiced at the lunch I discussed above, mirror differentiated mobilities by ethnicity 
that have developed in correspondence with the Korean wind and Korean money. In what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Chow describes this concept, drawing on Jameson’s discussion on the stereotype; brushing against that of 
another is “an encounter between surfaces rather than interiors—cannot really be foreclosed again by the liberalist 
suggestion that everyone is entitled to her own stereotypes of herself, which others should simply adopt for general 
use.” (Chow 2002: 57) 
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follows, I argue that the Korean Wind and Korean money did not cause or consolidate ethnic 
boundaries. Rather, I argue that they bring ripple effects to the lives of both Han and Korean 
Chinese in the wake of the “turbulence of migration” (Papastergiadis 2000), a turbulence that 
may seem chaotic, but is actually well-ordered through the interconnection and interdependency 
of various forces. In other words, despite distinctively typified ethnic images, for instance 
Korean Chinese customers vs. Han Chinese workers, neither group is immune to the Korean 
Wind. Instead, both are subject to its influences, and ethnicities and broad economic and 
cultural forces together constitute a special ethnic-finance-urban-scape.  
            I underscore the Korean wind as an ethnic-specific fashion and passion amongst 
Korean Chinese who take advantage of ethnic similarities (linguistic and cultural affinities) to 
enter the Korean labor market. The exclusiveness of this market has caused aspiring Han 
Chinese migrant laborers to fail repeatedly when attempting to get into Korea through illegal 
brokers. As one of these workers, depressed, told me, “It is much harder for Han Chinese to 
get a visa to Korea than Korean Chinese because we are not ethnic Korean, and thus less 
wanted in Korea.” Despite the far smaller chance for transnational migration to South Korea 
(due to their differentiated mobility), however, Han Chinese do not remain outside the dramatic 
social changes generated by the Korean wind. The Han Chinese of Yanbian who have not tried to 
migrate to Korea have a different vision for their futures and show different responses to the 
influx of Korean money, promoting their own businesses and chasing new possibilities in the 
domain developed and expanded by the influx of Korean money.  
2.1.3  Jumping Scales 
            Geographical scale matters in the individual’s ordinary life, but so do politics, the 
economy, and culture. Multiple migrations that the case of Yanbian illustrates ask us to rethink 
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the scale that we take for granted. Neil Smith critically reconsiders the question of “scale” and 
“rescaling” while looking at the rise of the “New Europe” under the EU, rethinking the nation 
state as a taken-for-granted scale, and inverting the traditional notion of scale as “spatial 
expressions of social functions” (Castell 1976; Smith 2003). Viewing scale as a social construct 
and “material artifact,” Smith defines it in different ways: scale is the geographical organizer and 
expression of collective social action; scale is set or fixed amidst the flux of social interaction; 
scale is the spatial resolution of contradictory social forces (Smith 2003). The production of 
scale, expressed in terms like rural, urban, region, and global, is fluid and fixed (Jonas 1994). 
Scale is both fixed and politically charged as in the case of defense of national boundaries, tax 
issues, and identity attached to place. On the other hand, scale is fluid because new scales are 
restructured based on the resolution between opposing forces of competition and cooperation 
(Smith 1984). Social contention and interaction break the fixity of “given” scales, creating what 
Smith terms “jumping scale,” a process and politics of uneven geographical development 
(Smith 2003). Here, migration plays a pivotal role, as migrants appear to be “scale makers” 
(Caglar and Glick Schiller 2011) engaged in readjusting and rescaling society according to the 
flux of mobility.10  
            The concept of scale and rescaling is especially useful in considering Chinese internal 
migration; a growing phenomenon that challenges fixed scales via deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization (Appadurai 1996). Since Communist China was established in 1949, the 
governing of the population has taken shape in three aspects: 1) location (household 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants is an attempt to relocate the relationship between migrants and cities, 
by looking at city, not as a self-evident spatial unit in the global economy, but rather as “city scale” that is a domain 
of restructuring and rescaling in relationship to its mutual constitution of other sites of organized power (Glick 
Schiller & Caglar 2011). This discussion helps me think of Yanji, not as a city of the spatial unit, but as an 
intersection that multiple dynamic and traffic come across; urban and rural, national and transnational, ethnic 
enclave and emerging consuming place.  
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registration); 2) quantity (the one-child policy); and 3) quality (an emphasis on health, education, 
and welfare to improve human quality) (Greenhalgh & Winckler 2005). In China, population 
has become the very terrain for the governmentalization and politicization of life, shaping a new 
social order and subjectivity. The system of location control, Hukou, or family registration, is the 
most apt site to consider constraints on the rapidly increasing contemporary Chinese migration 
to cities. Hukou has played a critical role in demarcating urbanites from rural people by 
restricting free movement and differentiating social benefits between cities and rural areas. 
When established in 1958, Hukou represented the outcome of the social activity of people based 
on where they were and what they were doing, yet eventually it became a precondition for social 
activity (Xikui 1986 (2000)). It also re-solidified caste and class, setting in stone the socio-
economic disparity between urbanites and rural people (Dutton 2000). Under the strict control 
of population movement, rural migrants who leave their registered place to live in the city 
without city registration are called the “floating population” (Solinger 1999; Meckenzie 2007; Li 
2001) or more pejoratively, “liumang,” being treated as “outsiders”, “second citizens,” “surplus 
beings”(Dutton 2000). In contrast to nomads, an undifferentiated group detached from a place 
posing a social threat as well as revolutionary social change, mangliu(liumang)—literally meaning 
people “who have left, or been forced to leave, their own land”—are seen as engaging in no 
productive work, being out of place in the Chinese sense (Baoliang 1993). The floating 
population is portrayed as an “amorphous flow” of laborers who can be expelled at any time 
after being used; they are considered internal others, stigmatized for being dirty, poor, and 
uncivil, and are seen as quite distinctive from “native” urbanites (Li 2001; Chu 2009).  
           Their vulnerability is exacerbated by “exclusive inclusion” (Agamben 1998) and “forced 
flexibility” (Cho 2009). Deserting the farming land for the city without an official Hukou, these 
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rural migrants, as “peasants,”11 are excluded from state protection and market activity, while at 
the same time they are included in the media and national narrative, as the poorest, most 
miserable group that the state can embrace, thus prescribing their right to be part of the city.12 
Under this regime of “exclusive inclusion” or “inclusive exclusion,” migrants attempt to 
transform themselves to become new urban subjects, inscribing civil, disciplined, productive, 
and responsible attitudes on their bodies and minds in order to improve their quality of life, 
Suzhi (Anagnost 2008; Chu 2009; Kipnis 2006; Li 2001; Ngai 2005; Yan 2009)13. The widening 
disparities between the poor and the rich, the rural and the urban, became attributed to 
“characterological traits,” and it was argued that the achievement of a “middle class” position as 
an ideal consumer-citizen can be enabled by “transformation of consciousness” (Anagnost 
2008). The sharp distinction drawn between the urban and the rural has resonated at the heart 
of narratives of rural migrants adjusting to city life, as migration itself works as a means that 
solidifies the migrant’s role as “scale maker.”  
           Exploring the turbulence of migration that I have witnessed in the city of Yanji,  
I also found that the scale marker—such as urban and rural—is a determining force for and 
deeply imbedded in the subject-making process; who they are, where they are from, what they 
are supposed to do. To this discussion, I bring a transnational dimension and perspective 
intersected with internal migration, the intersection that is the site that jumping scales constantly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Chu discusses the term nongmin, “peasant” in English, as a state identification that reeks of social and economic 
limitations. Nongmin conveys the stigmatic meaning attached to the “backward,” “superstitious,” and unproductive 
rural masses who are the major obstacle to national development and salvation. (Chu 2009:63) 
 
12 In addition to this “exclusive inclusion,” Cho elaborates, in her article, “Forced Flexibility,” how poor rural 
migrants’ desire to settle in either urban or rural areas is troubled and frustrated by conflicts over land rights in 
rural areas and policies that benefit urban household registration holders over rural people (2009; 53). 
13 According to Anagnost, Suzhi appraises the biological individual’s embodied capacities looking at the body as a 
site of investment through entepreneurialisation of the self (2008). The yearning for the self-development is 
attained by transformation of consciousness, Yan called “capitalization of subjectivity.”(2003a) 
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occur as a dominant condition of living in Yanbian. In reality, scale markers are more fluid and 
flexible than simple registry distinctions, such as urban/rural, national/transnational, and 
Korean ethnic town/Han Chinese town. In other words, various migrants—both Han and 
Korean Chinese—are jumping between multiple scales, thereby blurring their status as 
registered in Hukou14and the distinction between national and transnational. For example, I met 
many Korean Chinese transnational migrants who carry farmer’s hukou identification cards but 
carry on lives that go way behind the farm; they may own a house and farming land in the 
countryside of Yanbian, but they also may own one or more modern apartments in Yanji, while 
also renting a small room in Seoul. If they are better off, some Korean Chinese purchase new 
apartments in major Chinese cities with rising property values, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Qingdao, and rent them out as a source of income. These migrants are frequently moving back 
and forth between multiple places regardless of their originally registered status—whether as 
farmers or as urbanites. The scale marker, registration status, cannot fully capture who these 
migrants are, where they actually live, and what they really do. It is the new moment of mobility, 
as an old communist party member put to me; “now we (Korean Chinese) go to Korea as we 
go to our place (naejip in Korean) unlike when we were afraid of going there several decades ago 
(under the harsh Cold War circumstance)”  
         What follows is ethnography of the intersected traffic patterns and “jumping scales” of 
migrants who belong to multiple worlds in the moment of the post Cold War and postsocialism. 
These stories are especially about those who conceive of themselves as living on the margins of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 As the urban migration has been rapidly increasing in China, hukou has become flexible and problematic in that it 
reveals the unequal access for migrants to reach the city resources and state benefits such as children’s education 
and health care. To resolve the predicament that hukou imposes on migrants, cities such as Shanghai partially allows 
to issue the urban hukou to migrants on the limited condition; if migrants purchase a house or make investment of 
the certain amount (MacKenzie 2001). Since the permit is based on the economic potential, the urban hukou is still 
not easy for migrants to attain. The urban/rural distinction still remains.  
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Yanji, creating their own space with their own hands and hesitating between leaving and living 
in Yanji. Even the most vulnerable are able to “jump scales,” but scale jumpers still remain 
vulnerable. 
2.2  To the City ! 
2.2.1 Entrepreneur Farmer 
 
         While I lived in Yanbian, I rented a room from a woman in her late forties, a former rice 
farmer in a “pure” Korean Chinese city named Huolong, one of several Korean Chinese 
condensed areas—along with Longjing and Tumen—long known for the vast extent and high 
quality of their rice fields. At the time I met her, she was running a rental comic book store next 
to an ethnic Korean middle school in the city of Yanji, targeting Korean Chinese middle and 
high school students as her main customers. On the first day of each month, I went to her 
bookstore to pay my rent as a regular tenant. She gradually told me her story over my multiple 
visits. I was struck by how badly she would fit the stereotype of farmers as “uncivil,” 
“uneducated,” and “narrow-minded.” She has a sharp financial mind and immense persistence, 
as witnessed by her ceaseless attempts to make the difficult transition from life-long farmer to 
successful businesswoman and city-dweller.  
           Growing up in a “pure” Korean Chinese town, my landlady became an expert rice 
farmer and married another farmer in the same town some twenty years ago. In fact, this couple 
seemed to be especially talented in profit-making; besides rice farming, they were running a 
store that mediated between rice farmers and wholesalers, collecting commissions by helping set 
up deals between these two parties. They were “getting rich first” indeed, as Deng promulgated 
in 1978, economically exceeding most farmers in their town. The couple’s financial stability 
allowed them to stay put even as the Korean wind swept across the town in the late 1990s, and 
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her neighbors became desperate to get to Korea. Unfortunately, however, my landlady then 
suffered a severe life tragedy: her husband was killed in a car accident, leaving her a widow in 
her mid-thirties with a daughter and a son to support. The loss of her husband tore her up 
emotionally. Moreover, her life as a farmer hit an impasse because she could not both work the 
farm and run the store by herself. Farming is work-intensive, based on a gendered division of 
labor, and requires too much work for one person to take care of all seasonal duties and chores 
in and out of the rice field. Faced with these problems, she made up her mind. “I could not be 
lost all the time because I had to take care of my children. I had to put myself together. I had to 
get the farm and the rice store back on track. In order to live, I decided to re-marry someone 
nice in town, although I knew my neighbors would whisper about my marriage behind my back. 
But I had to find a way out of the swamp.”  
            After she got remarried, she started living in two houses, one on Yanji, one in the 
countryside. That is because she wanted to send her two children to the first Yanbian high 
school, which is considered the best high school in Yanbian for Korean Chinese. She also wants 
to continue farming with her new husband. In order to live both in the city and the countryside 
back and forth, she said, “ I had to become smarter about money.” The landlady re-arranged 
her money to invest in real estate, and bought a new apartment. It is very unusual in Yanbian 
for farmers to buy a new apartment in the city without first going to Korea to earn money. She 
soon bought two more apartments to rent out (including my one-bedroom apartment). She 
kept alerting me, “You should not talk about your room when we visit our town and meet my 
husband. He does not know anything about the house.” It seemed that the other apartments, 
and the rent they generated, belonged exclusively to her. She is also mostly self-responsible for 
her children’s care without getting any help from her new husband.  
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        Her income was gathered from different sources. The rental apartments helped her to run 
and pay the rent for the comic book store. Second, the income from the bookstore enabled her 
and her two children to barely make ends meet in the city. At the same time, her new husband 
was taking care of her lands and rice store in the farming town. Her multiple “jobs” kept her 
busy. She was moving back and forth between different living places, between the countryside 
and city, as a farmer, landlady, and owner of a bookstore. During the busiest farming season, 
from June to August, she was in the farming town to help her husband. But the rest of the year 
she stayed in Yanji, supervising her children’s study while running the comic bookstore in the 
hope that would eventually be able to get her son into the right high school. Although she has 
successfully managed multi-tasking, the urban life costs much more than life in a rural town. In 
her home village, she did not have to pay for food, since everything was “right there”: she had 
enough vegetables and animals (pigs, chickens, and cows) on the farm to feed her family. She 
did not have to pay rent either, since the house and lands (which are rented from the 
government for 30 years) belonged to her, too. But in the city, as a farmer with no “work unit” 
benefit, food and rent and everything else had to be paid for out of pocket. Most of all, her 
children’s education heavily weighed on her shoulders, pushing her to collect rents as an extra 
source of income. Even multiple sources of income did not seem sufficient to catch up to the 
soaring expenses of maintaining the urban life and supporting her children’s education. She 
sometimes seemed to waver under the economic burden, saying, “If my younger son goes to 
college, I would like to go to Korea to make money. I might be better off that way than being 
stuck here doing so many different things. But until then I need to stay here to look after my 
children.”  
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Photo 6. Yanbian Countryside. By June Hee Kwon (2009) 
Neither “poor” farmers nor relatively well-off urbanites have been immune to the Korean wind in 
Yanbian, in fact. My landlady, a farmer with an exceptional entrepreneurial sense, has witnessed 
many successful and failed cases of going to Korea. She continues to hesitate over whether or 
not she should go to Korea herself. She knows there is nobody who would look after her 
children if she went to Korea—since they are her children, she has take care of them, not her 
new husband. At the same time, whenever she feels that the cost of city life is too high, she 
starts considering the possibility afresh. She is well-off by the standards of her hometown and 
capable of multitasking as a farmer, landlady, and bookstore proprietor as she moves back and 
forth between Yanji and the countryside. Her story tells us that the scale of urban/rural, 
transnational/internal migration is not static, as she finds it possible to transgress with her 
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business sense and unceasing efforts to make ends meet. She is jumping scales in Smith’s sense. 
Yet her fluid movements are not random, taking instead a particular, purposeful direction.  
           That is to say, she limits the scope of her actual and potential migration to Korean-
speaking areas—Yanbian or Korea. Going to Chinese cities—Han Caves—has never been an 
option for her. Her hometown is a “pure” Korean Chinese town without a single Han Chinese 
household. As a result of growing up there, she never had a chance to interact with Han people 
or improve her Chinese language. Therefore, she feels very uncomfortable even in Yanji, where 
she frequently has to deal with Han Chinese whenever she goes on errands or does business. 
When she needs to meet people who speak Chinese, she frequently has to take her daughter, 
who is fluent at reading, writing, and speaking Chinese. Despite her successful real estate 
ventures, she feels as if she were illiterate in Chinese and this, in turn, makes her feel unfit for 
city life. She often told me that “as soon as I am done with my children, I will move back to the 
countryside where I do not have to speak Chinese.” Her background growing up in a “pure” 
ethnic town has limited her scope of migration based on linguistic boundaries. 
           And yet her desire for an urban life has been boosted by the ethnic education that the 
city of Yanji provides for her children. The condition of Korean ethnic schools in the 
countryside has become dismal as Korean Chinese have moved out and Han Chinese moved in. 
As a result of the sharply decreasing Korean Chinese population and the consequent shortage 
of Korean Chinese students in the countryside, Korean ethnic schools have begun to close. 
Moving to the city, then, has become an inevitable life choice for many Korean Chinese farmers, 
for the sake of their children’s education. The economic burden of educating their children in 
the city certainly makes these farmers consider going to Korea, which is the easiest and the 
most definite option for overcoming the economic gap between the urban and the rural. That is 
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why the risks of going to Korea—the possibility of being cheated by illegal brokers and/or 
deported by the Korean government—are believed to be worth it.  
            The city of Yanji has posed an economic challenge to her. Although my landlady has 
been successful in managing her properties and business, the total income is still insufficient for 
her to survive the city and support the rising cost of education for her children. She enumerated 
her monthly income as follows, to demonstrate how tight her monthly budget is. Her collected 
rent was about $200; $100 from my room, $100 from the other room. Her income from the 
bookstore was about $200 per month. The income from farming was annual rather than 
monthly, so the total reliable income every month is $400 without any extra social pension or 
benefits. This is a minimal amount of income compared to that of government workers, who 
average $300 a month or more in Yanbian, in addition to benefits and job security. If my 
landlady went to Korea, she could make more than $1200 per month, based on the current 
exchange rate (without taking into consideration the cost of living in Korea). Despite rapid 
economic development in China, the income gap between Yanbian and Korea remains large, in 
her case $400 vs. $1200. Based on the calculated numbers, my landlady, with her entrepreneurial 
sense, cannot but hesitate when confronted with the decision of whether or not to go to Korea. 
Not only farmers like her, but also Korean Chinese factory and danwei workers who have 
moved from the countryside to into Yanji all deem going to Korea as a route that offers the 
capacity to maintain the comforts of city life by overcoming the embedded distinction and 
discrimination between urban and rural people.  
             This move to the city has dramatically resulted in reshaping the ethnic composition in 
Yabian countryside. Many “pure” Korean ethnic towns have been struggling with a critical 
shortage of labor to take care of the land left behind by migrating Korean Chinese. Although 
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the land is not “owned” by individual farmers, but “rented” from the state for thirty years, it 
needs to be re-rented and cultivated by somebody when the original owners have left for the 
city or Korea. In fact, since most Korean Chinese prefer to stop farming and go to Korea in 
pursuit of lucrative transnational migration, Han Chinese farmers—who have a much slimmer 
chance to go to Korea—have started moving into these “pure” Korean Chinese ethnic towns in 
order to cultivate land “abandoned” by Korean Chinese. Some of these places, for example my 
landlady’s hometown, have refused to accept any influx of Han Chinese in the name of cultural 
autonomy, and to avoid potential ethnic conflicts with Han Chinese. But the dwindling 
numbers of Korean Chinese farmers make it highly unlikely that these towns can keep up this 
policy for long.  The land needs to be taken care of and Han Chinese are willing to do it. My 
landlady, like other Korean Chinese, constantly warned of the Han Chinese threat. “We cannot 
hear a newborn Korean Chinese baby crying while Han Chinese are increasing,” she would say. 
“Korean Chinese land is taken over by Han Chinese. We are losing our land.”  
           Regardless of ethnic concerns, the desire for urban life is persistent, and the rapidly 
decreasing Korean Chinese population will not allow “pure” Korean Chinese towns to remain 
ethnically pure much longer. At the intersection of desire for urban life with desire for 
transnational migration, Korean Chinese farmers have come to believe that the cultural and 
economic gap between urban and rural to be bridgeable as long as they could make it to Korea. 
As many Korean Chinese migrants prove this social fantasy to be reality, the transnational 
migration becomes more and more accepted as an inevitable passage to a better life. In the 
ethnic hub in flux, surrounded by a transnational fantasy and its seductive potential, my 
landlady hesitated, wondering whether or not she should leave for Korea in search of a better 
life, leaving her children behind; what makes her hesitate is the large margin, $400 vs. $1200, 
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stemming from her calculation. That seems like a good sacrifice to invest for the children’s 
future—or at least that is what she wants to believe when she considers the dangers and risks 
embedded in transnational migration. But she was still hesitating when I left Yanbian in the 
winter of 2009.  
2.2.2 Laid-off Factory Worker 
             The ramifications of the Korean Wind are influential in the small industrial cities of 
Yanbian, too. The brief history of a border town, Yuejing, which I introduced in chapter one, 
will showcase the impact of economic reform and the open economy. On a sunny day of June 
2009, I had a chance to spend time with local cadres of Yuejing. Cadre Yang invited me to a 
huge banquet, with local dishes and strong alcohol (baijiu) prepared by the female cooking staff 
working for the local government.15 Over lunch, served in a back yard of the government 
buildings, the head cadre shared with me his thoughts about the town’s history and 
contemporary circumstances, and expressed his excitement about having a guest from Korea 
(meaning me). According to him, Yuejing was once one of the most prosperous towns in 
Yanbian, with a pulp factory employing ten thousand factory workers. But when economic 
reform arrived the factory, full of outdated machinery, had lost its competitive power and was 
shut down in 1997. As the town confronted the crisis, a wealthy Han Chinese businessman 
from southern China (vaguely indicated as nanfang) bought the factory at a low price from the 
local government, and started reorganizing and refitting it, bringing in new machines and letting 
7,000 workers go. In fact, these layoffs—people called it “privatization”—had already been 
planned before the factory was sold. The work force had been half Korean and half Han 
Chinese, but in the whirlwind of rapid privatization, most of the Koreans got laid off or quit, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The gendered division of labor is very clear in Yanbian.  
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whereas the majority of the Han Chinese kept their positions at the factory. Some Korean 
Chinese workers who anticipated the approaching turmoil began to open their own businesses 
or prepared to leave for Korea. “The factory has now become a Han Chinese cave,” said the 
head cadre. 
            Under these large-scale dismissals, or xiagang16, Yuejing, formerly a prosperous border 
town proud of its enormous factory, rapidly decayed and declined, losing population and local 
businesses—grocery stores, restaurants, and so forth. Many of the former factory workers left 
for Yanji, either for better job opportunities or in the hopes of getting to Korea to make a 
larger amount of money in a shorter period of time. Either way was challenging to Yuejing 
Korean Chinese, coming as they were from a small border town. However, once the laid-off 
workers left Yuejing, they would never return to their hometown—now full of vacant houses.  
The head cadre lamented, “There was not much our government can do.  There was no pulling 
power to keep people from leaving.” The cadres working for the local government received 
raises and better benefits every year, so he never personally considered going to Korea for 
money. But most farmers and laid-off factory workers had few other choices, except leaving 
Yuejing to search for work in Yanji or elsewhere.  
            While hoping to examine the relationship between the mounting unemployment rate 
and migration to Korea, I was fortunate to meet with several former factory workers who had 
been laid off by the pulp factory in Yuejing. Among them, I became closest with a woman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Xiagang (stepping down from the post), in fact, is the state of maintaining a contractual relationship with one’s 
enterprise (work unit) and retaining benefits. Thus, one is technically not fired, but the xiagang do not have jobs, 
either. Hung and Chiu discuss the predicament of xiagang workers in Beijing, calling them “the lost generation.” 
Given the historical turmoil in modern Chinese history that ranges from being “sent down to the village” (where 
education was poor or nonexistent) during the Cultural Revolution to the rampant privatization and loss of jobs in 
the contemporary era, Chinese of a particular age have turned out to be an especially “lost” generation, so 
“culturally malnourished” that they are more vulnerable than other age groups to economic dislocations and crises 
(Hung & Chiu 2003).  
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named Kim Meihua, who shared with me her insightful thoughts on China’s economic reforms. 
Meihua, in her early forties, had worked in the pulp factory for fifteen years. She was the 
mother of a daughter who had just started middle school. I met Meihua at a social gathering in 
Yanji. Her family had lived in Yuejing for generations and her parents had also worked in the 
factory. In fact, she had inherited her mother’s position.17 Meihua described her life as an 
ordinary woman of her age; after graduating from her (Korean ethnic) high school, she got a 
decent, reliable job, married, and gave birth to her daughter. But eventually she found that her 
husband was not as hardworking a person as she had thought. He quit several jobs and drifted 
around. One day, Meihua made up her mind to open a grocery store on the corner of their 
street. She imagined that her husband would take care of the store during the day while she 
went to work. That way he could have a job to stick to, and their income would be doubled, 
although she had to borrow money to open the store. Another reason that she wanted to open 
the grocery store was that she sensed that the factory would not last long. Her coworkers were 
talking about what they would do and where they would go if the factory eventually went 
bankrupt. Meihua felt that she had to start thinking of what to do before she lost job. Her 
response was to start the grocery store. The business had a nice kick off, and did well for the 
first couple of months. One day, however, Meihua discovered that her husband was having an 
affair with a neighbor. The affair led to divorce. This made her wants to leave for Yanji in order 
to start a new life and offer a better education to her daughter. Her divorce seemed to hurt a lot, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The danwei system is the basis of the livelihood and employment security of the urban working class in China 
(Lee 2007); the flow of people is carefully monitored and rights of access strictly controlled, like a “gated 
community” (Anagnost 2008). Job security, housing, childcare and pensions are supplied through state-owned 
enterprises (Hung & Chiu 2003). Some have called  this system “organized dependence” (Walder 1986) and 
“danwei welfare socialism”(Gu 1999). Parents’ positions are frequently inherited by children, which functions as 
another form of job security.  
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but she tried to be calm about it. I asked how she felt when she first moved to Yanji. Her 
answer was a bit unexpected.  
I really think it was great for the factory to go out of business. If the factory were 
still running, I would still be working in a small city on the border. Now I have 
come to Yanji and can see a bigger and different world from where I used to live. I 
love being in Yanji. There are a lot more things to learn and more chances to pursue. 
My daughter has a much better education because Yanji has better Korean ethnic 
school, better teachers than Yuejing. The collapse of the factory caused by 
gaigekaifang (economic reforms and the open economy) turned out to be a great 
benefit to me. 
 
Since coming to Yanji, Meihua has lacked a stable job because she does not have any special 
skills, so she has tried many different things in order to make ends meet. She has thought of 
going to Korea to make money, but decided not to because taking care of her young daughter 
was more important to her than making money. Most of all, her sister—who had already gone 
to Korea, and even opened a restaurant in Seoul—let Meihua stay in her apartment for free in 
exchange for taking care of her sister’s son, who was a freshman in high school when I met 
Meihua. Because of her commitments, then, going to Korea was out of the question for Meihua.  
            Since she was relieved from the cost of housing, Meihua started looking for jobs she 
could do while taking care of two kids—one for herself, another for her sister. First, a friend 
introduced her to the Amway business, which was becoming popular in Yanbian. Meihua also 
sold life insurance, on a commission basis. Working as a sales person was suitable to her 
schedule because of its flexibility, which allowed her to raise the children while having multiple 
jobs. In addition, these did not require any higher education and they looked easy to tackle, at 
least to begin with. However, it turned out to be not easy at all to sell Amway products and 
insurance to strangers, as it was particularly difficult to convince people to buy products, and, 
especially, to keep them buying products as stable, returning customers. In order to foster these 
skills, Meihua was regularly attending classes offered both by Amway and by the insurance 
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company. The classes were about methods of persuasion, building self-confidence, and 
developing modes of self-management, as well cultivating the correct attitudes and behaviors 
for person-to-person sales.      
           One day, she invited me to her place and showed the class materials to me, explaining 
about the importance of having a positive attitude, citing her class lessons. She thought that if 
she really believed that “my business and the number of my customers will keep growing,” the 
belief would become reality, due to some form of self-conjuration. Yet she was basically a hard 
worker, too. Meihua was devoted to expanding her social networks, a crucial factor in  both 
Amway and the insurance business (so-called pyramid schemes). She became a member of 
many online communities and participated in a multitude of social gatherings, as when we came 
to meet the first time. However, since she was a newcomer to the city, her business was not 
growing as she wished. Even though she was barely making ends meet, Meihua continuously 
insisted that she was “happy with being in Yanji. I am learning a lot. The quality of my life in 
Yanji is much better than when I was working at the factory.” Most of all, Meihua was proud 
that she could give her daughter a better education in Yanji.  
           Miehua’s move to Yanji shows the contradictory aspect of urban life after economic 
reform. She lost what was supposed to be a life-long secure in her hometown. However, this 
loss and the consequent insecurity came along with the opportunity that enabled her to emerge 
from a small and dilapidated border town to the larger, more cosmopolitan setting of Yanji. As 
she pointed out, “The collapse of factory turned out to be a great benefit.”  The city life felt free, 
exciting, and unpredictable to her, compared to the same old, same old life in Yuejing. At the 
same time, however, her new life did not give her any job security.  Relying on Amway and 
insurance sales did not allow her to make any reliable future financial plans. In addition, unlike 
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her life in Yuejing, Meihua now had to pay everything out of pocket even though she did not 
have to worry about housing, which she received in exchange for helping her sister pursue the 
Korean dream. Meihua badly wanted to be successful in business without doing menial work in 
Korea, working under Koreans. Meihua, as a single mother, certainly knew that she had to take 
care of her children. Eventually, however, she could not help considering going to Korea as a 
way to pay the price of the city life. She was hesitating by the time I left Yanbian in 2009. “I am 
not sure if I can support my daughter’s college education without going to Korea,” she finally 
admitted.  
             As I discussed in the previous section, going to Korea has been generally considered 
the most certain and promising method to make the city life possible and more prosperous, 
especially for those who dream about educating their children and buying an apartment in Yanji, 
and those who moved from outside of Yanji without guaranteed social and financial support. It 
has become very common for Korean Chinese households to rely on “Korean money” sent by 
somebody working in Korea. In the case of Meihua, her sister happens to be a sender of 
“Korean money,” which helps to sustain her city life via free rent. But the influx of Korean 
money has led to a surge in the cost of living and levels of consumption in Yanji; Yanji has 
become an “expensive” city to live in, given the income levels of its people. Many Korean 
Chinese migrants certainly wish to cut off the continuous cycle of migration between China and 
Korea and settle to rest from long exhaustive labor as a transnational worker. But these 
migrants also believed that there would be no better-paid jobs in Yanbian if work conditions 
were the same as in Korea. The income gap certainly drives the circuit of migration; Yanbian is 
a spending place whereas Korea is a working place (see chapter 4). These new urbanites, 
moving from rural or small-town Yanbian, need quick, plentiful money in order to support the 
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pricy urban life of Yanji. These desires and needs have directed the flow of Korean Chinese, 
especially to Korea, a place characterized by cultural and linguistic affinities to Yanbian, but also 
a considerable income gap from Yanbian. In Yanji, the best place for Korean Chinese to live, as 
well as a parochial ethnic enclave, many Korean Chinese continue to hesitate between living and 
leaving, which has become the condition of mobile ethnicity. 
2.3 Ripple Effect 
          The impact of the Korean wind has been strong and multi-faceted. Most of all, economic 
achievement via emigration exacts a “cultural price” that threatens the local culture and value 
system (Fitzerald 2009: 128).18 The cultural price is loaded in an idiom such as “someone drinking 
the Korean water (Hankukmul mukda in Korean) would not want to work in China.” The tone of 
mockery expressed by the phrase “drinking the Korean water” targets small but significant 
behaviors and manners of Korean Chinese returnees. For example, those who “drank the 
Korean water” wear clothes and make up like a Korean, but are not quite Korean. They mix a 
Yanbian accent with a Seoul accent, and thus they try to speak like Koreans, but cannot quite 
manage it. The attempt and failure to imitate Korean styles becomes an object for derision and 
taunts in Yanbian. Moreover, relentless imitation seems to be an evidential mark of “lacking.” 
Those who drank the Korean water are believed to spend a lot of money to show off, 
regardless of their actual economic status. The common belief is that as soon as they run out of 
money, they will go back to Korea, because there is nothing they can do to make that much 
money in China. Certainly, this is ethnic hyperbole built on contempt for those who are seen as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Fizgerald discusses the “cultural price” of Mexican emigration to the US by looking at cultural dissimilation, such 
as losing Spanish language and converting from Catholicism to Protestantism. At the same time, Mexican 
emigration is considered as a route to acquire “culture” and modern labor discipline, forces seen as helping to 
modernize the local Mexican culture (2009). He states that “migration is a threatening conduit of cultural change” 
(135). I agree with this perspective, and yet, the case of Korean Chinese emigration has less to do with the state 
culture than with ethnic culture, unlike Mexican emigration as Fitzgerald discusses it.  
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drinking the Korean water. But the image of Korean Chinese as over-consuming is 
predominant and is projected even onto Korean Chinese children whose parents have gone to 
Korea. A Korean Chinese college student whose father went to Korea and made money there 
for a decade recalled his time in elementary school: “We could tell kids whose parents went to 
Korea from those who did not. Clothes, bags, shoes, and cellphones are the markers. They look 
just very different.” By contrast, a Han Chinese college student I met testified, “Korean Chinese 
students spend money like water. They eat out all the time. They wear expensive clothes and 
shoes. But since there is no parent to control their behavior, they are spoiled and free to do 
what they want. A lot of them get in trouble. In contrast, we Han Chinese cannot afford to do 
that, and we grow up under our parents’ protection, full of love.” In what follows, I explore 
how ethnic stereotypes have been solidified and how Han Chinese and Korean Chinese have 
differently perceived work and the future condition by Korean money and the possibility of 
going to Korea. Ethnic inter-dependence and inter-connection constitutes a new landscape for 
Yanbian, I argue.  
2.3.1 Surplus but Lacking Labor  
          In contrast to my imagination, shaped as it was by the song “Everybody is Gone,” 
Yanbian was actually quite lively when I first visited in 2006. The “three industries” about 
which Mr. Wang joked were busy with crowds of customers. The amounts of money that young 
people spent every night in eating and drinking seemed to be beyond the average income level 
of Yanbian. Interestingly, those who spent money “like water” were accused of having “backup 
money” that their parents or partners had sent from Korea, and they were expected to pay for 
the night. But this backup money was also considered as a source of trouble for the Yanbian 
labor market, making Korean Chinese too lazy to work and unable to prepare for the future. 
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The assumption is that Korean Chinese would not want to work in China, since they could not 
make nearly the income that they could get in Korea. This seems symptomatic of what has been 
called a “dual frame of reference”(Piore 1979; Fitzgerald 2009), a term that explains how people 
assess their options in one labor market based on their experience in another, such as in the 
case of Mexico, where emigration is rampant and carries great consequences for local 
economies. The dual frame of reference is especially well exemplified by employers who rely on 
Korean Chinese labor. Mr. Shin, with whom I became close friends, provides some sharp 
insight on this question.  
           Mr. Shin, the owner of a coffee shop located in downtown Yanji, is from Korea, and has 
made a great economic success in running several restaurants in Yanbian. Mr. Shin, in his early 
forties, believed back in 2000 that China would be a rising global economy soon, and decided to 
come to Yanbian. Since Yanbian is the Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture, a place where 
Korean is spoken as the first language, he thought that his broken Chinese would not be a great 
obstacle. In fact, he married a Korean Chinese woman, who also has played a critical role in 
their restaurant businesses. Other Korean Chinese business people call him “Yanbian son-in-
law” (yanbian sawi in Korean). Mr. Shin has targeted Korean Chinese young people, the majority 
of whose parents have worked in Korea, as his main customer group. This young generation of 
Korean Chinese enjoys Korean culture and mass media—music, movies, soap operas, clothing, 
and cosmetics—and accepts (and intensively consumes) Korean-ness as a familiar part of 
everyday life. Most of all, these Korean Chinese youngsters are dedicated customers, supplied 
with money sent from their parents in Korea. Given the specific characteristic of the Yanbian’s 
remittance dependent economy, Mr. Shin and two Korean friends started with a pizza 
restaurant in downtown Yanji in 2005, decorating it themselves. 
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Photo 7. One of Restaurant Run by Mr. Shin (2009) 
He sold the idea of “modern” and “healthy” Korean food by juxtaposing “Korean culture” 
with the restaurant business. With a backdrop of Korean songs and Korean styles of decoration, 
friendly service and a pleasant environment has become a trademark of the restaurant. The 
restaurant is named Happy Nara (happy country in Korean), with distinctions such as a no 
smoking policy, in contrast to most Chinese restaurants in Yanbian. Happy Nara represents itself 
as “the Korean place,” providing Korean food culture and a Korean atmosphere. Whenever I 
went to the restaurant, it was always packed with young Korean Chinese—as well as a few 
young Han Chinese. As the restaurant has gained popularity in Yanbian, Mr. Shin has expanded 
his business to include a coffee shop, a “Korean-style” Italian restaurant, and a fried rice 
restaurant (which is a popular item in Korea). By the time I left Yanbian at the end of 2009, 
Happy Nara occupied three stories out of a four-story building, and had changed its name to 
Happy Group.  
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          Despite his seemingly smooth journey to business success, Mr. Shin seemed worried 
about something. I asked what he was up to. He answered his employees often quite as soon as 
they obtain alternative or spare money to rely on. Then he has to find someone else to hire. 
“The most difficult thing about running a business in Yanbian is to find hardworking Korean 
Chinese waiters and waitresses (fuwuyuan) who will work for the long term.” Given that most 
customers are young Korean Chinese and the three owners are Korean, having Korean Chinese 
waiters and waitress seems to be essential in order to offer better customer service. Yet young 
Korean Chinese in their early twenties who worked at Happy Nara did not stay long. They did 
not work hard either, in Mr. Shin’s opinion. He explained:  
Young Korean Chinese are not desperate to work hard because their parents send more 
money than the monthly salary they could make in Yanbian. We pay around 2,000 Yuan 
a month for fuwuyuan. This amount does not attract their interest at all. In general, 
parents working in Korea feel sorry about being separated from their kids in the name 
of making money. These Korean Chinese kids just get used to easy money from a 
young age. Wages of 2,000 Yuan a month is not bad by Yanbian standards, but they 
think it is too trivial to exhaust themselves for. Korean Chinese fuwuyuan quit all the 
time, making excuses about going to Korea or going to larger Chinese cities. So we just 
have to hire Han Chinese fuwuyuan. They will stay here and work for years. It is truly 
difficult for us to communicate with Han Chinese, due to the language barrier. But they 
are much harder working and more sincere. We do not have any other choice except to 
hire Han Chinese fuwuyuan right now. 
 
Mr. Shin added that it was also hard to find middle aged Korean Chinese to hire, particularly 
women cooks. Most Korean Chinese working in Happy Nara considered their job nothing more 
than temporary work before they headed off to Korea. As soon as they got their work visas, 
these Korean Chinese fuwuyuan would leave Yanbian right away, Mr. Shin said.  
  Yanbian Korean Chinese have constantly been condemned for their lack of a work ethic—
they would not seriously take jobs in China. “They keep thinking, if they go to Korea, they can 
make several times more than this,” Mr. Shin continued. “That is why they just cannot bear 
another moment of being here in Yanbian.” As a result, an employer like Mr. Shin is always in 
 121 
the position of searching for new employees. “I think half of my time is spent to sort out new 
job applicants and interview them,” he said, sounding very frustrated. “Once the new hire stops 
working, I start searching again.” I met several other employers (Korean Chinese as well as 
Koreans) who, like Mr. Shin, professed themselves discouraged and unable to find devoted, 
long-term Korean Chinese workers. 
           These employers’ critiques of their prospective employees correspond with the dual 
frame of reference, the idea that if Korean Chinese go to Korea, they can make much more 
money than in China. Korean employers who I met often tried not to believe the firm ethnic 
stereotypes shaped by differentiated mobility—such as lazy Korean vs. diligent Han Chinese.  
But Mr. Shin and his colleagues easily come to prove the ethnic stereotype at work. For 
example, Korean Chinese think nothing of quitting to move to better paying jobs; Korean 
Chinese are dishonest when they manage company money; Korean Chinese are disorganized in 
their time and money management, in stark contrast to Han Chinese, who are hardworking and 
dependable. These problems are constantly traced back to one source: Korean Chinese have 
been spoiled by easy money sent from their parents or other family members. Put differently, 
sudden material affluence seems to trouble Korean Chinese youngsters’ work ethic; young 
Korean Chinese are so lazy and spoiled that they do not care much about their futures and 
careers. As Mr. Shin said, “There are so many Korean Chinese youngsters. But there are few 
who want to work.” There was, paradoxically, a lack of labor in what otherwise might seem to 
be a flood of surplus labor.19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  In chapter 9, “ The Rate of Surplus Value” in Capital vol1, Marx points out the contrast between necessary labor 
and surplus labor as following. “…I call the portion of the working day during which this reproduction takes 
necessary labor time, and the labor expended during that time necessary labor…During the second period of the 
labor process, that in which his labor is no longer necessary labor, the worker does indeed expend labor power, he 
does work but his labor is no longer necessary labor, and he creates no value for himself. He creates surplus value, 
which, for the capitalist, has all the charms of something created out of nothing. This part of the working day I call 
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          Practically speaking, however, these “not working” Korean Chinese are neither simply 
lazy nor lacking in work ethic. In most cases, “not working” accompanies the special period of 
waiting to go to Korea. The “not working” Korean Chinese believe that not working is a better 
choice because they should be prepared to leave as soon as the visa is ready for them. All the 
potential hassles should be taken care of before the sudden departure occurs; the problem is 
that they do not know when exactly the pending visa will be issued. This is not a matter of the 
work ethic of individual Korean Chinese. Rather it is a consequence of the fact that Korean 
Chinese futures are structured on the basis of unpredictable visas to Korea—the constant, 
relentless waiting (see chapter 3).  
          I also found that the “not working” symptom is common in the countryside when I 
visited farming towns. Both rice and dry-field farming are too labor-intensive for one person to 
manage the entire field. If either a husband or wife goes to Korea, the farming itself cannot be 
continued by the other spouse alone. The field is then rented to Korean Chinese neighbors or 
incoming Han Chinese farmers. After this disposal of the farming land, the remaining partner 
has to wait for husband or wife to return to China, living on the remittances sent from the 
partner in Korea. Or, the waiting person him or herself must prepare to leave eventually for 
Korea to reunite with the other spouse. Given that farming relies on a seasonal cycle, the 
farming land should be rented20 when the right person comes along to take over at the right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
surplus labor time, and to the labor expended during that time I give the name of surplus labor.” (324-325) Marx’s 
concept of surplus labor helps me in two respects. First, I simply imply surplus labor as the excess and flood of 
laborers that do not want to take an active part in labor market of Yanbian, as Mr. Shin is concerned. Second, I 
view the non-working Korean Chinese, who are willing to participate in the Korean labor market, as sort of 
“reserve army” that is cheap source of labor, which enables to continue to produce surplus value. In fact, the 
excess of Korean Chinese who badly want to go to Korea and who already work in Korea keep the Korean 
Chinese wage low ($1500-$2000 level), leading to the constant labor exploitation.  
 
20 In China, farmers have a land-use right for thirty years. During the period of ownership, the land-use right can 
be rented to or passed over to other farmers, depending on the contract. But the property continues to belong to 
the local government, not to individuals (Oi 1991). 
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moment. The huge number of people “waiting” in this fashion persons all over Yanbian tend to 
be thought of as “not working”—when actually they are suspended in the liminal time and 
space between living and leaving.  
           Rampant Korean Chinese transnational migration has thrown Yanbian into flux, 
redefining many characteristics of the ethnic zone. Han Chinese have moved into Yanbian in a 
quest for new jobs as a “floating population,” “ethnic others,” or “ethnic minorities.” On the 
one hand, these newcomers have caused ethnic discomfort to Korean Chinese who have been 
embraced by ethnic comfort for a long time. On the other hand, these “ethnic others” emerge 
as an essential labor pool to serve the Korean Chinese customers who enjoy the growing service 
sector in Yanbian, such as Mr. Wang’s “three industries.” The next section tells the story of 
how the Han Chinese have responded to the Korean wind and Korean money.  
2.3.2 Korean Chinese Customer vs. Han Chinese Dagong  
          To many Korean Chinese returnees, Yanbian does not feel like “home.” One of the 
reasons is that they are surprised at the dramatic increase of Han Chinese population in 
Yanbian, compared to when they left a decade ago. It is very typical to see Korean Chinese 
customers served by Han Chinese fuwuyuan (service people). Among the entertainment and 
service industries, massage parlors, one of the “three industries,” needs special attention here 
because it has attracted Han Chinese dagong (workers) from all over China. In Yanbian, a 
massage parlor is a common spot for people to visit with friends after gathering or drinking. 
Some massage places provide sexual services. But most massage parlors do not--they are very 
public and open for 24 hours, with multiple customers getting massages at the same time in 
the same room, often with friends. The customers—young and old, women and men—stream 
in constantly, day and night. While I was in Yanbian, I went to massage parlors with Korean 
 124 
Chinese friends many times as part of the routine itineraries of gatherings, which included 
drinking, eating, karaoke, massage, skewered lamb(羊肉串 yangrouchuan), and sauna.  
           Hearing about the high demand for massage services in Yanbian, many Han Chinese 
masseuses have moved into Yanbian—a kind of dream place for them, where they can make 
even more money than in larger Chinese cities, and with a lower cost of living. In practice, 
however, working conditions are not even close to dreamlike. They must work for twelve 
hours a day, with only two official days off a month. The income is unpredictable because it 
depends on the number of customers they serve. Waiting for random customers to come to 
pick them, these masseuses sleep curled up at work, sharing a large resting room with dozens 
of other masseuses. Night customers who visit after drinking and karaoke at 2 or 3 AM 
interrupt their sleep. Popular masseuses are frequently called by regular customers and make 
more money than those who are not often called. But they are always tired from lack of sleep, 
their qi (energy) and health suffering badly. They have to disregard their fatigue, as the key in 
this business is to make new customers into returning regulars (dangol), so as to maximize the 
predictable income.  
  I had chances to talk with several male masseurs from different regions of China.  
Many were dongbei (from Jilin and Heilongjiang), but there were also some from Anhui, 
Shandong, and Sichuan. After several visits I became friends with one, a Han Chinese I knew 
only as “Number 5.” Number 5, in his early twenties, came from a small rural town in 
Heilongjiang (in the northern part of Northeast China). After he graduated from middle 
school, he was not sure what to do. He did not want to be a farmer like his parents. He heard 
that massage could be a good way to make money, and Yanbian was recommended as a good 
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place to go if he has developed good skills. One day, I ended up having an interview-like 
conversation with Number 5, and this is some of what he told me:  
I heard that I could make decent money if I go to Yanbian. It is because people in 
Yanbian, in particular Korean Chinese, like to spend money they earned in Korea. I 
do not have much education or special skills. Thus I decided to learn to do massage 
in order to go to Yanbian. It is decent money, but a tiring job. Most of my 
customers are Korean Chinese. But most masseuses here are Han Chinese. Korean 
Chinese would not want to do tiring work like this because they think they can go to 
Korea to make better money. But Han Chinese don’t expect to go to Korea or to 
make big money all at once. Also, Han Chinese customers are not coming to get 
massages because they are very stingy. Only one out of ten customers is Han 
Chinese. The rest are Korean Chinese.  
 
Yanbian might not be the only “dream place” among masseuses, but Number 5’s testimony 
helps us understand how Yanbian is imagined elsewhere: as a hotbed of consumption driven 
by Korean money and Korean Chinese extravagance. In addition, the informal statistics on 
massage consumption suggested by Number 5 demonstrate ethnic distinctions between Han 
Chinese and Korean Chinese. He, along with other masseurs andmasseuses, assumed that 
Korean Chinese make money in Korea and spend it quickly, relying on more backup money—
the remittances.  
          Number 5 told me that he had a difficult time when the financial crisis hit the Korean 
economy badly in 2008. Remittances dropped off sharply, and some migrant workers and 
their families tried not to exchange Korean money into Chinese yuan, preferring to wait till 
the rate became more favorable.21 As a result, the economy of Yanbian was frozen, lacking the 
generous cash flows that had been a major driving force for its service-centered economy. 
Responding to the economic crisis, Number 5 reinforced the significance of remittances for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 According to Yanbian customs statistics, until 2008, a billion dollars a year in remittances had been flowing from 
Korea to Yanbian. But in 2008, it dropped to about seven hundred million dollars when the financial crisis brought 
with it a sharp depreciation of the Korean currency. The value of the Korean won has bounced back, from 10,000 
won: 40 yuan in 2008 to 10,000 won: 58.90 yuan in 2011. As the Korean currency showed increased strength, 
Korean Chinese rushed to exchange the won into Chinese yuan (Yeonhap News, May 1, 2011). 
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his own earnings. “The more remittances get sent, the more money gets made in Korea, the 
more Korean Chinese customers are coming to get my massages.” It is undeniable that 
remittances have generated these entertainment industries and sustained a large part of the 
Yanbian economy, with its focus on spending rather than making, consuming rather than 
working (see Chapter 4). The critical point made by Number 5 is about the Han Chinese 
migrant worker’s connection to and dependency on the remittance-driven economy. He 
brings to the fore the intimately intertwined consequences of Korean money, not only on 
Korean Chinese migrants and their families, but also on Han Chinese business people and 
dagong (workers) who rely on the influx of remittances for their incomes. In other words, 
Number 5 implies, when remittances decline, the whole economy of Yanbian, sensitive to 
their fluctuating flows, becomes vulnerable. Despite their differentiated mobility, both Korean 
Chinese and Han Chinese are swept up in the turbulence of migration, the migration that has 
actively altered the conditions of everyday life and reshaped the urban landscape of Yanji. 
          At the same time, Number 5’s insight pushes us to rethink the impact of fluctuating 
flows of Korean money in conjunction with global economic crisis. The Korean crisis was 
instigated mainly by the weakened US economy. In 2008, Korean financial markets, closely 
tied to the US market, tumbled when the US market collapsed. Many Korean companies 
ended up going bankrupt. The unemployment rate was at a record high. The service sectors 
that were occupied mostly by Korean Chinese shrank. The sharp depreciation of the Korean 
currency value slowed down the export of goods. In this economic turbulence, the devalued 
Korean currency especially affected Korean Chinese migrant workers, as they became victims 
of the instability of the currency rate—the total amount of remittance varies according to the 
currency rate of the day. Since the currency rate was disadvantageous to Korean Chinese 
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migrants in 2008 and 2009, their total income was cut in half as the Korean currency showed 
constant weakness against the dollar.   
         On the other hand, the Chinese economy stayed relatively strong in the midst of the 
crisis under the state’s support of economic growth and protection of the currency rate. 
Korean Chinese migrant workers began to return to Yanbian because they could not make as 
much as before. These returnees tried to seek the Chinese dream, starting new businesses in 
order to be part of the booming economy of China. At the same time, they were constantly 
frustrated by their inability to catch up with the rapid social changes that had occurred while 
they were away (I describe the returnees in Chapter 6 as existing “between two dreams”). 
Staying in Yanbian in 2008 and 2009, I met many returnees who were suffering from deep 
anxiety and frustration, uncertain of the best path for their future, unsure of where to settle 
down. After much contemplation and hesitation, the majority of Korean Chinese ended up 
going back to Korea, their once and future “dream place.” The income gap between China 
and Korea is not as vast as before, and the economic benefits from transnational migration are 
not quite as promising. Some migrants told me that they are too old or too late to join the 
Chinese economic boom. Others said that they just got used to working in Korea as physical 
laborers, and enjoyed the regular income. The Korean dream is gradually waning while the 
Chinese dream is still emerging. It might be the time to write that the fifth wind is the Chinese 
Wind. 
 2.4 Conclusion 
          Focusing on differentiated mobility by ethnicity and the turbulent effects of the Korean 
wind, I have examined the intersection of internal migration, transnational migration, and 
remittance development occurring in Yanbian for the last twenty years. I have argued that 
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ethnic groups have developed different ranges and routes of mobility and, consequently, 
different life choices. I also have argued that mobility brings interconnection between ethnic 
groups and mutual dependency on the remittance economy under the influence of Korean 
money. Throughout the chapter, I have highlighted the particular hesitation between living 
and leaving, as “jumping scales” becomes a common mode of life.  
            I wrap up this chapter with an anecdote of an encounter with a Han Chinese taxi driver 
who showed strong pride in the global economic rise of China. As soon as he noticed that I was 
Korean, he made the following confident declaration: “I am sure that China will be the greatest 
and strongest country in the world in ten years. We will exceed America, too. Let me predict, 
Koreans will come to China as dagong to make money in ten years as we, Chinese have gone to 
Korea as dagong to make money. Things will reverse soon as China rises.” Time and again, I 
have encountered this version of confidence in the Chinese future. This sort preening became 
stronger and stronger after the global financial crisis ruined the promise of the Korean dream. I 
came increasingly to believe that Yanbian has entered a phase of transition to the Chinese wind, 
(see chapter 6), despite the vibrant remittance economy still generated by money from Korea.  
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Chapter 3. Labor o f  Love : 
The Economy of Waiting and Affective Currency 
 
Everybody i s  Gone1 
Wife is gone, husband is gone, and uncle is gone 
Everybody is gone, to Korea, to Japan, 
  To America, to Russia, to make money 
Everybody is separated and crying 
What does life mean, we are all broken down 
Why are we sick of missing each other, 
We are waiting to live together sometime in the future 
 
          On a sunny day in May 2009, I had a chance to go hiking with a group of Korean 
Chinese. As I mentioned in chapter 1, hiking became a part of my routine weekly schedule 
and a major opportunity for participant observation, as it allowed access to Korean Chinese 
everyday life and personal stories. Since Yanbian’s spring comes in late April due to the 
region’s fairly cold climate, the hikers considered the two months of springtime—May and 
June—as the best season to see flowers bloom. My hiking trips, with various groups, were 
concentrated during this period. To me, the most exciting moments in hiking were the lively 
conversations over lunch, once we arrived at the peaks of mountains. Of all the hikers I came 
to know during the weekly trips, I became particularly close to a leader of one of the groups, 
Mr. Ho, who worked as a high-ranking official in the publishing field. At this time, too, Mr. 
Ho, who was good at creating a friendly and lively mood, started a lunch conversation by 
telling us about his story as botoli, the Yanbian term for Korean Chinese wives or husbands 
who have been waiting for their partners to return from Korea—sometimes for as long as a 
decade. The conversation continued among the hikers:  
Mr. Ho: After my wife went to Korea ten years ago, I became so lonely that I 
drank a lot—almost every day. The heavy drinking gradually ruined my body. In  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The song is a popular song widely known in Yanbian, expressing the feeling of rampant migration. It was made in 
2006. 
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Yanbian, there are so many lonely husbands without wives. What can we do, go 
home where there is nobody waiting for us? Drinking is my friend as well as my 
excuse not to go back home early. But since I started hiking, I have cut down on 
my drinking and gotten healthier. 
 
Hiker 1 [enviously]: But your wife sends the remittances on a regular basis, right? 
How many houses do you own right now? 
 
Hiker 2:  Nowadays, we should think we’re happy if we’re not divorced, if we 
own a house or two, if our kids have grown up without causing serious trouble, 
and if the remittances are still being sent. That’s a successful family; that’s the 
Korean dream.  
 
Mr. Ho: You guys are right. But waiting for your wife for more than ten years is 
not an easy task. There’s a reason why Korean Chinese get together for hiking 
or drinking or other leisure activities—it’s because they’re too lonely. Look at 
Yanbian. Everybody’s gone to Korea to make money. I don’t expect anything 
more except that my wife eventually returns. After ten years of waiting for my 
wife, I happen to believe that, as long as money is sent back, there might still be 
love.  
 
This conversation captures the common anxieties about long-term transnational migration in 
Yanbian, especially in relation to remittances and love. Ms. Yun, a journalist for the Yanbian 
Radio Station, had introduced me to Mr. Ho, and he was very curious about and supportive of 
my research from the beginning. He in turn introduced me to other highly ranked members of 
the Yanbian government and the Communist Party, and brought me to many different social 
gatherings, mostly large banquets involving heavy drinking with his friends. He invited me to 
his 60th birthday party, which is considered as an important turning point in the Korean 
culture. He introduced me to every single friend of his at the party—mostly Korean Chinese 
writers and journalists. He also arranged an interview for me with his mother who was a 
deeply committed Communist Party member, particularly during the Chinese War of 
Liberation2 before the new China was officially established in 1949. While accompanying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mr. Ho’s mother was one of the early Communist Party members who participated in the liberation war. She did 
not speak Chinese at all when she became a Chinese nurse army. “The nursing school during the war was a great 
school for me,” she said, “teaching the Chinese language as well as medical knowledge. I was illiterate in both 
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Photo 8. Hiking Trip. By Baishan(2009)	  
me to the most of the interviews and gatherings he arranged, Mr. Ho told me, “ I want to 
collect new stories and get to know many different things in the world as a writer. I also want 
to learn more about Korea, America, and different worlds from you, Juni.” Mr. Ho thought of 
me as a messenger coming from some other world.  He wanted to know what America looks 
like, how Americans behave, what they eat, what their sexual relationships are like, and so 
forth. I had to answer him somewhat vaguely, explaining that I did not know the American 
culture in detail, being a foreigner there myself. He also wanted to know about Korea. In most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chinese and Korean because I had no schooling because of the severe poverty of my family. Also, my father	  
thought women should not go to school, although I badly wanted to,. My brothers were educated, of course. 
Because of my illiteracy, I had to memorize everything in nursing school, without being able to read at all. But I 
was first in the class.” She has always been a dedicated Communist Party member. She kept saying to me, “We 
should admit that we cannot be better off without the help of South Korea,” meaning migration there to work. 
Her daughter, her son, and her daughter-in-law (Ho’s wife) have all been working in Korea for years.  
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of our conversations Mr. Ho and I focused on comparisons among different cultures, always 
returning to the problems of Korean Chinese in reaction to the Korean wind.  
           Not only curious, Mr. Ho is a friendly and witty storyteller. In fact, he is the author of 
three books, one of them the winner of an important literary prize for Korean Chinese writers 
in Yanbian. As a former factory worker in the publishing field, official recognition of his work 
means a lot to him. He was able to emerge from the ranks of ordinary laborers to become a 
important official (ganfu), but never gave up his dream to become a writer, a dream he had 
nurtured from his twenties. Writing novels occupies his mind and life as a core project 
alongside his main profession. He was also a great facilitator in the interviews he set up for me, 
breaking the ice and getting to the point as soon as possible. Most of all, Mr. Ho guided me 
through the local social setting, which would be hard for me to navigate without a (Korean 
Chinese) native’s invitation. In so doing, he embraced and situated me in a particular position 
as a “Korean” researcher and student who studies in an American university, working on “our” 
ethnic problem. He emphasized the ethnic bond—“we ethnic Koreans”—while his mother 
treated me as if I were a family member because I had the same last name as hers. The bonds 
that Mr. Ho helped me establish undeniably expedited and expanded my field research and my 
social network in Yanbian.  
            Despite his curiosity and extroverted personality, and his emphasis on the ethnic bond 
between us, he never told me that much about his wife, who had been working in Korea for 
years. His witty statements were made mostly from a third-person point of view, leaving a 
certain distance from his own life as botoli. His mother also kept quiet about her daughter-in-
law in Korea on the several occasions when I spoke with her about the Liberation War and 
her life. I became increasingly curious about his secretiveness regarding his wife. After a year 
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of virtual silence on the subject, however, Mr. Ho finally opened up, just as I was finishing my 
field research in Yanbian.        
             Looking back at my discussions with Mr. Ho, I kept wondering what made him so 
reluctant to tell me his own story, even as he told me so many stories about other people. 
How should I understand his ebullient social life juxtaposed with his secretive and 
underplayed personal life? How could he reconcile his public career as a Communist Party 
member and an officially recognized Korean Chinese ethnic writer with his years spent waiting 
for his wife and her money from Korea, a country that had been officially considered a 
capitalist enemy for much of his life? These questions continued to linger with me throughout 
my research as I came to recognize how difficult it was to hear and gather waiting stories told in 
the first person, despite the rampancy and omnipresence of such narratives in Yanbian. This 
chapter addresses my ethnographic challenge through a reading of two waiting stories spoken 
in the first person.  
             Zooming into the intimate domain of long-term, long-distance marriage relationships 
transformed by transnational migration, in this chapter I aim to understand the particular 
structures of feeling and personal emotional and economic strategies engendered by the 
temporality of waiting for remittances and beloved ones, from the point of view of those who 
wait. Staging the context that the moral and sexual anxiety of waiting stories has arisen from a 
setting of Korean Chinese ethnic migration to Korea, I point to waiting as a core and intrinsic 
condition that sustains the economy of migration. Here, I develop two interconnected 
arguments. First, I argue that waiting for money, and the partner, is an affective labor that can 
generate either a binding or a disintegrating force between the two separated parties. I 
understand an affective labor that includes an immaterial labor dealing with information and 
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communication. It also aims to turn to a feeling of ease and well-being, as in person service 
and caring service (Hardt & Negri 2000). Taking caring as a key element of affective labor, I 
investigate waiting while caring for love and money as a immaterial but productive labor in that 
the caring while waiting constitutes an essential part in serving better future and maintaining a 
long-term and long-distance transnational migration. Second, I argue that remittance is an 
affective currency that effects the transformation of individual intimate relationships and social 
dynamics. As a hiker illustrate at the beginning, Korean Chinese in Yanbian have accepted 
remittance as an evidence of love as well as an affective medium to transfer love in the 
uncertain and vulnerable intimate relationship. In doing so, I analyze the story of a film, Let the 
River Run, in which a father and son are both waiting for the wife and mother who has been 
working in Korea. Later, I explore two personal waiting stories, of a husband (Mr. Ho) and a 
wife (Ms. Li), respectively, stories that tell us about the anxiety, anticipation, betrayal, and 
vulnerability involved in waiting for money and love. My focus is on methods of caring for 
money and love, or what I call the labor of love.  
3.1 Emergence of Anxiety: Money and Love 
           Before I get to the actual waiting stories, I would like to discuss the anxiety embedded 
in Korean Chinese transnational migration, and its particular context. This is to understand 
the specific reasons for emerging moral and sexual tensions entailed in Korean Chinese 
transnational migration. First, the anxiety derives from the embedded illegality of much of the 
migration. Since the Korean government has issued work visas to Korean Chinese on the 
basis of kinship, Yanbian Korean Chinese, whose ancestors moved mostly from North Korea, 
cannot rely on kinship connections to South Koreans, and thus have instead faked kinship 
using illegal brokers—what I called “paper kinship” in chapter 1. Counterfeit documents have 
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enabled these migrants to get into Korea, where they tend to immediately fall into 
undocumented status. A majority of Korean Chinese migrants have been penalized and 
stigmatized as illegitimate workers, and are constantly anxious about possible deportation.  
            Second, another practice that has facilitated Korean Chinese illegal migration is fake 
marriage between Korean and Korean Chinese, a method that is especially reliant on the 
concept of Korean ethnic affinity. The manipulation of marriage in the pursuit of migration 
and money has become a critical subject that has stirred and destabilized Korean Chinese 
family and intimate relationships, often referred to as an “ethnic crisis” or “marriage in crisis.” 
In Yanbian, people believe that love is in crisis, having become subject to the power of money 
generated by the Korean wind.  
            The “crisis” has been mainly conditioned by cultural preferences that have uniquely 
favored ethnic marriages between Korean Chinese and South Koreans. In particular, fake 
marriage has been practiced as the easiest way for middle-aged Korean Chinese women to get 
into Korea. Yet many cases have shown that fake marriages—which frequently involve 
divorcing a “real” Korean Chinese husband in order to marry a “paper” Korean husband—
tend to result in real divorces. The rise in such “immoral” activities—especially abandoning a 
“real” Korean Chinese partner—has been received as an ethnic moral crisis. Yet the moral 
standard is dubious in Yanbian; these Korean Chinese are considered as immoral pursuers of 
mere material obsession (“money-money”), while at the same time it is understood that choosing 
this pathway is an often unavoidable part of planning for a better future. In the context of the 
Korean wind, fake marriage between Korean and Korean Chinese exposes fault lines of cultural 
and social anxiety.  
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             Finally and foremost, “money from Korea” is the essential flash point for moral and 
sexual tension between two parties living in two different countries. As the conversation that I 
opened this chapter showed, “Where money goes, love is”; the flow and friction of 
remittances—how much money is sent, and how frequently, and whether plans and 
expectations have been met—are crucial in maintaining long-term and long-distance 
relationships. The hikers half-jokingly told me that remittances sent on a regular basis are 
evidence of “love” and togetherness, and that saving and not squandering remittances will 
bring more remittances because it inspires trust in the sender. The chained sources of 
anxiety—illegal entry, the high probability of a partner’s affair, the sending and receiving of 
remittances—have shaped and reshaped the intimate relationships and material conditions of 
Yanbian Korean Chinese.  
          This widespread and commonly observed moral and sexual anxiety—love in crisis— 
among Korean Chinese is closely overlapped with discussions about the commodification of 
love and care as “the new gold” (Constable 2009; Parrenas 2001; Sassen 2000:2004; 
Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2004). The commodification of love has thrived on the 
development of international “marriage markets” (Constable 2003, 2005a; Freeman 2005, 
2006; Piper&Roces 2003) and Internet dating sites (Constable 2007b; Tyner 2009) in a 
transnational setting. Love is not simply a force for creating interpersonal ties (Fromm 
2006(1956)) but rather a means of producing value that is then circulated on the market. 
Nicole Constable examines the “commodification” of love on a global stage, describing the 
ways in which intimacy or intimate relations can be treated as if they have entered the market, 
and bought or sold as part of the global capitalist flow of goods (Constable 2009). The Korean 
Chinese case is no exception to this sort of commodification, especially in its use of marriage 
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as a key method of making and faking kinship (Freeman 2011). The true intention of any 
Yanbian/Korean marriage tends to be called into question; it is assumed to be a savvy gesture 
practiced for the sake of money in both Yanbian and Korea—regardless of what the partners 
may say or think themselves.            
            These recent anthropological studies on gendered transnational migration document 
the tension that love entails, looking at intimacy and intimate relationship as a core site, not 
only as a means but also as an end for transnational migration.3 For instance, in the 
Dominican Republic, sex workers rely on unpredictable transnational intimate relationships 
with foreign tourists, the relationships growing from sex transactions. The sex workers 
attempt to perform being in love with these tourists, often with the goal of marrying them. 
Marriage is a viable means to get a legitimate visa to leave the impoverished home country in 
order to make money, which is then sent back to take care of the family left behind. “Marriage 
as transaction”, in Brenna’s terms, serves as a survival as well as advancement strategy, 
allowing escape from their precarious present lives (Brennan 2004). In the case of marriage 
relationships between Japanese men and Filipinas, Faier argues that love is a “global self-
making” term that makes possible the transnational tie via international marriage and send 
money (remittances) back home (Faier 2009). In contrast to manipulating marriage as a simple 
means to make money or obtain a visa—“marriage as transaction”—the emphasis on love by 
the Filipina brides delivers a moral sense of self and cosmopolitan, modern personhood, a 
sense that ties them to their Japanese families and Japanese morality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Filipina migrants make money and take care of their own families by emigrating to take care of other families in 
other countries. The massive Filipina migration has transformed the Philippines into a labor-exporting country that 
now suffers from a “care crisis” (Parrenas 2001). In this discussion, the focus is not on the sexual transaction, but 
on the global chain of care shaped by transnational migration.  
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           These ethnographies commonly show that love—as one thread in a web of 
transnational practices—emerges as a contentious site that demonstrates “global hypergamy” 
(Constable 2005), or women marrying up into higher socioeconomic groups. They also 
illustrate love as a site for the production of value and a new condition of possibility, by 
reorganizing love alongside money and vice versa on the global level. Here, transnational 
migration has formulated a “chain of love”(Parrenas 2004) that develops the exchange value 
of care and love on a global scale, the value extracted from poorer countries to richer ones at 
low cost (Constable 2009). These transnational practices are made possible by intimate 
relationships, just as the intimate relationships have been reorganized by transnational 
practices, as Faier suggests (Faier 2007) 
              My investigation of the labor of love and remittance is built on transnational studies of the 
commodification of love, and the contentious relationship between love and money on a 
global scale. My ethnography on the transformation of intimacy also stays focused on the 
affective aspects of transnational migration, underscoring that transnational labor is initiated 
and maintained in the name of love—either as family duty or as economic betterment. At the 
same time, my approach to this tension is a bit different from that of other scholars, in that I 
pay special attention to the temporality of waiting both for money and love, and the derived 
fear and anxiety implicit in the Korean wind from the perspective of those waiting in Yanbian—
those who are not actually migrating, but who sustain the other pole of migration as key 
agents in the constant circulation of labor. What is the role of remittance in transnational 
economic and intimate life? What kind of transfer is remittance: is it gift or money? What is 
taken or given between the two parties, the sender and receiver of remittances? What if the 
exchange, and the way to a better life, fails or is betrayed in some fashion? How does love work 
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in this anxious and fearful situation; what is the labor of love? In answering these questions, I 
trace the complex fabric of anxiety built on waiting and remittances, highlighting the particular 
temporality structured by Korean Chinese migration and deeply entrenched as a part of 
everyday life in Yanbian. 
3.2 Waiting and Remittances  
            When I visited Yanbian for the first time in 2006, the entire region felt like a “waiting 
room,” full of both anticipation and fear of possible disappointment. Waiting was 
omnipresent; I met many Korean Chinese—wives and husbands, grandfathers and 
grandmothers, sisters and brothers, daughters and sons—who had been waiting for years for 
money and family members to return from Korea, much like Mr. Ho. I also met Korean 
Chinese who badly wanted to leave Yanbian for Korea, Japan, or America, waiting to get their 
applied visa issued (as portrayed in chapter 2). Of course, the long and sometimes desperate 
waiting does not always come to fruition. For instance, the remittances could stop; the partner 
could stop communicating, or disappear without leaving a word; the visa broker could turn 
out to be a professional swindler; long-gone parents could abandon their children without 
providing decent support. Beset by multiple forms and durations of waiting, Yanbian seemed 
like a “lobby” where all one could do was to wait to be called (Mattingly 2010:8). Yanbian was 
also like a place of “dwelling-in-travel” (Clifford 1997:2), with everyone always on the verge of 
that next move. 
            Hearing stories of waiting awash in anxiety and expectation over and over, I found 
that one of the most common fears among Korean Chinese migrant spouses waiting for the 
partner was, “What if my partner has an affair” (baramnada in Korean4)—with either a Korean or a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Baram’s literal meaning in Korean is “wind.” Baramnada means that people go out and wander with another 
partner, having an affair.  
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fellow Korean Chinese migrant. There are numerous cases where Korean Chinese migrants 
have stopped sending remittances and broken off contact after starting another life with a new 
partner in Korea. In this context, a break-up can be a critical, life-threatening event, as it 
results not only in the loss of the relationship, but also in exposure to economic vulnerability 
for the partner waiting for and relying on the remittances.  
             In a fragile, vulnerable long-term and long-distance relationship, waiting for 
remittances needs special consideration, since the remittance is generated by deferring the 
present togetherness of the couple. The remittance is sent to support the family back home in 
the name of love, so the personal attachment to the money is still vivid. On the other hand, 
the remittance is also an impersonal form of money that is simply used to buy things. 
However, the remittance requires special treatment; it needs to be wisely used, cared for, and 
invested to create more wealth and a better future. The remittance transfers not only the value 
of the money but also a sense of care for the partner and the relationship itself, which is 
sustained through the separation that brings the remittance. Deferral and waiting are key to 
the temporality of remittances, and the anxiety in this particular exchange needs special 
attention. Here, money as a form of remittance is a dubious medium; it provides the means of 
practicing moral responsibility for one’s family and its future, while at the same time, money 
can be a destructive source of sexual tension, forcing couples apart for long periods of time. 
This moral and sexual anxiety has been aggravated by the persistent influx of remittances as a 
main economic generator in Yanbian for the last twenty year. 
             The anxiety embedded in exchange is not new in theoretical discussions.  
Here, Marx’s early writing is useful in understanding the force of money—both constructive 
and destructive.  
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The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. Money’s properties are 
my properties and essential powers—the properties and powers of its possessor. Thus, 
what I am and am capable of is by no means determined by my individuality. I am ugly, 
but I can buy for myself the most beautiful of women. Therefore, I am not ugly, for the 
effect of ugliness—its deterrent power—is nullified by money…does not my money 
therefore transform all my incapacities into their contrary? (Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, p 138, Marx) 
 
This paragraph captures the subordination of individual feelings to money in dramatic ways. 
Money makes it possible to transform an ugly man into a powerful one who can overcome his 
ugliness. Money as impersonal but objective medium of value exchange is now intimately 
mediated in the human relationship. Money even appears to transform feelings, personal ties, 
and subjectivities.5 And yet, the potential of money is not always creative or binding.  It 
possesses destructive power as well. Marx continues,  
If money is the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, binding me and 
nature and man, is not money the bond of all bonds? Can it not dissolve and bind all 
ties? Is it not, therefore, the universal agent of divorce? It is the true agent of divorce as 
well as the true binding agent—the universal galvano-chemical power of society 
(Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p 138, Marx) 
 
The destructive power of money is inherent in its ability to move between realms, both joining 
and cutting human ties. The power of money also converts human desire into reality, “from 
imagination to life, from imagined being into real being. In effecting this mediation, money is 
the truly creative power.” (139). Money’s force of creative destruction can overthrow the 
social relationship. Here, the potency of exchange is not understood as the extension of the 
self into thing in the realm of exchange. Rather, money directly transforms human bonds 
through an intimate and dramatic engagement in the relationship between subjects. Money 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Simmel makes similar point regarding money. To him, money is a medium circulating between the subjective 
desire and desirable objects in the realm of exchange, without paying much attention to production and human 
labor. As a mere medium of exchangeability (130), money enables an impersonal bond between subject and thing. 
While leaving the chasm unfilled between the subject and the thing, the relationship between subjects remains 
impersonal and detached, which contrasts with Marx’s view of money as the personal and attached means of 
power as well as a means of exchange and the garnering of wealth.  
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arouses anxiety about uncertain consequences; we cannot know what changes money will 
bring about in transforming human bonds.  
             Whereas Marx highlights the transformative and unpredictable force of money and 
related anxiety, Mauss points out the anxiety from the point of view of the expected mutual 
obligation and anxious waiting related to the return of the gift in time. The gift exchange 
between two different parties aims to inscribe personal ties in mutual obligations and debts in 
order to prolong the relationship. To Mauss, the gift is not a mere thing attached to a person, 
but rather assumes a wholeness deeply connected with “souls”—“souls mixed with things, 
things mixed with souls” (Mauss 1990:20)—“the spirit of the gift.” This “indissoluble bond of 
a thing with its original owner” (Mauss 1990; Gregory 1982:18) makes the gift inalienable by 
imposing on the receiver the obligation to return. Therefore, the gift exchange is not an 
instant one-time trade, but a repetitive and constant exchange because the return is always 
anticipated. Until the return is completed, the gift remains a debt—it drives a “debt” or “loan” 
economy (Gregory 1982; Derrida 1994). In the gift economy, life is intermingled with things 
through a strict contract—“the time limit.” 
These are the notion of credit, of the time limit placed on it, and also the notion of 
honor. Gifts circulate as we have seen in Melanesia and Polynesia, with the certainty 
that they will be reciprocated. Their “surety” in the equality of the thing given, which is 
itself that “surety.” But in every possible form of society, it is in the nature of a gift to 
impose an obligatory time limit (Mauss 1990:35). 
 
A gift received “with a burden attached” (41) should be returned on the basis of the term—
the time limit. The presupposed “certainty” between two parties is key to maintaining the 
relationship.  When the return does not take place at the given time, the potential for rivalry 
and hostility within the contractual relationship is revealed. Derrida develops the significance 
of reciprocation within a time limit in his book, Given Time, focusing on the time boundary and 
temporality that conditions the gift exchange.  
 143 
The gift is not a gift; the gift only gives to the extent it gives time. The difference 
between a gift and every other operation of pure and simple exchange is that the gift 
gives time. There where there is gift, there is time. What it gives, the gift is time, but this 
gift of time is also a demand of time. The thing must not be restituted immediately and 
right away. There must be time, it must last, there must be waiting—without forgetting. 
It demands time, the thing, but it demands a delimited time, neither an instant nor an 
infinite time, but a time determined by a term, in other words, a rhythm, a cadence 
(Derrida 1992:41). 
 
Derrida also considers the “time limit” as a condition for a gift to become the gift: only if 
there is a deferral between exchanges and only if there is a waiting for a gift to be restituted, it 
can be the gift. Here, the certainty of the gift is deferred and undecided until the return is 
completed. The exchange between two parties remains unfulfilled as well as anxious due to 
the potential of destructive power that the gift exchange preserves until the waiting is 
completed and the promise to return the gift is kept. In the gift exchange, waiting is a key 
activity, as preparation for the next exchange and a major means of maintaining the 
relationship. Moreover, the rigors and demands of waiting can themselves heighten the 
creative and destructive powers of exchange.  
              Drawing on the transformative power of money as described by Marx, and the 
explication of anxious waiting from Mauss and Derrida, I take a slight different direction to 
understand the anxiety embedded in remittances, emphasizing the particular temporality that 
remittances entail—the tendency to be future-oriented—“waiting with anticipation” (Gasparini 
1995). In On Waiting, Gasparini sums up the attributes of waiting in three aspects: 1) waiting as 
an interstitial time; 2) waiting as blockage of action; and 3) waiting as an experience field with 
substitute meanings. In addition, relying on the dictionary definitions of waiting as “the action 
of remaining stationary or quiescent in expectation of something” or “remaining in a state of 
repose or inaction, until something expected happens,” he highlights that waiting embraces 
expectation, a future-oriented action that attempts to control uncertainty (Gasparini 1995). 
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Waiting is a special “crossroads” between the present and the future, between certainty and 
uncertainty. And waiting is the “present of the future”(Augustine cited from Gasparini 
1995:30). In the liminal temporality, waiting could be a passive activity producing feelings of 
powerless, helpless, and vulnerability (Cranpanzano 1986). On the other hand, waiting can be 
rigorous activity, since it might require a constant state of alertness and preparation. Moreover, 
“skillful waiting” produces a subject that is suitable to the speed and contingency of late 
capitalism (Chua 2011). 
             In Yanbian, I have witnessed different kinds of and strategies for waiting, but all of 
them demand the core trait of patience, which Gasparini charactereizes as “an ability to await 
events” and “the full acceptance of the other’s time” (Gasparini 1995). I have heard many 
Korean Chinese migrants and their families accept long-term separation as a “necessary life 
phase for a better life.”6 The embrace of waiting in everyday life leads me to understand that 
waiting has resulted in an interpersonal and inter-subjective temporality that binds two people, 
such as the separated partners appearing in the later part of this chapter. I view the waiting 
caused by separation as a form of work practiced alongside a series of substitute meaningful 
jobs, as Gasparini indicates; for example, waiting for partners while taking care of children or 
investing the remittances. Thus, waiting is a special temporal domain that creates a particular 
affect and sense of temporality—“the present of the future.” Waiting is not, I would argue, 
the act of doing nothing in a void time and space, but rather consists in doing something 
special in a given time, creating new arrangements and new meanings. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Barbara Adam cites Weigert in Time and Social Theory(1991): “ The essential temporality of everyday life means that 
humans experience not only the passing of time, but also the necessity to wait until one temporal process its course 
in order for another to begin. All humans wait, and in the fullest sense of the term, only humans wait. Waiting is an 
experience based on the interpretation and understanding of the temporal structures of events and human desires” 
(121). 
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   In what follows, my ethnography explores stories of waiting for remittance, a currency 
that entails a temporality of waiting7 between money and gift, a fused embodiment of making 
and caring for money to support the family’s future by deferring the present togetherness of 
couples. In other words, remittances act as a drive to imagine and hope for the not-yet-better-
future. Bloch discusses the Not-Yet-Consciousness as “the preconscious of what is to come, 
the psychological birth place of the new” (Bloch 1995:116). The not-yet-conscious and the 
not-yet-become exist in a space of concrete anticipation—that is, a space for something new 
to come into being. Potential futures live in the present moment without revealing their real 
appearance. Analyzing the anxiety stemming from the uncertain futures and long waits for 
partners predominant in a transnational migration circumstance, my interest is not to see the 
not-yet-consciousness as a stable temporality or psychological state, but rather to see how 
actively the waiting partners have developed methods of manipulating the not-yet-
consciousness in order to overcome uncertainty and despair about the future. Furthermore, I 
want to examine how the anticipatory emotion of the not-yet-consciousness cuts across the 
liminality between the present and the future and produces a particular image of the future 
(Adams & Murphy & Clarke 2009).8 Anticipation does not only belong to individual bodies. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Anthropologists have long discussed the pattern of exchange through a radical distinction between commodity 
and gift in terms of the personal engagement with and attachment to things. The concept of commodity 
presupposes independence and alienability whereas gift presupposes dependence and inalienability; the first is 
class-based whereas the second is clan-based (Gregory 1982). However, this binary opposition has been challenged 
in various ways. The thing has its own “social life” (Appadurai 1986), crossing boundaries between commodity and 
gift exchange over time. Appadurai demonstrates with an example: slave used be a commodity for exchange but it 
is not any longer as the society has changed. In addition, the clear distinction was criticized as romanticization of 
the western view in opposition to the non-western society that is based on the kinship (Parry and Bloch 1989: 8-
12). This contrasting view of gift and commodity exchange does not remain determined as seen in the notion of 
“instrumental gift” (Yan 1996; Yang 1994), “keeping while giving the inalienable possession” (Weiner 1992), and 
“alienable gifts and inalienable commodities” (Miller 2001).  
 
8 In the article, “Anticipation: Technoscience, life, affect, temporality,” the authors sum up the anticipatory regime 
as following: 1) it is formed through seeing the future as palpable in the present; 2) it has epistemic value for 
knowledge production and ethnicized value for subject; 3) it is formed through modes of prediction and 
instrumentality; and 4) it has affective dimension binding subjects in affective economies of fear, hope, salvation, 
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is also provoked and distributed in the form of mass fear and hope, thereby creating an 
“affective economy” (Ahmed 2004).  
             Reflecting the dominant and collective feeling structured by pervasive migration in 
Yanbian, my ethnographic analysis demonstrates the special economy and the role of 
remittance as an anticipatory means of maintaining (but also breaking up) the intimate 
relationship between two separated parties. Although remittance can be considered merely a 
form of money used in impersonal ways to buy things, it can also carry a strong personal 
attachment in that the remittance is sent to support the family back home in the name of love 
or family duty. It also needs to be wisely used, cared, and invested not only in order to create 
more wealth and serve a better future, but also to respect the sender’s time, labor, and sacrifice, 
as I elaborate in my discussion of the idea of “caring for money” in Mr. Ho’s story in the 
following section. Two parties—sender and receiver—exchange and share not only economic 
value but also a particular responsibility for the future of their family, which is sustained 
through the deferral of present togetherness. It is also a means of proving fidelity in the 
marital relationship. As the hiking members put it, “As long as money is sent, there is still 
love.” My question includes the temporality of remittances: how does anxiety for the future—
a form of anticipation—come into play in taking care of remittances, intimate relationships, 
and uncertain futures? Grounded in the ethnographic narrative of migrant families, my 
analysis suggests that remittances that include a temporality of waiting and anxiety serve as a 
critical means to link the present to the future in a setting of transnational migration. In what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and precariousness toward futures already made real in the present( Adams&Murphy&Clarke 2009). Here, 
anticipation is an activity that imagines the future into a more knowable present form and an affective state that 
generates a certain value of knowledge in order to manage future uncertainty and maintain the optimum of present 
life. 
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follows, I elaborate on the specific sources of anxiety in Korean Chinese remittance and its 
actual work that reshapes intimate relationships.  
3.3 Waiting Stories  
3.3.1 Let the River Run 
The movie Let the River Run is a noteworthy account of the contemporary Korean Chinese 
migration in the sense that it stages Yanbian as a “waiting room” where everybody is waiting 
for somebody to return. It also captures the necessity of migration to Korea and the rising 
anxiety of migrants’ families in Yanbian. In the movie, Chul, a middle school boy in Yanbian, 
shows up one day with a fancy motorbike. The motorbike makes him the object of flattery 
and envy from his friends, and approaches by many girls. Suddenly Chul is the most popular 
boy in school. At the same time, the motorbike leads him to become “a bad boy,” spending 
less time on school work and more money on eating out and drinking, and staying out in night 
clubs till late. Chul now makes friends easily with his money and motorbike. He is well aware, 
however, that his indulgences would be impossible without the money sent by his mother 
working in Korea in order to support his studies and provide for his future.  
              Chul’s mother, who was once a diligent farmer, has decided to go to Korea after 
witnessing the sudden material affluence of Korean Chinese returnees. She has seen them 
move from old-fashioned countryside houses to expensive urban apartments, dress their 
children in fancy clothes, and send them to larger cities for better educations. She feels left 
behind. Desperate to go to Korea, she secretly prepares to migrate through an illegal broker. 
She doesn’t tell her family about her decision until the day before she leaves to be smuggled 
into Korea. In fact, many Korean Chinese women choose the fake marriage route to Korea—
but this isn’t for Chul’s mom. “I am going to Korea,” she says proudly, “not through marriage, 
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but through smuggling. That way I do nothing shameful to my husband and son.” Her 
awareness of the possibility of “going to Korea through marriage” (hanguke shijipgada) 
evidences the sexual anxiety widely shared among Korean Chinese. She wants to portray 
herself as an honorable and brave wife and mother willing to confront the unknown dangers 
of a trip to Korea on an old, shabby, and unsafe ship of the sort used by illegal brokers to 
minimize costs. People often die or disappear on the way. Nothing is certain until the ship is 
safely anchored. None of this stops Chul’s mom, who believes that the dangers of smuggling 
represent a more honorable and moral route than fake marriage. 
         In Korea, Chul’s mother becomes an illegal worker constantly beset by police. Even 
under threat of deportation, however, she works hard day and night in construction and 
regularly sends letters and money to her family in China. Labor in Korea is much more intense 
than farming in China, but she is happy with the higher income and the anticipation of a 
better future. Meanwhile in China, Chul’s father, a quiet farmer, waits for his wife, still living 
their old life in the countryside. Sometimes, when he misses his wife, he ritualistically washes 
her clothes and dries them. There is little else he can do except wait for her money, and wait 
for her return. This long-distance family relationship seems stable and peaceful, if a little 
melancholy. But one day, as Chul’s mom is running from the police, she falls off a cliff and 
dies. She never returned home to her husband and son.  
          The movie captures Yanbian as “waiting room,” where almost everybody is waiting for 
somebody to return from migrant work. It shows the transformative power of money, the way 
in which it expands and transforms subjectivity as Marx elaborates above; the boy can 
promote himself from a common nobody into the coolest and the most popular figure in his 
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school. “Money from Korea” bought him the motorbike and, by extension, influence and 
status among his friends.9  
           However, the power of money does not merely serve individual satisfaction, but also 
transforms social relationships, landscapes, and dynamics. Remittances, mostly from Korea, 
have clearly contributed to local economic development in Yanbian. A remote ethnic border 
zone adjacent to North Korea, Yanbian has had to contend with limited economic support 
from the central government because it has been seen as neither “marketable” nor “profitable” 
as an investment opportunity. Therefore, “planned under-development” in this ethnic border 
zone, as Yanbian Korean Chinese informally presumes, has given Korean Chinese strong 
incentives to move out of Yanbian in order to seize economic opportunities during the rapid 
economic transformation of China. The influx of cash from Korea has had an enormous 
impact as I have showed in chapter 2: it now amounts to more than three times the annual 
income of the local Yanbian government, according to informal statistics.10 Dependency on 
remittances—not only by individual households but also by Yanbian economy in general—has 
been aggravated over time, and the influx of cash has dramatically transformed the culture and 
economy, greatly increasing consumption. The remittances have enabled Korean Chinese 
farmers to reinvent themselves as city dwellers. Increases in demand have boosted Yanbian’s 
construction and housing markets. The erstwhile ethnic backwater now seems to display an 
exemplary economic development, purely through the force of remittances. In the midst of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In Millennial Monsters, Anne Allison points out the fantasy energy encapsulated in commodities and new 
technologies, borrowing a term of “enchanted commodities” from Water Benjamin. She analyzes the power of 
Japanese play goods and toys that enchants and stimulates the imagination of players while revealing fantasies 
embedded in relations of capitalism, cultural geopolitics, and techno-communication (2006:29). Not only in the 
film, but also across the reigon of Yanbian, things and commodities that Korean Chinese purchased with money 
sent from Korea have stimulated the imagination of Korean culture and represented the material affluence. In 
addition, these things have played a critical role in enchanting the would-be-Korean Chinese migrants and 
provoking the Korean dream.  
10 It was more than $100,000 [correct figure?  Seems like it would probably be much higher…] according to the 
informal statistics for 2006 (Yanbian daily newspaper). 
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these changes, many Korean Chinese become as anxious as Chul’s mother to catch up with 
the fast pace of development, to keep from being left behind.  
            Besides the achievement of material affluence, the movie particularly highlights how 
money has transformed the intimate domain and the “structure of feeling” of Korean Chinese 
society in Yanbian, as migration has spread deeply in the fabric of everyday life. Money enables 
separated couples to divorce or find better partners. A moneymaking wife can dominate the 
marriage relationship, upending the patriarchal Korean Chinese family structure. As I 
mentioned above, many cases of “fake” divorce turn into “real” breakups. The increase in 
affairs and divorce has been viewed as a “moral crisis.” In this turmoil, Chul’s mother chooses 
smuggling to express her strong desire to avoid the moral stigma associated with fake marriage. 
When confronting the dominant structure of feeling related to migration—the notion that it 
subordinates love to money—she wants to prove her courage and her capacity to pursue “clean” 
and “sincere” money by choosing the more dangerous but more “moral” route of smuggling. 
However, her good intentions come to nothing when she is killed. Her family’s long wait 
cannot be rewarded or reciprocated, leaving Chul and his father only with emotional debt, 
sadness, and hopelessness. Chul’s mother, fighting against the uncertainty of the future, 
sacrifices her time, labor, and body in the name of love. But her death leaves the debt 
unredeemable and the desperate waiting unrewarded. A similar narrative debt haunts the 
following stories—and Yanbian itself.  
3.3.2 Caring for Remittances I: As Money 
         The numberless frustrations, betrayals and breakup stories that have been widely 
circulated in local magazines, radio shows, and essays, portray a form of moral hazard or even 
ethnic crisis that has presumably derived from “contamination” by Korean capitalist culture 
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(see how Communist Party members attempt to view the impact of the Korean dream and 
Korean wind in chapter 5). Personal breakup stories are less frequently made public because 
they are seen as shameful for families and individuals in Yanbian—a relatively small region 
where in many communities everybody might know everybody else. At the same time, it is 
public knowledge that everybody acknowledges and shares that the divorce rate and 
extramarital affairs are increasing in the midst of rampant transnational migration. Korean 
Chinese, I found, have dealt with this contradiction by creating a particular type of storytelling 
about breakups and betrayals, incidents that are too intimate, too private, or too hurtful to be 
freely spoken to other people. The stories are circulated in the form of rumors that have 
anonymous subjects, without identifying any names or places. But the contents and patterns of 
breakup and affair stories are constantly spoken and spread as a shared, empathetic experience. 
The contradictory traits of this type of storytelling—secrets that are also public knowledge—
have often caused me to have a difficult time gathering certain stories, even though I have 
developed longstanding personal relationships with many Korean Chinese botoli. 
          Another characteristic of this storytelling is that money and love can become 
intermixed and interchangeable, as in the saying “as long as there is money coming, there is love” 
that I introduced in the hiking scene. The following story of Mr. Ho is an exemplary one that 
shows the complex relationship between money and love in an intimate setting of transnational 
mobility.  I started hiking with Mr. Ho and his friends; I became close to him and heard more 
detailed personal stories about himself and his family. Even though Mr. Ho claimed that he was 
now more into hiking than drinking, he always seemed to find it easier and more relaxing to talk 
about himself when he got properly drunk. When we hung out with other botoli friends of his, 
all living alone in Yanbian while their wives were working in Korea, drinking was an essential 
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backdrop. After a hike one day in the fall of 2009, Mr. Ho started revealing his life story over 
lunch and drinks, the story that until then he had been unwilling to fully share with me.  
           Mr. Ho was a dedicated Communist party member in Yanbian whose wife has been 
working in Korea for the past twenty years. He had finally attained a stable life in his mid-fifties, 
but before that he encountered many vicissitudes. When his father, a hard-working and 
dedicated soldier, was randomly accused of being an “elite” who served “the capitalist evil” 
during the Cultural Revolution, his family completely fell apart and the social stigma of being 
the “babies of a capitalist” made it impossible for all of his siblings (and his mother) to get jobs. 
Their poverty became dire. The social isolation was even harder to endure. Mr. Ho’s youth was 
full of trauma, so he promised himself to gain outstanding social recognition someday in order 
to overcome the disgrace deeply attached to his status as “the baby of a capitalist.”  
           As the Cultural Revolution faded away after 1978, Mr. Ho was fortunate enough to land 
a job as a factory worker in a printing work unit. He was gradually promoted to better positions. 
He married and had a child in the mid-1980s, and had every reason to believe that he had built a 
much nicer and happier life than during the Cultural Revolution. But as the housing market was 
privatized in the early 1990s, his income quickly became insufficient to support his family. 
Conveniently, China normalized its diplomatic relationship with South Korea in 1992. The door 
to Korea—previously an “enemy capitalist homeland” under the strict politics of the Cold 
War—had suddenly opened wide. Many of his friends and relatives hurried to leave for Korea 
to seek better economic futures. Mr. Ho and his family were no exceptions. Following in the 
wake of the Korean dream and with an urgent need to adapt in a rapidly changing China, Ho’s 
wife, a factory worker, quit her job and went to Korea, while Mr. Ho concentrated on earning 
further promotions and extending his social network in Yanbian. Given that Ho had a 
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prestigious position in a good work unit, the couple believed her departure for Korea to be a 
rational choice as a long-term plan.  
          However, Mr. Ho did not want to let his wife go because of the saying in Yanbian, 
“Once your wife is gone to Korea, she will be lost in the Korean wind.” At the same time, he 
had to let her go in order to pay off the debt incurred when he had bought a new apartment as 
soon as housing was made a commodity to purchase rather than being provided by work 
units.11 After his wife left for Korea in 1993, he underwent an internal struggle as a patriarchal 
male breadwinner whose wife was now making more money than he was. He filled his wait for 
his wife with familial duties: taking care of his son, saving the remittances sent by his wife, 
transforming the money into tangible properties. His wise management of the remittances 
allowed him to achieve material prosperity. Despite his and his wife’s accomplishments, Mr. Ho 
remained anxious about her absence.  “In order not to ‘lose’ my wife and manage our common 
future,” he reflected once, “I have had to develop my ‘secret method’ to keep my wife for the 
last twenty years.” His secret method was that “caring for money is more important than 
making money.” 
           Mr. Ho’s fear—“losing” his wife in Korea—derived from the transformative power of 
money and the deferral of affective exchange. To begin with, Mr. Ho noted the creative power 
of money in transforming his wife into a controlling figure. Thanks to her income, Mr. Ho’s 
wife gained power over many aspects of their marriage relationship. For example, when Mr. Ho 
bought a new apartment with the saved remittances, his wife asked somebody she knew to 
check the real price and conditions of the house. Apparently, she never fully trusted the way 
that Mr. Ho spent her money. Although Mr. Ho felt horrible about his wife’s suspicion, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In Yanbian, work units distributed housing for free in the 1980s. But beginning in the 1990s, work units sold 
houses to their workers at very low price under a government subsidy. Mr. Ho’s work unit sold him a low-priced 
new apartment.  
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knew this was the consequence of her labors and the sacrifice of her body and youth.  He 
believed that the money in fact belonged to her. Thus there wasn’t much he could say against 
her. At the same time, Mr. Ho grew incredibly anxious about his wife’s growing freedom as a 
sexually independent subject. Mr. Ho was always afraid that his wife may have affairs with 
Korean men, whom he imagined as “cooler” and more sophisticated than Korean Chinese, 
based on his viewing of Korean soap operas.  
           Money provided his wife with the freedom to choose where she wanted to go. Her 
increased freedom meant increased anxiety for him. Despite his loneliness and frustration, 
however, he could not even imagine having an affair with another woman. “If I had an affair, I 
would lose my wife, my money, and all that I have made. How could I dare think of such a 
thing?” After observing many cases in which the extravagant spending of remittances sent by a 
partner in Korea led to a divorce, Mr. Ho was convinced that caring for money was the core 
force in strengthening his long-term and long-distance relationship.  
               His anxiety reached a peak when he visited Korea. He was eager to see the capitalist 
country, but even more eager to see his wife for the first time in three years. Mr. Ho was excited 
about the trip, and he imagined how emotional, moving, and arousing the encounter would be. 
He repeatedly practiced the right words to express his love for his wife. However, when he met 
her in Seoul, Mr. Ho was completely disappointed. All she talked about was money.  
My wife was very cold toward me. I had dreamt intensely about having sex with her. 
But she seemed to have no interest in me. She just “gave” herself to me once, and was 
in fact very reluctant. We had not seen each other in three years. I wondered what had 
happened. Is this because of capitalism? She kept saying, however, “No matter what, I 
will not leave my husband and my son.” I cried over these words, thinking how bad and 
lonely she must have felt to be saying things like that. 
 
Ms. Ho developed her strong attachment to money as a result of her long and harsh labors, 
more than twelve hours a day for years and years in capitalist and exploitative Korea. Mr. Ho 
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believed his wife worried neither about her husband nor her son. All she seemed to be 
concerned about was money—the way in which her “blood money” should be spent, saved, 
and managed. She had been living for money. She would die for money.  
  I see her sensitive reaction to money—in the form of remittances—from two different 
angles. First, Ms. Ho’s attachment to money could have been her way of refusing to be 
separated from what she had produced. Marx points out that labor produces not only a 
commodity but also the worker as commodity—“the worker puts his life into the object; but 
now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the 
greater is the worker’s lack of object” (Marx 1988:72). The worker does not belong to the 
consequence of labor, always being alien and external to the labor product. This is the 
alienation of labor, an innate characteristic of labor in capitalism. Ho’s wife’s strong 
attachment to money reflects her desperation to claim the hidden relationship between her 
work and its outcome. Money is an emblem of her investment of time, health, youth, and 
loneliness, a biography of her labor over the last twenty years. The money acts as her alter ego 
and a manifestation of herself, which needs to be well managed and preserved in whatever 
forms it takes.      
               Second, money demonstrates its transformative power in reshaping the couple’s 
relationship and subjectivity. Mr. Ho’s wife transformed herself from a docile wife working in 
a low-level factory job into a controlling breadwinner who directed the family’s financial 
fortunes while working in a metropolitan city in Korea. At the same time, Mr. Ho—a self-
defined patriarchal Korean Chinese man—dedicated himself to “caring work,” normally 
considered the province of the wife, while constantly catering to the needs and directives of 
his wife. In addition, despite the material affluence achieved thanks to the money sent by his 
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wife, Mr. Ho became a perpetually anxious husband who had to develop a secret method to 
tame the transformative power of money and the unpredictable desires of his wife in more 
creative ways—by overseeing the expansion of the family’s wealth and the maintenance of a 
nice house to which his wife would (hopefully) want to return. Money has its own agency and 
acts both as an end and as a means, and as such it was under special affective care in Ho’s 
household.   
3.3.3 Caring for Remittances II: As Gift              
          Despite the sovereign power of money, the remittance also acts as a gift that requires 
mutual reciprocity from husband and wife, who are under the obligation of being good 
partners to each other. Given the mutuality of the gift, Mr. Ho also had to pay back his wife 
by expressing care for the money she sends, as a way of showing his appreciation for her labor. 
His caring for money as evidence of his love, and a way to reciprocate her efforts, needed to 
be visible and tangible; otherwise his wife might not notice. Mr. Ho was afraid that the 
absence of return for her gift could unleash the destructive power of money and ruin the 
relationship. That is why he made a special effort to prove his deep care for her money by 
making shrewd purchases of real estate.         
            Despite his fulfillment of family duties such as taking care of their son and increasing 
the family wealth, Mr. Ho told me, “ I have always felt indebted to my wife. But I know my 
wife and I are mutually indebted to each other. ” The mutual debt between Mr. Ho and his 
wife must be paid off to each other at a given time. That is because the debt, which generated 
waiting by manifesting the desire for possibility (Han 2011), as Derrida shows us above, 
provided the condition for continuing their marriage relationship. Mr. Ho was waiting for his 
wife’s return home, and his wife was waiting to return to China. They had each endured 
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different kinds of waiting in different places, and engaged in different forms of caring for 
money. Waiting bound these two parties together, conditioning their interpersonal subjectivity. 
Waiting enables the flow of currency and sustains long-term migration.  
              At the same time, caring for money is not a sufficient gesture to sustain the long-
term, separated relationship, due to a tricky characteristic of remittances: the remittance was 
not exactly a gift given to Mr. Ho because it never fully belonged to him. The dominance of 
his wife over the money proved more powerful than he imagined.  
I thought the money was ours. So one day I lent some of it to my mother because she 
needed a security deposit to buy a new apartment. I did not tell my wife because I 
thought it was a trivial matter. Yet when she found out she became incredibly furious. 
She could not stop crying for several days and did not talk to me for a week. I had 
simply lent money to my mother! Wow! Since then I have realized how important the 
money is to her, but also that I cannot or should not touch the money under my 
control. I thought it was our money that needed my caring and management. But the 
money belongs to her, hence key decisions as to how it should be spent can be made 
only by her. 
 
After discovering that her money could not be spent without her permission, Mr. Ho felt 
powerless because he did not have any right to use the money, even though he was 
responsible for keeping it and if possible increasing it.  
I have never been selfish about the money. I thought it was our money, and I deeply 
appreciate her hardship. Thinking of her, I have done so much work here in Yanbian 
waiting for her to return. Is waiting easy work to do? I have had to play multiple roles 
to fill her absence as a mother, father, and teacher. Waiting has killed me for the last 
twenty years. Loneliness has been the source of all my diseases. I said to myself, I 
deserve better than this! 
 
Even though he managed their money and properties over the years, Mr. Ho’s obligation 
seemed to remain unfulfilled. He felt cheated by his long wait because his wife was never 
satisfied with his efforts and their consequences. Waiting is a feeling of being stuck. Waiting is 
hard work that requires “an ability to await events,” and “the full acceptance of the other’s 
time” (Gasparini 1995). But waiting is a kind of labor that nobody appreciates, as Mr. Ho said. 
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Waiting is a difficult activity that requires endurance and sacrifice—as he said, “loneliness is 
the source” of his illness. Mr. Ho believed that he had paid back the hardship of his wife’s 
labor. But his wife apparently did not agree. In her view, the transaction was never fully 
completed, thus leaving both of them with the debt seemingly unpaid. And if he stopped 
waiting, the relationship would immediately fall to pieces.  
              Mr. Ho kept emphasizing to me that his waiting should be recognized in economic 
terms as well, because remittances could not stand alone without his reciprocal efforts if they 
were to expand as property and wealth. His assertion was that remittances would be preserved 
only through careful collaboration in making and caring for the money. Although his wife was 
the one who has earned the money, she was not the one who actually spent or invested it. She 
could only hear about the process of using the money and see its consequences in the form of 
houses and things. At the same time, even though Mr. Ho was not the one who earned the 
money, he was the one who directly spent it. Yet his expenses were subject to the supervision 
of his wife, who claimed that the money belonged to her.  
               The agents who make and spend money are separated in a migration setting. The 
actual enjoyment of remittances is always deferred in “the present of the future.” The 
imagination of belonging to a common future is contingent on a mutual promise, one that is 
breakable and fragile. To this uncertainty, Mr. Ho’s secret method was a reasonable response; 
money was the only tangible evidence that could show his love that could appease the high 
anxiety of waiting. Mr. Ho believed that “where money is saved, my wife returns.” In the next 
section, I introduce Ms. Li’s story of broken promises and vulnerable waiting as a contrast to 
Mr. Ho.  
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3.3.4 Broken Promises 
Promises are the unique human way of ordering the future, making it predictable 
and reliable to the extent that this is humanly possible.  
 
                                                                       Cries of the Republic, Hannah Arendt12 
 
Of regular hiking members, Kim Jielan became my closest friend and informant during my 
field research in Yanbian (who appeared in chapter 1 and 2). Jielan is a graduate of the 
Yanbian medical school.  She is in her late twenties and works for the local government 
handling medical policy. Growing up the daughter of rice farmers in a town on the North 
Korean border, Jielan wanted to escape the farming life. Yet even after she made it through 
medical school and landed a stable government job, her financial status has been always tight 
because her family has never given her money, and it’s relatively expensive to live in Yanji, 
the capital of Yanbian. Her parents were never poor as farmers in her hometown, but they 
have never been well off enough to maintain a city life, either. In order to get ahead and 
support Jielan, their only daughter, her father tried for years to get work in Korea. But he did 
not succeed in getting a work visa until 2008, when he was finally able to join Jielan’s uncles, 
aunts, and cousins, who all worked in Korea. 
          On Qingming day, a traditional day to take care of ancestors’ graves, Jielan invited me 
to go to her hometown. “Since everybody is gone to Korea, there are not so many family 
members left in my hometown. To my family, it is a big financial relief that my father went 
to Korea. But my mom is very lonely. Why don’t you come with me?” In this trip, I met a 
number of “waiting people”(botoli), those whose partners have been working in Korea for 
years, including Jielan’s mother, an uncle (Jielan’s father’s brother), and an aunt (Jielan’s 
mother’s brother’s wife). Over lunch, all these botolis told their own story, which showed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I quote this from Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness. 
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how a waiting partner could be compensated as well as betrayed, and how the betrayal put 
the waiting in a vulnerable life situation.  
Jielan’s uncle whose wife has been working in Korea for years initiated the 
conversation regarding the Korean wind. Her uncle was running a store that dealt with ice 
trucks. He seemed to be doing well with his business, saying, “ It is enough to feed our 
family.” The uncle used to work as a banker in a small town but moved to the city of Tumen 
(one of Yanbian’s cities on the border with North Korea) after his wife made money in 
Korea enough to purchase an apartment in the city. He told us that his wife has been 
working for one of the most renowned entrepreneur families in Korea as a domestic worker, 
living in their house. His point was that his wife’s work was simple and her pay was good 
compared to other Korean Chinese working under harsh conditions in Korea, while 
bragging about their economic achievements thanks to the Korean wind. He was also proud of 
how well he has taken care of the housework, cooking for his son and himself and keeping 
his place in order as a good househusband. The modern apartment, well-maintained business, 
and constant remittances sent from his wife were all envied by other waiting people—
botoli—such as Jielan’s mother and her aunt. He invited me to his apartment, which had been 
newly decorated a year ago, suggesting he would show how good cook he had become. We 
laughed together because “househusbands” are unusual among Korean Chinese men, who 
are reputed in Yanbian to be very patriarchal and reluctant to do any housework, especially 
in contrast to Han Chinese men. But conditions shaped by the Korean wind force the waiting 
men to be good househusbands, even as some fear being considered something of a travesty 
in patriarchal terms, as seen in the anxiety of Mr. Ho. 
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In this lively conversation that the uncle mainly dominated, I saw Ms. Li, Jielan’s 
aunt (she was the wife of Jielan’s mother’s brother), looking depressed. Now in her late 
forties, she had been a farmer before her marriage. Now she worked in a Japanese bag 
factory in Yanbian, a job she disliked because of long working hours and low wages. But 
there was no way for her to escape the factory–unless she left for Korea, there would not be 
much change in her life. Ms. Li’s husband had gone to Korea seven years earlier, promising 
that he would return in three years and that they would have a happy life together afterwards. 
He was heavily indebted to the illegal broker on whom he relied to get to Korea. They had 
believed the debt would be a worthwhile investment in a better future. He became an 
undocumented person soon after he arrived. His illegal status did not allow him to move 
back and forth between China and Korea. He was determined to stay in Korea until he made 
a satisfactory amount of money. Things looked tough. But Ms. Li was willing to go through 
this struggle as long as her husband returned to China with the money that he promised her.    
For the first two years, her husband sent money to Li every other month, and she 
took good care of it. The remittances definitely helped, and she felt as if they were making 
progress. She anticipated making the move to a modern apartment. Starting in her husband’s 
third year, however, the remittances began arriving later and less often, and the amounts 
became smaller and smaller. Eventually, they stopped altogether. Her husband did not call or 
send word to Ms. Li. She could not reach him. He had literally disappeared from her life. 
There were rumors about Li’s husband, that he had met a new woman, or had gone broke. 
She had been waiting seven years for his return, and he had betrayed her, making her feel as 
if she had wasted her life for nothing. Unlike her relatives and friends whose Korean dreams 
came true, Ms. Li still had neither a house nor money, the usual visible evidence of the 
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Korean dream and reward for waiting for her husband. She wanted badly to get out of 
Yanbian and to go to Korea, even through a fake marriage if necessary. She told us that she 
would use whatever means she could to get into Korea. And yet she is still married to the 
disappeared husband and cannot divorce him, so even a fake marriage to a Korean man is 
not an option for her. “I’m getting old and sick waiting for my husband,” she said. “I’m 
really stuck. There’s no way out for me.”13 
             If we consider promises as an ordering of the future to make the future predictable 
and reliable (Arendt 1972; Ahmed 2010), the broken promise disordered Ms. Li’s future. Her 
husband’s disappearance all but destroyed her life, and left few ways out for her. 
There is no way for me to find my husband even if I go to Korea. And I could not 
afford to pay the expensive fee for an illegal broker anyway. I applied for a visa, but 
it was rejected. I’ve been dying to go to Korea—not only for money, but also to 
find my husband. At first I worried about him so much when he didn’t call me. But 
when I understood that he had intentionally cut off contact, I wanted to kill him! 
Now I’m just so exhausted from hating and waiting for him. It was over a long time 
ago, wasn’t it? I’m just one of many unlucky Korean Chinese swept up by the 
Korean dream. What’s the use of revenge? Still, I need to divorce him officially so 
that I can start my life over again. But nobody knows where he is, or nobody will let 
me know. I am really stuck. 
 
Ms. Li’s long-term and long-distance relationship with her husband started with a mutual 
promise, one that was given a time limit: “I will return in three years.” However, once her 
husband stopped sending money and calling her, their bond to each other and to a common 
future dissolved. Since then, her wait has transformed into a chronic, hopeless vigil. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The kinds of visa that allow Korean Chinese to get into Korea are very limited. Visas can be obtained through 
family invitation, marriage, and business. But high demand for visas among Korean Chinese has produced a 
thriving market in fake visas and documents. Also, family and marriage relationships are frequently counterfeited in 
order to obtain visas. Visas acquired through illegal brokers are very common among Korean Chinese despite the 
high cost. Korean Chinese still consider the trip to Korea worth it even after the rise of China as a prime global 
economic power and the financial crisis of 2008.  
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longer it goes on, the more vulnerable she becomes. In fact, Ms. Li could have made ends 
meet in China without relying on the remittances sent by her husband. Although the wages 
were not as high as what they would have been in Korea, she could feed herself and her 
daughter under a tight budget. What made her more miserable, however, were her ceaseless 
attempts to go to Korea and her continuous hope of making more money there: “If I went to 
Korea, I could get paid ten times more than now.” But, as her visa requests were being 
repeatedly rejected, her life seemed to float, not in her present, but in an imagined future 
somewhere else—perhaps Korea. The anticipation seemed poisonous, making her feel 
desperate to escape from the present. Furthermore, the discrepancy between her present and 
her expected, hoped-for future made her suspended life that much more painful when she 
compared herself with someone who had realized the Korean dream.   
             Once she ceased to hope for a rosy future with her husband, her mental and physical 
health deteriorated remarkably. She was sick but needed to work. She was weak but wanted to 
go to Korea. Until she succeeded, her desperation and angst would not go away. At the same 
time, she believed there wasn’t much for her to do except wait for the day she could go to 
Korea. Now, Ms. Li told us, “ I’m no longer anxious because I’ve lost hope. I’m just too 
exhausted from hating him and waiting for him.” At that point, she still wanted badly to go to 
Korea—not to get revenge on her husband, but to be rewarded for her lost time.  
            Beset by this internal struggle, Ms. Li was miserable in an economic respect. She was 
becoming a mere spectator—she saw herself lagging behind more and more in the rapidly 
changing Yanbian. Ms. Li came to know that she did not fit into the prosperous Yanbian that 
enjoyed the fruits of the Korean dream. She could not brag to her friends and relatives who 
seized their chance. Her long wait was hard but turned out to be useless, breaking her heart as 
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well as plunging her life into a kind of suspended animation. Her waiting—promised in love—
did not produce any value, thus leaving her empty handed. She was still waiting, not for her 
husband, but for her departure to Korea.  
3.4 Conclusion 
          This chapter has read the waiting stories of Korean Chinese migrants’ partners, 
exploring the anxieties, anticipations, economies, and temporalities generated by the influx of 
remittances from Korea to Yanbian, China. Exploring Yanbian as if it were a waiting room—
stuck but on the move—as in “dwelling-in-travel” (Clifford 1997:2), a place where waiting is 
considered an essential condition of life, I have argued that “waiting (in particular, while caring 
for money as a way of returning love) with anticipation” is in fact a form of labor that 
facilitates and perpetuates the circuit of transnational migration. And I have also argued that 
remittance is a currency that entails affect and futurity. I situate remittances as a special kind 
of money, functioning not only as money, but also as gift. In addition, highlighting the future-
oriented temporality of remittances, my analysis suggests that remittances entail periods of 
waiting and anxiety as a critical means to link the present to the not-yet-future in a setting of 
transnational migration. Although numerous Korean Chinese have wanted, pursued, and 
achieved the fruits of this ethnicity-based transnational labor migration, a moral and sexual 
anxiety has still dominated the collective feeling of Korean Chinese, taking the form of loss, 
loneliness, and uncertainty, as expressed in the song “Everybody Is Gone,” quoted at the 
beginning of this essay. It is undeniable that the remittances have brought economic 
prosperity to the Korean Chinese community. But at the same time, they have been 
considered a source of moral crisis, disrupting traditional family values and stable marital 
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relationships as a side effect of “capitalist contamination.” The migration has persisted under 
these contradictions for the last twenty years.  
          When I went back to Yanbian in 2011 for follow-up research, I learned more about 
what lies behind this official, public concern about moral standards. I realized that the actual 
lives of migrants and their families frequently turned on questions of moral legitimacy, sexual 
fidelity, and economic interests. On this trip, I saw Mr. Ho and received an update from him. 
I heard about a new life phase for Ms. Li. Both stories were very shocking. After another 
hike with Mr. Ho, just like the old days, we had dinner. In a confessional tone, he admitted 
that he hadn’t been faithful to his wife after all. “ How can you believe that a man wouldn’t 
have sex for ten years?” he demanded. “How many people do you think can wait for their 
wife to return without having affairs? Yanbian is so small that people would know instantly 
if I weren’t cautious. I have had very secretive sex partners in order to live. My wife should 
not know about this. But living a healthy life by having sex with whomever is a win-win 
game for both of us. My wife should actually appreciate that I live a healthy life for my age, 
while waiting for her for so long. I know for sure that my wife is not one to have an affair. 
But I just had to do it. I’m a man. It’s for my health.” After this outburst, Mr. Ho winked at 
me, perhaps expressing embarrassment about the double standard he had just invoked.  
Jielan told me that her aunt, Ms. Li, finally made it to Korea after multiple trials and 
errors. Ironically enough, she got back together with her errant husband. Despite the long, 
deep hatred she had nursed towards him, the couple is apparently enjoying a happy life 
together in Korea now. Jielan smiled. I was confused by the complex and contentious 
connivances in these stories. Perhaps Mr. Ho’s wink and Jielan’s smile signified attempts to 
paper over the moral and sexual anxieties that dominate Yanbian, where everybody is gone. 
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These pretenses might serve a vital role in the continued generation of the economy of 
waiting and remittances. As Mr. Ho said, “My wife went back to Korea again, and she still 
sends the money.”  
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Chapter 4. Spli t  Li fe : 
Bodies and Time Between the Two Worlds 
 
            One day in late December 2009 in Yanji—the capital city of Yanbian, the Korean 
Chinese autonomous Prefecture—I was getting ready to vacate my room while wrapping up 
my field research. The streets were completely buried by heavy snow, so all public 
transportation had stopped in Yanbian. On this snowy day, Ms. Park, a Korean Chinese 
migrant woman in her late fifties, was helping me move out. Ms. Park and I had become 
close by meeting many times in both Korea and China. While cleaning up and chatting 
together, she inspired me with her insights. “When I went to Korea for the first time, I said 
to myself that I would come back to China in five years. But, now, how many ‘five years’ 
have passed?” We were laughing. “Now, I am getting used to moving back and forth 
between Korea and China. So are my husband and my sons. I have almost become half 
Korean. I do not know how many five years will need to pass again. Perhaps I’ll keep doing 
it until I am too old or too sick to work in Korea anymore.” I take this moving “back and 
forth” between Yanbian and Korea and living in the two worlds as a point of entry to this 
chapter in order to understand the split life that is conditioned by a particular temporality of 
the visa regulation of the Korean government  
  In the Introduction, I discussed the enactment and revision of the Overseas Korean 
Act that excluded Korean Chinese from the category of “overseas Korean” due to their 
socialist associations and weak economic potential compared to other overseas Koreans, 
such as those in the U.S., Japan, and Canada—all of whom could freely enter and stay in 
Korea. Since the Act led Korean Chinese to remain undocumented—they constitute a 
majority of undocumented overseas Koreans working in Korea—the Korean government 
began to see Korean Chinese illegality as a critical “population problem.” To resolve the 
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undocumented Korean Chinese problem, the Korean government initiated a kind of visa 
that was specially designed for Korean Chinese, the H-2 visa, as a gesture of amnesty. The 
H-2 visa was intended to increase opportunities for Korean Chinese to freely enter Korea 
and to cut down on business for illegal brokers (The Korean Law Department 2007). To 
qualify for this amnesty, Korean Chinese are subject to the following conditions: the 
undocumented Korean Chinese must leave Korea for China for one year in order to return to 
Korea; after this year passes, they are allowed to work in Korea for another three years, after 
which they must leave Korea for a while, until the five-year H-2 visa is expired, using up the 
rest two years. If they abide by this peculiar rhythm imposed by the H-2 visa regulation, their 
previous record as an illegal worker is “cleaned,” and they can register as documented 
workers and obtain a “foreign identification card.” Although the renewability is still subject 
to random policy shifts, Korean Chinese workers welcomed the announcement of the H-2 
visa as a big relief that enabled the free movement of Korean Chinese (Kim 2008; 
Kim&Lee&Lee 2008).1 Most of all, the migration has increasingly taken the form of 
“seasonal labor,” as the workers adjust themselves to work schedules split between China 
and Korea (Kim 2009).2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jinyoung Lee, Hyekyung Lee, and Hyunmee Kim conducted a collaborative research project on “The Effects and 
Satisfaction of the Visit and Employment System,” funded by the Korean Immigration Service (2008). They studied 
Korean Chinese attitudes toward this new visiting system that is designed to increase opportunities for entry to 
Korea and to eradicate the illegal brokers who have profited greatly from illegal migration. According to their 
results, an overwhelming majority (82.7 percent) of Korean Chinese migrants were satisfied with the lower costs 
and lessened bureaucracy brought about by the new visa regulations. But 59.6 percent of these interviewees also 
answered that the new system has not helped much to increase the working opportunities of Korean Chinese in 
Korea (2008:67-84)  
	  
2 I have been in contact with several seasonal laborers during my research. A close Korean Chinese female friend 
of mine, in her early forties, works as an elementary school teacher in China, and goes to Korea every summer and 
winter break with an H-2 visa to work as a waitress. She says her Korean job during the breaks from school allows 
her to double her annual income.  
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              This chapter is attentive to the flip side of the H-2 visa (free movement) and the 
peculiar rhythm, “1-3-2,” as a central characteristic of the constant circulation of Korean 
Chinese labor between China and Korea. I argue that the H-2 visa crystalizes the Korean 
government’s official recognition of Korean Chinese as a particular ethnic migrant working 
class by permitting them to work only in designated fields that are mostly concentrated in 
the service industries and physical labor.3 One purpose for this visa and labor regulation—
formalizing the position of  “guest worker”—might have been to protect the Korean labor 
market from an overflow of cheaper Korean Chinese labor while avoiding long-term Korean 
Chinese residence in Korea.4 At the same time, the Korean government presented it as a way 
to fairly distribute chances for Korean Chinese to work in Korea, and to give the Korean 
Chinese, as a group of overseas Koreans, an advantage over other migrants. On the basis of 
stories of two Korean Chinese transnational migrant women who took advantage of the 
amnesty and increasingly relaxed policies that have ushered in a new phase of Korean 
Chinese migration,5 my argument in this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that the rhythm, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Under the H-2 visa regulation, Korean Chinese are allowed to legally work in 38 fields, including hotel and 
restaurant related service, construction field, car repairing, nursing for the sick and old, and domestic work (The 
Korean Immigration Service).  
 
4  Hyunmee Kim argues that H-2 is meant to protect residential rights and employment, yet provides only limited 
protection and rights  with respect to unemployment, social welfare, and family reunions. The receiving 
country—Korea—decides the number, condition, and rights of migrants, and policy itself is ultimately dependent 
on the “the condition of the Korean economy” (Kim 2009). 
 
5 Given the large number of Korean Chinese who were still not allowed to make the trip to Korea, the Korean 
government initiated a Korean language ability test as a qualification examination. Anybody who scores over 60 
points out of 100 earns a chance to enter a lottery. Since Korean Chinese speak Korean as their native language, 
it is generally not difficult for them to get 60 points. But lottery space is limited according to age group (20 
percent for people in their twenties, 25 percent for people in their thirties, 25 percent for those in their forties, 30 
percent for those in their fifties, and no limit for those 60 and above). Systematically controlling the entrance 
procedures through the language exam was intended to reduce illegal immigration, which has been facilitated by 
an illicit market in fake visas and fabricated documents.  The exam was supposed to benefit both the Korean 
labor market and the Korean Chinese who desire to work in Korea. But given the high demand for Korean visas 
among Korean Chinese, the success rate was still quite low and the waiting period very long, so illegal activity 
continued.  
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“1-3-2”—the particular temporal governmentality created by the visa regulation—sets a limit 
to the bodies, money, and futurity of Korean Chinese migrants, who have emerged as a 
transnational ethnic working class. Second, I argue that the 1-3-2 rhythm has reorganized the 
concept of “work place” and “home,” working time and non-working time, working bodies 
and resting bodies between Korea and Yanbian, thereby creating a split in terms of the body, 
time, and space—I term it “split life.” Throughout the chapter, my ethnography traces in 
detail the “habitus”(Bourdieu 1980)6 and methods developed by Korean Chinese migrants to 
care for their bodies, money, and time according to the rhythm of their transnational 
circulation. 
4.1 Domination of Transnational Work 
          Korean and Korean Chinese scholars have intensively studied Korean Chinese 
transnational migration as a popular fashion, called the Korean wind, that rapidly reshaped the 
work ethic and futurity of Korean Chinese as transnational migrant workers (Kim 2008; Lee 
2005; Lee 2008; Lim 2004; Noh 2001; Park 2006; Seol1998). These studies examine conflicts 
with and adaptations to transnational migration on the part of transnational working subjects. A 
central question concerns the in-between identity and location of Korean Chinese in terms of 
their ethnicity and nationality, and involves critically exploring experiences of discrimination 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
   6 Bourdieu elaborates on the concept of habitus as a “product of history,” “system of disposition,” and   
“internalized second nature” that produces individual and collective practices. It is produced by the work of 
inculcation and appropriation for the objective structures to be reproduced in the form of the durable 
dispositions. In particular, he points out the influence of institution in creating the individual and collective 
practices; “The habitus is what enables the institution to attain full realization: it is through the capacity for 
incorporation, which exploits the body’s readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the social, that the 
king, the banker, or the priest are hereditary monarchy, financial capitalism or the Church made flesh”(1980:57). 
The habitus—that is an internalized system structured through continuity and repetition and thus embedded in 
bodies and the practices—is apt to use in analyzing the formation of Korean Chinese transnational working 
subjectivity in that Korean Chinese have incorporated a certain temporality and spatiality—rhythm and logic of 
movement—into their bodies and moving practices along with the visa regulation and remittance flow.  
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suffered by Korean Chinese in South Korea, which they presumably understand to be their 
ancestors’ homeland.  
            Paying different attention from these studies, my analysis is more focused on the 
rhythm of “back and forth,” the flow of population between Yanbian and Korea. In Yanbian, 
where transnational labor has come to dominate every corner of everyday life, I found an 
assumption amongst Korean Chinese that Korea is a working place, while Yanbian is a non-
working place. Moreover, I understand the saying with which I started this dissertation—
“Everybody is gone with the Korean wind”—to hint that “everybody” is “gone” to work and make 
money, and that to be “not-gone” or “waiting” is to be not-working, while spending the money 
that has been earned overseas (see chapter 2 and 3). The stories in this chapter will tell us about 
the ways in which the rhythm of back and forth has reorganized perceptions and practices of 
the body, money, and time, by generating a stark contrast between working time in Korea and 
non-working time in Yanbian. This split practice of space overlaps with and differs from Marx’s 
insight on the relationship between home and work: “He feels at home when he is not working, and 
when he is working he does not feel at home” (Marx 1988). That is, Korean Chinese migrant workers 
(returnees) do feel at home in Yanbian because they are not working in Yanbian. At the same 
time, they do not feel at home in Yanbian, continuously testifying how much the non-working 
time in Yanbian, when they lack a steady income, makes them anxious and uncomfortable. In 
what ways have Korean Chinese, caught up in the Korean wind, shaped and reshaped the idea of 
work and home? What constitutes the shared inevitability of going to Korea, and perpetuates 
the idea of transnational work as “real” work, whereas time in Yanbian is constructed as 
unproductive, wasted time? Finally, in what way is transnational work similar to and different 
from work practiced without moving across national borders?  
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In this chapter, my interest focuses on the role of the rhythm and temporality that 
works as a particular governmental force to form subjectivities in accordance with the 
constant, frequent, and repetitive circulation of labor. Lefebvre suggests that the rhythm of 
everyday life is produced by the combination of cyclical time with linear time. He also 
emphasizes that for there to be rhythm, there must be repetition in movement, and the 
rhythm results in a new becoming with difference (Lefebvre 2004: 78-79). Building on the 
concept of Lefebvre’s rhythm, I additionally take into account the governmental aspect of 
the rhythm that constitutes a new order of life and new kind of subjectivity for Korean 
Chinese migrants in a transnational work setting. In the following, I will show that the 
rhythm of circulation—as a new symptom of “post-amnesty”—has generated a new 
perception and practice of the bodies, time, and space along with a new kind of free 
movement, creating split life between Yanbian and Korea. I will also highlight this particular 
temporality, “1-3-2,” has led to the emergence of multiple forms of caring methods that 
Korean Chinese have developed as transnationally mobile subjects.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The government of the self has been contextualized in the post-socialist setting of modern China. These studies 
show that the governing process is concrete but gradual, aiming to inscribe new attitudes of market logic onto 
bodies long habituated to what is represented as a rigid, state-centered socialism, eventually creating a new person 
altered by contact with ongoing dramatic changes in world capitalism (Dunn 2004; Hoffman 2010). Ethnographies 
on China, in particular, investigate a sort of neoliberal governmentality closely tied to the complex of Communist 
party-state-market, or “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics” (Wang 2006; Rofel 2007). The complex of state-
market-party produces a self-governed subject, not only by the application of external power, but also by self-
management. Suzhi, a Chinese term that roughly indicates ”human quality” (Anagnost 2004; Yan 2009), especially 
emerges as a key discussion point in looking at the new working bodies fashioned to serve China as a world factory. 
Market requirements “individuate the body” to fit into the arrangement of machinery for efficient production in 
the factory (Ngai 2005); bodies must internalize work habits and a new sense of time, institutionalizing everyday 
life. The controlling logic modifies unruly peasants, remakes deficient and lazy bodies into cheap and docile ones, 
and generally requires the improvement of workers’ Suzhi (Yan 2009). These studies tend to focus on the creation 
of new subjectivities through a neoliberal governmentality that is a “contact point” between the government of the 
state-market and the government of the self. Most studies are focused on the internal labor market, showing how 
Chinese have responded to rapid economic restructuring and the requirements of the new subjectivity.  
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           Pushing further to situate the self as a gendered, classed, and ethnicized subject 
specifically in a transnational setting—as a transnational ethnic working class, I examine the 
ways in which migrants are subject to the rhythm of circulation. I argue that transnational 
migration as a way of caring for the self and the future does not necessarily lead to economic 
rewards. Rather, caring for the self can facilitate a wide range of exploitation and even lead 
to the deterioration of bodies as the migrant workers try to make themselves more 
marketable. Work is not a simple economic practice, but rather the primary means for life 
(Weeks 2011), as work allows individuals to be integrated into social, political, and familiar 
modes of cooperation. Work emerges as an essential site and major principle of constituting 
the subjectivity that profoundly dominates our life. In the following, I ethnographically 
explore the emergence of transnational work as a core element of Korean Chinese life, and 
the development of methods of caring for the body, money, and time, as a response to the 
rhythm of circulation—the back and forth of the Korean Chinese migratory labor market. 
On the basis of the narrative of frequent repetition of movement back and forth, I highlight 
the split life that Korean Chinese have undergone, the split that plays a critical role in 
formulating transnational subjectivity. 	  
4.2  “1”:  One Year of Home 
4.2.1 Unfamiliar Home 
          During 2006 and 2007, Yanbian became re-vitalized by Korean Chinese who returned 
from Korea due to the Korean government’s granting of amnesty. When I visited Yanbian in 
the summer of these years, I found various reunions between long-separated families and 
friends in restaurants and hotels, celebrating homecomings after long-undocumented lives in 
Korea. Many of the migrants I had come to know through the church in Seoul—as I 
described in the Introduction— told me about their reunions with relatives they had not 
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seen for years. With tears in their eyes, the migrants recounted emotional moments at the 
airport. After (in some cases) more than a decade of separation, some did not recognize the 
dramatically aged faces of mothers and fathers, wives and husbands, daughters and sons. 
When the amnesty transformed Korean Chinese migrants from immobile 
undocumented workers to freely moving subjects, Korean Chinese returnees underwent 
feelings of unfamiliarity stemming from their long absence from Yanbian—their home. The 
changes were alarming: dramatic urbanization, intense consumption, a skyrocketing cost of 
living, and more critically, the obvious increase of the Han Chinese population. To Ms. Park, 
a Korean Chinese migrant worker in her late fifties whom I knew from the church, returning 
home did not feel the way she had thought it would. “Home is not like home,” she said to 
me repeatedly. “Yanbian is not like before, in many ways. I can’t get by in Yanbian now 
without speaking Chinese. Han Chinese are everywhere—bankers, sellers, workers (dagong), 
waiters and waitress (fuwuyuan). I don’t like that.” Most Korean Chinese I met in Korea told 
me that their first impression when they arrived in Korea was that “it’s like home.” 
Everything was written in Korean, their mother tongue even though they have been 
residents in China for generations (see chapter 1 and 3). Now these migrants felt Yanbian to 
have become an unfamiliar home. I recount the returnees’ stories about the feeling of 
unfamiliarity at home—as Park put it, “home is not like home”—while also detailing their 
efforts to prepare to depart again for Korea in a year.  
In a migration setting, home is a complex emotional and material locus in relation to 
the question of belonging and dwelling. One sees home as a place where one comes from 
and has an emotional attachment to and yearning to return to (Safran 1991). Beyond the 
limit of geographical boundaries, home might be reimagined through deterritorialized 
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political engagement via new media (Appadurai 1996; Clifford 1994). To those who have 
been on the move for generations, home could be construed as either “where you are at” 
(Gilroy 1991) or “where you are going to” (Chu 2010). Home may appear as a creolized, 
hybridized, and impure site to migrants because their mobility has led them to reassess the 
seemingly absolute and essential link between territory and identity (Hall 1990) through a 
process of displacement and temporalization in correspondence with specific histories and 
geopolitical dynamics (Axel 2004). On the other hand, those willing to leave their home in 
search of a better life may view “home” as an impoverished place lagging behind the present, 
held back by traditional culture (Chu 2010; Ngai 2003; Yan 2009; Zhang 2006).  
These discussions assume that mobility is a condition of modernity that speaks more 
about movement than settlement, urbanity than rurality, working than comforting, and 
moving forward than staying stuck in place. Here, home is imagined as a tedious and static 
space full of familiarity and repetition rather than new and potentially progressive. Thus, 
home is the place to depart from, not to return to—in fact, an impulse to return home might 
amount to a “regressive desire” (Felski 2000). To Korean Chinese, however, the locus of 
home is neither left behind nor static given their constant circulation back and forth between 
Korea and China according to the rhythm of “1-3-2.” Moreover, since China has risen as a 
global economic power, in the process boosting a new “Chinese dream” among Korean 
Chinese, home (Yanbian) cannot be seen simply as a regressive or backward place, either. 
Many Korean Chinese already have prospered in China’s economic boom, especially after 
the Korean dream was fundamentally shaken by the global financial crisis of 2008 (see 
chapter 6). In the remainder of this section, I explore how the migrants readjust from their 
rhythm of work in Korea to the rhythm of home in Yanbian, as well as vice versa, thus 
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adding complexity to the idea of “home.” In addition, I point out how their attempts to 
adjust have reshaped migrant subjectivity according to practices of space and time sharply 
split between working and non-working.  
4.2.2 Yanbian Time 
          When I made my first visit to Yanbian in 2006, the open hospitality and relaxed time 
management there amazed me, in total contrast to my experience of meeting with Korean 
Chinese in Korea. Practically speaking, I had much less difficulty arranging interviews and 
meetings in Yanbian. And yet, at the beginning, I did face some confusion and 
embarrassment in scheduling. In Yanbian, there is a unique perception of time and a 
particular way of planning ahead in making an appointment. Since eating and drinking 
together is believed to be a natural way to build a relationship in Yanbian, meal times were 
often chosen for meetings, usually lunch or dinner. To arrange the meal, I called my contacts 
and asked them if they could meet for conversation and interviews. They usually asked me to 
call them back in a few days. But it was not always specified when I was supposed to call 
back. It was left ambiguous. If I called them in “a few” days in my sense, they might say, 
“Let’s meet at 11:30 for lunch today.” The abrupt suggestion was embarrassing to me 
because sometimes I already had plans for another meeting at the same time. As I got used 
to the pattern of time arrangement in Yanbian, I tried not to arrange meeting schedules very 
tightly, but instead allowed myself to be more available to follow the flow and pattern of 
making an appointment. The way that I squeezed a large number of interviews into my tight 
schedule in Korea did not work in Yanbian. Schedules were much less rigid, and people did 
not always clearly block out particular time periods for specific purposes. Sometimes, the 
plan was made by spontaneously suggesting, “How about now?” This tendency might stem 
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from the expectation that other people also have a loose and flexible schedule. Of course, 
the improvisational nature of appointments at times led to time conflicts with other plans. 
Given this way of arranging time, however, time conflicts seemed to be more acceptable and 
understandable, and could be used as an acceptable excuse not to go to a meeting. In such 
cases it was of course necessary to divide up the amount of participating time, prioritizing 
“more important” meetings over “less important” ones.   
   The flexible time schedule became more obvious when I met someone for a meal. 
Usually, mealtime was combined with drinking time. It was very common to drink multiple 
bottles of beer or strong Chinese alcohol (baijiu) over lunch. The meeting usually lasted from 
11:30 a.m. to 2 p.m., which was, in fact, a normal lunch break for most people. Sometimes 
lunch was prolonged to play card games and do “no-work.” Long lunch hours accompanied 
by drinking (sometimes heavy drinking and even getting drunk) were often condemned as a 
lack of the Chinese work ethic. A journalist who was very mindful of my status as an 
outsider jokingly warned me that I should not write about the long lunches in Yanbian.   
  The loose and relaxing use of time results in a feeling of freedom. This “too-much-
free-time,” as Yanbian people tend to call it, sometimes spurs pride in socialism, as it is said 
to show that there is no need to be under work pressure like in capitalist Korea. At the same 
time, “too-much-free-time” can also be regarded with shame—as a lazy and unproductive 
violation of the socialist work pattern. The ambivalent feeling about too-much-free-time is 
reinforced after traveling to Korea and directly observing densely packed and fast-paced 
Korean time. “Witnesses” of life in Korea—those who had recently visited or worked in 
Korea—discussed the advantages of Chinese time while remaining ambivalent about the 
merits of Korean time. They had two main points: 1) the intensity of Korean time has 
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enabled Korea to advance and develop in a relatively short period, thus we have to learn 
from the strong work ethic of Koreans—however, 2) the stresses of Korean time have made 
human beings inhumanly subject to “work-work” life, unlike in China, where there is an 
abundance of food, time, and hospitality.8 In the end, the too-much-free-time of China leads 
them easily to come to the conclusion that China is the more comfortable country to live in. 
In particular, the Communist party members I have met in Yanbian tend to use current 
Chinese economic successes as clear evidence of the superiority of the Chinese way—led by 
Chinese socialism and the Communist party. These people also assume that going to Korea 
for work is the result of failure in China. Those Korean Chinese who have been able to 
benefit from the Chinese economic boom (see chapter 6) and have become much better off 
than the returnees/migrants have transformed a previously vague sentiment into a strong 
belief: the Korean dream has waned whereas the Chinese dream rises, even though Korea is 
still seen as a path to modernity for many people in Yanbian.  
4.2.3 Spending Anxieties 
          Given the unstable status of the Korean dream in Yanbian, the mark of insecurity 
attached to the returnees can cause tensions when they get together with friends who have 
achieved decent economic success without going to Korea. It is partly because the returnees 
believe that life is not all about sufficient food or free time. It is also because the returnees 
have had a hard time adjusting to the Yanbian rhythm, which to them involves spending 
excessive time consuming rather than earning. It is especially difficult when they have to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  In What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?, Katherine Verdery suggests the role of “time” in transition from 
socialims to Postsocialism; “ the collapase of socialism came in part from the massive rupture produced by its 
collision with capitalism’s speedup. If so, it would be especially useful to know something more about the life-
expereince of those people who worked at the interface of these two temporal systems and could not help realizing 
how different was capitalism’s time from their own”(1996: 36). Here, the state plays a critial role in creating a new 
temporal puncuations and rituals that leads to the new socialist man(54).  
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switch modes between, as they say, “too little time” and “too much time,” between Korea 
and China. I met Ms. Park in Yanbian again in 2009, and she was not exceptional in 
confessing the difficulty of switching rhythms when she returned to Yanbian. Park went to 
Korea ten years ago, leaving behind her husband and two sons. While she worked in Korea, 
her husband took care of their sons and maintained his job in Yanbian. Like many other 
Korean Chinese, she was undocumented for seven years. She was arrested, detained for a 
month, and almost deported. Fortunately, the minister of the church I discussed in chapter 1 
sponsored her, and she was released from jail. When they heard about her arrest, her family 
wanted her to return to Yanbian right away, whether she had made money or not. But she 
insisted on staying in Korea as long as possible, until she made a substantial amount of 
money. In the midst of all this, the 2005 amnesty rescued her from her long-term 
undocumented status and allowed her to go back to China for a new visa to return to Korea. 
Of course, Park really wanted to return to China because she had not seen her family for 
seven years—she had been unable to attend the wedding ceremonies of her two sons 
because she was stuck in Korea as an undocumented worker.  
 In 2009, Park returned to China to spend one year in order to properly use the five-
year work visa in Korea according to the “1-3-2” policy. We became closer during this 
period—she invited me to her home and even asked me to stay over from time to time. Her 
place was newly decorated and equipped with new furniture and home appliances. In fact, 
everything looked new in her house. Her husband gave me a short tour explaining to me 
how carefully he had selected materials and appliances. “I chose quality materials from 
Korea,” he said with pride. “We spent more than other people in decorating. I try to 
decorate in all Korean style.” As I visited the returnee/migrants’ houses in Yanbian, I 
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realized the importance they placed on demonstrating how much they spent purchasing and 
decorating their houses. Chinese apartments are sold unfinished, so the decoration itself is 
completely up to the homeowner, and matters critically in making distinctions of financial 
ability and taste. The “Korean style” of decoration, of which Park’s husband was so proud, is 
another commonality that I found in many newly decorated houses.9 Ms. Park moved into 
the house after she returned to China in 2006, following her long “detention” in Korea. But 
she spent less than a year in her new home before leaving for Korea to work for another 
three years. Although the house was purchased mostly with the remittances that she sent, 
Park had not actually lived there much because she worked in Korea for as long as her visa 
and her body allowed her to. It was now time again for her to finally spend a second year in 
her new place.  
One evening, I stayed over at Park’s place. While we were making dumplings 
together for dinner, Park started sharing her disappointments about life in Yanbian. Despite 
the excitement of returning home, Park was not completely happy. The changes that had 
taken place during her absence were simply astonishing. Even though this was her home 
country, upon her return she had trouble even finding her own house. The material 
conditions of Yanbian people had improved while she was gone in Korea, and the cost of 
living had skyrocketed. Park’s loss of networking and social skills made her feel outdated. 
She was also worried that her savings from Korea might run out quickly. She thought it 
would be hard to find the right jobs, ones that would satisfy her needs and expectations. 
Aside from a small and reliable pension, there was essentially no social safety net. Park talked 
extensively, listing all the concerns that made her anxious.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ambivalent feelings on the part of Korean Chinese toward Korea are common in Yanbian. For example, going to 
Korea “to work” came to be looked down upon, whereas going to Korea “for fun” became something to be proud 
of. The multiple meanings attached to “going to Korea”(Hankuk ganda) are analyzed in the next chapter.  
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She said that all her worries made her want to go back to Korea, where there is a 
“life.” In Yanbian, there was seemingly “too much life,” much of it spent eating, drinking, 
and hanging out with long-lost family and friends. But returnees found themselves anxious 
about not working (not making money) while having too much time. In other words, they 
did not feel that they were leading an actual life—they were just spending money and 
marking time while waiting to go back to Korea when the visa regulations allowed it. 
Moreover, “too-much-life” greatly burdened the returnees, particularly when they were 
invited to an event that was meant to show off the host’s economic capacity and to 
consolidate social networks. In China, once invited, one is supposed to invite back, to the 
same degree as welcomed. A generous invitation awaits another generous invitation in 
response. Park regarded this cultural protocol with unease.  
Another good thing about being in Korea was that I didn’t have to attend parties 
like weddings and birthdays, and so I didn’t have to give monetary gifts. But here I 
can’t avoid it. We all know each other because Yanbian is a very small society. If I 
don’t go to my friend’s parties and don’t give them anything, they’d be pissed off 
and wouldn’t come to my party. Then I’d lose my connections and my face (mianzi). 
If I were unlucky, I could end up with a bad reputation. People are afraid of the bad 
consequences of not going to parties. Also, it’s not good to have too few guests at a 
party. The number of guests tells other people how big my network is and how 
good my relationships are with other people. It’s kind of a mutual collaboration 
whether we really want or need it or not. It’s superficial. People are grumpy about 
going to parties. However, if I want to live a life and have a business in Yanbian, it’s 
essential to go to parties and manage the relationships. 
 
Park enjoyed these meeting and parties when she first returned from Korea. However, it 
quickly became a heavy financial burden, as she had to attend several parties a month. Half 
of her monthly expenses went toward monetary gifts for wedding and birthday parties. She 
thought the extravagant expense was crazy, and she could not afford to attend all the parties 
to which she was invited due to the high cost. “Since I’ve been in Korea, I don’t get ‘back 
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door money’ from work units,”10 she told me. Therefore, everything has to be paid out of 
my pocket. It’s just too much. Life here is too expensive. I don’t make anything, but I sure 
spend a lot.”  
    From Park’s statement, we can find an interesting co-relationship; “too-much-time” 
leads to “too-much-life,” which turns into “too-much-cost”—and no productivity. Some 
other ethnographic study also shows that time in Yanbian is mainly considered “time to lose 
money” or “time to make a workable body” (Kim 2009). From Park and also from many 
other returnees, I heard about the disjointed and ruptured relationship between earning and 
spending in the returnees’ lives in Yanbian. The stories were always told in an anxious tone. 
Here, Harvey might offer a useful insight about the close link between production and 
consumption. Harvey suggests consumption and production can constitute an “immediate 
identity” because the action of production accompanies the consumption of raw materials, 
instruments of labor, and labor power, and the action of consumption provides the motive 
for production by promoting human needs and desire. Harvey points out how “productive 
consumption” and “consumptive production” lead to the social process of reproduction 
(Harvey 1999:80). Production and consumption are usually conceived as occurring in the 
same place at the same time. Yet for Korean Chinese returnees, the immediate identity 
between the two—productive consumption and consumptive production—has collapsed 
because in Yanbian there is only consumption, or “too-much-life” springing from “too-
much-time” for these returning migrants. Production (earning money) occurs in Korea 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The “work unit” used to be a complex place where Chinese workers lived and worked together.  However, as 
privatization has accelerated, the work unit supported by the state lost competitive power in the market.  Thus 
many work units in China had to close down. However, people in Yanbian often call their work place—whether in 
a governmental office or in private business—their “work unit.” In this context, the “work unit” indicates a 
government-related job. Government jobs are commonly thought to confer stability, not only due to secure social 
pensions and benefits, but also extra money given as bonuses or gifts in order to maintain political networks.  
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whereas consumption (spending money) happens in Yanbian—a sharp geographical split 
between consumption and production. However, those who can integrate production with 
consumption and enjoy the “too-much-time” while maintaining a decent income (level of 
production) in Yanbian might again achieve the “immediate unity” suggested by Harvey. In 
addition, we can witness different attitudes toward “too-much-free-time” among different 
groups in Yanbian. In contrast to what Marx articulates, “He feels at home when he is not working, 
and when he is working he does not feel at home” (Marx 1988), which I discussed above, free time11 
does not feel free or at home to the returnees in the way that it does to well-off non-
migrants in Yanbian. Adorno defines “free time” as an extension of labor time, “a mere 
appendage of work” (Adorno 1991:163), so free time is not in opposition to labor. In other 
words, given that only those who work can have “real” free time, the Korean Chinese 
returnees cannot enjoy the “free time” with no work in Yanbian if we follow Adorno’s logic.  
 Park and other returnees confessed that they missed the congenial environment of 
Yanbian during their lonely sojourns in Korea where they lived a “work-work” life. Yet 
when returnees have to live only on savings earned in Korea, the cost of “too-much-life” 
turns out to be an economic and emotional burden that causes them anxiety—money runs 
out so quickly. As a lone individual who cannot rely on any work unit money or “back door 
money” coming from the Chinese work unit, the excessive expenses of invitations and 
“great parties” were often beyond Park’s planned budget. Her friends or relatives tended to 
assume that she had earned a great deal of money in Korea, and thus expected her to spend 
generously when inviting them to meals and parties. These expectations were another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Adorno discussed the concept of “free time” in The Culture Industry (1991) as a symptom of capitalist society. He 
argues, “Free time does not merely stand in opposition to labor. In a system where full employment itself has 
become the ideal, free time is nothing more than a shadowy continuation of labor” (168).  Since free time is 
described as an extension of work, I see those who spend free time without working as not really enjoying free 
time.  
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burden, according to Park. “It’s not just one invitation. There are so many to do once I start 
inviting people.” This “too-much-life” exhausted the returnees, making them want to return 
to Korea, where they focused on working rather than spending. In Korea they could live on 
a steady income without random expenses for parties in order to maintain social networks. 
Korean Chinese migrants, including Park, said that they had gotten used to living as working 
individuals rather than as members of extensive, and expensive, social networks. In addition, 
the migrants felt they could not keep with the social tempo in Yanbian after growing 
accustomed to the “work-work” rhythm of Korea.  
           Home as a place of spending without earning makes these returnees want to get back 
to work in Korea as soon as possible, which causes emotional as well as financial anxiety. 
Home becomes a place that makes these returnees feel backward in comparison with the 
increasingly wealthy work unit officers who had not gone to Korea to work. Here, again, 
home is not like home. Life is split by the rhythm of “1-3-2,” making Yanbian a “consuming” 
place and Korea an “earning” place. Somewhat disillusioned by her time in Yanbian, Ms. 
Park returned expectantly to Korea to complete the full period that H-2 visa allows. 
Shedding further light on the complex temporalities shaped by spatial movement, the next 
section aims to investigate how Korean Chinese migrants switched from the embodied 
home rhythm of Yanbian into the rhythm of work in Korea—that is, from the temporality 
of “life” to that of “work.” 
4.3   “3”: Three Years of Work 
4.3.1 The Employment Agency 
         On a hot sunny day in August 2008, I called Ms. Park to let her know I was back in 
Seoul for the next six months for my research. Park gladly answered my phone call, 
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sounding out of breath, perhaps from being in the middle of work. She said she would call 
me back in a couple of hours. Park, in her late fifties, had become my closest friend among 
the Korean Chinese ladies who were volunteering in the church—where she was called “Ms. 
Cook.” Not only Park, but also other members of the church had now become free-moving 
subjects and were busy catching up on the time they had lost to periods of enforced 
inactivity. They made me realize how the imperative to “catch up” pushes most Korean 
Chinese workers to work in Korea without any days off. Therefore, it was extremely difficult 
for me to do interviews and meet Korean Chinese migrant workers when I was conducting 
field research in Korea in 2008—after the amnesty. There were many occasions on which 
migrant workers apologized for being unable to meet with me due to the demands of their 
schedules. Because of their unavailability, there was little I could do except wait until they 
had time off, which happened once or twice a month. I did my best to squeeze into their 
schedules and travel at their convenience in order not to waste their time in heavy traffic or 
long-distance commuting in Seoul. Their full schedules were mainly a consequence of the 
kind of work they did. Sometimes these workers were employed for more than twelve hours 
a day. Their schedules were frequently uncertain; they had to be on call, waiting for work to 
become available. Whatever their particular situation, most Korean Chinese workers tried to 
maximize their income in any given period and moved frequently in search of the best 
working conditions, the shortest working hours, and the highest wages. Park called me back 
in a few hours, welcoming me warmly. But, she said, “I am not sure when I can meet you 
because I have been working without any days off lately. Maybe if you come to the 
employment agency sometime in the morning, at about 7 a.m., I could meet you there. We 
can chat before I head to work at about 9.” I appreciated her wise time arrangement.  
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  A few days later, I met Ms. Park in the Seoul Express Bus Terminal, the location of 
the employment office, where three lines of subways intersect and where the floating 
population and shopping stores are densely packed into the underground space. After 
exchanging greetings, we rushed to the office. I asked why she chose this particular agency 
and she answered that it was because the agency had a wide selection of jobs with good 
wages, and it was situated in an area packed with restaurants—a good source for job 
openings. Park said that, since she was not sure when she would go back to China, she did 
not want to work for a monthly salary.  That would limit her mobility too much. Rather, she 
liked the freedom to move between jobs fairly often, in constant pursuit of better daily 
wages and nicer employers.  
We arrived at the office—two desks, a couch, and two women busy answering 
phones. One of them, who seemed to be in charge of the office, noticed Park and welcomed 
her with a big smile because Park was a regular customer. But Park first had a complaint 
about her last job. The pay wasn’t bad, she said, but the owner was “grumpy” and the 
restaurant “dirty.”   “You should pick a better job for me next time. Okay?” The woman 
assured Park she would, and suggested several new job openings, all cook or waitress 
positions in restaurants. Park picked a cooking position near the office and received the 
address and phone number of the restaurant. I asked if it is the case that there are more jobs 
than job seekers.  The question triggered a conversation between the woman and Park. 
Agency manager: Of course, there are always a lot more jobs looking for good 
Korean Chinese workers like Ms. Park than job seekers. The employers are always 
complaining about the working capacity and quality of Korean Chinese. After the 
amnesty was granted, Korean Chinese don’t work as hard as when they were illegal. 
They are not desperate any more.  
 
Park: You’re right. The newly arrived Korean Chinese, they don’t know how to 
work in Korea. I have been in Korea for ten years. I have become an expert at 
working in Korean restaurants—almost like a Korean. But the newcomers are just 
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looking for money without knowing how to work. They are degrading the Korean 
Chinese reputation. The bad reputation seriously works against me.  
 
Agency manager: Yes, Korean Chinese are always looking for new jobs asking for 
more money. What employers want to change their workers every day? Now, 
Korean Chinese are spoiled and not working hard. They spend money like Koreans. 
They should save money and think of going back to China soon. But they buy 
expensive cell phones, drink a lot, eat out a lot, live in a nice house, pay high rent. 
They’re here to make money, not to live here forever. 
 
Park:  That’s why there’s the saying: the longer you stay in Korea, the poorer you get. 
It’s true that among my friends who’ve been in Korea for as long as I have, nobody 
has made as much money as me. I control my money very tightly. My husband 
cannot use the money I send back without my permission, not at all. I’ll go back to 
China after working in Korea for a couple more years.  
 
Behind Park, there were several more Korean Chinese women waiting for their turns. The 
agency manager had to go back to work. Phones in the office kept ringing, as people offered 
and inquired about new daily jobs. Leaving the office, Park spoke with some disdain about 
the attitude of the agency woman. “She pretends to be kind. But she’s disrespectful of 
Korean Chinese. Look at what she said. She thinks Korean Chinese only know money-
money and we Korean Chinese are inferior to Koreans. Don’t Koreans like money?” Park 
asked if I agreed, and I said I did. She was clearly dissatisfied with the conversation she had 
just had, even though had she portrayed herself as a “good” Korean Chinese, working hard 
without wasting money. At the same time, she made no attempt to avoid the stigma of being 
a money seeker, asking, “We’re here to make money, aren’t we?”  
 I was struck by the conversation for several reasons. First, the women shared 
assumptions about “good” Korean Chinese and “bad” Korean Chinese, as defined by their 
work ethic and the extent to which they save money.  “Good” Korean Chinese don’t move 
often between jobs, don’t spend excessively, and have an eventual plan to return to China. 
This assumption leads to the idea that Korean Chinese should consider Korea as a 
temporary working place, not as a permanent home. Thus, saving money—not wasting it 
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like Koreans—enables the “good” Korean Chinese to get back to China as soon as possible. 
Another assumption that lies behind the conversation is that Korean Chinese have their own 
kind or level of consumption in contrast to that of Koreans. In fact, the wage gap between 
Koreans and Korean Chinese in the service industries and physical labor is minimal. In fact, 
Korean Chinese with expertise as carpenters, electricians, or skilled12 construction workers 
might earn more than average Koreans. Overall, these assumptions have contributed to 
reinforcing or reproducing the representation of Korean Chinese—“almost Korean, yet not 
quite”—as temporary residents who should not be consuming as much as Koreans.  
 The labor market, through institutions like the employment agency office, assesses 
the value of Korean Chinese as physical and service workers. Korean Chinese job seekers 
need to tolerate the nuanced disrespect of Korean agency workers and employers, while at 
the same time showing a capacity to handle long hours and a demanding work load. Workers 
who have been able to satisfy these two conditions might obtain better-paid and less difficult 
or physically demanding jobs in the future. The agency is responsible not only for assigning 
the workers to appropriate jobs, but also for mediating work conditions and wages between 
the employers and employees, circulating the recognition and reputation of both parties. In 
this manner, the agency is a crucial mediator for Korean Chinese, in the sense that it plays a 
role in sorting out “good” Korean Chinese from “bad” ones, based on their previous work 
experiences and reputation. That is why somebody like Park, who can work “almost like a 
Korean,” can get a good reference from the agency and be assigned to a well-paid and 
comfortable job, whereas newcomer Korean Chinese workers tend to keep moving from job 
to job until they build a certain level of recognition and reputation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The daily wage for electricians and carpenters ranges from $100 to $150, with a monthly income that could range 
from $2500 to $3500.  Korean GDP per capita was $25,910 in 2010. Working hours are the highest in the world —
2255.8 hours/year.  
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Despite the wide presence of Korean Chinese migrants in Korea, mass media and 
public discourses have stigmatized Korean workers as “opportunistic,” “immoral,” “lacking 
in work ethic,” and “low quality labor.” There seems to be an increasing tendency to think of 
Korean Chinese as job-jumping money-seekers.13 One Korean employment agency worker, 
whose attitude is representative of many I have spoken with, told me that “there are not so 
many Korean Chinese I would want to arrange for hiring.” At the same time, however, 
Korean Chinese labor intensely occupies the service sector, being especially dominant 
among waitresses and caregivers. It was almost impossible not to encounter Korean Chinese 
waitresses when eating out in Seoul. Korean customers can tell the fact that “they are from 
China” from the Yanbian accent strangely mixed with a Seoul accent. The slight distinction 
tends to lead to an intuitive discrimination marking Korean Chinese from China as not fully 
Korean. Regardless of the disdainful stigma attached to Korean Chinese, however, these 
workers, such as Park, often express their confidence as money seekers by saying, “We are 
here to make money. What is wrong with seeking money-money?” Seeking money is the 
very reason they are in the country, and it provides them with a strong drive to get through 
their exhausting and stressful time in Korea. Experienced Korean Chinese workers often say 
that they have gotten used to and even come to like their tense and fast-paced “Korean time.” 
In particular, nostalgia for their “Korean time” peaked when they returned to China—where 
they were “doing nothing but spending money” (as I detail in the previous section). Despite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A random encounter with a taxi driver indicated to me the depth of some Koreans’ feelings against Korean 
Chinese migrants. On a summer day in 2008 in Korea, I took a taxi in Garibongdong, a neighborhood referred to as 
“Korean Chinese Town” in Seoul. The taxi driver started a conversation with me, expressing his fury about the 
unruly and troublesome Korean Chinese who, he though, caused social disorder. He also claimed that Korean 
Chinese are taking job opportunities from Koreans and siphoning money from Korea to China. According to the 
Korean Labor Research Institute (2010), however, the labor markets for Korean and Korean Chinese workers do 
not overlap--Koreans and Korean Chinese are not competing in the same job market. Thus the tension is heavily 
emotional and discursive, rather than simply a reflection of actual conflict in the labor market.  
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the earnest wish to return to Yanbian after living as long-term undocumented workers in 
Korea, Park and many other Korean Chinese testified that, once they got back to Yanbian, 
they missed the heavy and regular work schedule in Korea.  
4.3.2 Working Time  
         The population of Korean Chinese living in Korea has reached about half a million. 
Over time, the occupational fields of Korean Chinese have gradually diversified and 
professionalized as more Korean Chinese have pursued higher education and become 
academics or entrepreneurs, or have gone to work for globally well-known conglomerates 
such as Samsung and LG. However, most Korean Chinese are still concentrated in the 
service sector and construction. In these fields, there are broadly two kinds of wage 
systems—one is based on day-to-day employment and the other is based on month-to-
month. Once the wage system is decided—usually in the job announcement—the rhythm of 
work follows. 
 I will detail Park’s everyday life as following. Park has worked in many restaurants in 
Seoul as cook or waitress—very common jobs for Korean Chinese women in Korea. Park 
said that she worked mostly from 10 a.m. to 10 or 11 p.m. While work was supposed to end at 
11, she rarely left on time. She was often asked to clean up leftover dishes and prepare for 
tomorrow’s orders by the owner of the restaurant. She did not have a moment of rest during 
working hours—as it is put in Korean, “there is no moment to open the eyes and nose.” 
Most nights she had to rush to catch the last subway back home, arriving around midnight, 
and falling asleep around 1 a.m. Then she had to get up at 7 a.m. to get ready for work in the 
morning. Namely, her time is constituted simply by “working time” and “sleeping time” 
(Kim 2009). She repeated the same pattern for ten years—except when she was being 
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pursued as an undocumented worker, and thus had to work secretively and irregularly. Since 
a day off meant she was “losing” (i.e., not earning) her daily wage, Park tried not to take any 
more than one or two days off a month, usually for special occasions, reminding herself, “I 
have been like a working machine.” Even though Park grew accustomed to the intensity and 
pace of working in Korean restaurants, the chronic lack of sleep exhausted her. On days 
with a heavy and demanding schedule, she took Chinese medicine and multiple nutrients to 
maintain her health, since being sick meant losing wages. She has developed her own way of 
justifying the exhausting “work-work” life in Korea, saying to me, “I can forget my tiredness 
right away as soon as I get the cash in my hand at the end of day. Then I get up again and go 
to work the next day.”  
The power of cash helped Park forget her fatigue and gave her the drive to go on. 
Daily income in the service field ranges from $50 to $70 for women working in restaurants, 
and $70 to $90 for men working in the construction field. Mostly, this is compensation for 
more than twelve hours’ of labor depending on the kind of job and the extent of experience. 
These are demanding jobs compared to the work they get in China in factories and offices, 
and even on farms. Korea is a country notorious for its speedy pace of life and the heavy 
workload heaped on migrants. Park and other Korean Chinese workers said it was extremely 
hard for their bodies to get used to the intensity of labor in Korea for the first two years. As 
time went by, however, the heavy work became a “habit” (Inibakhida in Korean),14 and the 
pace is inscribed in the body as Foucault suggests in Discipline and Punish (152). Yet, even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In “Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,” E.P. Thompson points out time, in the industrial society, 
becomes abstract, homogenous, linear, and task-fragmented whereas the pre-industrial society experiences time as 
concrete, cyclical, and task-oriented (Thompson 1967). 
 
 192 
under the discipline mode of working, proper compensation for labor is still the key 
motivation. If there is no compensation, there is no work.  
 As half a million Korean Chinese have occupied diverse sectors in the Korean labor 
market over the past twenty years, they have developed a collective, informal understanding 
of the price of labor according to its duration, rhythm, and intensity—it is an intuitive 
measurement of labor value structured through many years of work experience. “If the work 
is too demanding or tiring,” Park told me, “I will search for another job right away because 
there are a lot of jobs out there.” The movement between jobs is so frequent that the 
migrant workers I knew were usually working different jobs whenever I saw them. It might 
be because wages are structured on the daily interval, thus it is easy for workers to quit or for 
the employer to fire them if expectations are not mutually met. More critically, Korean 
Chinese workers have taken advantage of a churning, fast-paced job market to constantly 
seek better opportunities. It has become the usual pattern of job-seeking among Korean 
Chinese migrants in Korea. “Which Korean Chinese would work in the same job for years 
nowadays under bad working conditions?” Park asked rhetorically. Although there is no job 
security in daily wage labor, and the daily wage determines a large portion of her current and 
future economic life, Park does not consider herself simply subservient to her employers, as 
she can always respond to unfavorable conditions by moving on to a better-paid job. At the 
same time, Park is certainly subject to the conditions of wage labor, as she places her trust in 
both the power of the cash that sustains her and enables her to risk short periods between 
jobs while she is pursuing better opportunities, and the power of the market to provide 
those opportunities. 
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4.3.3 Body Clock 
         On top of flexibility and a work rhythm that enables them to make relatively easy 
moves to better paid jobs, other matters that Korean Chinese workers seriously consider 
include autonomy and friendly working conditions. For example, Ms. Kang from Yanbian, 
another experienced cook in her late fifties (whom I also met from the church), did not like 
to change jobs often in search of better wages. A talented cook, she has enjoyed good 
relations with all her employers. For the last ten years, she has tried to work hard to become 
a “good” Korean Chinese while seeking jobs that offer her flexibility as well as stability. She 
explains,  
Once an owner recognizes my ability, she or he tries to keep me by giving me tips or 
a bonus from time to time. Also, as we become personally close, I might get a more 
flexible schedule, too. Then I can visit China for weeks for some family events and 
still go back to the same job [in Korea]. The restaurant owners would keep the 
position for me because they like me to work for them. It’s still a daily wage, but 
there would be a little of a raise over time. I can have more stability in this way. 
Getting recognition from owners is the key to making money in a comfortable and 
stable way in Korea. To me, freedom [non-intervention of the owner in her work] is 
also important because I get nervous when the owner is watching and grumpy about 
what I’m doing. So I don’t like to work as a nanny or caregiver for the sick or the 
old. Doing those jobs, I’d be stuck someplace without being able to come and go 
freely. That kind of job doesn’t give me freedom. I couldn’t go out or rest whenever 
I want. I’d be required to constantly serve the people in need. However good the 
money, it wouldn’t be worth the work.  
 
Whenever I talked to Kang, she always told me about the owner of the restaurant she was 
working in at the time, which was the most important factor in deciding whether she stayed 
at a job or not. She loved the freedom of flexible labor in the sense that she could easily quit 
and find another better job. But she considered freedom to be more than simply the ability 
to change jobs. “Freedom” for her included the capacity to negotiate with her employer 
regarding wages and days off. In other words, she valued freedom from an overworked 
schedule and from an over-policing gaze. Kang believed that she could make better money 
only when she had some kind of job stability in addition to simple flexibility. “If we move 
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too much between jobs, we cannot make money,” she said. “It’s better to stay in one place 
rather than move around.” When Kang wasn’t in possession of a satisfactory and stable job, 
it made her nervous, which caused other health issues. If she was sick, she could not work. If 
she could not work, she believed, she would “lose” money. Kang counted every day, every 
moment in Korea as moneymaking—time was literally money to her.  
However, her body clock keeps ticking—she is aging. “When I was healthy and fairly young, 
I didn’t worry much about my body,” she told me.  “I’m already in my late fifties. I know my 
time in Korea won’t last much longer, although the visa will allow me to stay. I feel I cannot 
push myself as much as before—like when I was in my forties.” I noticed that Kang was 
very careful about her health. Whenever I visited her place—living in a small room with a 
kitchen inside her room and an outside toilet, located in a soon-to-be developed area in the 
northern part of Seoul—she showed me multiple Chinese medicines she was taking for her 
health. Her husband in Yanbian sent some, and she brought some from China herself. Kang 
also explained how she ate food that was good for certain organs and specific symptoms. 
She was knowledgeable and proud of her methods in caring for herself. “No health, no 
money in Korea. If I’m sick, my time in Korea ends.” Over and over again, my 
conversations with Kang reinforced the entangled relationship between body, money, and 
time. 
Along with the structural constraint imposed by the visa regulations that assign 
Korean Chinese to a specific kind of flexible labor, I take into critical consideration the 
body’s capacity for laboring. Despite the constant “caring for the self” and government of 
the self—in Foucault’s term—that these workers have engaged in, the working body has 
definite limits. In addition, caring for the self can paradoxically cause the body to become 
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Photo 9. Ms. Kang's Room. By june Hee Kwon (2011) 
more vulnerable by increasing its exposure to longer, more exploitive work conditions. 
Korean Chinese migrant workers, whose bodies are usually their only means of production, 
have to rely on those bodies to produce the same amount of labor day after day. In order to 
have “tomorrow as today,” as Marx elaborates in the chapter called “Working Days” in 
Capital, the body must be rested, fed, and clothed, so as to reproduce today’s labor for 
tomorrow. For physical laborers, a healthy body is the fundamental factor that determines 
whether they can keep working in Korea or not. As Kang said, “What I’m the most afraid of 
is to be sick.” Illness was her worst enemy, one that could ruin her time in Korea along with 
her financial plans. However, Kang and other workers who rely heavily on their own bodies 
for work do not know when they will be sick—thus the extreme care they take with their 
health, in order to prevent or delay the onset of illness. Both Park and Kang worry about 
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their unpredictable bodies, often qualifying statements with phrases such as, “Before I get 
too old,” or “As long as I am healthy”—their own ambiguous deadlines for their working 
time in Korea. Yet it is largely because of the intensive, long hours they have worked as 
cooks, day after day, that their bodies have deteriorated over the last ten years. Many of 
Kang’s friends returned to China unable to work any longer because they had grown too sick 
or too weak from the physical labor in Korea. “You remember when we were chased after 
by the police when we were in church, right?” Kang asked me once. “Look at us now. 
Everybody can come to Korea to make money. Now this time is good. We are completely 
free. We don’t have to run away from the police anymore. But my body doesn’t allow me to 
work here forever. I know the ending time is coming soon in a few years. I should make as 
much as I can until then.”  
The stories of Kang and Park show how Korean Chinese migrants are constrained 
by the peculiar temporality of visa regulations, the types of work they do, and the body’s 
capacity. This temporality has governed the Korean Chinese working body and, in addition, 
the circulation of service labors. This limitation of migrant workers’ time in Korea pushes 
them to maximize their income during the time they have. As a result, the necessary “surplus 
labor time” necessary to reproduce labor for tomorrow, as Marx elaborates, is shortened or 
deferred until the one-year enforced return to China. The three-year intensive extraction of 
labor time in Korea has caused Korean Chinese working bodies to burn out. Kang wanted 
to take care of her body not for its own sake, but rather to prolong her working time in 
Korea, thus securing her money and future. Here, caring for bodies not only accomplishes 
economic gain, but also the further alienation of workers from their bodies. 
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 In fact, by the time I met Park and Kang in Yanbian after three years of intensive 
labor in Korea, they were exhausted and sick—their bodies were debilitated. Whether 
intended or not, the “1-3-2” rhythm has created a unique temporality of working and resting 
at both individual and collective levels. Additionally, it has resulted in entrenching its 
constantly moving subjects in certain habits and emotions. Korean Chinese migrant workers 
hope for predictability (that tomorrow will be the same as today) while, at the same time 
seeking flexibility in the hope that tomorrow might be better than today. The future cannot 
be imagined in the long term, but is rather renewed and repeated every day by the payment 
of daily wages—the future that Korean Chinese workers visualize is as short as one day long.        
4.4  “2”: Preparing for Two Years of Work 
4.4.1 Hopes and Cares 
          On a summer night in 2009, I received a phone call from Ms. Kang, who was 
returning to China as compelled by the visa regulation—she had used up her three years of 
work in Korea. She suggested catching up by inviting me to stay over her place in huolong, 
one of Yanbian’s cities, which is mostly populated by ethnic Korean farmers and located an 
hour away from Yanji. Kang apologized for not being able to call me earlier because she had 
been sick for a while after her return to China. She said she was now feeling a bit better. I 
went to Huolong a few days later to meet her. Kang was staying with her husband, who had 
waited ten years for her to come back. He used to be a factory worker, but had not been 
healthy enough to undertake heavy labor in Korea, so Kang herself had decided to go to 
Korea to work. Since then, Kang had been the main breadwinner of the household, sending 
money home from Korea. I remembered that she had often showed concern about her 
husband’s addiction to mahjong, a traditional Chinese game often played for money. She had 
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heard that it was common for Korean Chinese men with wives working in Korea to become 
addicted to gambling and fall deeply into debt. Fortunately, Kang’s husband was not so 
deeply addicted that he gambled away the money that she sent, but he played often enough 
to worry her.     
  She told me how much she missed her two sons when her status as an 
undocumented worker kept her from coming back to China. She had been in Korea since 
1998, and in that time they had both grown up and graduated from college.  Kang was proud 
of her sons and also of the fact that she had been able to financially support their education. 
After college, both sons obtained respectable jobs and lived in Shenyang, an industrial city in 
Northeast China. She considered her sons’ achievements as part of her life success, believing 
that “they are my hopes.” While going through hardships in Korea, Kang had two dreams: 
sending her sons to college, and buying a new apartment in Yanji, the capital of Yanbian. 
The first dream had come true. But the second dream was still on the way. Unlike other 
Korean Chinese migrants who earned enough to purchase cars and an apartment or two, 
Kang did not save enough money. Her earnings were mainly used to pay for college and to 
support her family’s daily living costs. In fact, when Kang invited me, she hesitated, and then 
warned, “My house is an old one. The toilet is outside. The kitchen is not a modern one. 
There’s only one big room in my house. If you’re okay with this arrangement, you’re more 
than welcome to stay with me.” 
  When I saw her, for the first time in a year, I noticed that she had lost a significant 
amount of weight. She seemed feeble, unlike in Seoul, where she used to be full of energy 
and the will to work. She appeared even more anxious, and started listing all the problems 
she had with being at home. As she warned, her house was an old-style Chinese house, one 
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of four or five houses that were all tightly connected wall to wall. There was no indoor 
bathroom, only a public bathroom shared with dozens of neighbors. The outside toilet—the 
public bathroom—was even harder to use in winter. Kang said that the kitchen without a 
sink or counter prevented her from standing up when she was cooking; she had to cook 
crouching on the floor, which caused her back pain. She didn’t have a private room in her 
house all to herself, which put her in close quarters with her husband—who did nothing but 
watch TV or play card games by himself. Her savings were running out because the cost of 
living was higher than she had expected. She had a list full of inconveniences and 
discomforts. 
  In addition to her overall dissatisfaction with being at home, Kang was ill, despite 
having been cautious about her physical well-being. Her symptoms broadly ranged from 
stomachaches to insomnia, back pain, and, sometimes, pain in her joints. She had visited 
several well-known Chinese doctors (mingyi in Chinese) in Yanbian for acupuncture and 
herbal medicine. She went hiking or walking every morning, even with these chronic pains. 
She also received electronic massage treatment, which was becoming popular in Yanbian. 
She did not want to go out with her friends because she had to drink and eat with them, and 
she thought that—living in Yanbian time—was too expensive. Regardless of her various 
attempts to feel better, Kang still felt nervous and uncertain about her health. As she had 
told me in Seoul, “What I’m most afraid of is being sick.” The state of her health would be 
pivotal when she decided whether she could return to work in Korea in a year. During my 
visit her anxieties seemed to peak:  
I should become stronger before I go back to Korea. But I’m not sure if I can be 
healthier in a year. I’ve been burnt out for ten years. I’m not as healthy and young as 
before. If I push myself too much, I could have a more serious disease. I’m more 
afraid of that. But I still have work to do. I want to move to a new apartment in 
Yanji. Also, my sons are waiting for me to return to open a restaurant in Shenyang. 
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But I don’t think we have enough money for that yet. I should make more for a 
couple of years. So I need to stay strong.  
 
Even though she had successfully realized one of her dreams in supporting her sons’ college 
education, Kang was desperate for more money, not only to move to an apartment in Yanji, 
but also to support her sons’ weddings. Kang felt she needed to purchase houses for them, 
too. She had been making fairly good money as a recognized cook by the restaurant owners 
she had worked for in Korea. But the rising cost of living in China seemed so hard to catch 
up with—for herself as well as for her husband, who could no longer work. Given her 
desperation, going back to Korea was a necessary choice for her, although in the long run 
she would eventually return to China to live with her family. In making all her dreams 
happen, her body, in particular, her healthy body was a key site because it was again her only 
means of production. Hence, care for her body was a critical way to protect her future 
prospects. But there was no doubt that her body was getting old and fragile. And even 
though she was a former factory worker (an occupation once represented as the ideal 
socialist subject who enjoyed total economic and social security), Kang did not have a 
reliable social safety net for her retirement. Although she rigorously prepared for going back 
to Korea by taking special care of her body, her body remained vulnerable and 
unpredictable—she could not know when she would be sick again.  
           Her life was limited not only by visa regulations, but also by her body’s clock. As long 
as her body allowed her to work, she believed that she could support herself and her dreams 
by making money in Korea. China, she was sure, would not be the place for her to create a 
new life. She was feeling too late and too old to join the rising economy of China. Her year 
in Yanbian was supposed to have been resting time to reproduce “surplus labor,” in Marx’s 
term. Instead it caused mounting discomfort and dissatisfaction. A couple of months seemed 
 201 
too long for spending without earning, while at the same time it seemed too short for 
physically recovering from the stress of heavy labor from the past decade. Kang carefully 
monitored her uncertain body’s clock in order to decide whether she would be able to 
reenter the circuit of labor migration—the rhythm of circulation.  
Ms. Park also was getting ready to go back to Korea. After her experience spending 
but not making money in Yanbian, Park’s calculating mind told her she would be better off 
going back to Korea. One more day in China meant losing money for one more day. At the 
same time, one more day in Korea meant one more day of wages earned. To Park, China is a 
land of excessive expenses whereas Korea is a place of earning and having too-little-time to 
spend on too-much-life. After ten years of a bitter life as a floating migrant subject, Park 
came to believe that time was not a natural phenomenon. Time was, instead, a fundamental 
resource that needed to be converted into money. She just could not waste time on 
Yanbian’s frenetic social life because wasted time felt like money being thrown away—and 
money is often proverbially compared to blood among Korean Chinese, considered as 
precious as a part of the body. Park said, “If I’m stingy, my friends accuse me of being 
someone who seeks only money-money. Sometimes I just ache to leave everything behind 
and go to work in Korea—although I hated to work when I was there.” Yes, Park missed 
home very much when undergoing the risk of deportation in Korea. At the same time, she 
became sick of Yanbian after returning.  “Home is not like home.”  
Unlike government officers with their pensions, Park could not draw on 
government or work unit money to help her economic future. She had nothing but daily 
wages to save for her old age. In the end, Park’s safety net consisted of nothing other than 
making as much money as possible in Korea until she could no longer work. She was tired 
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of too-much-time, too-much-life, and too-much-cost in Yanbian. It was time to go back to 
Korea. As she returned to the circuit of transnational migration she promised herself, “I’ll be 
in Korea for two more years as the work visa allows. Then I’ll see what to do.” When Park 
experienced competing temporalities between working rhythms and resting rhythms, 
production time and consumption time, she chose to step again into the rhythm of work, 
drawn by both its predictability and flexibility. It’s where she felt more at home for now.  
4.5 Conclusion 
           While exploring split bodies, time, and life of Korean Chinese migrants after amnesty, 
my finding in this chapter is that migrants’ freedom of movement exacerbates their 
vulnerability. Marx and Engels in The German Ideology posit labor as an essential activity of 
humans that renders them distinct from animals (1978). In the same vein, labor is “the living, 
form-giving fire”: labor serves as a basic causal force or principle of the historical motion of 
being (Weeks 1998:122). Certainly, as Weeks elaborates, labor comes into play as the 
“principle of internal genesis” and “immanent creative principle” of human beings. Park and 
Kang would not deny that labor is a vital force of life, given that they firmly believed that 
there was no “life” for them in Yanbian since they did not “work” there. They missed their 
time in Korea, even though it was extremely tiring and hard on their bodies. They believed 
that it was a way to provide for their own futures. However, the irony is obvious: the more 
they care for their bodies, and thus the future, the more their bodies become worn out. 
Caring for their bodies culminates in the deterioration of their bodies because it enables the 
migrants to maximize the extraction of labor and prolong their working time as much as 
possible. Here, labor itself alienates these workers from their own selves and their own labor. 
To Korean Chinese migrants, resting time in Yanbian is, in fact, a restless resting that 
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involves the anxiety of excessive spending without making money. Resting time is not 
actually a “rest,” but rather a temporary pause in “real” life—that is, working and making 
money. Resting time’s sole utility for them is as a period of recuperation, to allow their aging 
bodies to recover from the demands of Korea. As a result, the returnees cannot feel free 
during the restless resting time under the pre-determined rhythm of “1-3-2” that structures 
their movement.  
After coming back from follow-up research in Yanbian to Seoul in July 2011, I met 
Park and Kang in Seoul again. Kang was at first too busy to meet because she was working 
as a cook from 10 a.m. to 11 p.m.  Eventually, we met on her once-a-month day off and had 
dinner at her place. She proudly told me that she had finally gotten the apartment in Yanji 
she had always wanted, although she still owed money on it. “As you know,” she said, “I get 
easily nervous. The debt makes me so anxious nowadays. In order to pay it off, I might have 
to keep going for another three years in Korea. What can I do if I go back to China now? 
It’s hard to work here, but I love to have money in my hands at the end of the day.” Kang, 
in fact, looked a lot healthier and livelier than when I had last seen her in Yanbian. Again she 
showed me the many kinds of herbal medicines she had brought from China and the healthy 
fruit juices she made for herself. Her body care continued.  
Ms. Park, meanwhile, was now serving as a live-in-domestic worker for a couple, 
both medical doctors, in Apgujeongdong (one of the wealthy areas in Seoul). This job allowed 
her to go out only on the weekends. “It’s good money,” she told me, “but the kids are so 
spoiled. The house work is too much. There’s no resting time. I hate to work for this young 
couple. So I’m looking for another job. It should be a freer job, with shorter working hours.” 
Despite her present dissatisfaction, she said, she would work for another three years in 
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Korea until she made money enough to purchase houses for her sons. For now, Park was 
simply hoping that she could stay healthy long enough to achieve that goal.  
Back in Seoul, the rhythm of “1-3-2” was still at work in the lives of Park and Kang 
as they navigated the combined temporalities of visa regulation, labor, and their own bodies. 
And Ms. Park and Kang were still trying to move in accord with the rhythm. They hoped 
that tomorrow they would be as healthy as today in order to continue to work. They also 
hoped that tomorrow they would make more money than today to keep life moving forward. 
Yet the rhythm of circulation is subject to political whims and contingencies,15 and the future 
of Korean Chinese workers is contingent upon the recognition of the Korean government, 
which has never really decided whether they are overseas Koreans or cheap migrant labor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  The Korean government has changed the policy again, now requiring Korean Chinese to return to China after 
using up the “1-3-2” working period. This has caused confusion and trouble amongst Korean Chinese migrant 
workers. NGOs, related scholars, and Korean Chinese activists have held meetings to criticize the fluctuating 
migrant policy toward Korean Chinese. But the altered policy remains pending.  
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Chapter 5. Vigi lant Ethnic i ty : 
Encounters with the Forbidden Homeland 
 
          On a freezing and snowy day in November 2009, I headed to Longjing (one of six cities in 
Yanbian) to meet Mr. Kim Chul and his friends, all longtime Communist Party members. Mr. 
Kim, in his late sixties, was a retired government official, a dedicated Communist Party member, 
and a passionate writer full of energy, humor, and wit. Since my first visit to Yanbian in 2006, he 
had been an excellent guide, helping set up meetings with other Korean Chinese, and arranging 
my visits to farming towns, even though foreign researchers were informally discouraged from 
doing this. Eager to support my research, Mr. Kim had appointed himself my history tutor as 
long as I made sure to keep the following promises with him: 1) “Do not criticize the Communist 
Party”; 2) “Do not criticize socialism”; 3) “Do not ask for help or any information related to 
North Korea”; and 4) “Do not refer to me by my real name in your work.” Whenever he 
repeated the promises, I sensed that his ambivalence might come from two directions. On the 
one hand, many Korean visitors had caused trouble for him by breaking rules or criticizing China 
in public despite his warnings. On the other hand, he still wanted to help Koreans because of the 
shared “Korean” ethnicity, even though he was very likely to be investigated by the Chinese 
police afterwards. My understanding of his willingness to help, along with his discomfort about 
doing so, led me to make this assurance: I would do my best to follow his “guidelines” and honor 
our friendship. Before I headed to the lunch meeting that Mr. Kim organized with old 
communist party members on that day, he repeated one more time that I should not criticize 
China, socialism, or the Communist Party. “I will keep that in my mind,” I firmly promised.  
             In fact, Mr. Kim was not the only Korean Chinese who expressed such caution to me.  
Although I was a South Korean researcher who shared an ethnicity with them, I was still a 
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foreigner. The vigilant attitude frequently made it difficult to arrange interviews with local 
Korean Chinese. They would ask, “How can I be sure I’ll be okay after I talk to you?” Some were 
apparently saying, behind my back, “What is she doing here? Is she a spy, and for which country?” 
The suspicion was probably not personal. Rather, it attached to contact with “others” in general. 
Such contacts had brought about random political persecution and victimization in the past, 
particularly during the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, the constant wariness confused me 
given the current state of affairs, with numerous Korean Chinese making frequent trips back and 
forth between China and Korea, and the intimate cultural ties to Korea that manifest themselves 
on a daily basis, especially through television and other mass media. But the seemingly 
contradictory vigilance about Korean contacts is too common to dismiss, even in the midst of 
the rampant and preponderant Korean Wind that sweeps into every corner of daily life in Yanbian. 
What, then, makes most Korean Chinese wary of Koreans or Korea-related issues and concerns? 
What is the role of the Korean Wind in shaping this collective discomfort and suspicion alongside 
remittance development—which is, of course, mostly generated by money made in Korea? In 
what way have Korean Chinese try to make sense of the current state of Chinese socialism, in 
particular “Yanbian socialism” as reshaped by the impact of the Korean Wind.?  
          I already have introduced the structure of feeling across Yanbian induced by the unstable 
influx of remittance, examining it in previous chapters through the lens of anticipation, 
hesitation, and waiting. In this chapter, I continue to develop the discussion on structure of 
feeling—the particular vigilance and wariness—by placing a new focus on the narratives of 
Communist Party members who are at the intersection of the post-Cold War era and post-
socialist politics. These narratives will help me to elaborate on the attitudes of Korean Chinese 
party members, who retain faith in socialism and the Party, toward modern tensions between 
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China and Korea, socialism and capitalism, politics and economy. In particular, the stories tells 
us about the split politics that these party members have manifested; they show a strong political 
faith to the state of China and socialism, while treating the relationship with Korea in a mere 
economic term in the midst of the Korean Wind.  
           My aim is threefold in exploring these stories. First, I introduce the epochal moment of 
encounter between Korean Chinese and the homeland, South Korea, forbidden for four 
decades, highlighting the constant Korean Chinese anxiety toward Korea. Second, I analyze 
Korean Chinese party members’ attempts to balance their ethnicity and subjectivity between 
China and Korea in response to the Korean Wind. In previous eras, talk about “ethnicity” was 
much discouraged, and any claim of ethnicity was seen as detracting from one’s Chinese 
nationality. In recent years, by stark contrast, discourse about ethnic identity has bloomed, in 
particular, characterizing Korean “Chinese,” with an emphasis on Chinese nationality. Third, I 
examine the narrative strategy (split politics) of these members as they discuss transnational 
migration to Korea as an economic phenomenon while remaining politically faithful to 
socialism and China. This chapter argues that the Korean Wind has produced and reinforced a 
wary ethnic politics among Korean Chinese communist party members, who are attempting to 
make sense of their place in contemporary Chinese socialism by constructing a vigilant ethnicity.  
5.1 Old Secrets: The Forbidden Homeland 
5.1.1 On the Borderland 
          Yanbian has been a locus for numerous political and security concerns. It shares a border 
with North Korea, an over-layered, complex homeland that, as Cadre Yang, portrayed in 
Chapter 1, is a source of political anxiety and tension. As an increasing number of North 
Korean refugees cross the Tumen River to escape from dire poverty and political repression, 
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border control on the China side has become more militarized. In addition, North Korea has 
been a difficult place to enter from the South Korean end because the peninsula has remained 
divided since the Korean War was suspended in 1953. This has made Yanbian the easiest and 
most reliable route into and out of North Korea, which has sometimes resulted in the increased 
political scrutiny—international and national—on the province whenever regional tensions 
mount. Yanbian is indisputably Chinese territory. But it has become a channel, a link between 
North Korea and the outside world, especially South Korea, China, and other countries, 
possessing the need to engage with the unpredictable North Korean regime. The particular geo-
political border location means that Yanbian retains some of the old Cold War anxiety, and 
places the Korean Chinese who live there, directly as well as indirectly, under the political 
influence of both Koreas. 
            My hiking trips in Yanbian, which I have discussed in earlier chapters, heightened my 
awareness of being in such a borderland. One trip, in March 2009, took place shortly after two 
American journalists crossed the Tumen River, and the North Korean military arrested them. 
When the news broke, rumors rapidly spread: the Korean Chinese guide, who belonged to a 
church in a small town in Yanbian and helped the journalists to get around in the area, was 
sentenced to several years of imprisonment by the Chinese government; the Han Chinese 
translator was still on the run; the two American journalists were sentenced to twelve years of 
hard labor by North Korea. The rumors were clearly exaggerated and contained few specifics, 
yet they aroused a palpable political fear in the conversations of my fellow hikers. One of them, 
who worked for the government, gave us his take: 
When the news got out, a lot of journalists came to Yanbian. The five star hotels in 
Yanji [the capital of Yanbian] were all booked up. We were told by the central 
government not to talk to any foreigner, let alone those reporters. It was a pretty 
anxious moment. Since that event occurred, the Communist Party has paid closer 
attention to Yanbian as a border zone and added special border controls, while South 
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Koreans have become more interested in Yanbian as a channel to get to know more 
about North Korea. Because of its proximity to North Korea, Yanbian’s development 
has been neglected while its border status gets all the attention. Juni, you should be 
careful when you go to the border towns. Don’t be reckless like those American 
journalists [laughs]. 
 
I often faced this kind of half-joking warning throughout my fieldwork, a joke that also 
implicitly conveyed the unease with which Korean Chinese contemplated the prospect of 
accompanying me—a South Korean foreigner studying in the US, a potential troublemaker, 
possibly a spy. The suspicions are reasonable, however. Some Korean Chinese who befriended 
South Koreans have been accused of selling Chinese state secrets, and persecuted and punished 
for it. Rumors of such punishments haunted the region and amplified the fear. Another 
member of the hiking club summed up the situation: “It is because Yanbian is an ethnic 
borderland under the special political attention of the Communist Party.”  
            I have witnessed, time and again, the concept of “border” and “borderland” as a core 
principle of Korean Chinese subjectivity—the subjectivity of an ethnic minority within the 
Chinese state, living adjacent to a divided homeland. The borderland is an in-between interstice 
where different cultural values and intersubjective experiences are negotiated (Bhabha 1994). 
The borderland is an ambiguous sphere that links two worlds, imbuing its people with 
peripheral vision, a sense of marginalization, and a liminal feeling that “I am neither here nor 
there”(Zavella 2011). It is also an overlapping and layered space where people can see “double” 
worlds simultaneously and express both complex identities and resistance against the dominant 
social order (Anzaldúa 2000). Along with this intersectionality, hybridity, and multiplicity, 
borderlands also harbor the desolate, disconnected, and displaced feeling that Homi Bhabha 
calls “unhomeliness”—the condition of extra-territorial and cross-cultural initiation (Bhabha 
1994: 13). As I portrayed in previous chapters, Korean Chinese migrants who live and work in 
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Korea have developed a feeling of estrangement upon returning home. Confronted by new 
developments in Yanbian that occurred in their absence, they coined the now common saying, 
“Home is not like home.” Belongingness is revealed to be precarious and the concept of home is 
unsettled by the mobility of transnational labor migration.  
           This “unhomeliness” also takes the form of melancholia, a condition generated by the 
loss of a loved one who cannot be grieved properly (Butler 1997; Freud 2001[1917]; Eng and 
Han 2003; Navaro-Yashin 2012; Zavella 2011).1 I take melancholia as a useful lens onto the 
dominant structure of feeling of Yanbian: anticipation and waiting, the affect expressed in the 
local saying, “Everybody is gone with the Korean wind.” This constant and common 
melancholia as “unfinished process of grieving” (Butler 1997) is part and parcel of everyday life 
in Yanbian. The lost ones are not permanently lost, however. They send money (remittances) to 
their families in Yanbian on a regular basis (see chapter 3). They are expected to return 
eventually. In this manner, these migrants are not truly lost, but rather temporarily lost, with 
reunification constantly deferred. Under this circumstance of frequent coming and going, Korean 
Chinese have inhabited a particular melancholic and unhomely affect, generated by the 
geographical and cultural borderland, ever since Korean Chinese settled in Yanbian a century 
ago. 2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On the basis of “The Ego and the Id” and “Melancholia and Mourning” by Freud, Butler articulates melancholia 
as “unfinished process of grieving” (Butler 1997). Whereas mourning is an attempt to break from the lost one, 
melancholia is to refuse to let the lost one go--thus, the lost object continues to haunt and inhabit the ego as a part 
of the identification process. The lost one is preserved and co-existent with the ego (Butler 1997).  
 
2 Yael Navaro-Yashin, in an ethnography of the war-scarred borderland of Cyprus, argues that “affect is a charge 
that has a part to play in the sociality of the human beings who inhabit a space”(20). Here, affect is not only a 
means for inter-subjective connectivity, but also the channel that mediates between subject and 
things/environment. She focuses on the particular affect discharged by objects and environment, particularly ruins 
and other artifacts of war (Navaro-Yashin 2012). The Tumen River certainly “discharges affect,” running as it does 
between North Korea and China as a geographical, natural, and political border that vividly evokes the migration 
history of the Koreans who crossed it into Yanbian a century ago.  
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            Although my ethnography is attuned to the structure of feeling through a lens of 
borderland and melancholia, this chapter, however, aims to shed different light from recent 
migration discussions that highlight ambiguous belonging or unhomeliness. Again and again, 
they were not given to expressions of ambiguous belonging, such as “I am neither here nor there.” 
Rather, Korean Chinese members of the Communist Party insisted on their strong attachment 
to China and socialism. My argument is that the unambiguous belonging is a political product that 
Korean Chinese had to develop in order to survive the political turmoil of modern China. As 
indicated by Mr. Kim Chul’s obsessive quest to obtain assurances from me, associations with 
Korea or Koreans often have troubled Korean Chinese, not only during the Cultural 
Revolution, but also after economic reform, and even now. Ambiguous belonging has been 
forbidden by the state of China; Korean Chinese were encouraged to foreground their political 
and patriotic affiliations with China.  It is part of the vigilance thrust upon them as a 
consequence of living in an ethnic borderland of China.  
          Throughout my fieldwork, the frequent encounter with such vigilance on the part of 
Korean Chinese, along with an insistence on unambiguous belonging, constantly piqued my 
curiosity. It is the tight belonging to China that is in stark contrast to the recent migration 
studies with a focus on “between and betwixt.” What constitutes the unambiguous belonging 
underneath the strong affiliation with China and socialism? How can Korean Chinese 
guardedness coexist with the rampant desire for and relentless practice of transnational 
migration to South Korea? How do Korean Chinese resolve the self-contradictory attitude 
between China and Korea, socialism and capitalism, in the midst of the Korean Wind? Where 
does the contradiction stem from and move toward? Answering these questions, in the next 
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section, I stage the first encounter with the long forbidden homeland, South Korea, in order to 
demonstrate the anxiety woven through the daily vigilance in the wake of the Korean Wind.  
5.1.2 Fears for the Homeland            
            I have laid out the body of recent literature portrays diasporic people as melancholic 
subjects in that they are yearning home/land, living with a feeling of loss—they could not let 
the lost one go. Yet, to Korean Chinese, in particular, those who underwent the Cultural 
Revolution, the homelands—North and South Korea—have been a source of fear and a place 
forbidden to get close to since any tie to these homelands would lead to the political 
persecution. Here, let me introduce the family story of Mr. Wu, a Korean Chinese writer in his 
late fifties, who I was closely and occasionally discussing on a broad range of topics of Korean 
Chinese culture, history, and literature along with other Korean Chinese writers. His story about 
the first encounter with the homeland offers a number of clues about the complicated feeling 
toward the homeland—a place for fear but also for excitement.  
            Unlike the majority of Yanbian Korean Chinese, whose families moved from the 
northern parts of Korea, Mr. Wu’s family moved from the southern portion of the Korean 
peninsula under Japanese imperialism. Mr. Wu’s father came to China as a young child with his 
parents and siblings in search of a better life. When the family settled in China, they thought the 
migration was temporary, and planned eventually to go back to their hometown after making 
enough money in China. After Japan was defeated in World War II and colonial Chosun was 
liberated from Japan in 1945, Mr. Wu’s aunt—his father’s younger sister—did return to Korea 
with her husband and children. Mr. Wu’s grandparents also returned eventually. But Mr. Wu’s 
father suddenly fell ill, and could not make the long trip home. While his return was delayed, 
political convulsions spread across and beyond China; the People’s Republic of China was 
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established in 1949 and land redistribution was completed. Those who did not return to Korea 
right after the liberation from Japan started planning to stay in China. Most importantly, Korean 
Chinese farmers were granted farming land as part of the land  
reforms. They did not have to move constantly from one plot of land to another as floating, 
itinerant farmers any longer. Then, when the Korean War broke out in 1950, Korean Chinese, 
including Mr. Wu’s father, had to defer their return anyway—with no way of knowing when 
that might change.  
          Mr. Wu’s father became a teacher in a Korean Chinese high school. His wife, Wu’s 
mother, worked as an accountant in a pulp factory in Yanbian. But as the Cultural Revolution 
started, their stable family life was threatened, as the Wu family background—both parents 
coming from South Korea—aroused suspicions. The father’s occupation as a high school 
teacher was also used as an excuse to falsely accuse him of being an “intellectual” who served 
capitalism. The double accusation—South Korean spy and intellectual—seriously troubled the 
family. Mr. Wu’s father was sent to the countryside (to transform himself from an elite to a 
commoner by working with farmers). Mr. Wu and his siblings were persecuted and harassed as 
“spy’s babies.” The bullying and stigma were unbearable for young Mr. Wu. While his father 
was forced to be away for years, his family—his mother, two brothers and two sisters—were 
scattered to several relatives’ houses because Mr. Wu’s mother could not afford to feed four 
children by herself without the father’s support. Even after the Cultural Revolution ended, the 
accusation left a deep scar in Mr. Wu’s family. His father was too traumatized to initiate the 
search for his family back in South Korea—Mr. Wu’s grandparents and aunt. Although Mr. Wu 
was aware of his father’s desperation to know whether his aunt was still alive in Korea, he could  
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Photo 10. Ryu Yeonsan's Essay,  Seou l  Wind , dealing with the first counter with the forbidden 
homeland (1996) 
 
not even try to investigate the aunt’s status and whereabouts due to the possibility of another 
persecution.The story of the family’s connection to South Korea had to remain an unspoken 
secret. In Yanbian, the victimhood of Mr. Wu’s family was not at all exceptional. Any tie, not 
only to South Korea but also to North Korea, was covered up and left neglected until the early 
1990s. The collective silence regarding family ties to the two Koreas haunted Korean Chinese 
for decades.  
           Things gradually changed as the Seoul Asian Games (1986) and Olympics (1988) took 
place and some initial contacts between South Korea and Korean Chinese occurred; the 1980s 
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needs a special attention as a crucial turning point for Korean Chinese to re-encounter with two 
Koreas. I collected multiple testimonies, not only from urbanites working for the government, 
but also from farmers in the countryside, that from the mid-1980s, many Korean Chinese 
started secretively listening to Korean radio programs whose signals could be picked up in 
China. The activity was still so risky that they often listened under the blankets at night without 
telling anybody. It was an extremely novel and exciting experience to get to know the long-
forbidden Korea through voices speaking in the Seoul accent, which was familiar as well as 
unfamiliar to Korean Chinese. Mr. Kim Chul remembered secretly listening to Korean radio 
programs: “Whenever I heard them, I heard my heart pumping fast because I feared getting 
caught by the police. I knew I was doing what I was not supposed to do. But I could not stop. 
It was so fun and exciting. The stories and Korean songs were tuned to our emotions—we were 
the same ethnic people.”  
           Another reason that Korean radio became an emotional touchstone was a program 
called Longing Face, Missing Voice (bogosipen olgul, guriun moksori), which was about searches for 
family lost during the Korean War. The show was broadcast not only in Korea, but also in 
other countries. Ordinary people sent their stories to the program, hoping to get their search 
publicized so that lost family members might hear it and get in touch. But after decades of 
separation, memories grew cloudy, and the descriptions of lost relatives could be very vague. 
Still, sometimes Korean Chinese listening to the program in China noticed possible fits with 
friends or acquaintances, and told them about it. It was very rare, but occasionally, 
reconnections succeeded.  
           Some Korean Chinese started looking for their lost families on their own, exchanging 
letters with people in Korea. Most of these searches were undertaken in secret, and yet the 
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excitement of discovery was sometimes surreptitiously shared. Mr. Wu heard many such stories 
at the time. Since most Koreans and Korean Chinese did not know the exact addresses of 
relatives in the other country due to multiple moves, life changes, and societal transformations 
in China and Korea over four decades, letters were often returned undelivered. When they did 
get through, the letters did not reach the right person immediately, instead being passed from 
person to person, from house to house until finally the intended recipient was found. In the 
mid to the late 1980s, a few Korean Chinese who travelled to Korea on public business 
delivered and matched stories between people looking for their families in China and Korea. 
Since many searches were based on ambiguous and random rumors that had been circulated 
from mouth to mouth, actual reconnections seldom occurred. But the newly available means of 
communication—the radio program and increasing correspondence—did enable some to find 
and reunite with their lost families.3 As Mr. Liu—who was one of the fortunate ones who 
reconnected with relatives in South Korea during the 1980s—wrote in his book, Seoul Wind, 
Korean relatives began inviting their newly-rediscovered Korean Chinese families to Korea, 
paying the full travel costs, mostly because Korean Chinese could not afford to go otherwise. 
To make good on these invitations, Korean Chinese had to detour via Hong Kong to get to 
Korea due to the fact that there was no direct flight between China and South Korea at that 
time. 
            In 1985 Mr. Wu’s father started writing letters to his sister in Korea, as many Korean 
Chinese were secretly attempting at the time. At first there was no reply. Mr. Wu’s family hoped 
for a letter from the aunt, but nobody could openly express their hope—it was implicitly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The latecomers—those who moved from South Korea and lived in Heilongjiang and Jilin—were the ones who 
initiated the efforts to reunite, as they were more likely to have connections to South Korea. Thus, Korean Chinese 
from South Korea (namdoqi) experienced the encounter with South Korea earlier than Yanbian Korean Chinese 
whose families had moved from North Korea (bukdoqi).   
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forbidden to talk about it, even within the family. Finally in 1986, more than a year later, a letter 
arrived from the aunt in Korea, the one who had been separated from Mr. Wu’s father for forty 
years. Mr. Wu described the moment with vivid excitement:  
In fact, it seemed that the letter had been passed from wrong address to wrong 
address. When the letter finally reached our house, it was very much tattered. We 
did not tell my father about the letter at first. It was because at that time, he had a 
heart problem and high blood pressure from the physical and psychological trauma 
he suffered during the Cultural Revolution. We thought he would pass out if we told 
him about the letter. I was the one who opened it. I remember my hands were 
shaking and my heart was pounding. All my family were there together when the 
letter was opened. I read it to our family. Sadly, one of the things we learned was 
that our grandparents had passed away. 
          
After Mr. Wu’s father knew about he letter, he cried over the death of his parents, but also over 
the excitement that he would meet his living sister in forty years. His father was antsy and kept 
asking, nervously, “Do we have to go or do they have to come? Will they invite us or will we 
invite them?” After exchanging several letters, the separated siblings finally reunited in 1988 as 
Mr. Wu’s aunt and her family visited China via Hong Kong. Next year, Wu’s family visited 
Korea. The mutual visits have been ritualized annually or biannually. Mr. Wu said that it was 
hard to find the proper words to express the feeling of the moment. “We were deeply anxious 
and fearful about meeting our family in South Korea. My father’s long, secret dream had been 
fulfilled.” Excitement about reunited Korean Chinese/Korean families spread all across 
Northeast China around that time. “Korean guests” and “Korean Chinese guests” were 
welcomed both in China and Korea. Mr. Wu said, “It was just thrilling for the same Korean 
ethnic people to meet each other after such a long, desperate separation, after our harsh, 
traumatic history. We share the same blood. How great it was!”  
           Whenever I interviewed Korean Chinese people about their first encounter with the 
homeland, I could not help myself from having tears in my eyes—the stories were so 
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compelling and emotional. These narratives all followed similar story lines, from the search to 
the actual encounter, and all of them placed a great deal of emphasis on the concepts of 
common ethnicity, “the same blood.” Despite the excitement to be reunite with “the same 
blood,” however, the long-separated family reunification have turned out to be an occasion for 
Korean Chinese to reassure the discomfort with the homeland and Korean people—even after 
thirty year of the Cultural Revolution. The presumed reasons vary, supposed by Korean 
Chinese; “Koreans have lived under capitalism whereas we (Korean Chinese) are socialist 
subjects;” “Koreans have a work-work oriented life whereas we are still supported by the state of 
China.” In what way have Korean Chinese, who now live at a different moment from the 
Cultural Revolution (the harsh socialist revolution), readjusted their relationship to the 
homeland, in the midst of the Korean Wind, the very economic drive that dominates the 
everyday life of Yanbian? How do Korean Chinese those who had to repress the ambiguous 
and in-between-belonging between China and Korea accept the new flow of migration? In the 
next section, I chart the constant attempt for Korean Chinese party members to redefine and 
re-characterize their ethnicity along with and in contrast to the Korean Wind without simply 
suppressing their in-between ethnic identity—overcoming the fear.  
5.2 Redefining Ethnicity 
              On a freezing day in November 2009, I attended an academic meeting in the 
Northeastern Chinese city of Jilin, organized by the Korean Chinese literary magazine Doraji. 
The topic was the future of Korean Chinese identity in the face of rapid economic and social 
change, most importantly the Korean Wind. The organizer invited renowned Korean Chinese 
literary scholars, high-ranking Communist Party members, and rising young novelists from all 
over China. The meeting, conducted in the Korean language, mainly concerned the special 
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characteristics of Korean Chinese ethnic culture as distinctive from Han Chinese culture as well 
as North and South Korea. The participants debated whether and in what ways the culture of 
Korean Chinese should be considered unique and what kinds of efforts Korean Chinese should 
make to create or maintain cultural uniqueness under the policy of ethnic harmony pursued by 
the Chinese Communist Party. What intrigued me about this day-long conversation was not 
only how the Korean Chinese participants highlighted their ideas of “should-be” culture (how 
the future of Korean Chinese literary culture should be), but also how the participants were 
sharply divided into two groups. One group advocated the idea that the cultural uniqueness of 
Korean Chinese stemmed from the fact that Korean Chinese are a border crossing ethnic group, 
articulating two different cultures—Chinese and Korean. The other group insisted that Korean 
Chinese culture has been maintained through the special protection of the Chinese government, 
and thus is part and parcel of China. The fierce debate spilled out into the breaks between 
sessions, but I also observed cold feet, a reluctance to go too far. What engendered the identity 
debate and what was the role of the border in this divided politics? And why did it occur now? 
In contrast to being fearful about ethnic talk—as I elaborated in the previous section, this 
conference displays the growing contention and emergence of “ethnic talk” generated by 
Korean Chinese.  
             Attempts to view Korean Chinese as a borderland ethnicity are not uncommon in 
Korean Chinese newspapers, magazines, and blogs. Much of the debate centered on vernacular 
theories, widely circulated in Korean Chinese society, that attempt to explain the in-between 
identity of Korean Chinese. The first is known as the “daughter-in-law” theory (myunrilon in 
Korean). It was coined by a famous Korean Chinese literary intellectual, Cheong Panryong, 
who viewed the situation of Korean Chinese as parallel to that of a newlywed woman. 
 220 
According to the assumptions of Confucian gender patriarchy, the daughter-in-law (Korean 
Chinese) must obey the rule of the husband’s family (China) and make a special effort to 
become a full family member. A common criticism of this theory is that it portrays Korean 
Chinese as a people without agency, mere subjects of the Chinese state. Another theory relies 
on the metaphor of “the apple-pear graft.” This is derived from an ethnic tale about a farmer, 
newly arrived in China from North Korea, who decided to graft the Korean apple onto the 
Chinese pear. The graft turned out to be a great success, creating a new, delicious fruit, the 
“apple-pear,” which combines the tastes of both its parent fruits. The fruit has become a 
popular symbol representing the doubleness of Korean Chinese, who have in effect grafted 
Korean culture upon that of China, as we have seen in the discussion of doubleness, hybridity 
and borderlands. 
           Yet, alongside these two metaphors that emphasize the dual characteristics of Korean 
Chinese culture runs another argument: that Korean Chinese should be considered neither as a 
diasporic group nor as an ethnic minority group. This position insists that Korean Chinese are 
“100 percent Korean Chinese” as a definite civic member and ethnic minority of China, not 
migrants caught between China and Korea (Huang 2007). The first two theories assume border-
ness as an essential part of Korean Chinese identity, whereas the last theory de-emphasizes and 
unmarks border-ness as an ethnic characteristic. What, then, constitutes the 100 percent? Why 
do some celebrate the unique in-between-ness of Korean Chinese as a border crossing ethnicity 
while others are reluctant to accept the idea? In what way do or do not this conversation relate 
to the discussion on diaspora—borderland and melancholic subjects—that I introduced in the 
previous section? Most importantly, in what respect is the border-ness of Korean Chinese 
different from that of other ethnic minorities in China’s border zones and territorial margins?  
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             To answer these questions, anthropological inquiries regarding ethnicity, minority, and 
migration which provide useful insights. Minorities are discussed as an ongoing product of 
“human artifice,” as people who are not born equal, but may become equal as members of a 
group (Bhabha 1994). Bhabha elaborates on the production of minorities as parallel to the 
production of stereotypes in a colonial context, the stereotype being a particular, fixed form of 
the colonial subject that drives and maintains colonial relations (Bhabha 1994: 112), making the 
other recognizable in a system of knowledge about the Orient constituted through continuous 
investment (Said 1979). Ethnicity, denoting both the peoplehood as well as the otherness of 
particular groups (Sollors 1995), has been a major factor in producing and fixing others within 
and beyond the nation state. Despite the flexibility and vagueness ingrained in the concept, 
ethnicity tends to be confined to “named human populations with shared ancestry myth, 
histories, and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” 
(Smith 2001). Also, ethnicity can function as both a term of exclusion, a clear boundary marker 
keeping out certain groups, and as a term of inclusion aimed at removing boundaries and 
discrimination against othered groups (Chow 2002:25). Nonetheless, the ambiguous definitions 
commonly presume ethnicity to define groups that share time and space and to mark 
distinctions between outsider and insider. But counter to the perspective that views “ethnicity 
as a group” runs another argument about “ethnicity without groups” (Brubaker 2004). Brubaker 
suggests that ethnicity does not merely mark out specific entities or groups, but should rather be 
understood as defining “group-ness” and “event” in “relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, 
and disaggregated terms” (2004:11). Ethnicity thus emerges not as an attribute of group identity 
bounded by biology, culture, and geography, but as a process of ethnicization, forming and 
reforming the “human artifice” that maintains practical inequality (Wallerstein 1991). 
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           The inequality entailed in the process of ethnicization is especially helpful for me in 
analyzing the political implication concerning the 56 ethno-national groups (minzu) scattered 
throughout China, a discourse informed by the theme of the nation as “a plural singularity” 
(Mullaney 2011). Anthropologists on Chinese ethnic minorities have emphasized the state’s role 
in constructing “ethnic culture” and “ethnic identity” as a consequence of the “backwardness” 
of remote zones (Dautcher 2009; Harrel 1995; Litzinger 2000; Mueggler 2001). Characterizing 
the Chinese politics of ethnic minority as a civilizing project, Harell argues that the Han 
Chinese-dominated central government has engendered an ethnic periphery with a “stigmatized 
identity” as backward, uncivilized, dirty, and stupid (Harrell 1995). The arbitrary and simplified 
category of ethnicity devised by the Communist state as a consequence of the ethnic 
classification project conducted in the 1950s ignores the complicated histories, cultures, and 
politics of ethnic groups and assimilates them under the rubric of “One China” (Harrel 1995; 
Friedman 2006; Litzinger 2000).  
            Drawing on critiques of the centralized governance of ethnic minorities, however, 
current scholarship attempts to dismantle the unitary notion of Han-dominated “Chinese 
culture,” creating a new understanding of “marginality” (Litzinger 2000; Schein 2000) in terms 
of location, politics, and subjectivity. Ethnic minorities are seen neither as outsiders with respect 
to a coherent Chinese culture, nor as necessarily subject to assimilation by Han Chinese 
(Mueggler 2001: 19). Ethnic minorities come into play as active agents that negotiate with the 
state, recover forgotten culture, and re-define their own subjectivity (Litzinger 1998). In this 
new era, anthropologists pay attention to the concept of identity as contingent production at 
specific historical and institutional sites (Hall 1996a), “writing against the culture (culture as a 
fixed and frozen entity)” (Abu-Lughod 1997), and thinking of culture as “cultural production,” 
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marked by the fixing of traits and the manufacturing of traditions to support and/or subvert 
power relations (Schein 2000: 13).  
            Cultural production, however, never remains purely cultural, but is rather deeply 
concerned with politics, especially when it comes to the issue of ethnic minorities in China. 
Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has begun, in the wake of economic reforms, to 
support the revival of the traditional cultures and rituals of ethnic minorities, recognizing 
cultural differences that were repressed during the Cultural Revolution. As part of a 
modernizing project, the state’s past mistakes have been tacitly admitted, and forgotten or 
repressed traditions and cultures of ethnic minorities have been recovered and recuperated 
through “memory work” (Litzinger 1998). The recognition of ethnic others by the Chinese 
Communist Party has given rise to more openly displayed cultural differences and an 
appreciation of the uniqueness of each ethnic group. Deployed in the form of colorful attire or 
song and dance, cultural difference becomes the subject of ethnic tourism, and Chinese ethnic 
harmony is exhibited under the ideal theme of “plural singularity.” Chinese ethnic minorities 
now take their place in the pageant of legitimate and official others that help constitute the long 
and grand history of China.  
            I take “the revival of the ethnic” (Litzinger 1998) as a key analytical turning point in 
understanding the new dynamics between ethnic others and the Chinese Communist Party, one 
that attempts to go beyond the simple dichotomy between domination and resistance, the 
center and periphery (Harrell 1995), or internal orientalism (Schein 2000). Despite the constant 
and strong presence of the state in the governance of ethnic minorities, ethnic others come to 
show up in the public and political domain as active agents who engage in deploying and 
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promoting would-be-proper ethnic elements and politics in order to define and redefine who 
they are and what they would like to be.  
            While my work sheds light on the politics of revival of the ethnic under the regime of 
economic reform, my interest is not in the way that Korean Chinese, as ethnic others, have 
negotiated with the state and performed the cultural politics of reviving a forgotten ethnic 
identity. Rather, I highlight the gradual shift in the ways that Korean Chinese invoke their 
ethnic in-between-ness in the context of economic reform (the Korean Wind). In addition, I 
unravel how they have endeavored to deploy and promote the assembled ethnic characteristics 
and associated ethnic values in an era that requires Chinese to capitalize on whatever values 
individuals can mobilize (see chapter 1). As in the debate that unfolded in the conference scene, 
introduced at the beginning of the section, many Korean Chinese end up discovering the 
specific uniqueness of Korean Chinese culture (minzu tese) in its border-ness or 
“unhomeliness,”(Bhabah 1994). Instead of simply refusing the forbidden tie to Korea, this 
border identity expressed in such terms—“daughter-in-law” and “apple-pear”—reflects the 
rooted ontological contradictions of a people who have lived as the most recent settler migrant 
ethnic group in China. At the same time, Korean Chinese overtly claim a strong loyalty to the 
state of China as full-fledged members of the Chinese state, by coining a term “100 percent 
Korean Chinese.” This is a stark contrast to other ethnic minorities who have lived in China for 
centuries and who have built strong claims to territory, religion, and political autonomy—for 
the sake of their cultural and political autonomy, as recently seen in the heated Tibet and 
Xinjiang ethnic conflicts.  
            My analysis is centered on the seemingly unambiguous politics built on this split and vigilant 
attitude; Korean Chinese have appropriated their border-ness as an economic means to 
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facilitate transnational migration to South Korea while displaying the political affiliation to the 
state of China as an ethnic survival tactic. Namely, the border identity is repressed at certain 
points but revived at others. Some people celebrate it while some others obscure or ignore it. 
Overall, Korean Chinese expressions of border-ness turn out to be volatile, hinging on 
extremely individual political and economic choices. The ongoing debate might be an attempt 
for Korean Chinese themselves to answer what it means to be Korean Chinese. In what follows, 
I pursue these questions, tracing the long trajectory of Korean Chinese border crossing over the 
last century. To do that, my ethnographic analysis relies on the narratives of five elderly Korean 
Chinese Communist Party members and their border-related memories; the repressed and 
revived ethic memory.  
5.3 Korean Chinese Vigilance 
5.3.1 Embodied Border Crossing 
            Regardless of the repressed in-between ethnicity, the theme of border crossing is deeply 
ingrained in the oral histories that I have heard and the Korean Chinese history books that I have 
collected, as I discussed in chapter 1.4 Usually, the stories reflect multiple experiences of moving, 
not only border crossing from the Korean peninsula to China, but also from Yanbian to other 
parts of Northeast China or beyond. Here, let me go back to the scene of the lunch meeting that 
Mr. Kim Chul organized, asking for the reassurance that I would keep things to myself. In fact, 
after the first meeting, I had four other meetings with the same party members over lunch, drinks, 
and picnics, chances for me to develop deeper understandings of border crossings and stories of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 <Common Sense of Korean Chinese History>, <The Traces of Korean Chinese>, <One Hundred Years of Korean Chinese 
History> , <Jilin Korean Chinese>, and multiple collections of local histories written by local historians (Yanji, 
Longjing, Tumen, Hualong, Wangqing, Hunchun). All were written in Korean, and published in Yanbian. 
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mobility. Of the five members, Mr. Moon’s story is unique and exemplary. Now in his late 
seventies, he is a retired technician who used to work for the local government of Longjing. Mr. 
Moon’s parents left impoverished lives under Japanese imperialism in Kyungsang province, 
South Korea, for a better life in Jilin province, Manchuria, in the 1920s. Mr. Moon was born in 
1933—two years after the Japanese had occupied Manchuria. While growing up, the young Mr. 
Moon had been tired of endless poverty and farm work. One day when he was a teenager, the 
Chinese military called for volunteers to participate in the Korean War in 1950, fighting on the 
side of North Korea. He knew he was too young to go to war. But he was not to be denied a 
place in the army. During the Korean War, his duties did not expose him to much danger: he was 
a courier. from one unit to another and did simple translation work from Chinese to Korean, or 
the other way around, in order to help the North Korean and Chinese armies communicate with 
each other. The Korean War, which was disastrous to both Koreas, ended in 1953. After the war, 
some Korean Chinese soldiers remained in North Korea to aid in the reconstruction effort, while 
others returned to China. Mr. Moon decided to go back to his hometown in China because he 
had fallen ill and could not engage in hard physical labor.  
             There, he again had to face poverty and farm work, even after the successful socialist 
revolution and its programs of land redistribution and collectivization. As poverty peaked during 
the Great Leap Forward and three-year natural disaster of the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
“running away to North Korea” became the fashion among young Korean Chinese in Yanbian. 
Like many of his contemporaries, Mr. Moon decided to run to North Korea. He recalled the 
moment in an excited voice. “Every day, I heard about more and more young people who had 
disappeared, secretly gone to North Korea. I made a plan with several friends of mine in town to 
go, since all of us were too sick to farm. I just ran away with my friends without telling my 
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parents. Back then, North Korea was considered much better off than China. I was very brave 
without thinking much of the future.” His life in North Korea, however, was not even close to 
what he had imagined. Mr. Moon was full of dreams of becoming a factory worker in the more 
industrially developed North Korea, since he hated being a farmer in the cold weather of 
Northeast China. But working at a factory in North Korea was completely different from his 
dreams. The work environment was rigid and the supervision was tight everywhere. There were 
no friends or networks that he could rely on for help. “I was lonely and isolated, as if I lived in a 
completely foreign country.” The unpleasant conditions made Mr. Moon run away back to Jilin 
province, his home in China. 
             On returning from North Korea, the savvy Mr. Moon easily got a job as a technician for 
the local government. During the Cultural Revolution he was able to evade the persecution on 
former “runaways” to North Korea. He was extra careful to keep his runaway experiences to 
himself. Later in the 1980s—the era of economic reform–Mr. Moon realized that his life was 
stable and better off because of the technical skills he possessed. He took frequent trips to larger 
cities when new machines needed importing or introducing to Yanbian. These trips made him 
aware of new trends earlier than other Korean Chinese of Yanbian, which was considered a 
backward ethnic border territory. “I opened my eyes earlier than other Korean Chinese because I 
met Han Chinese in Beijing and Shenyang, and learned new knowledge from them and delivered 
it to Yanbian,” he said.  
          After China and South Korea normalized diplomatic relations in 1992, Mr. Moon’s life 
faced a dramatic change when he reconnected with a long-lost uncle living in South Korea. 
Unlike the majority of Korean Chinese in Yanbian, whose kinship ties are to the current North 
Korea, Mr. Moon, whose parents moved from the southern part of the current South Korea, had 
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an easier time visiting his Korean relatives because of the family reunion program initiated by the 
Korean government. Making contact with his uncle allowed Mr. Moon to be invited to Korea, 
where he eventually overstayed his visa while working as a technician in a factory. He recalled his 
encounter with South Korea as follows:  
In China, we learned that South Korea was a poor capitalist enemy and a baby of the 
American empire. It was right after the Seoul Olympics when I first visited South 
Korea. It was much more developed and cleaner than I had imagined. I looked so small 
and shabby compared to South Koreans, who were wearing cleaner and more 
fashionable clothes. Working as a technician, I made much better money than in China. 
But I did not tell Koreans that I was from China. Because I speak the Kyungsang 
dialect, Koreans did not notice that I was Korean Chinese. I knew that I would have 
been discriminated against or looked down upon if I had told them I had come from 
poor socialist China. 
 
He deeply feared the consequences if his South Korean friends learned that he had fought for 
North Korea in the war. Aware of the strong anti-communist sentiment in South Korea, Mr. 
Moon tried very hard to avoid saying anything about his war-related experiences. After 
overstaying in South Korea for five years, Mr. Moon had made enough money to buy a new 
apartment in Yanbian. He felt too old to keep doing physical labor in Korea, and returned to 
China in 1998.  
           He told me he was happy, and proud of where he was. “I have a spacious house in the city 
of Longjing. I am paid a pension by the government. My son and daughter-in-law working in 
Korea send some money once in a while. My granddaughter goes to college in Korea. I have 
friends to drink with and I have a wife. My life is good in general.” He was proud of his son and 
daughter-in-law, whose hard work was getting recognition from their Korean bosses. “Now I’m 
just waiting for all our family to live back together in Yanbian again. I do not think that day will 
come, though.” After hearing Mr. Moon’s long personal history, the other old party members 
said with surprise, “We didn’t know you’d been around the world that much.” Mr. Moon 
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answered, “Since I didn’t want to arouse suspicions, I didn’t want to talk about my story—I used 
to work in South Korea, my parents were from South Korea, and so forth.”5  
            Let me pause from his long border-crossing story for a while. Here, I was especially 
fascinated, indeed stunned, by the long silence that Mr. Moon has kept regarding his multiple 
border crossing experiences—from South Korea to China, from China to North Korea and back 
to China, and again, from China to South Korea, and back to China. Melancholia and  
“unhomeliness” have always been a part of Mr. Moon’s identification process through his 
multiple border crossings. And yet, his border-ness is not simply constituted by these experiences 
(his actual migrations) and multiply ambiguous belongings to China and the two Koreas. Here, I 
highlight his repetitions and vigilant attitude while border crossing across countries and regimes 
according to each particular context in which he was situated. During the Cultural Revolution, he 
had to hide his experience as a runaway to North Korea. While working in South Korea, he was 
afraid of being scapegoated by the rampant Cold War mentality there, and acted as if he were a 
Korean who had never been to China, relying on his southern regional Korean accent. Back in 
China, he did not overtly trumpet his moneymaking sojourn in Korea, “just in case” it would 
cause trouble. He intended to make his in-between-ethnicity at once foregrounded and obscured, 
revived and suppressed. 
          But at the same time, Mr. Moon openly and proudly talked about his children’s choice to 
work in Korea (his son working in construction and his daughter-in-law serving as a waitress, 
jobs typical of Korean Chinese in Korea). He meant to depict their transnational labor migration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In fact, there are two groups of Korean Chinese, depending on whether their ancestors originated from North 
Korea or South Korea. Since Yanbian borders on North Korea, many Koreans moved from the northern part of 
Korea to Yanbian from the late 19th century. Later, under the Japanese occupation, many farmers moved from 
southern Korea to of the northern parts of Manchuria, where fewer previous Korean migrants occupied the 
farmlands. Thus, there is a rough regional division; Yanbian is to Korean migrants from northern Korea as the 
northern portions of Northeast China (Jilin and Heilongjiang) are to migrants from southern Korea (Lim 2000). 
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as a mere economic choice and an essential investment for a better future. Their border crossing 
emerges as an economic and apolitical gesture whereas his experiences carry a political implication 
that could burden and impact his life as a Communist Party member who belong to the 
generation of the Cultural Revolution. How can we understand Mr. Moon’s vigilant attitude and 
seemingly contradictory reaction to border crossing? What is the principle or intention behind 
this wariness about border crossing? In the next section, I articulate how Korean Chinese party 
members use forms of socialist political claims about who they are and what they should be like, 
both highlighting and obscuring their bordered and vigilant ethnicity. 
5.3.2 Becoming Korean “Chinese”  
            Mr. Kim Chul, who posed multiple reassurances at the beginning of the chapter, is a 
vibrant storyteller, good at spicing his narratives with emotional expressions and witty jokes. He 
is a member of the Association of Korean Chinese Writers and he has published several works of 
fiction and essays in the literary journal of Korean Chinese. Like his fictions and essays, his family 
stories are full of border crossing experiences. The history of his family follows the same general 
narrative contours that are so common in Korean Chinese history. His grandparents crossed the 
Tumen River from the northern part of the Korean peninsula in the late 19th century, and farmed 
in a border town of Yanbian. At that time, the border seemed to be more porous. People came 
and went back and forth between Chosun and China. His grandparents were traditional farmers 
who reclaimed the barren land of Yanbian. Like his parents and grandparents, Mr. Kim worked 
on the family farm as a child, but ran away from home to a nearby city because he badly wanted 
to go to school there. He went to middle school three years later than his friends of the same age. 
After graduating from middle school, he returned home to support his parents’ lives as poor 
peasants and farmers. Once again he escaped farming, this time seizing a chance to go into the 
 231 
Chinese military, which was considered a life-changing opportunity in China in the 1950s. His 
military career consisted largely of travelling, learning, and studying—including the Chinese 
language, which he did not speak fluently before he joined the military, having grown up in a 
purely Korean Chinese town. The military was deemed a prestigious and promising profession 
that would secure a stable future in China. But Mr. Kim realized that he would soon reach a limit 
for further promotion because of his Korean Chinese identity—as an ethnic minority he was 
marginalized in the Han Chinese-centered military. “I could not stand the Han cave [Korean 
Chinese use this term to mean any Han Chinese-dominated zone] anymore and decided to come 
back home. However good the job I did, all benefits accrued to the Han Chinese, who were the 
majority in the military and helped each other. Nobody dared to discriminate openly against me. 
But I felt the limits. It was still discrimination, just an unspoken kind.”  
           After returning home again, he got a special chance to enter college as a former soldier in 
1966. During the Cultural Revolution he participated as a Red Guard, and became a Communist 
Party member. His political engagement and military background got him assigned to a good 
position in the local government of Longjing, a city in Yanbian where the majority of residents 
are Korean Chinese. Whenever I heard this part of his story from Mr. Kim, it was clear that he 
wanted to demonstrate his overt pride in being a party member, and his faith in the Communist 
Party. As he told me, “We Korean Chinese have not lost our language and culture even after 
living in China for a century, all thanks to the greatness of the ethnic minority policy of the 
Chinese Communist Party. Thanks to this good policy, you and I can speak and become friends.”       
           Despite the confident sense of belonging that Mr. Kim presented as a proud and faithful 
Chinese national and Communist Party loyalist, the issue of belonging has historically been a 
topic of contention amongst most Korean Chinese, as I repeated. Here, let me take readers back 
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to the lunch scene where I discussed the question of belonging with the Communist Party 
members. In contrast to Mr. Moon, whose ancestors moved from the southern part of the 
Korean peninsula (namdoqi, meaning to come from the south in Korean), a majority of Yanbian 
Korean Chinese, such as Mr. Kim’s grandparents, did cross the Tumen River from northern 
Korea (bukdoqi, coming from the north in Korean). These bukdoqi expressed a vague emotional 
attachment to North Korea, and often recalled the exact name and location of the “hometown” 
their parents had left seventy or eighty years before. I asked these elderly men how they could 
possibly remember these things. They answered that they had been required to use their northern 
Korean addresses in official documents and situations, such as elementary school. The habit 
continued until 1957—which was the year that the Communist Party started to emphasize the 
idea of China as “home country” of Korean Chinese—not Korea, but China. Before the 
establishment of the new Chinese state in 1949, ethnic Koreans were ambiguously considered 
Korean residents living in China, without a specific national citizenship. From 1957 on, however, 
the new ideological education forced Korean Chinese to define China as their home country. 
Now Korean Chinese had to obey only one country—Communist China—thereby becoming 
Korean “Chinese,” not “Korean” Chinese—that is, Chinese nationals with Korean ethnicity. The 
idea of “home country” was reinforced in stricter ways during the Cultural Revolution. Any tie to 
a foreign country could lead one to be accused as a “spy.”  
          During this period, many renowned Korean Chinese scientists and scholars defected to 
North Korea. It was not only because North Korea welcomed these people to the homeland, but 
also because Korean Chinese suffered random political persecution just on the basis of ethnicity. 
As ethnic others they were deemed to be potential spies for either North or South Korea. In the 
midst of political turmoil of these years, ties to South Korea—a capitalist enemy—were especially 
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used as critical evidence to justify political persecution as a capitalist. To most Korean Chinese 
who lived through the Cultural Revolution, South Korea was a source of fear of persecution and 
death. Either overt or exaggerated declarations of “anti-capitalist” or “anti-South Korean” 
sentiments were often the way to protect oneself from arbitrary repression. Due to their in-
between-ethnic background, most Korean Chinese maintained this particular structure of vigilant 
feeling, forged under the danger of “life and death” during the Cultural Revolution.        
           I carefully asked them to recall memories and experiences of the Cultural Revolution that 
required them to repress their border crossing identity and rather emphasize their full 
Chineseness. The old party members showed a bit of hesitation. They were not sure how to 
assess this political event and how to situate their relationship to South Korea and South Koreans, 
including me, even given the popularity of the Korean Wind. To end the awkward silence, I 
changed the subject, asking whether they had ever been to Korea. Out of five at the table, 
including Mr. Kim, three had been to Korea while two had not. Mr. An—who had previously 
worked in the Longjing police department—admired the cleanness and civil manner of Koreans 
in Seoul when he visited there. His son had been working in Korea for more than a decade and 
sent money back to China. After An spoke, Mr. Oh—a retired middle school teacher—proudly 
responded, “I heard that there is nothing to see in Korea. It is such a tiny country. Everybody is 
crazy about work-work. I have never been to Korea. And I don’t want to go, either. Look at the 
greatness of China—the economic achievement. The Communist Party is developing the welfare 
of the people. I would rather travel in China than go to Korea.” Mr. Kim argued with him a bit. 
“Mr. Oh, the greatness of the Chinese Communist Party is undeniable. But it is worth trying to 
go to Korea, at least once. However much we hate Koreans or South Korea, it is more developed 
than China in some parts. There is something we can learn from them. Also, aren’t we the same 
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ethnic people?”  Mr. Lee—formerly the principal of a middle school in Longjing—kept silent 
through the discussion. I asked him whether there was a special reason for him not to visit Korea. 
He said, “I’ve had several opportunities to go there. My work unit organized a trip. It was in the 
early 1990s at a beginning stage of the Korean Wind (Hankuk Baram) and not so many people had 
been to Korea yet. I wanted to go. But I was worried. What if I were persecuted after I came 
back? I didn’t want to lose my position and political power at that time. So I decided never to go 
to Korea. I just watch Korean TV and read their newspapers.”  
          This conversation allowed me to realize that these party members have hesitated as well as 
repressed to answer questions of belonging or identity because the identity question is related to 
life and death. In addition, it inspired me to rethink the locus of the two Koreas (North and 
South) with Korean Chinese, especially South Korea, a country constructed and imagined as an 
“enemy homeland” throughout the Cold War. South Korea was once a source of fear because 
any minimal tie resulted in harsh persecution. These particular anxieties, structured through the 
Cold War and the Cultural Revolution, have inhibited Korean Chinese from developing any 
political discussion and engagement beyond the advocacy of socialism. Any sense of ethnic 
and/or kinship attachment to South Korea was forbidden for decades. Thirty years later, 
however, South Korea has re-emerged as a source of modernity and a land of opportunity for a 
half million Korean Chinese, who have persistently pursued the Korean Dream in search of a 
better future.  
          The contradiction is that the old fears have not fully disappeared, but persist in the 
memories, habits, and feelings of these aging party members. For the most part, they criticized 
Korea, portraying it as a disorganized, disordered, or too-democratic country, as opposed to 
China, which they saw as an organized, ordered, and legitimately authoritarian country. They also 
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stay mostly reluctant to visit Korea due to the emotional vestiges of Cold War politics. On the 
other hand, these party members’ sons and daughters have been working in Korea—the previous 
enemy —and sending money back to China to support their families, including the officially anti-
Korean party members themselves. In the next section, I further explore the ways in which these 
Korean Chinese party members situate their vigilant ethnicity in a setting of transnational 
migration. My focus is on the oscillation; they dismiss Korean ethnicity as a political term while at 
the same time, they are more accepting of Korean ethnicity as an economic term.  
5.3.3 Seemingly Unambiguous   
          Let me go back to the confident and overt sense of belonging exhibited by Mr. Kim. 
Sometimes, Mr. Kim confused me by changing his logic and words in accordance with the 
circumstances. Whenever he introduced me to other party members, he told them, “This Korean 
lady wants to know what good Chinese policies have driven the quick economic development of 
China and how Korean Chinese enjoy benefits from the Communist Party.” In the presence of 
others Mr. Kim loudly ascribed Chinese economic development, or, more precisely, Yanbian’s 
development solely to the successful execution of economic policy by the Communist Party. 
However, when Mr. Kim was talking only with me in person, he emphasized the essential role of 
remittances sent from Korean Chinese migrant workers in Korea. The two versions of his 
attitude toward Yanbian’s development triggered my confusion.  
           We spent a great deal of time in sharing family and personal stories. His biography was 
another one full of mobility. I knew that his wife went to Seoul to work as a waitress in order to 
pay off the debt incurred by the purchase of their house. As a government officer, he could not 
make enough money to catch up to the new trend of purchasing of new apartments and 
obtaining expensive educations for his children and grandchildren. His wife’s trip to Korea was 
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essential, although he was sad and disheartened about letting her go to Korea. Mr. Kim also told 
me that both of his sons worked in Korea. He was proud of what he said was the high regard in 
which they were held by their Korean bosses. His younger son was still working in Korea when I 
knew Mr. Kim, and had made decent economic progress. But the older son, an undocumented 
worker, had been deported back to China. After his son returned, the son’s wife—Mr. Kim’s 
daughter-in-law—went to Korea herself so as to support the soaring cost of living and school 
tuition for their twin children. Overall, Mr. Kim’s family has deeply relied on remittances from 
Korea.   
           Despite the important role of remittances in his family economy, Mr. Kim has never 
overtly approved of them, at least to me. “The reason I had to send my wife, sons, and daughter-
in-law to Korea to make money is not because we are poor Korean Chinese, but because my 
family wants to have a bit better life in a faster time.” I asked him if he has ever thought of going 
to Korea to make money. He responded, “No. I have never thought of going to Korea to make 
money myself because I have a good position in China and get good benefits and a pension as a 
well-positioned Communist Party member. If I go to Korea to make money, that would not look 
good. Also, I would have lost my benefits if I had quit before I retired. I need to be the one who 
keeps up our social position in China while other family members have gone to work.” Instead of 
Mr. Kim going to Korea, his wife undertook the harsh burden of labor in Korea and contributing 
to the family’s economic betterment. Also, he wanted to be the core binding force at home, 
where his wife and his children would eventually return.  
            On his own family’s transnational migration, Mr. Kim’s position remains constant—
going to Korea is a mere economic activity. Since economic reform in China and, in particular, 
political normalization with South Korea in 1992, the revival of the border crossing ethnicity 
 237 
amongst Korean Chinese has been actively and even aggressively promoted in conjunction with 
the boom in transnational migration. By his account, all of Mr. Kim’s family members went to 
Korea through illegal brokers and stayed undocumented for years, whereas Mr. Kim remained 
politically stable and faithful to the state of China and the Communist Party in the midst of the 
rampant Korean dream. Not only Mr. Kim’s relatives but also numerous Korean Chinese 
individuals and families have re-discovered and mobilized the specific value of ethnicity in the 
new era of border crossing. They have marketed themselves to Korean employers as cheap 
migrant labor that nevertheless speaks the same language, eats similar kinds of food, and shares 
certain cultural characteristics. The ethnic uniqueness of Korean Chinese (minzu tese) has been 
described as almost Korean but not quite—and this is the very competitive value that has enabled 
Korean Chinese workers to march into the Korean labor market.  
            I do not mean, however, to suggest that Korean Chinese have faced an especially sharp 
shift from the era of repressed ethnicity to that of revived ethnicity in the age of economic 
reform. Mr. Kim’s narrative, rather, highlights the oscillation between repressed and revived 
ethnicity as seen in contradictory circumstances; Mr. Kim remained confident in and faithful to 
the communist state of China (obscuring Korean Chinese ethnicity) while his family members 
relied on and mobilized the ethnicity as a means to join the transnational migration in the name 
of economic advancement. I have argued that the repression and revival of ethnicity should be 
construed not as two separated moments, or as politically antithetical. They are, instead, a 
concocted effect deeply ingrained in everyday life as an implicit support mechanism for 
transnational migration between China and South Korea. Let me go back to the question raised 
at the meeting, what really constitutes 100 percent Korean Chinese? The partial answer might be 
vigilance and oscillation regarding their in-between-belonging despite the overt association with 
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the state of China. At the intersection of deep-rooted historical traumas with the Korean Wind, the 
ethnicity that was once forcefully hidden and repressed now appears and disappears, is 
foregrounded and obscured in conjunction with political context and economic opportunities. 
5.4 Conclusion 
           Converging to and diverging from the discussion on borderland and melancholia, 
hybridity and unhomeliness, this chapter has pushed further my ethnographic observation of 
the development of a seemingly unambiguous Korean Chinese identity/ethnic politics at the 
intersection of post-Cold War circumstances and post-socialist politics. I focus on the vigilant 
attitude of the Korean Chinese party members who oscillate between China and Korea, 
socialism and capitalism, politics and economics, examining what lies beneath the seemingly 
unambiguous ethnic politics. I have argued that the Korean Wind has prompted Korean Chinese 
to redefine their ethnic subjectivity and re-characterize what it means to be Korean “Chinese.” I 
also suggest that the intensified unambiguous attitude is a political artifact that the Communist 
Party members have nurtured, living as an ethnic minority on the Chinese border alongside the 
two Koreas. Instead of dismissing the diasporic affect, such as border affect and melancholia 
(those who cannot let the lost one go), I have underscored Korean Chinese had to let the lost 
one (homeland or kinship tie) go as a way to survive political turmoil and random persecution 
in modern China. The suppressed trauma and the “loss” of ethnic/familial ties, however, 
remain preserved as a major part of the self-identification of Korean Chinese as a vigilant 
ethnicity; it is repressed as well as revived as a seemingly unambiguous politics. 
            To this final suggestion I add a concluding anecdote; my encounter with a Communist 
Party member, Mr. Pi, who kept his silence throughout the lunch meeting, which went for about 
four hours. When we left and walked to the bus stop together, Mr. Pi broke his silence. “It was 
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very nice to meet you,” he carefully said. “You are the first Korean—the first foreigner—I have 
talked to in my life. My father was a scientist who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. He 
was accused of being a capitalist and killed during the Cultural Revolution. My brother, a scientist, 
too, was falsely persecuted as a spy for North Korea after my father died. Our family was 
completely torn apart. All of my siblings and my mother became impoverished. Although 
everybody is gone to South Korea nowadays, almost as if it is our real home, I could never dream 
of going there. Now I feel that I live in a better world since I’ve met and eaten with a Korean girl.”  
Mr. Pi’s voice trembled as he spoke to me, the first Korean he had ever met in person.  I 
was at loss, having tears in my eyes again. Also, I was truly deeply moved by the fact that he had 
approached me and confessed a traumatic family history. At the same time, his testimony felt 
uncanny to hear during a time when a half million Korean Chinese regularly travel back and forth 
between China and Korea—freely and frequently. Most of all, we live in an era when a majority 
of Korean Chinese households rely heavily on remittances sent from Korean Chinese working in 
South Korea. How can we make sense of the odd moment of socialism that these party members 
were situated in? The Cold War legacy still haunts the party members, who impose vigilance 
while at the same time a post-socialist China elevates the confidence and pride of being Chinese. 
The seemingly unambiguous politics that Korean Chinese party members posed has been 
complicated and exacerbated in the wake of the rise of China. Now, my focus moves on to 
Korean Chinese caught between two dreams: between the Korean dream and the Chinese dream.  
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Chapter 6. Between Two Dreams: 
From Dagong (Laborer) to Laoban  (Entrepreneur) 
               
           I revisited Yanbian for follow-up research in July 2011. On my arrival, I found that 
Yanji had undergone remarkable changes in the year and a half since I had last been there. The 
city looked cleaner and more packed with high-rise buildings. Moreover, as I travelled by taxi 
from the airport (on the outskirts of Yanji) to downtown, I saw many ongoing construction 
projects: the paving of new roads, the extension of major thoroughfares, and renovations to 
the main bridge (called Henanqiao) that connects the southern and northern parts of the city. 
The ubiquitous construction, along with an obvious increase in private car ownership, 
prevented the smooth flow of traffic. Such changes were not entirely unexpected; many 
Korean Chinese migrants had recently told me, in their emails and phone conversations (while 
I was in the US), about their own confusion at the dramatic recent changes in Yanbian. They 
could not find the place where they used to live; the cost of living had skyrocketed; levels of 
consumption had risen to bewildering levels The transformed Yanbian, bears witness to a new 
urban landscape, produced by Chinese economic growth mixed with remittance development 
(as I have laid out in previous chapters). 
             This chapter sets out to document the moment of the Post-Korean Wind, by catching 
the emerging hopes and frustrations, anxieties and regrets concealed behind the rosy scenes of 
economic development. My particular ethnographic focus is on the widely circulated 
reevaluation and rethinking of the gust of Korean Wind that has swept over individuals, families, 
and Yanbian society in general. Some migrants believe that they have achieved the Korean 
dream while some do not. Some are still pursuing the dream while others are done with that. 
Some missing their time in Korea while others loathed the memory, as captured in  
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Photo 11. Newly High Rising Buildings in Yanji. By June Hee Kwon (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
Photo 12. Traffic Jam in Yanji. By June Hee Kwon(2011) 
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Photo 13. The Road Under Construction in Yanji. By June Hee Kwon (2011) 
 
	  
Photo 14. The Coexistence of the Old Houses with the New Partments. By June Hee Kwon 
(2009) 
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the popular saying, “I would not even pee toward the Korea side.” Korean Chinese migrants 
do not celebrate the Korean dream as they did a decade ago. They have started critically 
evaluating and reflecting on what they have done, what they should (or should not) have done, 
and what they will do with respect to the Korean Wind, now and in the future.  
            A common notion has emerged from these narratives of re-evaluation—that those 
who did not go to Korea have become much better off than those who did. This widely 
spoken sentiment implies that mobility signifies lack whereas immobility is a marker of 
economic affluence and social stability.1 The emerging discourse contains a cautionary element; 
it encourages Korean Chinese not to move any more, but to settle in China. Local newspapers 
and Korean Chinese blogs have advertised and celebrated the stories of those who have 
achieved great businesses successes without going to Korea. These “stay-at-home” 
entrepreneurs offer public lectures and attend social meetings to share their experiences and 
know-how. Particularly popular are the stories of those who have made a dramatic life change 
from rural farming to owning restaurants, karaoke bars, massage parlors, clothing stores, and 
so forth. The media does celebrate the clever use of skills acquired by migrants in Korea, 
where they worked as dagong (physical laborers). But the obvious message in this coverage is 
that Korean Chinese should stop working under Korean capital as dagong, as that does not have 
a promising future. They should instead become entrepreneurs and bosses themselves, and 
manage their own money, businesses, and futures.  Through numerous classes and social 
gatherings, Yanbian’s new discourse of entrepreneurship channels ideas and methods of self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Postsocialist studies have examined the social changes about the privatization of the market economy and the 
making of new kinds of person and class subjects (Dunn 2004; Rivkin-Fish 2009). Li Zhang focuses on the 
“spatialization of class” by looking into the emerging middle class and their Hhousing/consuming practice in 
Kunming, China; homeownership and spatial reordering have risen as a contentious domain of class tension 
(2010). In Yanbian, the long embedded transnational mobility has constituted a certain personhood. As my 
ethnography elaborates, mobility has become a symbol of lack in cultural and social capital whereas immobility 
represents the economic stability.  
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development and self-improvement into a comprehensive program, a kind of government of 
the self, for ambitious individuals.  
               I take this social urge for a government of the self as one of the main characteristics 
of the current phase, what I call the “Post-Korean Wind.” I treat the Post-Korean Wind, not as a 
linear phase separated from the moment of the Korean Wind, but as a liminal social landscape 
in flux. I explore the time and space of the Post-Korean Wind in two ways. First, I shed light on 
the shifting meaning of mobility in Yanbian. Constant mobility has been a condition of life for 
the majority of Korean Chinese—nationally and transnationally—in the wake of China’s 
economic reforms, as I have elaborated throughout this dissertation. And yet, as China has 
gained status as a global economic power, immobility has increasingly come to symbolize 
affluence and stability—although it can certainly still signify the condition of being stuck or 
left behind. But there is an emerging contention and competition about the concept of mobile 
life. Second, alongside the increasing celebration of immobility, the majority of Korean 
Chinese (migrants) still have to move back and forth.  They are not able to cut off the circuit of 
migration between China and Korea. Despite a wish to keep still, to settle down, many 
migrants believe that it is too late to join the Chinese economic boom, to “catch up” to those 
who have gotten ahead of them. In addition, these migrants, who have gradually become 
transnational working class subjects over the last two decades by working in Korea, are 
convinced that physical labor, based on the body as the only means of production (see chapter 
4), is properly appreciated in Korea, but not in China.  
           Looking behind the scenes of Chinese development and the new Yanbian discourse of 
the government of the self, I argue that the Post-Korean Wind is a critical moment in which 
tensions escalate between the competing modernities of the Korean dream and the Chinese 
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dream. The Korean Wind is being rapidly re-characterized as an outdated fashion receding 
before the strong global influence of the Chinese economy. This chapter captures the futurity 
arising from this new juncture of Korean Chinese culture and the Chinese state. I also try not 
to dismiss the depression and dejection with which some Korean Chinese migrants and 
returnees have greeted the tensions between these two dreams.  
6.1 Homo economicus : Be Entrepreneurs (Laoban), Not Workers (Dagong)! 
              In the social landscape of remittance development, returnees who become wealthy 
after working in Korea for years have often gotten special attention. They appear in Korean 
Chinese newspapers as successful role models who have changed their destinies by pursuing 
the Korean dream. The media celebrate the expertise as well as the frontier spirit of these 
new entrepreneurs, characterizing them as ethnic heroes. All these celebrations have spurred 
a local re-evaluation of the Korean Wind, an emigration that began simply as a means of 
getting ahead. But criticism of the returnees has gradually mounted. In these accounts, most 
Korean Chinese returnees spent their time in Korea as physical laborers without developing 
special marketable skills that could help them create their own business upon return to China. 
Therefore, after returning to China, these migrants are unemployable, unable to compete in 
the new Chinese job market. In addition, since these migrants/returnees tend not to belong 
to any “work unit” (danwei) in China, they are not eligible for pensions offered by the state. 
Consequently, whenever the money earned in Korea runs out, migrants/returnees must 
repeatedly return to Korea as dagong (physical workers). These repetitive return trips to Korea 
have become, not a backup plan, but a way of life for certain groups. Well-off Korean 
Chinese tend to look down upon this “floating population,” whose work in Korea 
stigmatizes them as “lower” or working class. 
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          Moreover, newspapers and Korean Chinese intellectuals have warned that the trip to 
Korea is a shortsighted decision, an inadequate plan for the long-term future. Once they 
become dagong in Korea, these migrants must keep going back to Korea and face losing their 
social networks or guanxi2 and social positions in China. While working as manual laborers in 
Korea for long periods, it is claimed, these migrants are unable to make any progress in self-
improvement and become stuck in low-income positions, without access to the current 
economic expansion in China; they seem to be trapped within the circuit of migration. The 
creation of a permanent, Korean Chinese ethnic working class in Korea has aggravated the 
Korean Chinese subordination to Korea, Koreans, and Korean capital.3 Korean Chinese 
mass media and opinion leaders have encouraged migrants to cut off their dependence on 
Korean capital, urging them to follow a new direction—“Be laoban. Stop being dagong.”  This 
discourse challenges Korean Chinese to learn new skills and technologies when they return 
from Korea and to enhance their suzhi, or civilized manners and “human quality” (Anagnost 
2004; Yan 2009). The new belief is that Korean Chinese migrants should stop being 
exploited by Korean capital, but rather create their own businesses and increase their labor 
value in up-and-coming China.  
            In order to survive China’s privatization, Korean Chinese have construed 
transnational migration as a way to be responsible for the self. The encouragement of 
entrepreneurship, however, has gradually replaced the mobility that had previously been 
considered the best, or only, life choice for those Korean Chinese who would like to get 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mayfair Meihui Yang (1994) introduced the term “guanxi” to describe a relationship between objects, forces, or 
persons. Once guanxi is established between two people, each can ask a favor of the other with the expectation 
that the debt incurred will be repaid sometime in the future. 
 
3 Many Korean Chinese migrants have testified to the harsh discrimination of Koreans toward Korean Chinese. 
One Korean Chinese waitress asked, “How come they treat fellow Koreans in this bad way? But what can I do 
besides put up with this treatment? Making money is not easy.” Discrimination has been internalized and 
naturalized as an inevitable part of the Korean dream.	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ahead. In unraveling the emerging subjectivity of laoban (entrepreneur), the concept of homo 
economicus is a useful analytical guide to understanding Post-Korean Wind Yanbian. Homo 
economicus refers to those who endlessly pursue their own interest, responding systematically 
to modifications in the variables of the environment (Foucault 2008; Dilts 2011).4 The later 
Foucault viewed Homo economicus as the epitome of American neoliberalism, symbolizing an 
entrepreneurship of the self-realized through the interface of government and the individual 
(Foucault 2008: 252-3).5 In this argument, “government”6 concerns not only practices of 
government of the other, but also practices of the self, the practices that try to shape and 
mobilize through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants, and lifestyles of individuals 
and groups (Dean 1999:12). Governing people is not to force people to do what the 
governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts 
between techniques which assumes coercion and processes through which the self is constructed 
or modified by himself”(Foucault 1993: 203-4; the emphasis is mine). Here, Foucault 
characterizes the production of an autonomous and self-regulating subjectivity as a key to 
government of the self; that is, an action of the “self on self” (Dean 1999; Miller & Rose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Later Foucault became interested in the Chicago School’s human capital theory and the notion of homo 
economicus: “Human capital analysis starts with the assumption that individuals decide on their education, 
training, medical care, and other additions to knowledge and health by weighing the benefits and costs. Benefits 
include cultural and other non-monetary gains along with improvement in earnings and occupations, while 
costs usually depend mainly on the foregone value of the time spent on these investment” (Foucault 1993: 43; 
Dilts 2011: 7).  
 
	  	  	  5  In Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey is critical of the ideal of “freedom” that is fundamental to 
neoliberalism; free market, freedom from the state intervention, free consumers, and free to exploit one’s 
fellow(2005). I am aware of the lack of critical perspective of “freedom” assumed in capitalism/neoliberalism in 
Foucault’s discussion. Foucault does not directly engage in the debate on class dynamic and struggles that have 
emerged in neoliberalism, while focusing on the reproduction of the particular neolibreral/free subjects.  
 
6 Governmentality as an art of government has been defined as the “disposition of men and things,” “the 
conduct of conduct” (Foucault 1991), and “government at a distance” (Barry & Osborne & Rose 1996), and 
has animated discussions of poverty and welfare, social insurance and risk, health and education, and 
population and development. In this chapter, I focus more on the government of the self than the government 
of others or biopolitics that targets abstract populations (as I have elaborated in the Introduction).  
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1990: 26-28). Yet Foucault sees the government of the self as more than a simple investment 
for economic gain or reward, and furthers an ethical question: the government of the self is a 
practice that is explicitly self-conscious of its status as forging the self in relation to existing 
rules of conduct or styles of existence.  
            The government of the self has been contextualized by China scholars in the post-
socialist setting of modern China, providing a better understanding of self-responsible post-
socialist subjects.7 These studies show that the governing process is concrete but gradual, 
aiming to inscribe new attitudes of market logic onto bodies long habituated to what is 
represented as a rigid, state-centered socialism, eventually creating a new person altered by 
contact with ongoing dramatic changes in world capitalism (Dunn 2004; Hoffman 2010). 
Ethnographies on China, in particular, investigate a sort of neoliberal governmentality 
closely tied to the complex of Communist party-state-market, or “neoliberalism with Chinese 
characteristics” (Wang 2006; Rofel 2007). The complex of state-market-party produces a 
self-governed subject, not only by the application of external power, but also by self-
management. Suzhi especially emerges as a key discussion point in looking at the new 
working bodies fashioned to serve China as a world factory. Market requirements 
“individuate the body” to fit into the arrangement of machinery for efficient production in 
the factory (Ngai 2005); bodies must internalize work habits and a new sense of time, 
institutionalizing everyday life. The controlling logic modifies unruly peasants, remakes 
deficient and lazy bodies into cheap and docile ones, and generally requires the improvement 
of workers’ Suzhi (Yan 2009). The government of the self embraces the idea of self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  7 In Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics, Stephen Collier points out one of characteristics of 
economic reforms in the Post Soviet is to aim “responsibilize” citizens, “not just as subjects of need but as 
sovereign consumers making calculitive choices based on indnvidiual preferences”(2011:8). The gradual inscription 
of the sense of responsibility is parallel to the discussion on “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristic.”  
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improvement and economic betterment, as an ethical project that market subject should 
internalize and habituate.  
             The concept of Suzhi frequently comes up in ordinary conversations with Korean 
Chinese. Most Korean Chinese, whether migrants or not, believe that self-transformation 
and self-modification is key to surviving China today. The rampant pursuit of “money-
money” deserves moral criticism as a symptom of the “contamination of capitalism,” while 
at the same time it is widely accepted and practiced as a normative life choice. I view homo 
economicus not only as a collection of essential attributes for economic gain as a marketable 
subject, but also as an ethical aspiration, to be attained by improving one’s self-knowledge 
and acquiring sophisticated social manners to become a “civil” and “cultural” subject. While 
exploring the social imperative to become an entrepreneur as well as the failure of many 
returnees to become part of the new rising China, my analysis shows the hope and 
frustration surrounding Suzhi improvement—a crucial life project, an attempt to overcome 
the social limits of uneducated farmers and laid-off factory workers. In addition, two 
groups—those who have gone to Korea and those who have not—tend to develop different 
understandings of what it means to have good Suzhi. Exploring the social imperative for self-
improvement, I suggest that it reduces social disparities and hierarchies into “personal 
problems.” This makes people believe that the tireless individual effort will enable them to 
correct their vulnerable life condition—to change their fate.  
6.2 After the Korean Dream 
6.2.1 Long Detour 
          On a hot sunny day in August 2008, I happened to drop by a used bookstore near 
downtown Yanji, packed with books published not only in Yanbian but also in North Korea. 
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When I walked in, Mr. Guo, the owner (in his mid thirties at the time), was following the 
stock exchange in one window on his computer, chatting with a girl through a webcam on 
another, and watching for shoplifters on his surveillance camera. He noticed I was a 
“Korean customer” to whom he could sell rare books at a higher price than usual, and 
started bringing books out from the back to show me.  We fell into conversation. Mr. Guo 
had returned from Korea several months before after having worked there with his parents 
for the past ten years. Like other Korean Chinese, he had followed the “Korean dream.” 
During his ten-year absence, however, economic conditions had improved dramatically in 
China, and he found himself having a hard time “catching up” with other Chinese when he 
came back. But he was still very upbeat about his growing business. “You should know that 
these books are very rare and precious in Yanbian. I invested a lot of money that I earned in 
Korea to buy these old books. I also travel wherever I can to find them.” Giving me his 
business card, he asked me to tell others, especially other Koreans, about his bookstore. He 
also handed me the business card of his mother’s fortune-telling business right next door. 
“My mom is very good at fortune telling. Would you like your fortune told?” I answered, 
“Why not?”  
*                 *               * 
            Guo’s family moved to Yanji from a remot farming town in Heilongjiang in the early 
1990s. Guo’s mother (I will call her Aunt Kim) and his father, who grew up in a pure 
Korean Chinese ethnic town and only had an elementary school education, do not speak 
Chinese fluently. They left their hometown, a “Han cave,” for Yanbian because they wanted 
to feel at home surrounded by Korean Chinese people. But Yanbian differed from their 
preconceived expectations. In spite of the Korean Chinese ethnicity they shared with the 
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people of Yanji, Aunt Kim felt lonelier because she was treated as a stranger or outsider 
(waidiren). They did not have any networks of friends or relatives in their new home. In 
Heilongjiang, the small Korean Chinese community was supportive and warm-hearted 
because Korean Chinese were a small ethnic group in a Han Chinese world. In Yanbian, 
however, Korean Chinese were everywhere, competing with each other. Aunt Kim felt that 
Yanbian people were too savvy and selfish and thus, hard to befriend. However, as lonely 
she felt in Yanbian, Aunt Kim knew that Yanbian was a much better place for her to start 
her hair salon business.  
            While her business in Yanbian was becoming stable in the early 1990s, Aunt Kim 
heard many rumors of Korean Chinese who went to Korea for family visits and brought 
Chinese medicine to sell there, earning a decent amount of money in a short period of time. 
The thought of making a trip to Korea piqued Aunt Kim’s interest. When the Korean dream 
peaked in the late 1990s, many Korean Chinese moved to bigger cities in China as well as 
South Korea. As a consequence, the “migration business” that illegally smuggled Korean 
Chinese or arranged fake marriages for them was dramatically growing. The massive 
emigration resulted in a sharp decrease in the Korean Chinese population that furnished 
most of Aunt Kim’s clients. The beauty salon still earned her a decent living, but Aunt Kim 
felt unsatisfied. One day a broker who arranged trips to Korea visited her salon. Aunt Kim 
was thrilled by this encounter.  
Of course, it was all illegal, I knew. He asked me if I wanted to join his business or 
not. Since I had many customers coming and going, I could introduce them to the 
broker. That was his idea. By doing that, in fact, I made fair amount of money. On 
the one hand, I ran my beauty salon. On the other hand, I was working with the 
broker. I was a so-called “baby-broker”(saeggi broker who manages the trafficking). 
But one night I asked myself, why don’t I go? I started preparing the trip first for 
my husband and my son. The broker helped us, and thus it happened easily. After 
they successfully got to Korea through the broker, I closed my business and 
followed them within a year. Since I knew the broker personally, I did not have to 
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pay as much money as others. I thought meeting him was the luckiest thing that 
happened in my life. I was so bold and brave, when I think about it now.  
  
For the first couple of years, she worked as a waitress in Korean restaurants, like many other 
middle-aged Korean Chinese women. The labor was demanding, but she was making much 
more money than she had made running her beauty salon in China. Her skillful husband did 
not have difficulty finding a job in Korea. Her son was so popular with his Korean bosses 
that they rewarded him with a higher wage than other Korean Chinese workers. The Korean 
dream was coming true for her family; they became more and more prosperous. According 
to Aunt Kim, Korea was a very competitive and tiring place to be, and yet there was always 
the promise of earning more money through hard work. In fact, Aunt Kim felt more at 
home in Korea than in China. She adapted to Korean ways and enjoyed being free to speak 
Korean with other Koreans. She viewed Korea, and in particular Seoul, as cleaner, more 
organized, and more convenient than China. She thought that Koreans were better 
mannered and more civilized than the Chinese. She was so satisfied with life in Korea that 
she was able to forgive the hard labor and exhausting lifestyle. Most of all, her growing 
material prosperity made her want to stay in Korea longer and longer, in spite of her family 
being undocumented.  
  Everything seemed to be going well until Aunt Kim seriously injured her back. 
Unable to perform physical labor any longer, she learned how to tell fortunes on the basis of 
one’s date and time of birth. She was excited about her new career prospects.  
I started telling fortunes in the street in front of a subway station when I was in 
Seoul. Many random people came to ask me about their life issues. Also, many 
Korean youngsters dropped by just to have fun, hearing about their futures and luck. 
The business was going great and I was really enjoying making good money. But 
when the global financial crisis affected the Korean economy in 2008, business 
slowed down. And the value of Korean money was going down, too. The Korean 
currency was devalued by half against the Chinese yuan. That is why we suddenly 
decided to leave Korea. We were afraid. We thought, if we stayed longer in Korea, 
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we would lose more money. As soon as we decided to leave, we packed and came 
back to China. 
 
In fact it was her son, Guo, who most strongly insisted that they should go back. to China. 
He had become sick of doing simple and tiring physical work in Korea. In addition, Guo 
believed that he could not marry if he stayed any longer in Korea. He thought that Korean 
women would not marry Korean Chinese men, and it would be hard for him to find a 
Korean Chinese woman in Korea. He wanted to start a new life in China, by opening his 
own business and finding a young Korean Chinese bride in Yanbian. Aunt Kim, her 
husband, and her son were in the end satisfied with their ten years in Korea. They believe 
they have achieved the Korean dream. Upon leaving South Korea they received “black 
stamps” on their passports because of their undocumented overstay in the country. This 
meant they might not be able to visit Korea for the next several years. But, they wanted to 
hurry back to China in order to catch up the Chinese dream. But now it was time to move 
on to the Chinese dream 
6.2.2 Settled: Be Laoban  (Entrepreneur)! 
Aunt Kim and Mr. Guo invited me to their newly decorated apartment to celebrate the 
Chinese New Year of 2009. She asked me to make dumplings with her family. While we 
chatted, off and on, about several different topics, Aunt Kim reflected on her return: 
I really did not want to come back to China. But if I had stayed in Korea, I would 
have worked as a hostess in restaurants or as a cleaning lady in motels until I died. I 
cannot work like that. In addition, the money we made in Korea would not have 
been enough to support me into my old age there. With that money, however, we 
could start our business in China and secure the basic means of livelihood here. We 
can be laoban (business owner) without working for other Koreans. After returning 
from Korea, we bought three houses and decorated all of them. My son and I also 
started our businesses. My life has been tough with poverty and constant moving 
around in the past several decades. But, after all I have been through, I finally feel 
happy. This small office of mine is heaven for me. 
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Photo 15. Aunt Kim's Newly Decorated House. By June Hee Kwon (2009) 
 
Aunt Kim believed that “[w]e should all do something for ourselves and by ourselves, if we 
want to make real money.” Her family followed the new ideas that celebrate 
entrepreneurship, or laoban. For the first three months after their return to China, Aunt 
Kim’s family was busy setting up a new life in Yanbian, spending much of the money they 
earned in Korea. They searched for the right location for a bookstore and bought new 
apartments to live in. Aunt Kim and her husband were excited about their new housing. 
They had never lived in a clean, modern apartment, and thanks to their newfound affluence 
they have been able to furnish their home with a wide screen Samsung TV, new furniture, a 
computer, and a washing machine. Despite their rural hukou, Aunt Kim’s family came to  
enjoy material prosperity in the city of Yanji—and it was the fruit of ten years’ hard labor in 
Korea. Her roundabout journey appeared to have ended here, in a new apartment and a 
modern lifestyle; nearly everything they owned had been purchased since her family had 
restarted their lives back in China. For her business, Aunt Kim’s warm, friendly, and 
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welcoming personality had already enabled her to secure a number of regular customers. 
“Because China is rising, Yanbian is rising, too,” she told me. 
So a lot of people are trying to open new businesses. When they do, these laoban 
come to ask me what their fortunes will be. Also, they ask me to come to perform a 
good luck ritual on the day they open their business. Those who are wealthy call me 
“sunsangnim, sunsangnim”(a Korean term that indicates “teacher,” in a respectful form). 
I am just an elementary school graduate from the countryside. I never imagined that 
the day would come when I was called “sunsangnim,” never in my life. 
 
We laughed. Aunt Kim repeated to me time and time again, “These are the happiest days in 
my life, given how much I have been through.” Her repetitive “happy talk” seems to have 
two sources. One is her relief at not having to move any more, the fact that her family is 
now permanently settled. The constant moving between different cities and between China 
and Korea was quite wearing on her. Two, she is proud of being laoban of her own 
fortunetelling business and having earned the title “Sunsangnim.” Both her business and 
personal life have fulfilled the social imperative to become laoban. She has successfully 
engineered a completely new life in the aftermath of the Korean dream.  
            Her son, Mr. Guo, had also worked hard to get adjusted to the new China after he 
returned. He filled his bookstore with a large number of Chinese, North Korean, South 
Korean, and Yanbian books. His savings from his decade in South Korea allowed him to 
build this extensive collection in just a few months. He was helped by his previous 
experience as a street vendor of used books before he went to Korea.  
Whenever I have extra money, I go book hunting from individual sellers, morning 
markets, and other street vendors. Even before going to Korea, I already knew the 
value of old and rare books. All old things--old books, old pictures, old money—will 
come to have great historical value. I believe I can make a lot of money by selling 
these rare things. I have a good eye for the price and value of books. And I know 
who will be interested in buying them. Can you guess? Koreans like you, who collect 
rare books from North Korea and Yanbian. They will buy my books, no matter how 
expensive. You know what my dream is? I will eat up all used bookstores in Yanbian 
in three years. My store will be the used bookstore in Yanbian. 
 
 256 
To fulfill this aggressive plan to expand his business, Guo worked seven days a week. His 
mind was preoccupied with business: what used books to buy and how to sell more of them. 
In addition, while running the bookstore from nine to four o’clock, Guo would anxiously sit 
in front of his computer trading stocks, as I described at the beginning of the section. The 
extra income from the stock exchange would enable him to buy more books, he believed, so 
he could arrive at his goal sooner. He was also developing an online used bookstore to target 
Korean customers interested in books from North Korea and Yanbian. Since these books 
are mostly not available in Korea, he knew he could sell them at an inflated price.  
            Guo’s family story shows us how the Korean dream has enabled a poor farm family 
to seek a new life of entrepreneurship, to become homo economicus in the pursuit of self-
reinvention and Suzhi improvement. Aunt Kim’s long journey of escape from poverty—
from poor farmer to hair stylist to migrant broker to fortuneteller—has finally come to 
fruition. She has transformed herself, not only by telling fortunes for her customers, but also 
by achieving fortune in her own life. As she told it, she was born into a tough life, and yet 
she never stopped working to improve her economic situation. At the end of all her travels, 
Aunt Kim lives in a modern apartment surrounded by new possessions. She commutes 
everyday to her workplace (a tiny storage room) to meet her clients coming to ask about 
their fortune and future. Whenever I visited her workplace, she always said, “This small, 
humble office is next to heaven for me.” Mr. Guo is also on the way to his dream. Whenever 
we had drinks or a meal, he would repeat his ambition to “eat up all used book stores in 
Yanbian in three years.”    
             After ten years of working in Korea, a place believed to be a source of modernity 
and economic betterment for most Korean Chinese, Aunt Kim and Guo internalized and 
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practiced the idea of homo economicus that Yanbian social media and intellectuals promoted for 
returnees newly locating themselves within the rising Chinese economy. On the one hand, 
these returnees still embrace Korean lifestyles; they watch Korean soup operas and use 
Korean products. On the other, they have developed new entrepreneurial skills and new 
styles of networking in China. That is to say, returnees’ everyday lives are filled with different, 
and competing, symbols of modernity. In the new scene of the Post-Korean Wind, I have 
gradually come to understand the constant striving to be a homo economicus and improve Suzhi 
as a series of desperate gestures by former farmers and transnational workers who lack a real 
social safety net to protect their vulnerable futures. In the next section, I analyze how “being 
in China without going to Korea” signifies belonging to a more modern and stable life, on 
the basis of two stories that tell us about the competing moderninites and tension between 
two dreams.  
6.3 Proudly Immobi le  
6.3.1 Mark of Lack:  “Going to Korea” 
         T he stories of returnees vary. Like Aunt Kim and Guo, some returnees used to be 
farmers who could not even dream about living in the city if they did not go to Korea. Some 
became lobans, expanding their own businesses such as restaurants, karaoke bars, and grocery 
stores. Some lived on the rent they collected from apartments that they purchased with money 
earned in Korea. Despite the economic achievements of these returnees, however, I gradually 
came to realize an emerging new view of the Korean dream in Yanbian. The position of 
Korean Chinese returnees has shifted, as I noticed when Mr. Guo admitted his frustration at 
having a hard time “catching up” upon his return.  And certainly, not everybody is as happy or 
satisfied as Guo or Aunt Kim.  
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          The critical voice of disrespect for those who have pursued the Korean dream has been 
found among the Korean Chinese who are especially proud of China and Chinese economic 
success, including high-ranking party members. They often argue for the non-necessity of 
going to Korea. They believe Korea to be a place controlled by “work-work” time (see 
chapter 4), and argue that Korean Chinese migrants belong to a lower social class in Korea, 
working under Koreans. Mr. Long, one of a group of government officers with whom I had 
dinner one day at a North Korean restaurant in downtown Yanji, intrigued me with his 
critique of what he viewed as the “epidemic” of Korean Chinese going to Korea. He insisted 
grimly that “only those who have nothing special to do or no ability to break through in China 
have gone to Korea.” He explained why he did not need to consider going to Korea, using his 
housing purchase history:  
For example, my wife and I were offered a new apartment at an incredibly low price 
by our work unit (the Yanbian Zhou government) in the late 1980s when housing 
privatization had just started in Yanbian. We bought the first house assigned to me. 
Then we bought a second house, the one assigned to my wife. We did not pay much 
out of pocket. Also, I have received some gifts and bonuses for the New Year or 
special occasions. Unlike us, those who go to Korea have to pay for everything out 
of their pocket. They have to buy their houses at full price. There get no benefits 
since they do not belong to a work unit, let alone have access to “back-door money” 
(duitdon in Korean). My life is far better than theirs, although I might have less cash 
flow. I have been able to make ends meet in China. So I have never thought of 
going to Korea. Why should I? 
 
Mr. Long, in his late fifties, a father of a son going to high school when I met him, had a wife 
who also worked for the government. After college graduation (he was in the first group of 
Chinese who took the college examination in 1978), he was assigned to a government job. 
Eventually he was promoted to a high-ranking position in the Yanbian Zhou government. As 
a prestigious official, he showed disdain toward those who became migrant laborers to South 
Korea:  
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Fifteen out of twenty of my close high school friends have worked in Korea. When 
there is an alumni gathering, there are more people coming from Seoul than here—
that’s where the majority is. They seem to have a better life with financial stability, 
buying apartments and cars and wearing clothes like Koreans. But when you look at 
them more closely, their lives are full of problems and troubles. A lot of them are 
divorced. Their kids have gone astray. They have gotten sick or injured from the 
heavy labor in Korea. Also, doing simple physical work for more than a decade 
under the bad treatment of Korean bosses has made them fools (meojori in Korean). 
They are incapable of starting a business and a new life back in China. They have 
made money, perhaps. But there is not much left over after buying an apartment out 
of pocket. Then they have to go back to Korea over and over. They’ve got nothing 
but a Korean accent, which is useless [he said in a contemptuous tone]. Can we say 
that it is a good life, losing everything but a useless Korean accent?  
 
In fact, speaking with a Korean accent appears to be a minimal but crucial criterion 
in evaluating the extent to which returnees have adapted to and embodied the 
Korean way of life—referred to as “Korean water” (Hankukmul in Korean). For 
instance, Yanbian people often made fun of Korean Chinese migrants who imitated 
the Seoul accent, “awkwardly” mixing it with the Yanbian accent. I heard many of 
the Korean Chinese in Yanbian say they were “disgusted” by the bragging returnees 
who spoke with a Seoul accent and wore Korean-styled clothes. A Korean Chinese 
woman who returned to Yanbian to run her own grocery store told me, “I have tried 
to use a much stronger Yanbian accent since I came back from Korea. People talk a 
lot behind my back. If I even slightly mix in the Seoul accent, they point a finger at 
me. People are sensitive to the accent. Now, having been to Korea is not a proud 
thing to say, unlike before. Everybody has drunk the ‘Korean water’ and made 
money there.” It seems that going to Korea and speaking like a Korean are no longer 
markers of status in Yanbian, even though Korea retains a strong symbolic power as 
a source of remittances, new lifestyles and fashions, and modern culture. Increasinlgy, 
having a “weird” Korean accent or wearing Korean-styled clothing is being 
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interpreted as a marker of lack—a sign of being unable to make it in the new market 
economy of China.  
             By contrast, the perspective expressed by Mr. Long indicates confidence that his 
status in China is established precisely by distinguishing himself from those who went to 
Korea to make money. At the same time, those who have been away from China for long 
periods might have a difficult time adjusting to the vast, recent changes, as Mr. Guo indicated 
earlier. Returnees testify they are under serious pressure from those who belong to privileged 
work units and others who have gained economically in their absence. The most successful 
among the Yanbian “stay-at-homes” tend to express their pride with a bombastic attitude. A 
social split is becoming clearly demarcated, as Yanbian people now bluntly say, “Those who 
did not go to Korea ended up being much better off.”  
6.3.2  In the Chinese Dream  
              During the years 2008 and 2009, I witnessed the impasse of returnees faced with a 
sluggish Yanbian economy,,8 as I met with a number of returning migrants from Korea who 
were suffering from deep anxiety and frustration. At the same time, the crisis brought 
opportunities for those who followed the Chinese dream. For example, while taking advantage 
of the strong value of the Chinese currency against the Korean currency, some Korean 
Chinese merchants bought products in bulk from Korea cheaply and sold them in China for 
great profit. The profit margin was much bigger than when the Korean currency was stronger 
before 2008. Moreover, the strong yuan enabled Korean Chinese to enjoy a much greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 According to the statistics of Yanbian Customs, until 2008, about a billion dollars a year in remittances had been 
flowing from Korea to Yanbian. But in 2008, remittances dropped sharply to about $700 million in the wake of the 
financial crisis, which was accompanied by a sharp depreciation of the Korean currency. The value of the Korean 
won has since bounced back, from 10,000 won: 40 yuan in 2008 to 10,000 won: 58.90 yuan in 2011. As the Korean 
currency shows renewed strength, Korean Chinese have rushed to exchange their Korean won into Chinese yuan 
in order to take advantage (Yeonhap News, May 1, 2011). 
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spending power when travelling in Korea. There gradually arose a different flow of Korean 
Chinese to Korea, one that includes business and tourism as well as low-wage labor migration.  
          In recent years Chinese tourists have become known as the main customers for 
imported, pricy products in luxurious Korean department stores—the “big players” are all 
Chinese.9 Korean newspapers occasionally report that after Chinese customers visit stores, the 
shelves are left empty. Even though the stories about Chinese big spenders are not specific to 
Korean Chinese, I met several Korean Chinese merchants in Yanbian who were enthusiastic 
about the relatively cheap prices of quality goods in the Lotte luxury department store in 
downtown Seoul, a magnet for tourists. I met a woman in her later forties, whom I call here 
Dang Laoban, who ran a well-known drug store in Yabian, and she shared her experiences of 
travelling in Seoul: 
I went to Seoul with several friends of mine who have their own businesses in 
Yanbian. For a week, all we did in Seoul was shopping and eating, shopping and 
eating. The seafood in Korea was a lot cheaper and much better quality than in 
China. We ate until we could not eat anymore. I felt things were very cheap 
compared to Yanbian, and even to Beijing because we exchanged the Chinese yuan 
for the Korean won. Three of us spent more than $30,000 in the fur coat section of 
the Lotte department store. We kept trying on different coats. The clerks knew that 
we were Korean Chinese and assumed that we were not able to buy the expensive 
stuff. I could tell that they were not as kind to us as they were to other Koreans or 
Japanese customers. But they had luxurious, good-quality items, and the price was 
comparatively low. We could not help buying the stuff. It was a great deal. 
 
Dang Laoban’s consuming power was unusual in Yanbian, although she was not the only one 
who could spend as much money as she wanted. The encounter with Dang Laoban, in fact, 
complicated my understanding of Yanbian, as I had mostly experienced the region’s deep 
dependency on the outflow of population and the influx of remittances. Additionally, she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In 2011 the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industries and Hana Tour conducted a survey of 300 shopping 
tourists from China and Japan. The result demonstrates the rising consumer power of Chinese tourists: 32.3% of 
the Chinese surveyed purchased more than $1,000 in South Korea, compared to only 4.2 % of Japanese tourists. 
37.79% of Chinese and 81.5% of Japanese purchased less than $500 (Money Today [Korean newspaper], Sep 7, 2011). 
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helped me rethink the spatial split that I discussed in the previous section, with Korea as 
work-filled, stress-inducing, and exhausting, and China as a place of relaxation, consumption, 
recharging. That is certainly how the two countries appear from the migrant perspective. But 
from the point of view of newly rising, wealthy merchants, the split turns out to be the 
opposite: Korea is a place of consumption and fun, whereas Yanbian is a space for work and 
profit-making.  
             I was introduced to Dang Laoban by Professor Lan at Yanbian University, who has 
been friends with her since high school. According to Professor Lan, Dang Laoban was one of 
the wealthiest people in Yanbian, and needless to say one of the most successful female 
entrepreneurs. When we met for a couple of hours in her office in downtown Yanji, I was 
able to discern the natural-born aggressive merchant behind her calm and friendly manner. 
Her biography offers some distinctive points. Dang Laoban was from a small rural town in 
Yanbian and grew up going to Han Chinese schools, from elementary school to university. As 
a result, she was more fluent in the Chinese language than Korean and felt more at ease with 
Han Chinese than with Korean Chinese—which is quite uncommon among Korean Chinese 
in Yanbian. Dang Laoban said that she had tried to think of ways to make more money, ever 
since she was young. She went to college in Sichuan. It took her a week to get there from 
Yanbian by train. Whenever she came back home from Sichuan for breaks, she brought goods 
from Sichuan and sold them in Yanbian. When she went back to school in Sichuan, she 
brought different goods from Yanbian and sold them in Sichuan. Despite the stress and 
fatigue of carrying her luggage full of things to sell back and forth, she enjoyed trading and 
gaining margins. She recalled that she did not make large profits, but they were big enough to 
enable her to get through her college education on her own. 
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           After she graduated, she was assigned by the government to work in a chemical factory 
located in Jilin City. It was a decent job but she did not make as much money as she had 
wanted. In addition, after she got married, she wanted to buy the apartment assigned to her 
work unit. But she could not afford to buy it on her own and had to borrow money—though 
she thought this was a good deal at the time. Still, she did not like being in debt, so in order to 
pay it off, Dang Laoban decided to quit her job to find a better way to make money. She did 
xiahai, meaning she “plunged into the ocean,” leaving behind job security in search of a new 
life opportunity by running her own business. Although she had quit her work unit, she still 
relied on the network of contacts she had built there, and began selling Chinese medicine in 
the early 1990s. Dang Laoban put in a great deal of effort to gain a better sense of her new 
business: she worked during the day and studied at night with medical books belonging to her 
husband, who was a doctor.  
             It was in the early 1990s that Dang Laoban gained momentum in her business. At the 
time, Chinese medicine was in high demand in Yanbian because Korean Chinese liked to 
bring it as an authentic, special gift from China when they visited families and relatives in 
Korea with whom they had had no contact for decades. Since there were few business 
dealings between China and Korea at the time, Chinese medicine was rare and highly prized in 
Korea. As more and more Korean Chinese came to realize its value in Korea, Chinese 
medicine was transformed from a gift into a commodity. However, as waves of Chinese 
medicine penetrated the Korean medicine market, the Korean government tightened 
regulations, instituting a regimen to distinguish fake medicine from authentic. A large amount 
of “inauthentic” Chinese medicine became unsellable and was disposed of, and as a result, 
 264 
many Korean Chinese who had bought Chinese medicine in bulk went into sudden 
bankruptcy. Their investment turned out to be a total loss. 
             However, even after the severe drop in its value in the mid-1990s, Chinese medicine 
remained popular because it was believed to be an essential item for Korean Chinese have to 
carry to Korea for their own use, for routine body care and for use in medical emergencies. 
Korean Chinese were simply accustomed to taking Chinese medicine rather than western 
medicine, and additionally the cost of drugs and remedies was thought to be too high in Korea. 
As more people travelled to Korea, the demand for Chinese medicine rose again. Although 
Dang Laoban never migrated to work in Korea herself, her business expanded along with the 
flow of migration. In other words, Dang Laoban, who stayed behind in Yanbian, depended on 
the Korean Chinese migration for her material affluence just as much as the massage therapist 
Number 5 relied on the influx of remittances for his income (as recounted in chapter 2). 
Remittances have provided a critical thread that connects very disparate subjects who 
contribute to and benefit from Yanbian’s economy of migration.  
           Dang Laoban has successfully diversified into a new business—a hot-pot(火锅 huoguo) 
restaurant. I asked her what the method of her success was. 
I just like to make money. Also, I like to spend money. And, I like to give away 
money to the poor and sometimes, my employees. I have always tried to figure out 
how to make more money, ever since I was young. I thought of going to Korea. But 
then I would have to do some simple job like waitress or nanny. I don’t want to do 
that—and I don’t want to work under a Korean boss. Those who go to Korea 
cannot use their brains; they are only using their bodies. You know what? I cannot 
communicate with my friends who come back from Korea. They have all become 
fools after working in Korea for a decade, while here I keep thinking of how to 
expand my business. 
 
Dang Laoban sharply summed up the main narrative of the waning Korean dream: Yanbian 
people were literally saying (as Mr. Long stated in a previous section) that labor migrants who 
go to Korea to do simple and tedious work become “fools” (mojori or babo in Korean) after 
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using only their bodies and not their brains for years. In this view, Korean Chinese migrants 
are lacking in their Suzhi. The encounter with Dang Laoban inspired me to think further about 
the rapid economic and social differentiation occurring in Yanbian. It is the rising class of the 
newly wealthy who make migrants/returnees feel left behind.  
*          *          * 
               The testimonies of Mr. Long and Dang Laoban demonstrate a new understanding of 
mobility in Yanbian: namely, that moving freely across borders is no longer celebrated, but is 
instead now seen as a sign of lack, of inability to compete. The ways in which Dang Laoban 
and other well-off Korean Chinese in Yanbian now understand mobility seems to be quite 
disparate from what has appeared in other migration studies. For example, Aiwha Ong argues 
that flexible citizenship is a cultural logic of capitalism that enables transnational subjects a 
more fluid means of accumulating capital and acquiring social prestige. In an accelerated 
transnational setting, wealthy disaporic Chinese collect multiple passports and challenge the 
static relationship between the state and citizen. Ong does not mean here that state control 
has abated, but rather that nation states and mobile subjects develop new methods of 
articulation with capitalism in the late modernity (Ong 1999). Here, mobility serves as a 
symbol of economic power and political potential to allow the mobile subjects to negotiate 
with the state and market in search of capital accumulation. On the other hand, in Cosmologies 
of Credit, Julie Chu discusses the experiences of Longyan Chinese who pay to be smuggled into 
the US in pursuit of a better life, and portrays their earnest desperation, often maintained 
through multiple unsuccessful attempts. According to Chu, “[I]mmobility in all senses of the 
word—physical, social, and economic—had become the ultimate form of displacement in a 
post-Mao world boasting of forward momentum and global openings.”(Chu 2010:259). Chu 
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sees mobility as a normative choice, in the sense that a majority of Longyan Chinese have 
pursued or hoped for it, and also as a necessary condition of modernity that enables 
marginalized subjects to overcome the stagnant and delimiting positioning as “peasants” in a 
“peasant village.”  
             The experience of Korean Chinese migrants might be analogous to that of the 
overseas Chinese or Longyan’s peasants, in that all three have pursued their dreams by 
becoming flexible and mobile subjects. However, focusing on the testimony of Dang Laoban 
and Mr. Long, we can discover a new set of narratives surrounding mobility, ones in which 
some Korean Chinese have begun to mock mobility that marks a lack of economic security. 
This group of Korean Chinese believe “immobility”—staying in Yanbian and expanding their 
businesses—is a proud symbol of economic stability and prestigious status rooted in local 
politics and economy. Mobility has become a less celebrated and triumphant life choice 
because it causes migrants/returnees to lack sufficient social networking and thereby fall out 
of step in the lively, emerging Chinese economy. Their frequent movements make migrants 
lose the opportunities that the Chinese dream could provide. Ironically, in this discourse 
“immobility”—in contrast to Chu’s argument, which sees “immobility as a form of 
displacement”—is understood as an effective means by which the non-migrant Korean 
Chinese have achieved economic gains, as they have been able to stay on the same page with 
the booming Chinese economy.  
6.4 Leave Again   
6.4.1 Free/Caught 
             As my research moved toward its end, I found that the tension between the Korean 
dream and Chinese dream was constantly rising. One particularly intense moment 
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demonstrated the contradictory and ironical aspect of the Korean dream, a conversation 
triggered by my simple question, posed to a pair of former migrant workers: How do you 
feel about returning home after working in Korea for ten years?  
I knew Mr. Yun and Mr. Shin from the church that I described in the Introduction. I 
was especially close to Mr. Yun because I had spent more time with him; he was an active 
member of the Korean Chinese Association, a group that insisted on the inclusion of 
Korean Chinese in the category of “Overseas Korean.” Both men, in their late forties at that 
time, were enthusiastic to engage in conversation, and recalled their time back in Korea in 
contrasting ways. We talked casually while sitting at KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken) in 
downtown Yanji.  
Mr. Shin: China has changed a lot. It’s now much better off than when I left. People 
don’t worry about having enough food anymore. But, however good China has 
gotten to be, I still want to go back to Korea as soon as possible. I just miss the 
feeling when the flight lands at the Inchon airport. It smells different and it feels so 
good being in Seoul.  
 
Mr. Yun [in a grumpy tone]: What’s good about it? I was deported from Korea. I am 
still full of anger toward Korea. It’s a bad country, which kicked out its own ethnic 
people. There are no basic human rights. The law sucks. The discrimination was 
unbearable. The exploitation was extreme. I would not even want to piss toward 
Korea [in a very angry voice]. 
 
Mr. Shin: What are you talking about? You say you hate Korea, but you still want to 
go back, don’t you? I know you’re getting ready to go back.  
 
Mr. Yun: It’s not because I like it, but only because I can’t make here as much as in 
Korea. I just want to use the opportunity. I need money. 
 
Mr. Shin: You’re fooling yourself. We have to admit that Korea has offered great 
opportunities for Korean Chinese. Without advantages from Korea, how could 
Yanbian be economically improved this much and this fast? Look at the Han 
Chinese farmers. They are still poor.  
 
Mr. Yun: Not really. The policy of the Chinese government has become better and 
better. Now, Han Chinese farmers are better off than Korean Chinese who went to 
Korea. There is no worry about starvation. They are well-off and well-fed, and 
they’ve never been to Korea.  
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Mr. Shin:  Are we pigs? Whenever I hear people say that China is the best country 
due to plentiful food and free time, I get really pissed off. Food is not enough for 
life. We are not animals. We should have a life. I cannot find the life in China that I 
had in Korea. Yes, the work was very hard and tiring. But I had a great time there, 
and learned a lot. I took classes on exercise, yoga, and computer run by the local 
government.  
 
Mr. Yun: Where did you find time to do all that? Police were tracking me down all 
the time. I was always nervous about deportation—that, and money. 
 
Mr. Shin: You must not have managed your life there, then. We were all in the same 
situation. I was illegal and the police were after me, too. Even with the risk, I liked 
being in Korea. Here I can’t get used to the way people spend too much time eating 
and drinking. I feel I am wasted here, without producing anything special. 
 
Mr. Yun: If we have money or power in China, it will be the best place to be. China 
will be the greatest economic power in the world, exceeding even America. It’ll 
happen in just a few years. 
 
Mr. Shin: China and some Chinese might have a lot of money. But there’s no 
civility, no politeness. Look at the Han Chinese spitting all over the world. It’s 
really gross. Public space is very dirty. Nobody really takes care of it. Chinese are 
way behind in cultural manners (suzhi). Do you remember how clean the streets 
were in Seoul? We are human beings. Life should have more to it than just eating 
and drinking. I want to get back to the life I had in Korea—I just miss it.  
 
I am pausing their argument here. It had nearly degenerated into a fight. In fact, I was 
embarrassed at the loud, angry conversation that had erupted in public space while I was 
trying to subtly mediate between them. At the same time, I was wondering what really 
sparked their intense disagreement. It might have been partly because they were insisting on 
different interpretations of similar experiences as undocumented migrant workers in Korea. 
It may also have been because the two men were in contrasting situations—one (Mr. Yun) 
was stuck in China and the other (Mr. Shin) was still able to travel between the two countries 
after the amnesty took effect.  
             Having gotten to know Mr. Yun over the previous couple of years, I understood 
why he was speaking in an upset tone by showing his odd contradiction between what he 
said and what he really wanted. Mr. Yun was deported from Korea in 2007 and thus unable 
to travel freely to Korea, unlike other returnees who got the benefit of the amnesty that the 
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Korean government granted to Korean Chinese undocumented workers. He missed out on 
applying for amnesty because he was undecided about whether to stay in Korea longer or 
not. He had urgently needed to make more money in Korea—his wife was very ill at the 
time, and his daughter was preparing for college. If he stopped sending money to them, they 
would be in serious financial trouble. There was no other source of income for his family 
unless he sent remittances. But the conditions of the amnesty were that he had to leave 
Korea for one year before he was eligible to return to Korea (see chapter 4)—which would 
cut off his remittances just when his family really needed them. While he was hesitating, Mr. 
Yun was arrested at work and deported back to China.  
            By contrast Mr. Shin, who applied for amnesty on time, became a free-moving 
subject who could enjoy the “smell” and “feeling” of being in Seoul. He said, “Whenever I 
remember the moment that the airplane hits the ground of Inchon airport, I become excited. 
I cannot wait for the moment to come again.” Mr. Shin looked proud of and happy with his 
working experience in Korea, although his friends in China looked down on him because in 
Korea he worked a low-wage construction job. Some of his friends who had never gone to 
Korea had done very well in the wake of China’s global rise. He was honestly shocked at the 
amount of money that they were making. His humble achievements were not comparable to 
those of his friends who ran their own businesses and benefited from the current economic 
trends in China. They were experts at mobilizing their networks and raising back-door 
capital, neither of which he would be capable of doing. Nonetheless, Mr. Shin is confident 
about himself. In his view, he has learned “lessons” from Korea that his wealthy friends who 
stayed in China could never know. The most important of these lessons, Mr. Shin said, had 
to do with manners—not spitting in public, refraining from littering, lining up at the subway. 
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Knowledge of such manners enabled Mr. Shin to judge who was “cultured” and who wasn’t. 
Moreover, he liked what he considered the Korean habit of speaking in milder tones and 
listening respectfully to others, compared to the louder and more boisterous way of talking 
in Yanbian. As he told me, in a confessional tone,  
I would not want to be known as Korean Chinese, as I don’t act or speak like other 
Korean Chinese. I have made a special effort to embody manners and orderliness 
because I would like to be seen as cultured and civilized. That is why I was very 
displeased about the uncultured manners in China—spitting, shouting, taking their 
shirts off in public. They have no manners, whether they have money or not. 
 
This statement demonstrates Mr. Shin’s search for “something else” beyond money and free 
time, his conviction that “[w]e are not pigs.” Mr. Shin seemed to lean sharply toward Korean 
manners, accepting them as more modern and polite—and yet not all his memories about 
Korea were good, either. He had to put up with harsh discrimination. His Korean employers 
were often exploitive, forcing him to work for long hours and treating him as a second-rate 
citizen. There was no job security, and he did not know a single person in Korea who 
deserved to have his full trust. He had no health insurance. When he got sick, he had to 
nurse himself back to health without access to a doctor, since he could not afford the high 
cost. Regardless of the adversity, hardship, and insecurity of working in Korea, however, Mr. 
Shin said he could not overestimate the satisfaction of making money and gradually 
increasing his savings. Sometimes, he received raises, occasionally big ones, in recognition of 
his labor. Mr. Shin said it was not all bad to be in Korea, and he was able to draw some 
meaningful lessons from his time there.  
I have learned how Koreans divide hours into minutes to use time in an effective 
way and how every hour is converted into money. In Korea, one minute and even 
one second is counted as money, unlike in China, where time is too loose and too 
plentiful. There is nothing free in Korea. Even Koreans older than sixty or seventy 
are still working, still leading their lives. You know what? There are much more 
poor people in Korea than in China. In China, most people own houses and there 
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are few beggars seen in the streets. But because Korea is a capitalist country, there is 
less support from the government. It is very obvious in Korea; if there is no work, 
there is no life. It is a brutal and competitive society. I was the only one I could rely 
on. I had to take care of myself. Now, I have nothing sacred in my life—I will do 
whatever it takes to survive. 
 
The argument was intense, emotional, explosive, and his confession was compelling. At the 
end of the conversation Mr. Shin told us he was preparing to go back to Korea. After 
growing accustomed to construction work in Korea, he had come up with a new concept of 
life: “If there is no work, there is no life.”10 He said that he was good at disciplining himself 
in terms of handling time, money, and his body as to continue to work, and he also enjoyed 
organizing his life around work, as other Korean Chinese migrant workers also testified in 
chapter 4. Contrary to the assumptions of the discourse of entrepreneurship, Mr. Shin, a 
proud dagong, has also developed methods of governing himself and internalized these 
principles in order to become a proper worker in Korea. More importantly for him, he has 
adopted civility and cultural manners as the core principles of a good life. As he steadfastly 
maintains, “We are not pigs.”  
             His life seems to be far from the ideal now promoted in Yanbian: “Be laoban, stop 
being dagong.” Even in the face of mockery, however, he repeatedly emphasized the priority 
of suzhi over money, suzhi that he believed he had acquired by living in a different and more 
“developed” world. His view contrasts starkly with those of Mr. Long and Dang Laoban, 
who exhibited little respect toward such floating migrants as Mr. Shin. He insisted 
confidently  “Those who never went to Korea don’t know about the world. They’re just big 
frogs in a small pond.” It is true that migration was a channel through which he learned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10   In The Problem with Work, Kathi Weeks analyzes work not as a simple economic practice, but as the primary 
means by which individuals are integrated into social, political, and familial modes of cooperation. She also views 
work as an essential part of life that transforms subjects into the independent individuals of the liberal imaginary; it 
is construed as a basic obligation of citizenship (2011:7-8). But she remains critical of work’s domination of life in 
the modern world. 
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about the world, in a form of “social remittance”(see chapter 2). After the amnesty, he 
became a frequent traveler between China and Korea, in contrast to Mr. Yun, for example, 
who lacked the freedom to go to Korea, because of his previous deportation. But Mr. Shin’s 
life was caught within the six-year rhythm of circulation, “1-3-2” (as I elaborated in chapter 
4), a rhythm that was and is subject to change under the fluctuating migration policy of the 
Korean government. His situation, like many other Korean Chinese who have moved back 
and forth, is contradictory: he is free but caught. And he is moving but still on the margin, both 
in China and Korea, as a transnational working class subject.  
6.4.2 Caught/Caught 
            When I met Mr. Yun again in Yanbian in 2009, he was barely making ends meet in 
China, working at a local restaurant. At the same time, he was trying every possible means to 
leave China—including going to Australia as a farm worker, or to the US as a simple manual 
laborer. In addition, he was still trying to get into Korea, regardless of his professed hatred for 
the place. After a big dinner on a piercing cold day in January, Mr. Yun suggested that I stay 
over in his daughter’s room instead of going back in the dark and cold to Yanji. His daughter 
was eighteen years old and attended a Han Chinese school. She could barely speak Korean, 
although she did understand and communicate with her parents and grandmother in Korean. 
When I came to her room, she was studying for an English exam to go to an Australian 
university. If she got in, it would create a chance for Mr. Yun to go to Australia as a parent of 
a student, which was another of Mr. Yun’s ideas for getting out of China. As he had 
previously told me, his wife was too sick even to walk around in the house. She had suffered 
complications after back surgery a few years before. The doctors could not tell what exactly 
was wrong with her. Their dining table was full of bottles of different medications that she 
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was on to mitigate her pain and various symptoms. They took up a considerable portion of 
the monthly household budget. Mr. Yun’s mother-in-law also lived in the house, and she 
helped with the cooking and cleaning.  
           Although I was planning to stay just one night in Mr. Yun’s place, I ended up staying 
another couple of days on Mr. Yun’s insistence.  “When would we meet again?” he exclaimed.  
During my stay, I helped his daughter with the English exam and hung out with her, watching 
her favorite TV shows and listening to her favorite music. These several days allowed me to 
talk to Mr. Yun’s family and see how Mr. Yun’s time was spent, structured, and planned. I 
came to understand better the fury that Mr. Yun expressed in the conversation above; he was 
truly desperate to leave China, where he was caught without making much money and without 
much of a future.           
          He certainly tried everything he could to get out. His usual morning routine included 
calling around to various brokers in the migration business. If a possibility had developed for 
him to get a visa to go to any country, he went down to the office to see what he could do. 
But it was apparently very hard for him to get anything, even faked or manipulated visas, let 
alone one to Korea, where he had been deported from. I also noticed that he obsessively 
played the lottery (彩票 caipiao) every night. It seemed like far more than a mere hobby for him. 
After dinner, he always went to the lottery store where a crowd of people gathered to see 
which number would be the winner. One night, Mr. Yun took me there and explained how it 
worked. I understood only vaguely, even he repeated everything. He shared some information 
and greetings with the men in the store. After we got back home, I found out that lottery-
related “research” kept him up till 2 AM. I asked, “Don’t you sleep?” He said, “I have 
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something to study.” He laughed then, but he was serious about his “studies.” In his financial 
desperation, Mr. Yun was trying to crack the logic of the lottery.  
            As I portrayed in my discussion of “the split bodies and split time” of Korean 
Chinese migrants as they juggle between “too-much-time” in China and “too-little-time” in 
Korea, half of Mr. Yun’s life was lost after he was deported back to China; he had been very 
busy with work in Korea, but now had no work in Yanbian. I have to point out, however, 
that Mr. Yun’s desperation was different from what I have elaborated in chapter 4. While 
most Korean Chinese migrant workers, like Mr. Shin above, have moved back and forth 
between China and Korea under the condition of the amnesty and the “1-3-2” rhythm, Mr. 
Yun was caught in China, unable to go, not only to Korea, but also to other countries, due 
to his unlucky and untimely deportation. Unlike Mr. Guo and Aunt Kim, who have become 
laoban after saving every penny earned in Korea, Mr. Yun did not have much savings because 
the money he had earned in Korea was still the only source of income for his household, and 
much of it had to be spent for his wife’s medication and daughter’s tuition.  
             Now he did nothing but watch his friends and relatives make better money than he 
ever did. “I am really pissed off whenever I think of the moment I got caught for 
deportation and see other people freely moving around. It doesn’t matter whether they’re 
working as a lower-class dagong under Korean bosses. They’re working in Korea and making 
better money than me in China.” The missed opportunity to apply for the amnesty exposed 
him to the wide disparity between those who can move and those who cannot. Stymied by 
unpredictable and fluctuating visa regulations, Mr. Yun has become ever more depressed and 
dejected as he is confronted by his intractable situation every single moment, without being 
able to find any exit except “studying” the logic of the lottery.  
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              In fact, he had tried very hard to find work since he was deported from Korea, Mr. 
Yun lamented. Whenever he got paid in China, however, he could not avoid comparing the 
wages, asking himself, “What if I had worked the same kind of job for the same hours in 
Korea?” While he cursed the Korea that inhumanely deported him, I also found that he lived 
on his memories of Korea—how much he had made per day, what good friendships he had 
developed there, how hard-working he had been there, and so forth. His constant 
remembrances of his time in Korea had prevented him from working in China, by making 
him want more and more to leave China as soon as possible. His body was caught in China 
while his mind was in Korea. The deported Korean Chinese, like Mr. Yun, were caught, 
neither living in nor leaving China. They did not have enough capital to invest in or open 
new businesses as laoban. Nor did he want to get paid the very low wages of dagong in China. 
His future, like the lottery, had become too contingent, dependent on random luck and 
unpredictable timing, and had little to do with his own strivings and hard work. He was 
caught.  
6.4.3 Out of  League  
           While studying the implicit but embedded social split between those who went to 
Korea and those who did not, one lingering question was about the actual dynamics and 
feelings between two groups. Another returnee, named Park, in his late thirties and migrating 
back and forth between China and Korea, highlighted his anxiety by describing the widened 
social split in Yanbian in a tone of frustrated confession—how he felt about being back at 
home and the meaning that was attached to his work in Korea.  
Now I feel ashamed of working in Korea. If I say to my friends that I am going 
back to Korea to work, then, they say, you’re still going there? What for? They look 
down on me, I think. That’s why I often just say that I have a business in Southern 
China—Shenzhen or Guangdong. I don’t want to say what exactly I am doing in 
Korea. I’m kind of secretively moving back and forth without telling the truth. I 
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have no education, no special skills. All I have is my body [the word he uses actually 
connotes something more like “flesh” (momdungari in Korean)]. Thus, what I, as a 
Korean Chinese, can do in Korea is nothing more than simple, low-end physical 
labor, by using my body. I have been working hard as well as spending hard. To be 
honest with you, I don’t have much savings since I tend to spend money as soon as 
I make it. I just assume that I can keep earning as long as I work in Korea. That is 
true for all Korean Chinese. But, the job is boring, same old, same old. When it gets 
really bad, I think I can’t live like this forever. But, once my money runs out in 
Yanbian, there is no way for me to make it up except by going back to Korea. I have 
a son and a wife to support, and there is a limit to the money I can make in Yanbian. 
I don’t know what to do to make money here. I don’t have enough of a social 
network to start off a new business. Here people spend a lot of money eating and 
drinking. If I kept pace with them, I’d go broke quickly. I have no idea where their 
money is coming from. When I meet these wealthy friends who used to be poorer 
than me, I can’t talk to them. There’s something in common among them, but I 
don’t know what that is. I feel like there is something that I am missing. I can’t cut 
into their conversation. I feel out of their league, lagging behind what’s going on in 
Yanbian and in China. 
 
Mr. Long and Dang Laoban’s denigration of migrants as “fools” migrants does, in some ways, 
dovetail with the compelling confession of Mr. Park and his feelings of loss and inferiority. Mr. 
Park expressed unexpected feelings of embarrassment about staying in Yanbian, and believes 
he can never be as well integrated into Yanbian as he was before. This new feeling of being 
uncomfortably at home has made him start reevaluating the gains and losses of his persistent 
pursuit of the Korean dream.  
            In the late 1990s when the Korean dream swept through Yanbian, Mr. Park made up 
his mind to go to Korea and found a broker to give him the fake documents to get there. He 
recalled he was full of dreams and believed the saying, “If you go to Korea, your back will 
ache from gathering the dollars.” Of course, the rumor he wanted to believe turned out to be 
an extreme exaggeration, but his work in Korea was fairly rewarding, and the trip was worth 
trying despite the high risk of apprehension as an illegal migrant and the high fees he had to 
pay the illegal brokers. There was no denying—it was a good deal. Mr. Park has witnessed the 
power of remittance, expressed in his capacity to purchase a new apartment and fancy clothes. 
For the last ten years, Mr. Park, as one of the earlier seekers of the Korean dream in his rural 
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hometown, diligently followed it for ten years, determined not to live like his parents, who had 
been poor farmers.  
             Yet the limits of the Korean dream have been gradually revealed over the past couple 
of years. The returnees that I met, including Park, have accumulated many anxieties, concerns, 
and frustrations pertaining to their life of migration. The frustrations seem to be multi-layered. 
First of all, the relative value of remittances has sharply diminished because the income gap 
between China and Korea has become much smaller than it was a few years ago, and the 
exchange rate has come to work against Korean Chinese migrants as the Korean won showed 
its weakness in tandem with the global financial crisis. Secondly, it turns out that remittances 
cannot be accumulated or expanded if the families of migrants merely spend it on the day-to-
day cost of living without making investments. In other words, remittances cannot work 
properly as a source of wealth unless the money is carefully managed and re-invested (see 
chapter 3). Thirdly, unskilled and service-centered, low-end jobs do not promise a better 
tomorrow, but instead the endless repetition of the same simple work patterns—what Marx 
called “tomorrow as today” (Marx 1986). Migrants who move between two countries seem to 
be flexible and mobile, but at the same time, they are trapped within the migration circuit as a 
cheap source of labor; they are in the six-year rhythm—“1-3-2”—as discussed in previous 
chapter. Mostly importantly, their long absence from Yanbian caused them to lack the social 
networks essential for doing business in China. The feeling of displacement and loss turns out 
to be actual and material rather than simply emotional. They are missing something they 
should have known they needed, as Mr. Park testified. The “something”—the behavior code 
for economic and social success—might be key to overcoming their situation, but the gap 
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between the already successful and the recent returnees becomes more visible and wider all 
the time. 
            Despite the drawbacks, Mr. Park tried to stay positive: he wanted to end his life in 
Korea as a construction worker and start a new business in China. At the end of December 
2009, he was busy travelling around several cities in China making plans to open a restaurant 
business. He did some market research, but the results were not too promising. It turned out 
that Yanbian was already too packed with restaurants and other service industries—stimulated 
by remittances from Korea. Cities in Shandong where Koreans and Korean Chinese are 
concentrated, such as Qingdao, Yantai, and Weihai, were too expensive for him to break into.  
One day when I joined a gathering with Mr. Park and his friends over drinks at a bar 
in Yanji, he was filled with regrets. “I should have come back a few years earlier, before the 
boom,” he said. “I’m afraid I’m too late.” Two of his friends disagreed. One of them said, 
“We did the right thing at the time. I made a lot and spent a lot. No regrets. I miss the time in 
Korea so much: working, drinking, eating, traveling around.” The divided opinions 
surrounded the Korean dream and the Korean Wind made me recall the argument between Mr. 
Yun and Mr. Shin. Korean Chinese continue to engage with, and actively re-evaluate what 
they have done and what they will have to do in the era of the Post-Korean Wind.  
            I called Mr. Park two weeks later to ask how his market research went in Weihai, 
Shandong. His phone was off. One of his friends told me that he had left for Korea two days 
ago. I remembered that Mr. Park’s working visa was still valid. He was gone back into the 
circuit of “1-3-2,” pursuing a temporary future, now caught between two dreams.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
             In the wake of economic reform, many Chinese have gone through an endless, 
dramatic self-modification and transformation by frequently jumping between completely 
different occupations and becoming the other to the self, as Xin Liu powerfully illustrates in 
his study of the new landscape of rapid development in southern China (Liu 2005). Both 
converging on and diverging from the overall pattern of Chinese development and self-
transformation, this chapter has explored the ways in which the Korean Wind—an ethnic-
specific fashion for transnational migration, but also East Asian economic occurrence in the 
context of the global economy—has re-invented Korean Chinese as self-responsible subjects 
in a privatized China. In this last chapter, I have taken a look into the consequence of the two 
decades of the Korean Wind, especially in relation to the recent rise of the Chinese economy. 
My field research, mostly conducted during the financial crisis (2008-9), allowed me to observe 
the emergence of the liminal social landscape of the Post-Korean Wind. This particular moment 
exhibits a new intensity and contentiousness surrounding the concepts of mobility, modernity, 
and futurity, as Korean Chinese find themselves situation between the Chinese and Korean 
dreams. My ethnography analyzes the ongoing hope and frustrations of migrants and the 
growing Korean Chinese reevaluation of the Korean Wind with a focus on the widely circulated 
social imperative for entrepreneurship and the government of the self—“be laoban, stop being 
dagong.”  
              My findings are twofold. First, I conclude that the concept and practice of mobility is 
in critical flux in the Post-Korean Wind moment, with a view emerging of mobility as a mark of 
socio-economic inadequacy, whereas immobility is coming to be seen as correlating with 
affluence and stability. Second, despite the emergent social imperative to stay in China and not 
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to become a migrant laborer, mobility is still a deeply embedded part of Korean Chinese 
culture, even if migrants have gradually become more marginalized. I have argued that the 
Korean Chinese have fashioned a mobile ethnicity as a way of dealing with the contingencies of 
contemporary economic reform. But their way of working for a better future—their particular 
government of the self—has created unexpected vulnerabilities, sealing them into a circuit of 
migration as a transnational ethnic working class. 
            Despite the social split seen in this chapter at the moment of the Post-Korean Wind, I do 
not mean to suggest that the Chinese dream has replaced the Korean dream in Yanbian. 
Rather, I aim to highlight the new meaning of mobility emerging from the widely circulated 
social imperative that advises migrants/returnees to cut off the endless migration cycle and 
settle down permanently in China. In addition, I want to suggest that the Korean Chinese idea 
of modern subjectivity—having good Suzhi—is not fixed, but rather open to debate, 
depending on the extent to which personal transnational experiences and social capital are 
integrated into the idea of what it means to be a “more modern” subject. The thriving, yet 
oddly dejected borderland of Yanbian, a place where nobody is truly immune to the Korean 
Wind, showcases the cultural, economic, and political intersection, the flux and transition, 
between two dreams.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
          Follow-up research that I conducted in the summer of 2011 confirmed that the 
Chinese dream, introduced in chapter 6, had by then come into play in every corner of 
Yanbian. Both Koran Chinese and Han Chinese have embraced the remarkably rapid 
Chinese economic rise and the growing influence of China in the global economy. The 
curse-like-prediction that one of Han Chinese tax drivers shared with me—“Koreans will 
come to China as dagong (workers) and in ten years we Chinese will exceed America”—
seemed to have already become a reality.  During my research, I heard over and over stories 
of personal economic betterment combined with strong national pride, accompanied by 
concrete examples of development: a new highway connecting Yanbian to the Northeast 
Chinese cities and thence to Beijing; the conspicuous consumption of super-wealthy 
Chinese; increasing budgets for government projects and schools. The patriotic celebrations 
and national pride I witnessed were unprecedented in my experience.  
           A meeting with members of the Association of Korean Chinese Writers was not 
exceptional. The writers gave me a warm welcome and we caught up on all the news for the 
last year and half while I had been away from Yanbian. Our conversation mainly covered the 
economic boom and the increasing budget assigned to the Association, money that now 
enabled some of them to travel to Korea. This support made the writers feel more the equals 
of Korean writers, who used to show them disrespect on the basis of their lack of cultural 
and economic capital. One of the writers, Mr. Choi, said, “We do not have to be daunted by 
Koreans any more. I felt thrilled about my fat wallet. It wasn’t like the last time we were 
there, when we were always in an inferior position, always asking Koreans for more money.”  
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          At this moment of the Post-Korean Wind, as I termed it in chapter 6, Korean Chinese 
and Yanbian have truly transitioned to a different stage of economic development, and a 
different kind of relationship with Korea and Koreans. Not only these Korean Chinese 
writers, but also professors, journalists, and entrepreneurs that I met during the visit are re-
characterizing what it means to be Korean Chinese in this new moment, foregrounding the 
strong potential of the “Chinese dream.” But in the midst of all the boastful conversation at 
the writers’ dinner, a story told by Mr. Choi changed the dinner mood dramatically. It 
conveyed the realities of emotional complexity and economic/political entanglement that 
Korean Chinese still face, living in the borderland.  
            Mr. Choi is a renowned, award-winning Korean Chinese novelist. He is originally 
from a small border town, as is his wife. He started his story by introducing his hometown 
to me as a place I had to visit someday as a researcher of Yanbian. Most farming towns on 
the border, like his hometown, suffer from steep population declines, and are especially 
known for their critical lack of Korean Chinese “brides.” This is because many Korean 
Chinese women left Yanbian beginning in the early 1990s in the wake of the Korean Wind, 
going to marry to Korean men, or working for Korean companies in need of cheap Korean 
Chinese workers who spoke both Korean and Chinese. A growing shortage of Korean 
Chinese women is popularly blamed for the low rate of Korean Chinese reproduction. It is 
also condemned as a moral crisis because Korean Chinese women have left in pursuit of 
money instead of maintaining a family life back home (Noh 2011). In the midst of moral 
critiques targeting Korean Chinese women, female North Korean defectors, arriving as a 
result of food crises suffered continually by North Korea since the mid-1990s, have 
gradually filled the vacancies that Korean Chinese women left behind. Many women who 
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fled from North Korea settled in Yanbian border towns and entered informal (common law 
marriage) marriages with Korean Chinese (and sometimes Han Chinese) men.  
          Whenever I went to border towns, I heard about stories of North Korean brides who 
had crossed the Tumen River. And yet their whereabouts and identities seemed to be 
considered secrets that should not be openly spoken because the brides could be deported at 
any time if they were exposed. Moreover, the children born to relationships between 
(Korean) Chinese and North Koreans could not be registered in the Chinese household 
system since they were born to mothers without any official legal status in China. Due to 
these legal complexities and security concerns, the brides’ lives remain concealed and 
unspoken, although the impact of these “North Korean ladies” remains obvious and 
distinctive in these border towns. North Korean women seemed to live well-mingled with 
Korean Chinese and Han Chinese in these towns, and their neighbors tried their best to 
protect them.  
             Mr. Choi’s brother-in-law (his wife’s younger brother) was in the same boat as other 
aging male Korean Chinese farmer who had been unable to marry—he ended up in a 
common law marriage with a North Korean woman who had crossed the Tumen River. Like 
other cases, their marriages were not officially recognized and thus, the twins born to the 
couple could not be registered either. In order to help the unregistered couple and the 
newborn twins, Mr. Choi and his wife have registered the twins to their own household, as if 
they were the real parents.    
           The story showed more complexity as the North Korean bride eventually moved on 
to South Korea, claiming refugee status and settling there. After three years of ups and 
downs, she finally attained South Korean citizenship, and invited her Korean Chinese 
 284 
husband (Mr.Choi’s brother-in-law) to join her. When he arrived in Korea, , however, he 
found out that his North Korean bride was having an affair with another Korean Chinese 
man. Mr. Choi said that she has cut off contact with his brother-in-law, and there has been 
no more news from her. Meanwhile, the brother-in-law wants to stay in South Korea 
because he cannot support the twins by himself in China if he returned. The children have 
no doubt that Mr. and Mrs. Choi are their parents. “Whenever I see the twins, my heart is 
broken,” Mr. Choi said, with tears in his eyes. “I am worried about whether we can raise 
them properly—as if we were their real parents.”  
          This story seemed incongruous in the midst of so much rosy talk about Yanbian’s 
thriving economy and the Chinese rise to global power. It felt especially outlandish being 
told after all the bragging from the writers about going to Korea on a government-funded 
trip for fun, not for hard labor. At the same time, the story exemplifies the peculiar border 
location of Yanbian, where multi-overlapped crossings have taken place. Han Chinese have 
been coming to Yanbian in pursuit of new economic opportunities generated by the 
remittances from Korea. They have rapidly filled the formerly “pure” Korean Chinese 
farming towns, taking over rice fields that Korean Chinese had left behind. North Koreans 
have been secretively crossing the River and settling in Yanbian (and sometimes going 
beyond Yanbian), because of the relative affluence and geographical adjacency of Yanbian—
before eventually going to South Korea as refugees. South Koreans and other international 
agents have taken advantage of the border location of Yanbian as a connecting node to 
North Korea for economic and political reasons. Yanbian has become a passage channeling 
people, goods, and money, both despite and because of the marginal location of the ethnic 
borderland. Yanbian is in flux and transition. People continuously leave and live.  
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*               *             * 
           Capturing the critical transition of the Korean Chinese transnational migration in 
conjunction with the global economic crisis, my dissertation has examined the formation of 
mobile ethnicity with an ethnographic focus on the theme of the Korean Wind as it emerged at 
the intersection of post-Cold War and post-socialist cultures. I have especially attempted to 
situate the Korean Wind as a unique product of the economic reform and open economy 
(gaigekafang) that both Korean Chinese and Han Chinese have experienced across and 
beyond the region of Yanbian. Through the lens of kinship, development, money, love, 
bodies, and time, I have analyzed the new affect and materiality, belonging and dwelling, 
hope and frustration of mobile ethnicity, in two respects. On the one hand, I have traced the 
reconstituted subjectivity of Korean Chinese as a particular ethnic working class in a 
transnational setting. On the other hand, I have highlighted the re-characterized ethnic space 
of Yanbian as a channel that myriad agents have traversed. This dissertation, which captures 
two competing dreams, the Korean dream and Chinese dream, has argued that Korean 
Chinese have chosen mobility as a way of dealing with the contingencies of contemporary 
economic reform. But their way of working for a better future has created unexpected 
vulnerabilities, sealing them into a circuit of migration as a transnational ethnic working 
class.  
           Mobile Ethnicity aims to contribute to a new understanding of mobility and ethnicity in 
three respects. First, this study shows the critical role of remittances (along with the Korean 
Wind) in relocating population (both pulling them into spaces and pulling them out), and 
creating the intersection of internal migration and transnational migration, thereby reshaping 
the spatial characteristics of the region. Differentiated mobility (Massey 1994) by ethnicity—
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under the influence of the Korean Wind, an ethnic-specific fashion of mobility—has enabled 
ethnic groups to develop different ranges and routes of mobility and, consequently, different 
life choices. However, mobility also enables increased interconnection and mutual dependency 
between ethnic groups (chapter 2). Although the Korean Wind has mostly deeply influenced the 
scale and scope of Korean Chinese mobility, Han Chinese do not remain unaffected by it. 
They never tried to migrate to Korea, but have hardly been immobile—they have also moved 
in response to the influx of Korean money and the vacancies left behind by Korean Chinese. 
This growing ethnic interdependency can help us situate the Korean Wind as a transnational 
economic drive to reconfigure the ethnic and urban landscape across and beyond Yanbian—
overcoming the notion that the Korean Wind affects only Korean Chinese migration.  
          Second, I have elaborated on the ambiguous role of mobility in tandem with the flow of 
remittances; mobility is most often thought to generate economic betterment, but it can also 
aggravate economic vulnerability. Instead of accepting the idea of a solidified nexus between 
migration and development (Glick Shiller 2010; Messy and Parado 1998; Wise and 
Covarrubias 2010), I have insisted that the connection is more fragile than is usually 
appreciated, and emphasized how the flow of remittances is volatile and fluctuates with global 
economic and political circumstances. Although the city of Yanji symbolizes rapid 
urbanization and economic development, in reality, its remittance-dependent economy is 
vulnerable to factors such as currency rate and overall economic conditions, rather than reliant 
solely on individuals’ work ethic or strength of purpose. On a personal level, remittance is 
commonly believed to be a critical source of money for households, an indispensable way to 
get ahead, to secure a better future. And yet, as Mr. Ho’s story powerfully demonstrated, 
“where love goes, money goes” (chapter 3): remittances are an unstable and unpredictable 
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currency because they depend on long-term, long-distance, intimate relationships. My 
ethnographic analysis of remittance—on the macro and micro scale—offers an insight into its 
special nature as not only gift or realization of familial duty, but also as fluctuating currency 
requiring careful management and submission to the peculiar temporality of long waits and 
unknown futures.  
           Third, my dissertation hinges on transnational temporality as a major component of 
subjectivity and spatiality. Recent anthropology tends to see mobility as normative and 
attachment to place as exceptional (Salazar & Smart 2011)—and yet, Korean Chinese 
migration shows that the bifurcation between mobility and immobility, emplacement and 
displacement, living and leaving is not always clear-cut. These two seemingly contradictory 
modes of being reinforce the liminal condition of many Korean Chinese livelihoods and 
households, as they travel between two worlds and live in “divided homes” (Zavella 2012). 
Korean Chinese liminality is especially exacerbated by Korean visa regulations, which force 
the migrants into a “split life” under a rhythm of multiple temporalities: working and making 
money in Korea, resting and spending in Yanbian (chapter 4). The transnational temporality 
ends up weaving two different worlds into a common everyday life, and requiring that bodies 
switch easily between two different modes of time. This ethnography of a particular Korean 
Chinese mobility—which attempts to respond to the unpredictability of the economy while 
being constrained by visa regulations, remittance flows, and bodily capacity—helps us 
understand time as a governmental force in making and unmaking subjects and space.  
             In conclusion, my dissertation has illuminated the ripple effects of the Korean Wind as 
Korean Chinese have discovered, promoted, and deployed their ethnic currency in the 
transnational labor market. I have also brought to light the articulation of “Yanbian socialism” 
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with the Korean Wind from the long-forbidden capitalist homeland. The Korean Chinese have 
made a rigorous effort to get reconnected to Korea through peculiar methods of kinship-
making and/or faking. In particular, the faking of “kinship” challenges the very concept of 
kinship: it does not result in empathy and sociality, but instead functions merely as a ticket to 
Korea, and quickly becomes a pricy commodity transacted in the migration market. In the 
midst of their reconnection, however, Korean Chinese have also practiced vigilance, 
maintaining their political faith in China alongside their cultural and economic links to Korea. 
My work aims to weave together an account of the particular structure of feeling that Korean 
Chinese have shaped as they are caught between confusion and hesitation, contention and 
contradiction, economic desperation and political caution. I capture their constant 
adjustments and revisions as a major principle in the formation of mobile ethnicity, alongside 
actual, material changes and movements across borders.  
           Let me go back to the bus scene with which I opened my dissertation, two Korean 
Chinese women lamenting that everybody was gone with the Korean Wind. After the long 
journey of this dissertation, however, we come to realize that Yanbian, a parochial ethnic 
borderland, has not simply been vacated by leaving Korean Chinese, but is instead being 
constantly re-characterized through the reproduction of interrelations and the possibility of 
the existence of multiplicity (Massey 2005). That is to say, Yanbian is not a place rooted in 
authentic Korean identity, but an “event” (Cresswell 2004) in which diverse kinds of capital 
and ethnic populations intersect with the global economy. In the borderland in flux and 
transition, a mobile ethnicity is never gone with the Wind; rather, it is constantly on the move, 
tacking back and forth, even generating new breezes and gusts of its own. This flexibility and 
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adaptability might in the end be the only thing that is truly “one hundred percent Korean 
Chinese.”	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